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ABSTRACT
This study examines the relevance and consequences of the
use of the comparative method as a tool of interpretation
of the law of the European Convention on Human Rights and
particularly, the capacity of the "transplants" of
principles and legal thinking from one tradition to the
other to enhance the protection of rights and freedoms.
The metaphor of "transplants of laws" is proposed to
depict more clearly the complexities of transfers and
borrowings between various systems of protection.
The work is guided by the question: "Is there a European
law of human rights?" The affirmative answer is qualified
by the existence of overlapping systems and remedies which
affect ECHR construction. The comparative method is used,
therefore, to bring to light the effect of these pressures
in specific cases. The consequences of the dynamic
interpretation, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation
and the supranational judicial review of member states'
actions are also addressed. There is a limited inquiry
into the drafting of the ECHR and into the protection of
human rights in the EU system from the point of view of
the same comparative method. In addition, the effect of
the ECHR in three countries (with civilian, common law and
"mixed" legal systems) is studied.
It is the conclusion of this work that the strain produced
by a multiplicity of systems on interpretation is turned \
to positive protective use with the help of the
comparative method and this, in turn, improves the
protection of the individuals. Further reliance on the
method can assist the European organs in the refinement of
their interpretative tools. As a result, a more
harmonised protection of human rights emerges which is
easier to share by different legal systems, although
without becoming one single system of protection.
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Introduction
[A European Court of Human Rights]
in no way challenges the authority
of the world court, but it may well
be that the principles laid down by
the United Nations will be better
and more effectively interpreted by
courts in the more limited and
homogeneous area of regional units:
Let Europe judge Europe.1
This dissertation is an investigation into the
interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and its Protocols by the Strasbourg institutions
and the judges of the member states. Specifically, it is
concerned with the legal rules of human rights and how
they convey their meaning. It examines, therefore, legal
interpretation with a special emphasis on the comparative
analysis of the case law of the European Court in
Strasbourg and of three domestic jurisdictions, France,
Italy and the United Kingdom. A comparison of their
different approaches will be examined concentrating in the
use of the comparative method as a tool of interpretation
in the adjudication of human rights and as a means of
assessing the work being done by the European and domestic
courts. In addition, this study will examine the
prospects for harmonisation and Europeanisation of
standards of protection in the area of human rights.
These issues are mainly treated by the examination of data
resulting from inquiries into, (i) the European and
domestic case law on human rights, (ii) the existing
literature on the subject, and (Hi) the activities of
those involved in one way or another in European human
1Sir Winston S. Churchill, "Council of the European Movement. A Speech at the Salle des
Beaux Arts, Brussels, 26 February 1949", in: In The Balance. Speeches 1949 and 1950 by
Winston S. Churchill ed. Randolphs. Churchill, (1951), 28.
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rights adjudication or litigation, such as judges of the
Strasbourg Court, staff of the Council of Europe and
practitioners, by means of interviews which provide
additional first-hand information.
With regard to the layout of this introductory chapter, it
opens with a statement of the topic of the dissertation,
followed by a discussion of the vocabulary and the domain
of study and its subjects. There follows a list of the
questions to be looked at and a discussion of the
methodology used to examine them. Finally, it closes with
the general structure of the dissertation, which provides
the categories necessary to organise the evidence
collected in order to enable conclusions to be drawn.
The topic of the present study
The topic of this thesis is based on the civilian and
common law influences underpinning the development of the
European Convention on Human Rights law and mechanisms,
and is focused on their effect on the interpretation of
the Convention and its Protocols at the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg and in France, Italy and the
United Kingdom, and the consequences of the evolution of
common standards in human rights law and case law for the
creation of a shared system of European public law.
The vocabulary
In this work, the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg is referred to as the "European Court" or
"Strasbourg Court" and the European Commission of Human
Rights, also with its seat in Strasbourg, as the "European
Commission." Unless stated otherwise, neither of these
two expressions (European Court and European Commission)
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refers to the two organs of the European Union system that
bear a somewhat similar designation, namely the European
Court of Justice in Luxembourg and the European Commission
in Brussels. In this study, therefore, the European Court
of Justice of the European Union will be referred to as
the "ECJ" and the "Commission of the European Union" will
be referred to as such or as the "Commission of the EU".
The European Union itself will normally be addressed by
its full name or by the acronym "EU." The expression
"European Union law" will be addressed as "EU law" in the
understanding that the expression European law covers a
much wider field than the law of the EU, i.e. it also
includes, among other things, the ECHR, its Protocols and
the human rights system discussed in this dissertation.
The acronym "A-G" after a surname stands, as is well
known, for "Advocate-General" before the ECJ. If,
however, the reference is made to the EU or its organs in
a pre-Maastricht Treaty situation, the (old) acronym "EEC"
will be preferred.
On the other hand, the expression "member state" will be
applied to the High Contracting Parties of the Council of
Europe, unless stated otherwise. Again, in order to avoid
confusion with the European Union system, those countries
which are part of that system will be collectively
designated with the phrases "EU member states", "the
member states of the EU" or as "EU countries." (Those
expressions in singular, of course, will mean that only
one member of that system is being referred to.)
In addition, as is also well known, the acronym "ECHR"
refers to the European Convention on Human Rights
(Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms), however, in this dissertation,
unless stated otherwise, it refers to the Convention
itself and its Protocols. When the expressions
"Convention law" or "law of the Convention" are used, the
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reference is to the aggregate of the ECHR, its Protocols,
the appropriate procedural rules and the European Court's
case law.
The domain of study
The purpose of this section is to put the topic and the
eventual findings in proper perspective. Among the vast
number of aspects that could be considered in a study on
human rights, this dissertation concentrates on the
civilian and common law influences on the system of the
ECHR as a whole and on legal interpretation both in
Strasbourg and in the member states. Many other important
aspects of the Convention have had to be left out, for
example, the impact of the Convention system on domestic
law and its potential to spur on legislative or policy
changes. The focus of this dissertation should therefore
be seen as only one of the many and various issues that
could be studied.
In addition, it is accepted that there might well be a gap
between whatever progress is made in the legal aspects
studied here and those violations that slip through the
net of protection - i.e., the grave problem of whether
there is actual protection of human rights on the ground.2
The sole fact of some violations not reaching the European
organs (or even the legal system of a member state for
that matter) should not be taken as an indication that
2See, inter alia, the case before the European Commission of Human Rights: France, Norway,
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands v. Turkey, 9940-9944/82, 35 D & R 143, concerning
violations of human rights in mainland Turkey. The other Turkish case concerned serious
violations committed by the Turkish armed forces in Cyprus. Although the European
Commission established the violations, the Committee of Ministers "had taken note of the
Report of the Commission as well as of the memorial of the Turkish Government and found that
events which occured in Cyprus constitute violations of the Convention" and diplomatically
urged inter-communal talks under the auspices of the Secretary-General of the United Nations
avoiding a direct decision on the breaches.
they do not exist;3 unfortunately redress simply does not
result in those instances. At any rate, unlike the
situation in other times or in other parts of the world,4
the present tendency in (Western) Europe is to conform to
the rule of law and to honour (albeit reluctantly
sometimes) Strasbourg findings; it is suggested that this
characteristic gives us room to study the legal aspects of
the system without producing too much of a one-sided and
legalistic picture. Moreover, the Council of Europe,
unlike the United Nations human rights institutions, does
not have to attempt answers to the conundrum whether human
rights standards are universal or whether they mainly
reflect Western notions of justice and individual
freedom.5 The member states of the Council of Europe,
despite the differences between their legal and political
systems, are all agreed on the fact that fundamental
freedoms "are best maintained on the one hand by an
effective political democracy and on the other by common
understanding and observance of the Human Rights upon
which they depend" because these countries "are likeminded
and have a common heritage of political traditions,
ideals, freedom and the rule of law."6 Admittedly, the
language of the Preamble to the ECHR may be a touch
3Conversely, the poor record of Italy and the United Kingdom in Strasbourg should not lead us
to jump to the conclusion that human rights are completely disregarded in those countries. The
issue is more subtle, as Frangoise Hampson put it very well regarding the United Kingdom:
"Whilst the United Kingdom is not guilty of the gross and systematic violations of human rights
found in so many states, that is hardly relevant. It has agreed to be judged by Western
European standards." Frangoise Hampson, "The United Kingdom Before the European Court
of Human Rights", (1989) 9 YEL 121, 173.
4See, for example, Antonio Cassese, Human Rights in a Changing World. (1990), 121, where
he addresses the problem of violations of human rights in the world. Among other case studies,
he urges us to draw lessons from the failures in Argentina in protecting human rights against
violations in the period mid-1970s to the 1980s in the context of a fight against terrorism: "A
brief consideration of what happened in Argentina may throw some light on this complex of
problems; it may perhaps also provide lessons for the future (lessons that will obviously apply
only to the extent to which we succeed in being guided by rational choices and not by
emotional impulses and pressures)."
5"Human rights were born in the West, they bear the hallmark of Western culture and express
Western concepts" although their enjoyment should not be limited to western people nor are
the exclusive creation of Europeans, argued M. Badinter, the "General Rapporteur" at the
Colloquy on "The Universality of human rights in a pluralistic world", Strasbourg, 17-19 April
1989, Final Report, Document H (89) 3, page 3.
6Preamble to the ECHR.
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grandiose, however, in the world at large, differences
between the countries are much more pronounced than in
(Western) Europe, especially since "the primacy of the
individual is not accepted universally."7 As the United
Nations Secretary-General observed, there is still much to
be desired as regards protection and for example, the
discussions at international conferences or, we should add
in our case, a debate on legal interpretation, should not
distract us from seeing the difficulties in the
safeguarding of freedoms and liberties:
At the World Conference on Human Rights, which will
open in Vienna on Monday [June 14, 1993], member
states of the United Nations will convene with
governmental and non-governmental organizations and
human rights activists. As this gathering takes
place, we must not lose sight of the people who are
its purpose: the writer who fears the state, the
mother who sees her sons' and daughters' lives and
prospects frustrated by bureaucrats, the villager who
knows that a beating - or worse - lies in store for
him. 8
Not only could many other examples be added, but a glance
at the press and other sources will inform us of actual
and potential violations of human rights even in some of
the member states of the Council of Europe.9 Nonetheless,
a "realist" description of human rights protection also
fails to cover all sides of the issue. For one thing, as
it has been written on inferring causal relationships
between human rights and economic growth, no single social
accounting scheme is unquestionably effective for the
measurement of human rights protection, "Existing measures
7Stanley H. Naismith, The International Protection of Fundamental Human Rights: An
Examination of the Role and Effectiveness of International Law in the Elimination of Torture.
Ph.D dissertation, University of Glasgow, (1988), page 1 of the conclusion.
8Butros Butros Ghali, "Democracy, Development and Human Rights for All", IHT, June 10,
1993.
9Regarding human rights protection "on the ground", in addition to the cases mentioned
above, the failure of Turkey to meet European standards played a part in the negative answer of
the EC Commission to that country's 1987 application for European Community membership. It
was indicated, among other reasons, that its treatment of prisoners, workers, citizens and
minorities (such as the Kurds) were not on a par with accepted EC standards. See: David
Buchan, Europe: The Strange Superpower. (1993), 119.
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are not only highly suspect in terms of their reliability,
validity, and equivalence, but were designed to fulfill a
different purpose: very gross comparisons of states'
repressiveness ..."10
Whatever the case, the power of the law to improve the
protection should not be underestimated in the "more
homogenous" European context. This dissertation therefore
proceeds in the conviction that the availability of a
legal benchmark in Europe, the ECHR system, against which
national practices can be measured (and then, if
necessary, modified) in a context of further control over
state action is of substantial importance for the respect
for and protection of human rights. Notwithstanding the
above, it should not be forgotten that human rights
judgments at a supranational court (or at any court for
that matter) are shaped by many elements, therefore, their
outcome cannot be completely explained in terms of legal
interpretation alone nor a study of interpretation would
allow us, for example, to predict the outcomes.
The objective of this study
This dissertation is a study of the relationship between
the Western legal traditions, the interpretation of human
rights law and the legal systems of the member states, and
the control of state action by supranational organs
leading to an improved human rights protection. The
research seeks to find and identify difficulties in
interpretation that may bring about an unsatisfactory
protection of human rights when several legal orders come
in contact. The adopted approach will enable us to place
the topic of protection of human rights within a wider
framework of public law that is becoming increasingly
10Russel Lawrence Barsh, "Measuring Human Rights: Problems of Methodology and
Purpose", (1993) 15 HRQ 87, 121.
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European in the sense that the Convention system is
striving to establish an ordre public europeen.11 The
topic may give clues to discover trends on the future of
public law in Europe - which might be used to remedy
shortcomings - and would contribute to the understanding
of some aspects of litigation at a supranational level.
The methodology, on the other hand, points to the
usefulness of comparative law as both a tool of
interpretation in the European Court and a means to
perform this investigation.
The research will also bring together sources from a
variety of jurisdictions. It will use a vocabulary
(transplants of laws, "incoming tides", infiltration and
so on) in an attempt to produce a mental image to help in
the understanding of the complex relationship between the
European and the domestic legal systems of a supranational
organisation which are pulled by the pressures towards
further Europeanisation and uniformity on the one hand and
the respect for diversity and national differences on the
other. In addition, the choice of France, Italy and the
United Kingdom, as the domestic jurisdictions to be
studied has been made on the basis of a comparative
approach because of the connections of these countries
with the two Western European legal families. Likewise,
the inclusion of Scotland as a mixed law jurisdiction (of
the two legal families) adds another dimension to this
work.
Admittedly, the judicial function of the Court of Human
Rights (and other courts addressed in this study) can be
analysed from the different perspectives of a lawyer (and
thus, focusing on processes or legal rules and their
interpretation), a political or social scientist or a
historian. This dissertation concentrates on questions of
11A. Z. Drzemczewski, European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law: A Comparative
Study. (1988), 19.
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legal interpretation of Convention law. Other aspects
will be mentioned only in parentheses if they give insight
to the topic.
The questions asked in this dissertation
The questions in this dissertation were prompted by a
series of observations on human rights legal
interpretation which were required to venture an answer to
the question in the title: Is there a European law of
human rights? A series of provisional and necessarily
incomplete explanations will be put to the test. The
reasoning began with the perception that despite the
presence of the high-profile Strasbourg mechanism, there
was considerable diversity in the interpretation and
application of the ECHR throughout the member states, to
the extent that a straightforward answer to the question
could not be easily provided. Rather, it prompted another
question: Are there several systems of European human
rights law or just one? The law applied to human rights
cases in Europe is interpreted in the midst of a tension
between the diversity among the member states and the
magnetism of the archetype of one single European system
of protection, which are two strong forces pulling the
process of decision making in opposite directions.
The observation that legal interpretation and the
assumptions and tendencies vary from one legal system to
another suggests the need for a comparative examination to
study the pull of diversity. A weakness of the Strasbourg
system was readily observed: the system was cast in the
mould of a traditional international organisation estab¬
lished between sovereign states. Not surprisingly, it had
no device to stop the member states from invoking the
defence of the reason of state or derogating from their
obligations. Another weakness which will be studied is
- 9 -
the weak control over future cases as result of handling
its own case law as jurisprudence constante, as is the
case in civilian jurisdictions.
The allure of one single European law of human rights is
another force to be reckoned with. The question is
whether the (hypothetical) arrival at such a single system
of protection would mark a success for this organisation.
The decision to vest individuals with the right of direct
access to an international machinery put the European
governments under important obligations and determined a
degree of erosion of their sovereignty as the European
organs became involved in the "mighty problem" of judicial
review of member states' actions. The
"countermajoritarian" dilemma of judicial review will be
addressed. Moreover, the open-ended rules of the ECHR
require a great deal of (actualising) interpretation and
the incorporation of goals such as the due respect for the
dignity of the human person that the European guarantee
was created to uphold. A study of the margin of
appreciation afforded to the respondent governments in
relation to the "European consensus" and the surveys of
the state of the law in different member states will be
provided.12 The breadth of the margin of discretion
appears to depend on factors such as the nature of the
right and its restrictions, the type of issue of the case
and the obligations assumed by the member state concerned.
Sometimes it is wide enough to let the member states act
independently, but on other occasions the European organs
12R. St. J. MacDonald, "The Margin of Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of the European Court
of Human Rights" in: Andrew Clapham and Frank Emmert (eds.) Collected Courses of the
Academy of European Law. 1990 Vol. I-2, (1992), 95. On the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation, see also: Walter J. Ganshof van der Meersch "Le caractere "autonome" des
termes et la "marge d'appreciation" des gouvernements dans ('interpretation de la Convention
europeenne des Droits de I'Homme" in Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension:
Studies in honour of Gerard J. Wiarda. F. Matscher and H. Petzold (ed.), (1988) and Thomas A.
O'Donnell, 'The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the Jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights", (1982) 4(4) HRQ 474.
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seem to keep interpretation firmly on the path towards
further uniformity.
The environment of many kinds of legal systems where
interpretation takes place adds to the complexity of the
situation and suggests the question whether a minimum of
uniformity in legal interpretation is required to achieve
a consistent protection of human rights. Comparative law
can be used as a tool of study and of interpretation
therefore it will play a double role in this dissertation.
Despite the approximation that has been taking place
between the legal systems, those still differ in some fun¬
damental aspects, and as a consequence, it is possible to
use their differentiating traits in the search for the
influences of the legal traditions on the system of the
Convention.
Another issue to be looked at is the situation of the ECHR
in the selected member states. Do their judges (perhaps
spurred on by litigants and their lawyers) look to
Strasbourg for interpretative guidance? It may be
necessary to resort to a double methodology of statutory
interpretation in those jurisdictions that routinely carry
out a restrictive interpretation of domestic statutes,
such as the common law jurisdictions, in order to avoid a
dilution of the protection.
The system of the Council of Europe is one of the various
systems of protection of human rights that exist in
Europe,13 and it overlays its human rights law
13ln addition, all the member states of the Council of Europe, with the exception of Switzerland,
are members of the human rights system of the United Nations, which is based on the operation
of the United Nations Charter in the hands of a political organ, the Human Rights Commission.
This Commission has pursued the setting of standards, the drafting of instruments, such as the
Universal Declaration of 1948 and the International Covenants of 1966, subsequently adopted
by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Besides, other organisms and instruments are
also in operation, such as the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights which created
the Human Rights Committee. Another example is the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights that is supervised by the Economic and Social Council of the United
Nations (ECOSOC) which established a Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
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interpretations on others furnished by the systems already
in place. The assorted legal systems of the member states
and also the EU play their different parts in this
protection. The question of interpretation in all of
these systems is relevant because the application of the
ECHR does not rest entirely on what could be accomplished
in Strasbourg. The functions of the Strasbourg
interpretation, as with the work of its organs, are rather
of a supplementary nature. In this (restricted) sense it
may be possible to use the term "subsidiarity."14 National
courts appear to be crucial to enforce civil rights, and
make both the law givers and the administration comply
with them. Strasbourg offers the possibility of a
different (although not necessarily "better") balance of
the interests at stake in a case. At the bottom of this
is the paradox of international human rights in general:
states are at the same time the perpetrators of the viola¬
tions and on the other hand, the authors and addressees of
international norms on how to treat people within their
own jurisdiction.15 International (or supranational)
organisations can only provide a remedy after states have
had a chance to put matters right.16
This organ has promoted human rights through various mechanisms of protection, and
examined, reported and publicly criticised some flagrant violations. Other systems of protection
under the auspices of the United Nations include that established under the Committee on
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), the Committee against Torture (CAT), and also, the
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). In addition, a number
of Conventions and Recommendations have been sponsored by the International Labour
Organisation (ILO) and the UNESCO (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organisation). See, for example: Asbjorn Eide, International Protection of Human Rights.
Publications and Documents Division of the Council of Europe, (1989), 29 and 30.
14On the other hand, in European Union law and very simply put, "subsidiarity" means that
decisions should be taken at the lowest appropriate level: the EU would take action only if and in
so far as a proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the EU member states and could
be better achieved by the EU. "Subsidiarity" applied to the system of the ECHR is therefore a
different form, meaning "secondary" or "ancillary" with regard to the protection of rights and
freedoms offered by the member states.
15Jack Donnelly, "International human rights: a regime analysis", (1986) 40 International
Organization 599, 616.
16See Article 26 ECHR: "The Commission may only deal with the matter after all the domestic
remedies have been exhausted (...)."
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In addition, the persistence of the Strasbourg system
suggests that it offers, or may be in a position to offer,
a benefit to the people of Europe in protecting their
rights and holding their governments accountable. This
trend underlines the need for the judiciary and the
lawyers of the member states to understand and use both
domestic and European law.
The methodology
The difficulties presented by the subject involve, as
Mireille Delmas-Marty wrote, "penser et ordonner le
multiple sans pour autant le reduire a 1'unite ou
1'abandonner a la dispersion."17 Her idea will guide this
work.
The anticipated methodology involves studying the
adjudication process of the European Court and the
practices of the other Strasbourg organs (if relevant)
through an investigation into the case law, examining
legal interpretation in order to determine whether there
is one system or are several systems of protection, what
their mutual relationships are and what effect they have
on the substantive law of the ECHR and how the protection
of human rights fares in such a contrasting environment.
The study of primary sources involves the scrutiny of
Strasbourg18 and domestic case law with a particular point
17Mireille Delmas-Marty, Le flou du droit. (1986), 12.
18The Strasbourg Court case law can be found in the EHRR (European Human Rights Reports),
Series A (European Court of Human Rights, Judgments and Decisions), Series B (European
Court of Human Rights, Pleadings, Oral Arguments and Documents), YECHR and in other
reports. With regard to the Commission, its case law can be obtained from D&R (European
Commission on Human Rights, Decisions and Reports), in the Collection of Decisions of the
European Commission on Human Rights, as well as in EHRR and other accounts. The Digest of
Strasbourg Case-law relating to the European Convention on Human Rights includes
references to European Court judgments; reports, opinions and decisions on admissibility of
the European Commission and resolutions of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of
Europe (under Articles 32 and 54). It contains extracts (from all those sources, published and
unpublished), arranged according to the articles of the ECHR and its Protocols. It is periodically
updated. Besides, the CEDH (Centre d'etudes des droits de I'homme), a specialised section of
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of view, that is, looking for the encounter of the legal
traditions and their effect on interpretation. The
comparative approach adopted in this dissertation will be
discussed in Chapter 2 and further developed in Chapter 7.
Added to that, there is an apparent paradox in the picture
that first comes out of a listing of the case books as it
may make us wonder whether it is not obvious at this point
already that there is one European "common law" of human
rights, created by the European Court of Human Rights,
shared by all the member states of the Council of Europe
and which is more or less contained in all of these
primary sources. But even these sources alone disclose
that this is an extremely simplified depiction. The
closer we look at the case law, the more clearly its
complexities stand out and a simple answer becomes more
and more elusive. This understanding is reinforced by how
the ECHR is applied (or not) in domestic law. The
scrutiny of the texts of the relevant cases will proceed,
therefore, by looking at the appropriate domestic case law
of the United Kingdom, France and Italy. Although the
investigation will discuss the position of the ECHR in
relation to municipal law, the main concern will be to
establish the ability of the ECHR to influence domestic
legal interpretation. In addition, there will also be a
study of the underlying reasoning in the case law of
Strasbourg and a very brief inquiry into the discussions
that led to the creation of the Council of Europe and
particularly, the debates in the run-up to the ECHR.19
the Library of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg, keeps a comprehensive catalogue on
published material on European human rights organised according to the articles of the ECHR
and its Protocols.
19The "Collected Edition of the "Travaux Preparatoires" of the European Convention on
Human Rights" is a bilingual (English/French) publication and is a reproduction of those debates
in chronological order. The indexes are found at the end of each volume and refer only to that
volume, most often in the form of references to the individual speakers without mention of the
articles of the ECHR in its final shape.
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For an analysis of interpretation that might answer our
main question, a review of the human rights cases will be
performed in the light of the comparative method and the
findings will be discussed with help from the evidence
provided by secondary references. Further data on
interpretation as influenced by the legal traditions in
Strasbourg and in domestic law and the characteristics of
domestic interpretation will be gathered from
supplementary sources (many of these sources are
publications, official documentation, and so on) and the
transcripts of some interviews.20 With regard to the
latter, and despite similarities in the questions asked,
these were not part of a set inquiry designed to be used
in, say, statistical survey research. Most of the
interviewees were asked open-ended questions on the
complexities of their work, and since each had a different
area of speciality, the queries became more focused by the
end of each interview and, indirectly, in successive
interviews made with their colleagues. The questions
concentrated on what they did and observed, since they
were the people directly involved in the processes.21 The
goal was to complete some of the information already
obtained from other sources, to have a more complete
picture of the actual work performed at Strasbourg, and to
see (if possible) some tendencies into the future.
20The interviews were conducted in a study visit to Strasbourg in September 1992, and also, in
London, The Hague, Leiden and Paris on other occasions in 1992 and 1993. The
practitioners, judges and officials interviewed in those opportunities requested their identities
be kept off the record, however. The information, rather than being quoted and attributed, was
used to derive insights to help the research performed on other sources. The technique
proved valuable to see the other sources under a different light.
21Each interview was conducted relying on a memorised tentative order of topics and subtopics
to cover, which concentrated on, but was not limited to, the interviewee's opinions from the
bench or his or her particular position in or before the machinery, on the encounter of the civilian
and common law traditions in the cases heard at Strasbourg in terms of the interpretation of the
substantive law and in the way cases were handled procedurally. The questions usually moved
on to the point where the interviewee was asked whether he or she thought that the work of the
Strasbourg organs amounted to the hatching of a European law of human rights, and if so,
whether it synthesised the civilian and common law traditions of the member states in some
measure. In general, a "teach-me approach" was followed for the reason that "if the interviewee
believes he can teach you something, he is more likely to reveal more about the intricacies of his
activities." (Aaron Wildavsky, Craftwavs: On the Organization of Scholarly Work. (1989), 69.)
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Finally, the vocabulary to be used could be considered as
part of the methodology for the reason that the metaphors
such as transplants of legislation, imports and exports of
laws, impact of legislation, autochthony, home-grown
legislation, tensions, and so on are resorted to in order
to help us understand some of the intricacies of this
complex area of the law. The subject is developed in
Chapter 2.
The structure of the dissertation
This dissertation is mainly a study of the interpretation
of the law of the ECHR in a complex environment of
multiple legal systems. The structure will guide the
reader through the different aspects of attempting an
answer as to whether there is a European law of human
rights. If the answer is in the affirmative, then other
questions follow, such as where the European law of human
rights is and whether it is interstitial law, with a
multiplicity of systems overlapping and taking care of
human rights protection in different ways or, on the
contrary, whether a single body of law has been developed.
The focus on the Strasbourg system provides us with a
perspective from which to see the legal hold of the ECHR
in different jurisdictions and place the issue of the
protection of human rights within a framework of an
increasingly Europeanised public law. Europeanised means
internationalised in this context, because individuals do
not stand alone against their governments any longer as
they can resort to a supranational forum which can place
limits on the power of the governments.
The dissertation is divided into five parts. It opens
with the section entitled "The framework of the analysis"
which is subdivided into two chapters. Both of them deal
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with background and methodological questions. The present
chapter is followed by Chapter Two, which will address the
metaphor of "transplants of laws" coined several years ago
to explain situations in which laws were "borrowed" from a
legal system and "incorporated" into another. The purpose
is to attempt to make it easier to picture in the mind's
eye the complexities and intricacies of the operation and
interactions of the overlapping systems of protection. It
will be argued that the coming into contact of various
legal systems constitutes an extremely important aspect of
interpretation in Convention law and thus, explain the
need of comparative law as a tool of interpretation. The
experience of mixed jurisdictions such as Scotland22 will
help us define the method of study. The reader will be
reminded that this dissertation is not concerned with a
study of impact of laws, and a section of the chapter will
(concisely) consider this issue.
Part Two is termed "The interpretation of the ECHR by the
domestic courts" and will insist on the importance of the
protection in domestic law first. Chapter Three will
analyse these issues, and will take up the question of the
domestic status of the Convention in France, Italy and the
United Kingdom. The courts of the member states are
largely responsible for the observance and enforcement of
human rights law within their national jurisdictions. The
Convention's law and case law will be pictured as imported
law entering the domestic jurisdictions and producing
various legal effects. The ECHR, however, does not cover
an area of the law completely denuded of domestic
provisions. The contracting states were no legal tabulae
rasae when they signed up for the ECHR. The attitudes of
national courts vary considerably from country to country.
22 Relevant works, among others, are the following: T. B. Smith, Studies Critical and
Comparative. (1962), particularly the chapter: "The Common Law Cuckoo: Problems of 'Mixed'
Legal Systems with Special Reference to Restrictive Interpretations in the Scots Law of
Obligations", 89, and Liana Fiol Matta, "Civil Law and Common Law in the Legal Method of
Puerto Rico", (1992) 40 AJCL 783.
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Part Three, entitled "Decision-making and interpretation
in Strasbourg" will unfold the discussion over the
interpretation of Convention law in Strasbourg. Chapter
Four will conduct a limited inquiry into the circumstances
leading to the drafting of the ECHR to look into the
tensions between the diversity of national legal systems
that came into contact and the aspiration to set down in
writing some universal principles applicable throughout
Europe. The presence of political factors will also be
acknowledged. Chapters Five to Ten will change the focus
and offer a comparative re-examination of the means of
interpretation used in the adjudication of human rights
cases by a supranational court.
Chapters Five and Six will weigh the textual, contextual
and teleological interpretation of the ECHR at Strasbourg.
Specifically, they will look at the interpretation process
and discuss the significance of an actualising
interpretation vis-a-vis the open-ended articles of the
ECHR. The inquiry will also highlight the form and layout
of the decisions in order to set up the background for the
comparative analysis of Chapters Seven to Ten. The study
will therefore feature a comparative analysis of the
jurisprudence of the Court, defining with further
precision the comparative law method and providing
examples of the encounter of the traditions and its ef¬
fects on interpretation and the final outcome of the
cases. Although it will be recognised that several
factors come into play at the moment of determining the
outcome, it will be argued that a reasonable
interpretation of the law of the Convention, which is
placed at the cross-roads of legal orders, can be reached
by reliance on a comparative technique in addition to a
"dynamic" and "actualising" interpretation "in the light
of present day conditions." It will also be recognised,
particularly in Chapter Seven, that the Strasbourg system
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draws on the legal concepts and principles of national
legal orders. The idea of a tension between diversity and
uniformity in Convention law will pervade the discussion.
More specifically, it will be argued that a paradox lies
in this tension, on account of the failure that a complete
success in establishing a single system of human rights
might bring about. Heterogeneity is needed as a source of
inspiration in Convention law, and the comparative method
is a way to put diversity to use.
Part Four is entitled "The EU and human rights." It
contains one chapter. Chapter Eleven, which will look
briefly at the interpretation of the ECHR under EU law.
Comparable to the system of the EU, the Strasbourg
mechanism is an international system that puts in contact
the domestic systems of the member states and a
supranational organisation. The similarities with the EU
range from some aspects of the procedure before the Court
to the import and export of laws, to the harmonisation of
laws and so on. The harmonisation carried out by the ECJ
has to face the dilemma of choosing between an ever
growing uniformity and a space for each member state's own
public policies. The differences between the systems and
the point that the protection of human rights in the EU
system is completely subordinate to the existence of an EU
right will also be addressed.
Finally, Part Five closes the dissertation asking again
the question "The European law of human rights, one system
or several?" in order sum up the findings and spell out
the conclusions in Chapter Twelve. The system of the ECHR
will appear as unfolding its potential to achieve
harmonisation of the legal systems of different countries
and the tension between the aspiration to uniformity,
which is implied in the question of the title of this
dissertation, and the acknowledgement of diversity, which
is accepted in its subtitle, will be referred to once
again by trying to show that interpretation of European
human rights law is made in an contrasting environment
permeated by legal diversity.
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Even where the population is much
like that of Britain, a
transplanted British institution
will probably grow in a different
manner because the soil is
different22
To the mass of Americans resident
in the island [of Puerto Rico] -
and this is particularly true of
the lawyers - the entire system of
law and government, of domestic and
public institutions, was bad simply
because it was different from our
own ... The only way to make
Americans of the Porto Ricans, it
was argued, was to give them,
without delay, the system of law of
one of our States.24
Introduction
This chapter is a theoretical discussion concerned with
applying the metaphor of "transplants of laws" (coined
several years ago to explain situations in which laws were
"borrowed" from a legal system and "incorporated" into
another) to the relationship between the Human Rights
system of the Council of Europe, the member states and
also, the protection of human rights in the system of the
EU. A definition of the expression "legal transplants"
will be provided and then the terminology used in the
23Sir Ivor Jennings, The approach to self-government. (1956), 33.
24Manuel Rodriguez Ramos, "Interaction of Civil Law and Anglo-American Law in the Legal
Method in Puerto Rico" (1948) 23 TLR1, 18, quoting from Leo Stanton Rowe, The United
States and Porto Rico. (1904), 14.
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literature and this dissertation will be briefly
discussed. Later, the relationship between laws and
"soils" will be addressed, especially as regards the
dominant role of the national legal systems in the
protection of human rights in comparison with the
secondary role of the law of the ECHR. In addition, the
issue whether harmonisation can co-exist with diversity
will be addressed. Finally, the issue whether estimates
of Convention compliance by the member states are taken
into consideration by the European Court in the decision¬
making process will be addressed.
"Legal transplants"
Before we consider the interpretation of the transplanted
law of the ECHR in operation in domestic law, in
Strasbourg and in the system of the EU, a definition of
the metaphor of "transplants" in use is in order. The
metaphor is a way of thinking abstractly adopted by some
writers. Stated at a very high level of generality, an
act of legal transplantation can be defined as the
"borrowing" of laws or case law from another system for
their transference to a host legal order. It is
comparable to the action of uprooting a plant from the
ground where it grows in order to plant it in another
place, or the act of transferring tissues or organs to
implant them in another part of the same or another human
or animal body. If the transplanted law does not fit in
its new "environment", the situation is compared to a
"rejection" as the recipient body refuses to accept the
transplanted tissue or organ. Finally, if the law is not
(outrightly) "rejected" but its operation is modified by
the recipient body of law and case law, the comparison is
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with a biological transplant that turns out differently.25
Likewise, a European law of human rights is imported into
the member states' legal systems, but unlike those
biological examples the "transplant" can take place
without uprooting the borrowed law from its "home" legal
system. There might also be rejections and differences in
the way it "grows."
Terminology of "legal transplants"
A brief review of the literature reveals that there is
some connection between the terms used and the reach or
size of the sort of "transplant" they address. They
provide an assorted list of terms, which coupled with the
dissimilar causes that may prompt a "transplantation of
law" (not the least of them political), the various ways
in which it can take place and the different agents
involved, helps explain the presence of ambiguities in the
terminology. The ambiguity is no reason, though, not to
resort to them as long as a clarification of their scope
is provided. The terms range from the weak words
"influence" or "infiltration", which suggest a limited
penetration of foreign law, to the strong noun "reception"
capable of conveying the idea of a massive invasion, such
as the Reception of Roman law in Europe. In other
languages, for example French, there is also a hierarchy
in the terminology which extends from the weak noun
influence, to the strong terms penetration or reception.
Similarly, the German language is no exception to this
rule and the terms range from the weak EinfluB (influence)
to the strong expressions Rezeption des romischen Rechts
(reception or adoption of the Roman law), or Aufnahme des
Fremdsrechts (reception of foreign law), and in those
2 5 It is difficult to separate the notion of "rejection" from the fact that it may take a long time for
a law to turn a "law in the books" into "law in actual operation". Alan Watson, "Legal
Transplants and Law Reform", (1976) 92 LQR 79, 83.
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cases where the transplantation of the foreign law has
been substantial, the verb eindringen (to enter, to
invade, to intrude, to penetrate) appears suitably
graphic.26
In this dissertation the metaphor of (biological)
"transplants" is mixed with the figure of an "incoming
tide". The idea of a "tide" is another way of
conceptualisation, but the mix between the two has not
been whimsical. Rewording Roland Bieber's way of putting
the relationship between the EU legal order and the member
states, the terms "incoming tide" refer both to a
relationship between legal systems and to their mobility.27
The metaphor of a "tide", of course, is borrowed from Lord
Denning in H. P. Bulmer v. J. Bollinger SA,28 where he
applied it to the penetration of European Community law in
English law, as follows: "But when we come to matters with
a European element, the Treaty is like an incoming tide.
It flows into the estuaries and up the rivers." The
boundaries between the law of the Convention and municipal
law are in constant change. As "water", it can "spill"
its principles over existing law29 and its standards can
"soak" even those areas which did not appear directly
affected by the Convention when it was signed. In fact,
Lord President Hope pointed out that the ECHR has expanded
its role and covered more "terrain" than that contemplated
at the moment of ratification, as the
26Jean Gaudemet, "Les transferts de droit", (1976) L'Annee Sociologique 27.
27Roland Bieber, "On the Mutual Completion of Overlapping Legal Systems: The Case of
the European Communities and the National Legal Orders", (1988) 13 EL Rev. 147, 147.
28[1974] 1 Ch. 401, 418.
29Rudolf B. Schlesinger et al. pointed out that the rights of the ECHR can exercise a
"radiation" effect on private law relationships and have been cited in courts in disputes
between individuals (e.g. whether a particular contractual provision violates public order).
See: Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Hans W. Baade, Mirjan R. Damaska and Peter Herzog,
Comparative Law: Cases - Text - Materials. (1988), 729/30, footnotes 8a, 8b and 9. Also, this
issue (named "Drittwirkung" in German constitutional law) has been addressed by Andrew
Clapham in: The privatization of European Human Rights (1993) and by E. A. Alkema, "The
third-party applicability or "Drittwirkung" of the European Conventin on Human Rights", in: F.
Matscher and H. Petzold (eds.) Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension:
Studies in honour of Gerard J. Wiarda. (1988), 33.
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decisions of the European Court of Human Rights have
developed a jurisprudence on the subject which some
believe was not in the minds of the signatories when
they ratified the Convention. This has taken the
Convention beyond simple statements about rights and
freedoms which have universal appeal, to a large
number of detailed rulings whose effect on the
legislation and administrative practices of ratifying
states is being felt increasingly as years go by.30
Various works on transplants of laws are rather dated,
however. Some of the questions they ask, namely those
concerning the need to devise criteria of
"transplantability" of laws and institutions, methods to
"acclimatise" the grafted law, or the warnings against the
indiscriminate use of transplants are of less relevance
for this dissertation (although it may be advisable for
those attempting law reform to bear those considerations
in mind) .31 For our purposes, however, one of the
metaphors to be retained is the one concerning whether a
"transplant" was modified by the new environment where it
"took root" and apparently was not "rejected". Sophie
Boyron provides us with a more modern example of a
(probable) "rejection" of a legal transplant: the
principle of proportionality may not work in English law
as it does in France, to the extent that a "repudiation"
could ensue:
Such concepts cannot be viewed in isolation, but are
integrally related to the whole theoretical framework
which exists within a particular legal system. If the
proposed 'transplant' does not take into account the
framework into which it is integrated, the graft could
be rejected or could lead to endless problems. It is
the view held by eminent comparative lawyers that one
should proceed in such cases with the utmost caution:
'the line which separates the use of the comparative
method in lawmaking from its misuse' is very fine. To
avoid those dangers, some cautionary notes must be
heeded: one must take into account certain factors
30The Rt. Honourable Lord Hope, "From Maastricht to the Saltmarket" a lecture delivered
before the Society of Solicitors in the Supreme Courts of Scotland, on November 6, 1992,
15.
31Otto Kahn-Freund, "On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law", (1974) 37 MLR 1, 6.
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when hoping to use comparative law in this way; one
must also try to avoid generalizations on foreign
systems and make use of the case law on a systematic
basis.32
Part of the comparative law inquiry to be undertaken in
Chapters 7 to 10 tries to avoid generalisations and makes
use of the Strasbourg case law as a microcosm where
standards of different origins work themselves out in the
creation of a "European" answer to human rights issues,
prompted by the application of the ECHR "top-down" so as
to measure the behaviour of the member states. As a
result, the system infiltrates "new or "alien" legal
conceptions with which a given national legal system may
have to come to terms."33 No member state was legal tabula
rasa as regards civil liberties, therefore it explains the
interest of the comparatist in the outcomes of various
legal systems coming together before supranational organs
and the importance of the comparative method in the
process of decision making.
Transplantation of standards of protection
In general, legal transplants into another system can
involve different combinations of statutes, rules,
principles, case law or even the systematics that organise
a legal order. The expression "transplants of laws" used
here consists in, on the one hand, a transfer by
Strasbourg to the member states of the different rules and
clusters of rules that are made up principally of the
substantive law laid out in the ECHR and its Protocols and
also, the Court's case law. The latter conveys the
Strasbourg standards of protection as well as the Court's
32Sophie Boyron, "Proportionality in English Administrative Law: A Faulty Translation?",
(1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 237, 238.
33Thomas Buergenthal, "Interaction of National Law and Modern International Agreements:
Some Introductory Observations", (1970) 18 AJCL233, 234. See also the questions
asked in: Kahn-Freund, "On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law", (1974) 37 MLR 1, 6.
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autonomous concepts. Obviously, the particular
combination of ingredients actually transplanted differs
from one country to another.
In addition, there is the aspect to this transplantation,
which is the transmission of rules principally by means of
legal principles and legal knowledge from the member
states to the Court and also the Commission. The
Strasbourg organs are themselves composed of lawyers from
different member states and different legal orders,
therefore it is plain that their experience and knowledge
supplies comparative insights but introduces pressures as
well. Given the way the law of the Convention operates,
then it is clear also that each case where Convention law
is discussed will bring into contact at least two legal
systems, and therefore, it is to be expected that the
tensions which arise have some effect on legal
interpretation.34
As an "incoming tide" of standards of protection - minimum
or maximum - expected to apply throughout the member
states, the "transplanted" ECHR can produce a measure of
harmonisation of approaches. Although the ancillary
nature of the ECHR in relation to the member states' legal
orders prevents the Strasbourg system from taking a
stronger stance on harmonisation (the first restraint on
the powers of state authorities lies in the hands of
domestic law), the infiltration of the (supranational)
Convention law sets however limits by either percolating
or trying to percolate through to the constitutional
arrangements of the member states. It provides an
essential legal substratum of rights and freedoms that can
be shared by all the member states who are all Western
European democracies. The "transplanted law" does not
implement "top down" uniformity as it does not set limits
34The encounter of the systems and traditions will be explored further in chapters 5 to 10.
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on other recognised rights by the member states.35 Even
so, one may be tempted to suggest that the activity
carried out by the European organs amounts to a
supranational judicial review, similar to that performed
by constitutional courts.
Setting aside the controversy in favour or against the
incorporation of the ECHR in domestic law - and doing this
is not to deny its importance - the Convention standards
can work their way into national law even where the ECHR
has not been incorporated. Although the particular
protections of the ECHR may not be invoked before the
domestic courts, applicants can plead them before the
European organs by availing themselves of the right of
individual petition under Article 25 ECHR.36 Experience
shows that, as soon as this right is granted, individuals
resort to the ECHR. This should not be taken to mean that
the standards of protection found in the Strasbourg system
are necessarily "better" than those of the domestic
jurisdictions, what matters is that Article 25 ECHR widens
the choice of legal tactics and strategies for the
applicants (and their lawyers) despite non-incorporation.
Sir Humphrey Waldock estimated that the relationship
between the Convention and the domestic legal orders
generated by Article 25 ECHR could be equated almost to
the relationship produced by incorporation in domestic
law:
35Dimitros J. Evrigenis, "Le role de la Convention europeenne des droits de rhomme", in:
Mauro Cappelletti (ed.), New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe. (1978), 351. In
addition, Article 60 ECHR sets down that: "Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as
limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be
ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to
which it is a Party."
36Article 25 (1) ECHR lays down that "The Commission may receive petitions addressed to
the Secretary General of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental
organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that the High
Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged has declared that it
recognises the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions. Those of the High
Contracting Parties who have made such a declaration undertake not to hinder in any way
the effective exercise of this right."
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Acceptance of the right of petition creates a link
between the Convention and the domestic law comparable
to that created by incorporation. In Common Law and
Scandinavian countries where the Convention is not
part of the domestic law, this became apparent as soon
as it began to penetrate into the minds of the legal
profession that the right of petition concerned them
in their own practice. As soon as domestic lawyers
realised that recourse to the Commission was a genuine
legal means of redress, forming part of their own
legal armoury of legal remedies, it began to assume
for them, in their own systems, the role of a true
Bill of Rights. In countries which have both
incorporated the Convention in their law and accepted
the right of petition that effect is, no doubt,
intensified.37
Where the ECHR as substantive law is absent from the
national statute books, it may infiltrate in a different
way as a (supranational) "remedy", and thus it is capable
of reversing the Latin maxim Ubi jus ibi remedium into Ubi
remedium ibi jus.38 If that is the situation, then there
is a parallel with the origins of English common law. In
the latter the Latin maxim is also reversed because,
historically, remedies pre-dated the existence of the
principles and rules governing them.39
The existence of this "infiltration" of the ECHR ("through
the back-door" or otherwise), however, does not mean the
achievement of full harmonisation of approaches across the
member states. The transplantation of Convention law is
neither uniform nor are the approximation of approaches it
promotes all-embracing. The possibilities of inconsistent
interpretations in different national systems or in
different areas within a legal system remain as will be
seen in Chapter 3. The European jurisprudence, which
aspires to guide national law in these matters, is itself
37Sir Humphrey Waldock," The Effectiveness of the System set up by the European
Convention on Human Rights", (1980) 1 HRLJ 1,11.
38Sir Humphrey Waldock, op. cit., 12.
39C. M. G. Himsworth, "Judicial Reviewde los actos administrativos en el Reino Unido", in:
Javier Barnes Vazquez (ed.) La justicia administrativa en el derecho comparado. (1993), 529
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challenged by a (wide) doctrine of the margin of
appreciation and its dependency on the context in which
the case arises, the latitude afforded to member states on
some public policy issues, the incompleteness of the
catalogue of rights and/or the absence of a system
equivalent to Article 177 EEC.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that bringing the Convention
into play repeatedly over a period of time keeps it edging
into municipal law and therefore, further recognition of
the ECHR may be indirectly achieved. In the United
Kingdom the effects of the ECHR are felt despite its
"weaker" influence as compared to the situation in other
countries where individuals can make their Convention-
based claims directly before the national courts.
Regardless of that disadvantage, according to Lord
President Hope40, the detailed Strasbourg rulings have
"implications for the courts, even if the Convention as
such remains outside our domestic law." In France also,
the ECHR gradually expanded its role in domestic law.
Despite incorporation, national judges at first were
unwilling to make references to the ECHR's articles. If
they did, it was usually without seeking illumination from
the European case law. After some time, they eventually
allowed the European jurisprudence to put them on the
right interpretative path.41
National judges appeared more inclined to keeping their
own familiar national approaches to rights and freedoms,
while legal practitioners, for obvious reasons, were less
conservative towards pleading the ECHR as another remedy
40The Rt. Honourable Lord Hope, op. cit., 15.
41F. E. Dowrick, "Juristic Activity of the Council of Europe - 25th Year", (1974) 23 ICLQ
610, 627. France signed the basic ECHR in 1950, but it took them almost a quarter of a
century to ratify it. Dowrick points out that the French reluctance to ratify can be attributed in
the 1950s to the Algerian war, in the 1960s to De Gaulle's nationalism. There was a petition
to France in the Vienna Conference of 1971 to ratify the ECHR, and in 1973 President
Pompidou indicated French readiness to carry out ratification, which did not take place until
1974 when it passed the internal law ratifying the ECHR and several Protocols (see footnote
concerning this in Chapter 3 of this dissertation).
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available to their clients.42 Apparently judges, unlike
lawyers, were in general terms more inclined to stop and
consider carefully whether the ECHR or the Strasbourg case
law were binding on them, and if so, in what measure. In
colonial Africa, conversely, even post-Reception colonial
courts continued to cite English case law and relied on
English text-books for guidance43 with an almost submissive
attitude to those elements "alien" to their legal systems.
Even if legal practitioners in Europe appear more enthused
towards citing the ECHR than the national judiciary, the
lack of widespread access to the required materials may
still be a hurdle for furthering the use of the Convention
in domestic litigation. For example, as far as the
situation in the United Kingdom and Ireland are concerned,
Mary Robinson wrote that she was in no doubt of the
existence of such difficulty:
I am acutely aware of the lack of access for
solicitors and barristers in Ireland and the United
Kingdom. There are, of course, a few who specialise
in this area and who have the knowledge of where to
find the relevant materials. However, it is vital
for the balanced development of human rights
litigation that the legal profession in general in
member countries should feel competent to advise on
the issues, and to plead a case before the Commission
and Court if so required.44
This diagnosis is seemingly shared by Lord President Hope.
He took it a step further, though, as he pointed out that
the lack of access to the necessary materials on the part
of the lawyers has repercussions on the judges' work, who
do not have the appropriate Convention case law cited to
42Concerning France, Judge Pettiti, pointed out that it was the lawyers who saw in the ECHR
a sort of universal panacea, , "L'invocation de la convention europeenne devant les
jurisdictions nationales", in: Mady Schaffer (ed.), L'Avocat et I'Europe des 12 et des 21. La
Defense des droits de I'honnme. L'intearation communautaire perspectives 1992. (1988),
109 .
43A. N. Allott, 'The Authority of English Decisions in Colonial Courts", (1957) 1 Journal of
African Law 23, 23.
44 Mary Robinson, in: Mady Schaffer (ed.), op. cit., 82.
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them, to the extent that the situation becomes a vicious
circle. As a result, the ECHR is prevented from
percolating into domestic case law.
(...) access to the relevant case law and other
working materials on these subjects [both EU and
Convention law] is extremely difficult for the
judges, as it is indeed for most practitioners. This
is in marked contrast to the ease with which research
can be conducted into our own statutes and case law.
On these subjects therefore the judges are especially
dependent upon the researches of counsel. This is
true both north and south of the border - it is not,
I must emphasise, a peculiarly Scottish problem. I
have heard it said that English judges are reluctant
to explore the significance of the developing
jurisdiction under the Convention and that, this
being well known, it has its effect on counsel who do
not wish to spend days researching into a topic on
which the judge is likely to cut them short. As a
result the judges have not had the jurisprudence
cited to them, and it has not found its way into
their judgments.45
Moreover, many legal and non-legal elements intermingle
with any legal implantation and may facilitate it or not.
It has been said that, "As soon as human rights leave the
lofty realms of academic debate and come down to earth,
they become incorporated in women and men dependent on
different States and political systems, with different
life-styles, cultures, production techniques and also
religious beliefs."46 In the eighteenth century
Montesquieu drew up a highly impressionistic list of non
legal factors which affect the operation of the law in
general, which was intended to support his thesis that the
laws of one country do not readily fit into the legal
system of another.47 Today, he would have probably placed
little faith in a supranational system such as the
Convention because its existence seemingly contradicts his
arguments that laws must relate to various physical and
45The Rt. Honourable Lord Hope, op. cit., 17.
4 6 Final Report of the Colloquy on "The Universality of human rights in a pluralistic world"
47Kahn-Freund, op. cit., 7.
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political aspects of a country. Climate, topography,
location and size of the territory and also, the degree of
liberty, way of life, religion, inclinations, wealth,
number and activities of the population, all have a
bearing on the law. Laws are also related to one another,
to their origin, to the purpose of the legislator, and to
the order of things on which they are established,
Montesquieu wrote.48
Some of the elements in such an intuitive list may be
among those that introduce the pull of diversity to the
process of interpretation of human rights law nowadays.
The constant tension between diversity and unity in human
rights protection is not altogether alien to many of the
factors that determine the "spirit" of the law, in
addition to many others that Montesquieu left out of his
list or which did not exist more than two centuries ago.
Many writers in the twentieth century have also thought
that only in the most exceptional cases could the
institutions of one country be used somewhere else,
although such assertion is a qualified one in view of the
interconnection of world society (put by the sociologist
Wilbert E. Moore in the 1960s as "the world is a singular
system"49) which can facilitate transplants.50 A similar
line of thinking led Robert Seidman51 to question the value
48Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, translated and edited by Cohler, Anne M et. al. p. 8
and 9. Montesquieu analyses the operation of the law in their relation to various
environmental factors, as follows: "On the laws in their relation to the nature of the climate"
(Book 14, Part 3); "On the laws in their relation with the principles forming the general spirit,
the mores, and the manners of a nation" (Book 19); "On the laws in their relation to
commerce, considered in its nature and its distinctions" (Book 20); "On the laws in their
relation to the use of money" (Book 22); "On the laws in their relation to the number of
inhabitants" (Book 23) and "On the laws in their relation to the religion established in each
country, examined in respect to its practices and within itself (Book 24).
49Wilbert E. Moore, "Global Sociology: the World as a Singular System" (1966) 71 American
Journal of Sociology 475.
50Kahn-Freund, op. cit., 8 and 9.
51Robert B. Seidman, The State. Law and Development. (1978), 30. To stress the absurdity
of those Transplants", and especially the fact that laws are apparently still being mechanically
copied from the former metropolis, he quotes on page 34 two examples: the first concerns
Lesotho, who borrowed the highway traffic act of South Africa and as a consequence lorries
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of the transference of English law to Commonwealth Africa,
and he proposed the "Law of Non-Transferability of Laws"
which affirms that legal transplants fail to induce
behaviour in their new home similar to that induced in
their original site. This "law" has a few corollaries,
such as laws are addressed to an addressee prescribing a
behaviour, however, how an addressee will respond depends
not only of the rules but also, of a complex of other
factors. Custom, geography, history, technology and other
local conditions, although not a function of the law, were
different in Africa from those in England52 and therefore
the law "grew" differently.53 British lawyers imposed the
law they knew and consequently believed to be "good"54 (and
which probably "worked well" for the Colonial power) but,
unsurprisingly, English law by itself could not foster
behaviour in English-speaking Africa similar to what it
encouraged in England. We may conclude as well that the
physical and institutional environments of the different
member states of the Council of Europe differ from country
to country and from time to time, and that they explain in
part the different "growth" of the ECHR in the various
jurisdictions.
Political systems are much like legal systems from the
point of view of their prospects of functioning properly
after being transplanted to a new environment. T.
Koopmans argued that numerous factors will inevitably
affect the operation of a political system when
transplanted to another country; he could have made the
above a set weight were banned from their roads, however, the country did not have a
weigh-bridge; the second example points out that the penal laws of English speaking Africa
contained an eighteenth century English provision forbidding wandering about at night with
intent to commit a offence with one's face blackened.
52 Robert B. Seidman, op. cit., 31 and 35. It seems that a strict adherence to analytical
positivism prevented British colonial service men from understanding this fact.
53Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray , "Adaptation of Imported Law in Africa", (1960) 4 Journal of
African Law 66, 69. Also, the English law transplanted to (or borrowed in) Africa was as a
rule the law in force in England on a specific date, although it seems to have been open to
doubt whether decisions of English courts made after that (arbitrary) date were binding on
African courts.
54Robert B. Seidman, op. cit., 33.
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same case as regards a legal system, for the reason that
local conditions may affect the "transplant" to the extent
that it will operate differently or worse, fail to "work"
at all:
In some political systems, like the British system,
legal considerations are less important in the end
because guarantees against abuse of power by the
rulers consist of political rather than legal
remedies. In Britain the role of the opposition and
of the back-benchers in Parliament, the prospect of
general elections, and the fear of ferocious press
reactions do more to keep rulers within bounds than
the existence of the bar and bench together. The same
system shows its weakness, however, when transferred
to a different soil. That system did not, for
example, work in the same way when it was applied in
Northern Ireland, and it was a conspicuous failure
when transplanted to Africa. In countries like
Nigeria, Ghana, and South Africa, the system did not
work because the political guarantees proved
ineffective.55
As in the situations of transplants and borrowing of laws,
the domestic legal and political systems, each one with
their own traditions and institutions, together with a
host of extra-legal factors present in the new "soil" have
a bearing on the interpretation and application of law.
An often quoted example of the failure of formal changes
to modify behaviour is that the grafting of the Swiss
Civil Code onto Turkish family law by Attaturk's reforms
did not transform Turkey into another Switzerland.56
Coming back to the situation of the ECHR in municipal law,
it should not surprise us that the British debate on the
ECHR, for example, is coloured by national perceptions of
what a judge should or should not be adjudicating on,57 and
understandably, the controversy itself may seem odd enough
to a continental observer used to a very different
organisation and role of the judiciary in society.
55T. Koopmans, "Understanding Political Systems: A Comment on Methods of Comparative
Research", (1986) 17 Ga.J.lnt'l & Comp. L. 261,268.
56June Starr and Jonathan Pool, "The Impact of Legal Revolution in Rural Turkey", (1984) 8
Law and Society Review 533, 553.
57J. A. G. Griffith, The Politics of the Judiciary. (1989) 3rd ed. reprinted, 85 and 235.
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On laws and different "soils"
The differences between countries did not stop transplants
of laws from taking place, however. Legal borrowing has
been extensive in history and legal ideas were transported
to very different geographical, political, social and
economic conditions, and thus the major ingredients of
Western legal systems have been borrowed from elsewhere,
and only Roman law was apparently an exception.58
There are examples of transplants which became applicable
law despite the lack of connection with a particular
society. Arguably, a legal order is fairly independent ^
from the society where it operates as law exists as
something distinct from other institutions, operating
autonomously and in its own sphere. The Reception of
Roman Law in Europe shows that a shared "ius commune"
could co-exist with diverse (local) legal systems and that
legal rules may be transplanted even though the relevant
local circumstances of the donor and recipient countries
are at variance. The Germanic tribes in Europe made use
of Roman law rules and in the Middle ages there was a
massive adoption of Roman rules in many dissimilar
European states, be they monarchies, oligarchies or
republics. Those people importing the Roman rules into
the legal order of their countries were only interested in
the rules and not in the context surrounding the operation
of the law in Roman times.59 Professor Watson has pointed
out that at the time of the Reception of Roman law in
Europe, the sources available to those who introduced it
or to the law professors who taught it did not disclose
the operation of those rules in practice. Not
surprisingly, then, the Scottish law students who learned
58Alan Watson. The Nature of Law. (1977),100.
59A!an Watson, The Nature of Law, op. cit., 105.
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Roman law in the Netherlands in the seventeenth century
brought it back home with no knowledge of its effect in
society. These observations do not exclude that some
"imports" of laws may have been made because they were
thought to have worked well, over a period of time, in
their countries of origin. The point is therefore, that
generally speaking, it is not necessary for legislators or
law reformers who are searching out for ideas to have any
systematic knowledge of the law or the political structure
of the prospective donor.
Moreover, some writers suggested that the position towards
which the ECHR is heading to in Europe as regards the
protection of human rights is part of a process in which a
new shared law in Europe is being created. Different
local conditions do not necessarily rule out the viability
of a supranational legal order ("ius commune") which can
therefore co-exist alongside various national legal orders
{"ius proprium") . 60
On the creation of a European shared law, T. Koopmans
wrote that,
... I submit that a new ius commune for Europe is
taking shape before our eyes. We see it, but we are
not completely aware of it. And that is so because
our minds seem to have different compartments, and
our languages different concepts, for what is in
reality one and the same process. We see it in terms
of Community law, or of human rights protection, or
of general principles of law, or of comparative
methods - and each of these branches has its own
specialists. We could, however, also see the same
evolution in a completely different perspective, by
taking the common legal heritage of Europe as our
point of departure and by then combining those
aspects of legal evolution which are making common
60Michel De Salvia, "L'elaboration d'un "ius commune" des droits de I'homme et des liberies
fondamentales dans la perspective de I'unite europeenne: I'oeuvre accomplie par la
Commission et la Cour europeennes des droits de I'homme", in: F. Matscher and H. Petzold,
Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension: Studies in Honour of Gerard Wiarda.
(1988), 556.
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what used to be separate. In that sense, we may be
witnessing the birth of a new ius commune.61
History gives us other (very different) examples where the
law did not grow out of the "common consciousness" of the
people of a particular country (paraphrasing the
expression of the nineteenth century German jurist von
Savigny)62 but which was nevertheless applied to them as
sort of ius commune. After the Treaty of Union between
England and Scotland many Scots left for several British
colonies where they had to live under transplanted English
law.63 And so did thousands of Germans, Italians, Jews,
Poles, Scandinavians and many others who, as a consequence
of emigration to America in flight from lack of
opportunity, persecution or hunger in their native Europe
(and elsewhere), lost their connection with their legal
systems, but could organise their lives under the common
law of their country of adoption, which having been
transplanted from England, was the product of other people
and culture.
The two-way and on-going "European" variety of
transplants
The European law of human rights is compared in this
dissertation to an "incoming tide" being poured out by the
Strasbourg Court and coming into the member states (in a
process of "top-down transplantation"), but part of that
61T. Koopmans, "Towards a New "lus Commune"", in: Bruno de Witte and Caroline Forder
(eds.), The common law of Europe and the future of legal education. (1992), 49.
62F. P. Walton, "The Historical School of Jurisprudence and Transplantation of Law", (1927)
9 Journal of Comparative Legislation (3rd. series) 183, 183-4.
63T.B. Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative. (1962), 91. This writer, interested in the
issue of the expansion of the common law at the expense of the civil law, asked an
interesting rhetorical question: "Had even these alone been permitted to take with them to
their new homes the essentials of their municipal law - which knew no dichotomy of law and
equity; which was unfettered by forms of action; and which was largely based on Roman law
and on theories of jurisprudence accepted by other colonising nations of Western Europe-
who could be certain that the Common Law would have prevailed in North America?".
- 38 -
tidal flow is, however, law which the Strasbourg organs
took from the legal systems of the member states. For
example, the European Court and also the Commission
perform a comparative survey and draw principles from
domestic law which are incorporated into the decision
making process as the "European consensus" on a legal
institution in the laws of the member states (part of the
"bottom-up" process of infiltration of a shared law). As
said, there is also the borrowing of principles for
decision making which are taken from the member states'
legal systems by Strasbourg. Among them, there is the
principles of "proportionality", the "accesibility and
previsibility of the law", the "balance of convenience" of
the interests involved, and so on. In general, there are
no explicit references made as regards the particular
domestic legal order from which a specific contribution
was taken, nevertheless, this inspiration albeit indirect
is unequivocal.64 The point is that Convention law is
therefore the result of a two-way transplantation.
Marc-Andre Eissen wrote that "For the reason indicated a
moment ago [that is, the development of the "autonomous
concepts"] and also thanks to, of course, a deeper
specialisation, the organs of the Convention, the Court in
the first place, "export" more than what they "import"."65
The main exports of the European Court to the
constitutional orders of the member states are its
autonomous concepts developed in its case law, for
example: "criminal charge"66; "mental patient"67;
"conviction"68; "determination of his civil rights and
64Marc-Andre Eissen, "L'interaction des jurisprudences constitutionnelles nationales et de
la jurisprudence de la Cour europeenne des Droits de I'homme", in: Dominique Rousseau
and Frederic Sudre, Conseil Constitutionnel et Cour europeenne des Droits de I'homme:
Droits et Liberies en Europe. (1990), 140-141.
65Marc-Andre Eissen, op. cit.,146.
66Art. 6 (1) ECHR.
6 'Art. 5 (1 e) ECHR.
68Art. 5 (1 a) and Art. 7 ECHR.
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obligations"69; "correspondence"70; "detention"71; "deprived
of his liberty"72; "law"73; "witness"74; "vagrant"75 and
many others. The Court strives to give them a "European"
meaning (as opposed to the meaning they may have in a
particular jurisdiction). The arguments of Montesquieu
and several other writers as regards the influence of
local conditions on transplants are somewhat to the point
again because many of these notions have different
meanings in the member states,76 however, the practice of
the Court of giving them an "autonomous" meaning may
enhance their "transplantability" as their meanings are
independent of those in national law.
In Colonial Africa, conversely, the transplantation of
English law tended to proceed one-way. Although there
were "flows" within Africa itself and between India and
Africa, the main tendency was, however, that of
"exporting" laws from the metropolis to the colonies. The
two operations involved in the process were, first,
borrowing English law to supplement and modify African
law, and second, adapting the imported law to Africa.77
The member states of the Council of Europe, unlike their
(former) colonies participate more actively in the
different aspects of the creation of European human rights
law. Within the Council of Europe, of course, the
relationship between a metropolis and a colony is absent;
all the member states are able to participate on an equal
footing to shape the law that is, in turn, transplanted
back into their own systems. Further, we should not
69Art. 6 (1) ECHR.
70Art. 8 ECHR.
71Art. 4 (3 a) ECHR.
72Art.5 ECHR.
73Arts. 2 (1) and (2 c), Arts. 5 (1 b) and (3), Art. 6 (1), Art. 8 (2), Art. 9 (2), Art. 10 (2), Art. 11
(2); and Art. 12 ECHR, and also, Art. 1 Protocol 1 and Art. 2 (3) Protocol 4, "judge or other of¬
ficer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" Art. 5 (3) ECHR.
74Art. 6(3 d) ECHR.
75Art. 5 (1 e) ECHR.
76Marc-Andre Eissen, op. cit., 142.
77Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, op. cit., 76-7.
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picture in our minds that this two-way relationship
between Strasbourg and the member states is strictly
limited to an exchange with the countries presently within
the Council of Europe. It can be speculated that the same
kind of transfer will quite probably take place when more
and more Eastern European countries come into the fold of
the Council of Europe and its human rights system.78 If
the Council of Europe's79 main task in the recovery of
Eastern Europe is to give advice on the mechanics of
constitutional government and the protection of human
rights then, it makes sense for the system to be receptive
to the experiences and legal traditions of the new
members, for one thing, it will facilitate
transplantation.
Both situations are also to be contrasted for other
reasons. The relative size of the "transplants" involved
is different. Despite the fact that in both cases the
imported law has been introduced to a varying extent and
by various means, Convention law certainly does not
constitute the major part of the law applicable in each
member state. Further, its area of coverage is restricted
to civil liberties and not even to all of them and its
role is secondary to the available authochthonous
legislation and case law on human rights.
With regard to other aspects, however, the situations are
comparable. First, the notion of two competing forces,
the "unity" provided by the transplant (a law shared by
metropolis and colony)80 versus the "diversity" of local
78Judge Pettiti anticipates that in the near future the new members will extend the Europe of
the Council almost to the Ural Mountains. See: Louis E. Pettiti, "La Commission et la Cour
europeenne des droits de I'homme", in: Mario Bettati, Fritz W. Hondius, Jean Michaud, Louis
Pettiti, Joel Rideau, Jacques Robert and Frederic Sudre, Les droits de I'homme et la
nouvelle architecture de I'Europe. (1991), 20-21.
79"Securing Europe's peace", in Europe: The Revolution of 1989-92. a collection of articles
first published in The Economist between November 1991 and February 1992.
80Admittedly, it is possible to "borrow" work from law commissions which therefore would
have never been applicable law anywhere or the "transplant" could end up being so
modified that it becomes a piece of legislation entirely different, and so on.
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conditions which explain the differences between the
different "growth": the transplant turned out differently
in the colonies and could not induce behaviour similar to
that generated in the metropolis. The interpretation of
the "transplanted" law of the Convention suffers from the
tensions between similar tendencies under a different
guise. One is the pull of diversity. It concerns the
effect of the various different local conditions obtaining
in the member states and the existence of many legal
systems that protect human rights in Europe. In addition
to national law and the "transplanted" Convention, in some
of the member states there is the system of the EU which
concerns itself with human rights on questions of EU law,
and more generally, there is the international law of the
United Nations and a host of international treaties signed
by the member states. Taken to an extreme, the various
systems and the variety of local conditions work against
the harmonisation of human rights protection. The other
force is the pull towards a single system of human rights
protection in Europe. As a result, the construction of
human rights law stands at an interpretative cross-roads:
it has to attempt to integrate the particular approaches
of a variety of legal systems but guided by a tendency
towards uniformity. There are pressures between "top-
down" European standards and "infiltrations" of "bottom-
up" national singularities, between tendencies to one and
to several European systems. Those issues will be
discussed in the ensuing chapters, which will look, for
example, at the effect of local conditions (which can per¬
colate to the Strasbourg decision making process) on the
process of interpretation, as in Tyrer v. the United
Kingdom.81 In that case, the European Court refused to
respect the singularities of the Isle of Man concerning
corporal punishment of young offenders, despite its
81(1979-1980) 2 EHRR 1.
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allegedly long tradition on that island.82 The
dissertation will also try to show that domestic law
cannot really put up barriers to roll back the tide of
Convention law. Some cases appear to support this view,
particularly those where the Convention is grafted onto a
local institution that cannot measure up to the European
requirements and as a result, the local institution has to
give way to the European standards. For example, the fair
trial requirements of Article 6 ECHR are at odds with some
aspects of the Ministere Public of civilian countries; or
a long detention on remand, possible in some member
states, is not consistent with the terms of Article 5
ECHR.83 On the other hand, local conditions introduce
changes in the interpretation of the "foreign" law, which
account for differences in the final outcomes of the cases
or in their implementation, such as for example, in a
series of cases concerning transsexuals, the comparative
problem for the Court is how to apply its standards to the
essentially different administrative legal systems of
France and England while at the same time treating them
equally and avoiding contradiction in its own
jurisprudence. Dwelling for a moment on the many-sided
nature of the subject, on the one hand, as it has already
been said, the boundaries between the systems of
protection are being constantly re-defined, while on the
other, the experience of transplants in other epochs or
lands suggests that transplanted laws need time to "take
root". Setting aside whether a "transplant" achieved
complete success or not (for this is so difficult to
measure) the completion of the Reception of Roman law in
Europe took a considerable length of time. Although the
82The Independent, March 6, 1993, "Isle of Man says it will abolish 'brutal' birching": "An
appeal to the European Court of Human Rights in 1979 resulted in the birch being
condemned as a "cruel and unusual punishment". The island was advised to remove it from
the statutes, but failed to do so. A young Scottish holiday-maker who smashed a pint glass
into another teenager's face on a ferry to Douglas in 1981 was sentenced to four strokes.
His lawyers had this reduced to a fine on appeal, quoting the European ruling. No such
sentence has been handed down since."
83More on this in Chapter 9.
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rhythm of change and development is quicker now than then,
it is suggested that Convention law has achieved a degree
of success as regards harmonisation in some areas of human
rights law, and in addition, it seems reasonable to expect
harmonised approaches in other areas in the future.
The coming into contact of the legal systems: the
relationship between the comparative method and
"transplants". Will comparatists ever be made
redundant ?
The study of transplants carries with it another useful
notion for this work: the "transplants" and "tides" taking
place in the law of the Convention bring together various
legal systems, and therefore, explain the need for the
comparative method to attempt an answer to the question
"Is there a European law of Human Rights?". This study
aims chiefly at analyising the tensions between the
civilian and common law elements present in the
interpretation of Convention law, how they are enunciated,
how they finish up in the encounter with one another and
how they eventually influence outcomes.
Mario Chiti asserted that although there are still
important differences between national legal systems for
the time being, those may disappear some day in the future
due to the pressures of European Community law. He put it
this way:
As this administrative law [in the system of the EU],
common to all the member states, and elaborated or
advanced by the Community, becomes more extensive and
pervasive, the task of the comparatist whose interest
lies in evaluating the characteristics peculiar to
each national system, will as the differences in time
become fewer, be diminished.84
84Mario Chiti, "Administrative Comparative Law", (1992) 4 European Review of Public Law
11, 25.
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If that speculation is true it means that the differences
between the systems, families or legal traditions will be
done away with at some point in the future and one of the
consequences, put tongue-in-cheek, may be that
comparatists will lose their jobs. The experiences of
transplants, including the massive reception of Roman law
(a "ius commune") suggest otherwise, because even when the
reception was "completed" the European "ius commune" so
created did not supersede local laws.85 It is suggested,
therefore, that the situation as regards Convention law
will not necessarily be different. Most likely, diversity
will not disappear and comparatists will always be able to
set side by side the different legal systems and find
meaningful points of contrast and similarity between them
in spite of the various incoming tides of European law
(including, of course, EU law) taking place over the
years.
In the nineteenth century, as the codification in
continental Europe cut national systems off the European
common or shared law, the first studies of comparative law
came into being but most of them stressed the differences
between the systems.86 Today, the European systems of
integration, and their "incoming tides" of European law
operate in the opposite direction by breaking the
isolation of national law. The differences between the
systems are still active, however, and they affect
interpretation. A comparative study is therefore
appropriate to see the operation and effect of the
differences between systems and families.
85T. Koopmans, "Towards a new "ius commune"" in: Bruno de Witte and Caroline Forder
(eds.), The common law of Europe and the future of legal education. (1992), 43.
86Gino Gorla and Luigi Moccia, "A "Revisiting" of the Comparison between "Continental
Law" and "English Law" (16th-19th Century)", (1981) 2 Journal of Legal History 143, and
Luigi Moccia, "English attitudes to the 'Civil Law"", (1981) 2 Journal of Legal History 157.
Also relevant for this stage is H. C.Gutteridge, Comparative Law: An Introduction to the
Comparative Method of Legal Study & Research. (1974).
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The European Court is situated at the top of a
multiplicity of legal systems and comparative techniques
are resorted to as a matter of course in the process of
passing judgment, especially as a tool of construction.
To begin with, the Court looks for a "European consensus"
on a certain area of the law, which is a result of a
comparative survey of the laws of the member states. In
addition, comparative techniques are used to make sense of
the cases in the context of the legal systems in which
they have been argued. Finally, the Court also seeks
inspiration and borrows "principles" from the legal orders
of the member states.
In general, the comparative method rests on the assumption
that the civilian and common law legal systems still
differ, and for that reason, established distinctions
between them can provide useful criteria of
differentiation. In a sense mirroring the comparative
activities of the European Court, the comparative method
will be used in this dissertation as a tool of study. The
method will let us detect whether, and if so when, those
different legal systems and traditions mould the judicial
process and the jurisprudence. It has to be stressed,
however, that those factors operate in conjunction with
others, so although they impress upon the results of the
cases they do not altogether determine them. Each case
will be analysed as a microcosm of the pressures between
legal systems in the framework of a confrontation between
unity and diversity as regards systems of protection.
A comparative test based on differentiating factors will
be applied to individual European Court decisions so as to
find, make visible and gauge the relative importance of
the common law and civilian elements present in the
interpretation of Convention law. The criteria for the
analysis are sets of questions derived from the approaches
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of the legal traditions to a series of issues.87 Those
concern the nature of law and its role in society, the
organisation of the legal system and the judicial
function, and the sources of law and legal method, as well
as matters of style and the use of legal materials.
Further, the aspects touch upon differences in the legal
methodology, in the relative importance of the different
institutions within the system, in the method of
reasoning, in the hierarchy of sources, even in the very
idea of law. The particular aspects to study will be
classified as follows: the general structure of the legal
system of the respondent member state, the procedural law,
the rules of evidence, and finally, the classification and
rules of what is private and public law.88 These well-
defined particularisations are intended to overcome the
disadvantages of a nineteenth century approach consisting
in running sweeping parallels and contrasts.89 The method
will focus the comparative research on the operation of
the law in the case law and as a result, it will highlight
the "pull" of the legal traditions in each case.
The analysis to be carried out in this dissertation,
although mainly based on the study of the jurisprudence,
is not altogether limited to it. For example, the method
will be applied to the Strabourg procedure. For that
purpose, the following questions will be asked: whether
the procedure consists of "stages", whether it tends
towards an inquisitorial approach, whether it is
"contradictoire", and finally, whether it favours written
over oral exchanges. The analysis is intended to help us
87 Particularly relevant for the formulation of the comparative method in this dissertation are: Liana Fiol
Matta, "Civil Law and Common Law in the Legal Method of Puerto Rico", (1992) 40 AJCL 783, Peter H.
Russell, The Supreme Court of Canada as a Bilingual and Bicultural Institution (Documents of the Roval
Commission on Bilinaualism and Biculturalisml 1969, and T. B. Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative
(1962), particularly the chapter: "The Common Law Cuckoo: Problems of 'Mixed' Legal Systems with
Special Reference to Restrictive Interpretations in the Scots Law of Obligations", 89.
88See: A. Watson, The Making of the Civil Law. (1981)1 and 14; also K. Zweigert and H.
Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law. (1987), 69.
89Basil Markesinis, "Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience", (1990) 53
MLR 1,2.
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understand the "spirit" of the European Court,
particularly whether it tends to a civilian or common law
model.
In addition, a jurisprudential analysis of the Court's
decisions will be carried out, and the focus of the
comparative study will be on the judgments' "style" in
order to establish whether they tend to be deductively
justified as the decisions passed in the civil law world
or whether they are tightly argued as in the common law.
There will be a study of the protection of human rights in
the EU system from the point of view of the same
comparative method.
A comparative study will also be performed on the domestic
position and uses of the ECHR by the national courts in a
common law jurisdiction (England), a "mixed" jurisdiction
(Scotland) and two civilian countries (France and Italy)
in order to see how the law of the ECHR is assimilated
within the local legal system. The way a legal system
evolves and takes in transplanted law cannot be
dissociated from its own characteristics and "this is what
makes for the usefulness of comparative study in a world
where international relations and activities are taking an
increasingly important place."90 The legal and extra-legal
factors surrounding the operation of the receiving legal
system in the member states work against the dissolving of
all their peculiarities in a single system, a reason for
preferring the term "harmonisation" instead of
"unification" when addressing the effect of the
transplanted law of the ECHR.91
Lastly, the influence of the traditions will be approached
from the point of view of another type of "transplant":
90Joseph Dainow, 'The Civil Law and the Common Law: Some Points of Comparison",
(1967) 15 AJCL 419, 435.
91 Michel De Salvia, op. cit., 556.
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this time on the people (drawn from the various member
states) who were involved in drafting the ECHR and also,
those who are now in charge of its application in
Strasbourg. The analysis is based on the assumption that
lawyers in general are bound to draw upon their own
experience and training in the particular legal system
form where they come from. The pull of the traditions
will manifest itself through their reactions to the legal
issues involved in drafting or in deciding as case may be.
The same comparative method will therefore be applied to
the work of the drafters, judges and commissionners as
observable in the travaux preparatoires, the ECHR itself
and the Strasbourg case law.
Further details concerning the comparative method are to
be provided in the chapters where it is used. Finally, it
can be conjectured that comparatists working on the law of
the Convention will not be put out of their jobs.
The "flood" in action: the transplants taking root.
Although in some cases the "incoming tide" of Convention
law entered the domestic legal systems in a limited sense,
in some others, it appears to have infiltrated all the way
down to municipal law and even to the subconscious of
lawyers and domestic judges. Infiltration can be looked
at as it takes place mainly influencing the legislature or
the judiciary, that is, as prompting changes in the
statute book and in the case law. As regards changes in
the law books, a study found that:
[...] the responses of the countries from the various
systems of law did not differ greatly at all. The
difference was in how they responded not whether they
responded. The dissimilarities between the responses
of Scandinavia and those of the other geographic areas
was that, for the most part, Sweden was more open in
stating that the change in national legislation was
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due directly to a ruling regarding the Convention or
the Convention itself.92
Let us consider briefly a few examples of statutory
changes prompted by the law of the Convention. Although
the examples of the European Court taking notice of
changes in domestic law point to the significance of a
wider survey of the effects of the penetration of the
Convention (let alone the issue of the legitimacy of the
Strasbourg system asking the member states to change their
laws), unfortunately that survey exceeds the scope of this
dissertation. This section, therefore, is restricted to
provide a few indications in that area, in the hope that
these will give an idea of this other aspect of the
effects of the "incoming tide".
The several consequences of this "incoming tide" on the
legal systems span from the incorporation of the
substantive law of the ECHR in municipal law or the
enforcement of the judgments of the Court to the citation
of European precedents in domestic cases, to those more
remote consequences, such as the citation of European
literature or even the knowledge of European law on the
part of legal practitioners and judges. Added to that,
the Convention law puts further pressure on the domestic
legal systems by requiring governments to legislate and
their courts to develop appropriate methods of
interpretation to protect human rights.93 The armtwisting
Strasbourg is capable of may vary according to
jurisdiction.
Strasbourg enjoys survey and control capabilities which
are restricted at best. Under Article 54 ECHR the
92Jody Rose Piatt, The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms: Its Influence on national legislation and administrative practices of its member-
states. Ph.D dissertation, The American University, (1992),154.
93Tom Campbell, "Introduction: Realizing Human Rights", in Tom Campbell, David Goldberg,
Sheila McLean and Tom Mullen (eds.), Human Rights: From Rhetoric to Reality. (1986), 7.
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Committee of Ministers only examines prima facie whether
the state concerned adopts measures in good faith to give
effect to a judgment, but does not carry out an abstract
control of the laws. A lenient attitude towards the
governments on the part of the Committee may lead to the
same issue being successfully litigated again, as for
example, the issues of prisoners' correspondence in the
United Kingdom. After Golder v. United Kingdom94 the Rule
37-A of the Prison Rules was amended, but apparently
without removing all other defects, and such failure gave
rise to the Silver case.95 In Silver the government
appeared to play down before the Committee of Ministers
its obligations under Articles 53 and 54 ECHR but before
the Court it relied on a resolution adopted by the
Committee concerning the Golder case in order to say that
the Committee had approved the measures taken as being in
compliance with the decision of the European Court. Every
so often the governments appear to voice contradictory
views at the Court, the Committee of Ministers or the
national parliaments96 and this shows yet again the gaps
between the law in the books or the theory and the
empirical world. The case Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v. United Kingdom97 also has a claim to our
attention in this matter. The minister concerned
addressing the House of Commons, spoke of the United
Kingdom being "duty bound to make the changes required to
Veiu s paper at the Sixt
Rights.
97(1985) 7 EHRR 471
comply with the Convention as interpreted by the Court."
A Strasbourg official asked this very pertinent question
"why the inconsistencies?" then added, "I hope that the
explanation is not that the Court and national parliaments
are exposed to the glare of publicity whereas the
Committee of Ministers meets in secrecy, behind the padded
doors of the Palais de 1'Europe" and finally made the
following quite surprising statement: "I honestly think
the public would sometimes be shocked to discover the
things that are said in the secrecy of the committee."98
Whatever the case, in various suits against Italy, the
Court seemed to take into account the fact that that
country had introduced reforms in domestic law purportedly
to comply with the ECHR, as follows: "The Court stresses
that special diligence is necessary in employment
disputes, which included pensions disputes ... Italy
moreover acknowledged this by amending, in 1973, the
special procedure laid down in this field and by
introducing, in 1990, emergency measures intended to speed
up the conduct of such proceedings."99
There are other cases where the European Court kept in
view the measures taken in domestic law as regards the
implementation of Convention law. For example, in the
case Silver v. United Kingdom100, where the applicants, all
convicted prisoners, complained of the control of their
mail by prison officers and the European Court found a
breach of the ECHR. The point that interests us is that
the Court pointed out that as of December 1, 1981, the
United Kingdom had changed the directives on
correspondence. Although those changes could not be taken
into consideration because the revision of the rules took
"Sixth International Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights.. 818.
"Cases versus Italy where the quoted paragraph is used: Nibbio (28/1991/280/351) para.
18, Borgese (28/1991/281/352) para. 18, Biondi (28/1991/282/353) para. 18, Monaco
(28/1991/284/355) para. 17 and Lestini (28/1991/306/377) para. 18.
100(1983) 5 EHRR 347.
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place after the relevant events, the Court nevertheless
acknowledged them:
In general, it is not the Court's task to rule on
legislation in abstracto; indeed, at the time of the
events giving rise to this case, the new regime was
not yet in force. Its compatibility with the
Convention therefore cannot be examined by the Court.
However, the Court notes with satisfaction that,
following its Golder judgment on the one hand and as a
result of the applications in which this case
originated on the other, substantial changes have been
made by the United Kingdom with a view to ensuring
observance of the engagements undertaken by it in the
Convention.101
Not everything is so gloomy, however. The law in both the
statute and case books tells us that the Strasbourg organs
have been created, that they are in operation and that
they subject to international control the functioning of
the internal institutions of the member states.102 Unlike
the situation in Europe in the 1930s and 1940s, a
supranational recourse against (oppressive) policies on
the part of governments is now available.103
When the European Court passes judgment, Articles 32
(1),(2),(3),(4), 50, 53 and 54 ECHR, and Articles 3 and 8
of the Statute of the Council of Europe come into play.104
Although only the judgments of the Court are binding and
the decisions of the Commission are not, sometimes even
before the pronouncement of the Court105 or the
101(1983) 5 EHRR 347, para. 79.
102Polys Modinos, "Effects and Repercussions of the European Convention on Human
Rights", (1962) 11 ICLQ 1097, 1100-4
103F. E. Dowrick, op. cit., 628.
104See Vincent Berger, "Case Law of the European Court of Human Rights" Vol. I 1960-
1987, (1991) 2nd. reimpression, 409; A. H. Robertson, "Applying, and effecting compliance
with, decisions (with reference to the European Convention on Human Rights)" in Stephen
Schwebel (ed.) The effectiveness of international decisions. (1971), 346 and A. H.
Robertson, "The European Convention on Human Rights" in Evan Luard (ed.) The
International Protection of Human Rights. (1967), 123.
105As far as Scotland was concerned, it appeared that the Scottish educational authorities
were advised to abolish by July 1984 the use of the "tawse" to impart corporal punishment in
schools even before the Court had given judgment. (The Times. February 25, 1982).
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Commission,106 the mere filing of an application may
produce the desired effect.107 The decisions of the Court
are final and have the force of res judicata only in the
case which led to the actual judgment.108 The Court makes
a pronouncement on whether a violation took place, and if
so, on whether just satisfaction will be granted to the
injured party. The Court does not annul or amend any
measure taken by a member state nor does it suggest to the
member state concerned any measure or remedial action to
implement a judgment.109 Just satisfaction means monetary
compensation or perhaps only a declaration that a right
has been violated110 and in such case, the member state is
not, however, forced to quash, abrogate, withdraw or
modify the offending measure.
A breach of the ECHR could arise partly or wholly from the
law of the member state, but the corrective action the
member state can undertake does not necessarily involve
the introduction of legislative changes as other means can
be used, for an example, appropriate changes in court
practice.111 A violation could also come from the exercise
of a discretion enjoyed by a domestic authority under
municipal law, such as the Golder case and the UK Prison
Rules, or even arise out of the very existence of a law in
breach of the ECHR, for example, the Dudgeon112 case.
106In response to the extent the Commission was bound by its own previous decisions, see
Hansard, (HC) vol 974, col 256, 428. See p. 62 and 13, para 48.
107F. E. Dowrick, op. cit., 625. For instance, in the case Knechtel v United Kingdom the
applicant while in prison believed he had reason to sue the prison doctors for negligence but
was prevented from corresponding with a solicitor. In December, 1970, the Commission
declared the case admissible, the United Kingdom government made an "ex gratia" payment
to the applicant and issued instructions to prison governors to facilitate access to legal
advice.
108Article 52 ECHR.
109P. Leuprecht saw in Judges Wiarda's and Ryssdal's opinion in the Skoogstrom case a
disappointment with the majority's reluctance to let the Court "enlighten" the national
legislature with a ruling on the merits.
110Article 50 ECHR. See his comments on J. Velu's paper at the Sixth International
Colloquy about the European Convention on Human Rights.
111 J. Velu, "Responsibilities for States parties to the European Convention", Proceedings




On the other hand, a study of compliance with the European
Court rulings based on statistics may have to overcome the
difficulties concerning the differences in keeping this
kind of information in the different member states.113
Similarly, their respective bureaucracies differ, to the
extent that the experience gained by the (hypothetical)
researcher in dealing with one may not be useful somewhere
else.
It goes without saying that not all the changes in the
direction set by the ECHR are a direct consequence of the
Convention system, as different situations can be
distinguished: (1) where the ECHR (as interpreted by the
Strasbourg case law) was at the root of the change114; (2)
113Some member states have a reputation for keeping such information very poorly. For
example, as regards the economic success that took place in Italy in the late 1970s the
author Luigi Barzini pointed out with amusement that it just happened "without any public
explanation or scientific exegesis foreigners could study", and he added that "There were
no reliable statistics". See: Luigi Barzini, The Impossible Europeans. (1983), 168.
114 For example: evidence of the cases labelled as (1) concerns the directly positive effect of
the ECHR as can be seen in the list of laws that have been passed to bring domestic law in
line with the Convention, such as reforms prompted by Strasbourg findings against the state
that carries out the reform. Let us take Italy (Alessandro Bernardi and Francesco Palazzo,
"Italy" in Mireille Delmas-Marty (ed.), The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights: International Protection versus National Restrictions. (1992),196-7), where after the
Ciulla case, Parliament passed law 3.8.1988 n. 327, amending Article 6 of the 1956 law,
abolishing the special form of detention at issue in the Ciulla case; and in addition, Articles
314 and 315 of the new Code of Criminal Procedure, which came into force on October 24,
1989, confer a right to compensation for wrongful detention under certain circumstances. In
the same country, Bezicheri ((1990) 12 EHRR210) appears to have promoted changes
under Article 299 (3) of the new Italian Code of Criminal Procedure, which came into force on
October 24, 1989, requiring that the judge rule within 5 days on any application by the ac¬
cused seeking his or her release from detention on remand. In the United Kingdom, after
the Golder case, the Prison Rules 1964, in force in England and Wales, were amended and
instructions were given to prisons in Scotland and Northern Ireland. The Sunday Times case
No. 1 ((1979-80) 2 EHRR 245) promoted the new Contempt of Court Act (1981 c 49). For
further details on the United Kingdom, see: L. H. Leigh, "United Kingdom", in Mireille
Delmas-Marty (ed.), The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights:
International Protection versus National Restrictions. (1992), 273. In addition, after the Case
of Young, James and Webster ((1982) 4 EHRR 38), the ruling of the European Court of
Human Rights held that United Kingdom legislation which permitted the operation of union
closed shops breached the rights of employees to freedom of association and other political
considerations led to the substitution of the Employment Act 1980 (1980 c 42) by the
Employment Act 1982 (1982 c 46). The new provisions, however, left the rights of the
individual employee to be deduced as a consequence rather than stating his rights to
freedom of association. The doubt as to whether this legislation satisfied the requirements
of the Convention came from the "residual" approach to individual liberties in the United
Kingdom. The Dudgeon case is another example, as it prompted the Homosexual Offences
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where the ECHR played a marginal role; (3) where the ECHR
played no direct role but the domestic law evolved in such
a way that it complies with European law115; and (4) where
the ECHR' was powerless to amend the law or to prevent an
unfavourable development.116 in addition, there are
questions concerning any legislative effort which also
apply to reforms prompted by ECHR, such as whether the
reforms have sufficient breadth117; the changes are
(Northern Ireland) Order 1982, which entered into force on December 9, 1982,
"decriminalising" in Northern Ireland homosexual acts in private between consenting males
aged 21 or over, subject, however, to certain exceptions concerning mental patients,
people in the military and merchant sailors. Another example of the influence of Convention
law can be seen in the discussion of the Prisoners and Criminal Proceedings (Scotland) (Bill
HL 2 R 19 May 1992), where among other things, clause 2 introduced arrangements to
change the law in accordance with the European Court's judgment in Thynne, Wilson and
Gunnell ((1991) 13 EHRR 666) which dealt with discretionary life prisoners. These
prisoners are those sentenced for life partly as a punishment for having committed one or
more offences and partly to protect the public. The European Court established that once
the punitive grounds no longer hold, the public risk ground must be open to review by a
body having the status and constitution of a court.
11BA few examples in France, Italy and the United Kingdom will be mentioned. In France, the
judgment in Xand Y v the Netherlands ((1986) 8 EHRR 235) spurred a reform of the Criminal
Code. Article 322 of the French Criminal Code restored the equality of sexes within the
meaning of Article 14 ECHR when it admitted that author and victim of the crime of rape can
be of either sex and also, to the requirement of effective protection as laid down by the
European Court in this Dutch case. In Italy, a representative case is Law n. 98 (1974)
(protection against telephone tapping) which was passed to protect private life against illicit
interferences. Another example, is the trend towards "decriminalisation" and to offer alter¬
natives to prison under European influence, especially under the pressure of the ECHR or
the Minimum Rules of the Council of Europe. As a result, the Italian authorities carried out a
reform of the penitentiary system in 1975. (Moreover, it has been reported that the civilian
legal systems have been trying to limit the scope of criminal law, if only to reduce legal
uncertainty or deal with the excessive number of cases, decriminalising and creating
alternatives to criminal sanctions. See: Marc Robert, "Inequalities in Sentencing", Disparities
in Sentencing: causes and solutions. Collected Studies in Criminological Research volume
XXVI, European Committee on Crime Problems, Strasbourg, (1989), 56.) In the United
Kingdom, the cases Winterwerp vthe Netherlands ((1979-80) 2 EHRR 387) and Airey v
Ireland ((1979-80) 2 EHRR 305), where the applicants had contended that the right of
persons of unsound mind to be legally assisted was to be read into Article 5(4) ECHR,
determined that during the debate on the Mental Health Act (Amendment) Bill there was par¬
liamentary pressure for the addition of a clause guaranteeing legal aid and representation
before review tribunals.As regards the effects on society at large, a study of impact could
also survey, for example, the newspaper articles on the subject of the ECHR in order to issue
some conclusions as to the general awareness of the public of their rights under the
Convention system.
116Renee Koering-Joulin and Patrick Wachsman, "France" in Mireille Delmas-Marty (ed.),
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights. International Protection
versus National Restrictions. (1992),131.
117The point is, however, that laws can be challenged again on grounds that, for instance,
they do not fully implement the Convention or better yet, that what was regarded as
implementation is not viewed as such any more after some time. Ian McKellen reported in
"The Guardian", July 22, 1993, "Through a gay viewfinder" that two British male
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respected in practice; and finally, whether the
interpretation in domestic courts gives a meaning to the
reformed or new laws in accordance with the ECHR or
whether under the guise of interpretation the Courts are
eviscerating them. The difficulty with a study of law
reform prompted by the ECHR (or by the ECHR together with
other factors) is that the law may still remain "law in
the books" rather than in practice as it is not the
adoption of rules but their enforcement what matters. The
comparative method applied to the study of the
interpretation of case law, as it will be undertaken in
this dissertation, can show what happened in practice
rather than what it may be theoretically possible
according to statutory law, and therefore, provide us with
a more complete picture of the emerging shared law of
human rights in Europe and its complex interactions with
the various legal systems of the member states.
Conelusions
The metaphors contained in the theory of "transplants"
provides us with a terminology useful to think abstractly
on the (complex) relationship between the Human Rights
system of the Council of Europe, the member states and the
EU in relation to the interconnections between these
systems and their effects on interpretation. The theory,
which was developed to study other situations (such as the
Reception of Roman law or the situation in Colonial
Africa), is also helpful to acknowledge the tension
produced by the pull towards one or several systems of
human rights protection.
A feature of the theory is that it enables us to see the
complex interconnections in more manageable terms, as two-
homosexuals (respectively aged 20 and 25 at that time) were questioning the age of
consent before the European Court of Human Rights.
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way exchanges. There is the process of "top-down
transplantation" which can take place by means of
incorporation of a combination of statues (the ECHR plus
the ratified Protocols), but also, rules, principles and
case law. Non-incorporation of the Convention does not
necessarily mean that a barrier has been raised against
the tide of Convention law. In spite of non-
incorporation, as soon as the right to individual petition
is granted individuals can take their cases to Strasbourg,
and as a consequence, at least some effects of the
Convention will subsequently permeate all the way down to
domestic law in general, and even to the minds of some
legal practitioners. The overall effect is to set limits
on the powers of the state and this, in turn, tends to be
good for human rights protection. The actual combination
of elements involved in the transplantation of the
Convention is different from country to country. There is
also a the process of "bottom-up transplantation" because
the Court and the Commission borrow principles from the
member states' legal orders, carry out comparative
surveys, and the human right organs in Strasbourg are
composed of lawyers from diverse legal backgrounds.
On the other hand, from the experience of transplants in
other lands and times there are some lessons to be learned
apart from borrowing vocabulary. The first is that there
are many legal and extra-legal factors active in the
member states, such as for example those mentioned by
Montesquieu in his work "The Spirit of the Laws" and many
more, which require that harmonisation co-exist with
diversity. Those factors are the main reason why in many
cases it is impossible to avoid inconsistent
interpretations of Convention law in the different
jurisdictions, both by the domestic and the Strasbourg
organs. Besides, and taking into account the considerable
differences in size and impact, it should not be forgotten
that the "transplantation" of English law to the New
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Commonwealth did not turn Africa into England as the Swiss
Civil Code did not turn Turkey or Egypt into a Western
country.118 Therefore, the "transplantation" of Convention
law will not automatically unify all approaches to human
rights issues all over the member states of the Council of
Europe. The metaphor of "transplants of laws" will be
used for a different reason. It helps to make visible the
coming into contact of various legal systems, and
therefore, to highlight that the comparative method is
called into play precisely by this coming together of at
least two legal systems in a case. The comparative method
is needed for the construction of human rights law in the
midst of the overlapping law of the Convention and the
protections offered by national law (and other
international instruments), between "transplants" imposing
"top-down" European standards and "infiltrations" of
"bottom-up" national singularities, between tendencies to
one and to several European systems. The existence of
these various relationships shows that the interpretation
of ECHR law in a contrasting environment and that the
comparative method plays a double role in Convention law,
as a tool of interpretation and of study. As regards the
latter use, the comparative method will show how the
civilian and common law elements are enunciated in the
case law, how they finish up in the confrontation with one
another and how they eventually influence outcomes. The
comparison between the approaches of the legal systems
relies on the assumption that the civil law and the common
law still differ.
As it was said of the EU system, here too, "The European
judicial process, characterized by a symbiotic
relationship between national courts and the Court of
Justice, is a complex dialectic process - even more
intricate than that of a divided-power national judicial
118F. P. Walton, op. cit., 191.
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system such as a federation."119 The notion of a
"dialectic process" in human rights protection also runs
through this dissertation and will be discussed in the
ensuing chapters, however, one difficulty will always
persist in any analysis of Convention law, and that is the
factor of indeterminacy in a system where "transplants"
take place as "tides" and which is in constant mobility.




the European law of
human rights on
the member states
A quoi bon une Convention
europeenne des Droits de 1'Homme?
Nous sommes en democratie. A quoi
bon une Cour europeenne puisque nos
tribunaux assurent
traditionnellement le respect, la
defense des libertes publiques et
des libertes privees?120
However responsive and just
domestic law may be, there is and
will remain the need for a kind of
international long-stop. This may
be peculiarly true of Britain,
which does not afford the courts
the constitutional opportunity to
review much oficial practice.121
Introduction
The ECHR has been introduced into the member states to a
varying extent and by different means, and it is described
in this chapter as "transplanted law" in order to explain
its incursion in domestic law as "an incoming tide."122
The purpose of this chapter is to review the position and
uses of the "transplanted" ECHR in municipal law,
particularly the difficulties in its application by the
120Some European politicians in the 1950s, quoted by Judge Louis-Edmond Pettiti,
"L'invocation de la Convention europeenne devant les juridictions nationales" , in: Mady
Schaffer, L'Avocat et I'Europe des 12 et des 21. La Defense des droits de I'homme:
L'intearation communautaire perspectives 1992. (1990), 111.
121Cedric Thornberry "Why the law needs an international long-stop", The Times. November
29, 1973.
122On EU law, see: H. P. Bulmerv. J. Bollinger SA, [1974] 1 Ch. 401, 418. See also
Chapters 2 and 11 of this dissertation.
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domestic courts in three member states123 of the Council of
Europe: France, Italy and the United Kingdom (which
includes different legal orders in neither of which the
ECHR has been incorporated).
The investigation will concentrate on whether, "directly"
incorporated or not, the ECHR assists national courts in
the construction of domestic law and also, on how the
judiciary spells out the nature and validity of the ECHR.
The study is divided in two parts, as follows: (i) the
expansion of the ECHR through infiltration in domestic law
(aspects concerning the law in the books), and (ii) how it
fared in its encounters with (existing) national law as it
appeared in domestic cases where it was invoked. The
method has some similarities with studies on EU law where
a supranational law penetrates the EU countries:
First is the dimension of formal penetration, the
expansion of (1) the types of supranational legal
acts, from treaty law to secondary community law,
that take precedence over domestic law and (2) the
range of cases in which individuals may invoke
community law directly in the domestic courts.
Second is the dimension of substantive penetration,
the spilling over of community legal regulation from
the narrowly economic domain into [other] areas124
Finally, the question whether a harmonised application of
a European law of human rights throughout the member
states is attainable will be addressed. The issues
include whether the differences in the interpretation of
this transplanted law are bound to exist indefinitely and
whether it may be appropriate to conclude (from the survey
of the domestic case law) that the ECHR law and the
Strasbourg system fulfil the role of a shared European law
of human rights.
123Incidentally, these three countries, together with Germany, provide almost fifty percent of
the caseload at Strasbourg.
124Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of
Legal Integration", (1993) 47 International Organization 41, 43.
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Part I: the expansion of the ECHR through
infiltration in domestic law. Some aspects
concerning the law in the books.
(a) Constitutional provisions
The constitutional law provisions in the member states
introduce their share of the pull of diversity into the
process of the interpretation of the ECHR. The "spirit"
of constitutional law is different in each country as each
jurisdiction has its own way of handling issues of rights
and freedoms. In France, the Constitution of the Fifth
Republic (1958) stresses in its Preamble that "The French
people solemnly proclaim their attachment to the Rights of
Man and to the principles of national sovereignty as
defined in the Declaration of 1789, confirmed and extended
by the Preamble to the Constitution of 1946", and its
Article 2 states "the equality of all citizens before the
law, without distinction of origin, race or religion".
The French Constitution does not contain a list of rights
such as the Italian, but makes references to the
Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of
1789, which sets forth "in a solemn declaration, these
natural, inalienable and sacred rights of man", and to the
Preamble of the Constitution of 1946, where "the French
people proclaim once more that every human being, without
distinction of race, religion or belief, possesses
inalienable and sacred rights."125
The Italian Constitution of 1947 states in similar vein
that: "The Republic acknowledges and guarantees the
inviolable rights of man both as an individual and in the
social organisations where his personality is developed
[...]" and "All citizens have equal social rank and are
125English version from: George A . Berman, Henry deVries and Nina M. Galston French
Law: Constitution and Selective Legislation
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equal before the law without distinction." Freedoms are
listed too, some of which are the inviolability of
personal liberty and personal domicile, the right of
association, freedom of speech and the press, freedom of
religion, education, the right of all citizens who are of
age to vote, and the like.126
Conversely, the constitutional position in the United
Kingdom is in sharp contrast with the French and Italian
approaches because the United Kingdom has a constitution
composed of a scattered mixture of legislation, case law,
customs and conventions.127 In fact, England epitomises
the common law style, providing remedies and avoiding the
affirmation of rights and liberties. We should consider,
for example, the British answer to the Secretary General
of the Council of Europe who, pursuant to Article 57 ECHR,
asked the member states to indicate how their domestic law
gave effect to the provisions of the ECHR. The United
Kingdom answered in 1966 sending a list of statutes
starting with Magna Carta.128
It is well-known that the United Kingdom Parliament has
absolute theoretical power to enact or change any law at
will. Moreover, in England and Wales courts do not
recognise any higher legal order by reference to which
parliamentary legislation could be held void, although,
because of British membership in the EU, EU law either in
the form of legislation or rulings of the ECJ, is an
integral part of the domestic legal systems of the United
12 6 Part 1 of the Italian Constitution is labelled "Rights and Duties of Private Citizens" and
sets out extensively the rights and freedoms recognised in the country, using two formulas
to introduce those rights "everyone has a right to" or "the citizens have a right to".
127Colin R. Munro. Studies in Constitutional Law. (1987), 1.
12 8British Government, "Application de I'Article 57 de la Convention Europeenne des Droits
de I'Homme - Royaume-Uni - Reponse du 13 septembre 1966"^ September 13, 1966,
Council of Europe document H (66) 9, Addendum 2.
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Kingdom and has overriding power over opposing
legislation.129
(b) The position and uses of the ECHR in domestic
law
The diverse constitutional provisions, together with the
national legal order in general will necessarily affect
the position of the ECHR in municipal law, and this, in
turn, will have implications for the authority of the ECHR
in a particular legal system and on the source of this
authority. The use, i.e. the capacity of the Convention
law to alter, in the hands of domestic judges, the
interpretation and the solution that municipal law would
have offered otherwise, will depend on the position held
by the ECHR in domestic law.
The position of the ECHR is linked to the standing of
international law in municipal law. France, and also
Belgium and Holland, are monist countries, therefore, an
international treaty approved by the state and which has
entered into force on the international plane will
automatically become part of the law of the state without
any "incorporation" or "transformation". In France the
courts may take the view that an issue arising out of the
interpretation of a treaty is for the executive to clarify
and consequently, put a question of interpretation to the
executive branch of government when in doubt. Italy, as
well as Germany, requires the transformation of a treaty
by an act of Parliament if it is to have any effect in
domestic law. All subsequent effects of the treaty can
then be attributed exclusively to the domestic statute of
129Since Factortame v. Secretary of State for Transport ([1991] 1 AC 603.) injunctive relief
is also available against the Crown while a preliminary ruling from the ECJ made under Article
177 EC is awaited.
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incorporation. In the United Kingdom130, and also in
Denmark, the dualist system entails that a treaty as such
has no effect in domestic law unless there is a national
rule making provision for its incorporation.
(c) Human rights in domestic law
The Strasbourg human rights system emphasises the national
authorities' task of securing the rights laid down in the
ECHR by reviewing the acts and omissions of national
governments. In any given human rights case, national
judges are to apply municipal law in the first place - and
we should add, as well as the Convention law that has
managed to percolate through to domestic law. The
success of the national authorities in doing so depends on
whether, among other factors, the stipulations of the ECHR
can be claimed in proceedings before municipal courts, an
issue connected to the effect of international law within
the national legal order.131 This brings us to the way the
ECHR is transplanted132 into the legal systems of the
member states and how it "grows" in different "soils".
The infiltration in domestic law varies from country to
country, where different legal cultures133 determine that
130Treaties are made under the prerogative powers of the Crown and do not become perse
part of English law. A treaty that requires a charge on public funds or an alteration of English
law cannot be enacted without Parliament passing the appropriate legislation by Statute.
English courts will not apply a treaty unless there is an enabling statute. See: sir Robert
Jennings, "Human Rights and Domestic Law and Courts" in: Protecting Human Rights: The
European Dimension. Studies in honour of Gerard J. Wiarda. 296-7, and also, R. Higgins,
"United Kingdom" in: the United Kingdom National Committee of Comparative law (eds.),
The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law. 123.
131P. van Dijk and G. J. H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on
Human Rights. 14.
132This word is an image used to name the law that is not a direct creation of a national legal
system but comes to it from an international legal order.
133A comparison may be made here with the EU. Dr. Ludwig Kramer, of DGXI, EU
Commission, pointed out the difficulties that the EU faces in translating directives into
different legal systems during the examination with regard to environmental protection
legislation carried out by the Select Committee on the European Communites of the House
of Lords, on October 15, 1991. HL53-II, (1991-92),12.
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the Convention be differently absorbed, integrated, and
even perceived.134
The "top-down" transplantation encounters a host of
different legal and political systems with a particular
approach to rights and freedoms that cause the existence
of a thousand and one ways of implementing the ECHR. As
the European Court remarked in the 1976 case Swedish
Engine Drivers' Union v Sweden135 "[N]either Article 13 nor
the Convention in general lays down for the Contracting
States any given manner for ensuring within their internal
law the effective implementation of any of the provisions
of the Convention". Its effects on the internal legal
orders varies because while some states have entrenched
bills of rights, others have resorted to incorporation or
have contented themselves with the provision of remedies
and those differences affect the operation of the ECHR.
In those countries where the ECHR is part of municipal
law, the operation of self-executing136 provisions and
those which are not is necessarily different. Only those
self-executing rules can be directly invoked in court137
without the assistance of the local legal system.
Unfortunately there is no unambiguous way to tell one from
134The familiar distinction between the dualistic and monistic positions on the relationship
between international and municipal law must be recalled once again. The dualistic view
understands the international and national legal systems as two separate orders.
International law has effect within the national legal system only after it has been transformed
into national law. If the constitutional law of a state gives internal effect and priority to inter¬
national law, international law has this status by virtue of that constitutional law, not by virtue
of its own nature. On the other hand, the monistic view takes all the various legal systems of
the world as being components of a global legal system in which national authorities are
bound by international law even in their relations with individuals, regardless of the trans¬
formation of international law into national law. Individuals can directly invoke rules of
international law in national proceedings, which must be applied and given priority over
contrary municipal law. Let us remember that the monistic view is not required by interna¬
tional law at its present stage of development and that this observation applies to the
European system of human rights.
135(1979-1980) 1 EHRR617, 631.
136A self-executing treaty is one which does not require legislation or any other action by the
contracting states to make it operative internally as part of their municipal law. Whether a
treaty is self-executing or not is a question of interpretation.
137A. H. Robertson, Human Rights in National and International Law. (1968),22 - 27.
- 67 -
the other, so the distinction must rely on the wording of
the rule and the context in which it has been
transplanted. Besides, a provision can be self-executing
in one country and not in another. To begin with, the
provisions set down as an "obligation to refrain" are
operational without any further legislation. Take the
example of the provisions whereby "No one shall be
subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment"138, "No one shall be required to perform
forced or compulsory labour"139, "No one shall be deprived
of his liberty save in the following cases"140 and
"Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a
language which he understands, of the reasons for his
arrest and of any charge against him."141 These provisions
contain prescriptions which afford specific protections
that could be claimed as they stand in any member state
where the ECHR has become part of the local legal system.
In other cases, however, the terms of the ECHR per se,
without a basis in national law, are not sufficient to
afford protection. For example, the exigency that the
member states "hold free elections at reasonable intervals
by secret ballot"142 or the provisions that grant judicial
or administrative options for the individuals to challenge
decisions affecting their rights.143 To assert such rights
individuals must therefore rely on the provision by the
member states of competent authorities with jurisdiction
and appropriate procedures to channel claims. Likewise,
the clauses that authorise governments to take certain
measures which restrict rights and freedoms on condition
that they are applied "in accordance with a procedure
138Article3 ECHR.
139Article 4 (2) ECHR.
140Article 5 (1) ECHR.
141Article 5 (2) ECHR.
142Article 3 Protocol 1.
143Articles 5 (3), 5 (4) and 13 ECHR.
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prescribed by law"144 or that they are "in accordance with
the law"145 all need help from national law. Similarly,
the requirements of judicial control laid down in Articles
5 and 6 ECHR cannot establish as such the jurisdiction of
any given court. Their open-ended terms are exposed to
the influences of the local "soil": the notions of "judge"
and "court" or the manner in which judicial control is
exercised are bound to be different in the various
"soils". As a consequence, the provisions concerning the
"determination of civil rights and obligations or any
criminal charge" or, to give another example, "a fair and
public hearing"146 will perforce have different
connotations in different member states.
EU law is different in this respect.147 The relation
between the national courts and the ECJ is more direct
than with Strasbourg. The ECJ has taken the view that
directly applicable provisions in the EEC Treaties and in
the decisions of EU institutions have internal effect
regardless of the characteristics of each particular
national legal system. The rules that form the core of EU
law have priority over all provisions of national law,
even constitutional.148 No doubt the case could be made
that the EEC Treaties strong at producing a "shared" or
144Article 5 (1) ECHR.
145Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 ECHR.
146Article6 ECHR.
147The ECJ does not review the municipal law of the EU member states, and when it judges
the validity of the acts of the EU institutions it does so by reference to EU law and not to the
law of the member states. The relationships between the EU and its member states are
governed by EU law. No doubt reference to the law of the member states in those
circumstances would have a negative effect on the uniformity or efficacy of EU law. See:
Internationale Handelgesellschaft (1970) ECR 1125 and Hauer (1979) ECR 3727.
14Nonetheless, sometimes co-existence and co-operation between the EU and the
member states is not so easy. Germany's Federal Constitutional Court, before the ratification
process of the Maastricht Treaty was completed, heard complaints alleging that ratification
would breach the German Constitution. The point is, however, that the issue was raised and
addressed by the Constitutional Court. In its complex and rather long ruling in the case
Manfred Brunner and Others v. The European Union Treaty ([1994] 1 CMLR 57) the Court
rejected such claims. It stated, inter alia, that the sharing of human rights protection of
German citizens between Germany and the EU does not dilute the rights guaranteed by the
German Constitution and it also recognised that, in a relationship of co-operation with the
ECJ, both courts guarantee the constitutional protection of such rights.
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harmonised ius commune in view of their purpose of
generating legislation intended to abolish differentials
throughout the member states in their area of coverage.
In contrast, the ECHR lacks per se overriding power over
domestic legislation.
Part II: the case law on how the ECHR fares in its
encounters with national law. Domestic cases where
it was invoked in France, Italy and the United
Kingdom.
(a) France
Owing to a traditional distrust of the judiciary, based on
historical reasons, the accepted belief in France149 was
that statutes were inviolable.150 The position was based
on the French understanding of the separation of powers,
which required that the judicial system, statutorily
created, be bound by statute to give effect without
question to the laws passed by Parliament and prohibited
from applying any conflicting rule whether it be a
constitutional or treaty stipulation. There was a
"fissure" in the system, however, from which the ECHR
started to percolate through. The traditional position on
the inviolability of the laws was inconsistent with the
apparently clear constitutional provisions that gave
149France signed the Convention on November 4, 1950, but ratified it only on May 3, 1974,
when it also accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights in
accordance with Article 46 ECHR. The right of individual petition was recognised on October
2, 1981, when France made the declaration provided for in Article 25 ECHR. The ECHR was
ratified by the decree No. 74-360 of May 3, 1974 and published with the additional
Protocols # 1, 3, 4, and 5 as well as the reserves of the French Government at the time of the
ratification. After that moment, other Protocols entered into force, Protocol # 2 (Decree No.
81-917 of October 9, 1981), # 6 (Decree No. 86-282 of February 28, 1986), #7 (Decree No.
89-37 of January 24, 1989) and # 8 (Decree No. 90-245 of March 14, 1990). Protocol # 9
signed in Rome on November 5, 1990, has not entered into force yet). (From:
D. 1992.Somm. 129)
i50James Beardsley, "Constitutional Review in France", (1975) The Supreme Court Review
189, 254.
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international treaties an authority superior to domestic
statutes.
In spite of the rules of Article 55 of the Constitution,
the doctrine of the inviolability of the statutes
determined that the three supreme courts151 (the
Constitutional Council, the Court of Cassation and the
Council of State)152 did not accept at first the pre¬
eminence of international law. When they eventually did,
it was not in a single and synchronised stroke. The
uncertain state of the law lasted until the Council of
State decided the Nicolo153 case in 1989. As time passes
domestic statutes will probably keep losing further their
"sacred" character and give more way to European law in
the area of human rights,154 as the new jurisprudential
position makes plain that various areas of the law are
increasingly under the European law "flood".
According to the Constitution, a treaty or an agreement,
having received legislative approval in the form of a
statute, from the day of its publication155, possesses a
151 It may be argued that this is not an usual typology, however, in this context it means that
the three courts are the highest courts of the land in France. Each one of them is a court of
last resort within its own jurisdiction. The Court of Cassation and the Council of State are at
the top of the ordinary and administrative courts, respectively. Although the Constitutional
Council is not at the top of a hierarchy of courts, it was set up by the Constitution of 1958 to
make sure that the Constitution is respected by the other branches of government. It is a
supreme tribunal in the sense that there is no appeal against its decisions. Also relevant for
this stage are: Y. Madiot, "Du conseil constitutionnel a la convention europeenne: vers un
renforcement des liberies publiques?" D.1975.C.1, R. Merle, "La convention europeenne
des droits de I'homme et la justice penale frangaise", D.1981 .C.227, Jean Rivero, Le Conseil
constitutionnel et les liberies. (1987) and John Bell, French Constitutional Law. (1992).
152All the French courts are named in English for reasons of consistency: the English name
of the domestic courts of all the non-English-speaking countries mentioned in this
dissertation will be used whenever there is one available.
153 Roger Errera, "Recent Decisions of the French Conseil d'Etat", [1990] PL 134.
154Jean-Frangois Touchard, "A propos de I'arret Nicolo", (1990)106 Revue de Droit Public
et de la Science Politique 801, 808.
15-The French Constitution knows three categories of treaties: those subject to ratification
with legislative approval; those subject to ratification without legislative approval; and those
only requiring publication. To become applicable, an international agreement needs just
one formality, publication, even if this publication is made by an international institution.
Courts will only apply a treaty which has been "published" (as it happened to the ECHR on
May 3, 1974) because publication is the way to bring it to the attention of those affected by it.
See J. D. de la Rochere, "France", in: F. G. Jacobs and S. Roberts (eds.), United Kingdom
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hierarchically superior position over both prior and
subsequent conflicting legislation. Article 55 states
that application of the treaty is conditional upon its
reciprocal application by the other signatories.156 Under
Article 54 the President of the Republic, the Prime
Minister or the President of either House of Parliament
can refer treaties to the Constitutional Council for
determination of their constitutionality.157 Finally,
Article 53 deals with the approval by statute of various
types of treaties.158 The case law was not, however, a
reflection of these provisions.
Until it decided to change its jurisprudence, the Court
of Cassation159 followed what was called the "Matter
doctrine"160 on the inviolability of statutes so that in
the case of a conflict between a statute and a treaty,
courts were bound to apply the statute. A few months
after the Constitutional Council's decision of January 15,
National Committee of Comparative Law, The Effect of Treaties in Domestic Law, volume 7,
(1987), 42.
156The English translation of all the articles of the French Constitution of 1958 are from:
Constitutions of the World, volume V, Blaustein & Flanz ed. Oceana Publications, New York,
1988. Article 54 of the French Constitution: "Treaties or agreements duly ratified or ap¬
proved shall, upon their publication, have an authority superior to that of statutes, subject,
for each agreement or treaty, to its application by the other party."
157Article 54 of the French Constitution reads: "If the Constitutional Council, the matter
having been referred to it by the President of the Republic, by the Premier, or by the
President of one or the other assembly, shall declare that an international commitment
contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, the authorisation to ratify or approve this com¬
mitment may be given only after amendment of the Constitution." Since the constitutional
reform of October 29, 1974, a group of 60 deputies or 60 senators can submit legislation to
the Constitutional Council, as Article 61 of the French Constitution sets down that: "Organic
laws, before their promulgation, and regulations of the Parliamentary assemblies, before
they come into force, must be submitted to the Constitutional Council, which shall rule on
their constitutionality. To the same end, laws may be submitted to the Constitutional
Council, before their promulgation, by the President of the Republic, the Premier, the
President of the National Assembly, the President of the Senate or by 60 Deputies or 60
Senators."
158Article 53 of the French Constitution: "Peace treaties, commercial treaties, treaties or
agreements relative to an international organisation, those that imply a commitment for the
finances of the States, those that modify provisions of a legislative nature, those relative to
the status of persons, these that call for the cession, exchange or addition of territory may be
ratified or approved only by statute."
159The English name is used whenever there is one available, for the sake of consistency
and clarity when dealing with the domestic courts of the various member states of the
Council of Europe.
160Roger Errera, id., 135.
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1975, the Court of Cassation had to pass judgment in the
case Administration des Douanes c. Societe J. Vabre161 in
which the supremacy of EU law was disputed. The Court of
Cassation (in chambre mixte) held that Article 95 EEC took
precedence over a subsequent French statute.162 This case
purported to be a confirmation of the provisions of the
Constitution; however, it was based on the case law of the
ECJ, particularly Costa v ENEL.163 All the ensuing case
law of the court followed this new line of reasoning which
set aside the inviolability of statues as far as
international law (and, therefore, the ECHR) was
concerned. In French law:
Based on the traditional denial of judicial review of
constitutionality of (parliamentary) legislation,
French lois, once promulgated, are not subject to
court control; they are unchallengeable and supreme,
no matter whether they violate the French
constitutional texts, and, in particular, the sacred
French texts and traditions on droits de l'homme.
Since Cafes Jacques Vabre, however, this basic
prohibition can no longer bind the judges of France
to the extent that French legislation is in conflict
not with the French texts and traditions, but with a
transnational bill of rights, the European Convention
on Human Rights .164
A typical case in which the Constitutional Council
supported the traditional French position of inviolability
of statutes is a decision of January 15, 1975.165 The
internal legislation (Section 4 of the Voluntary
Termination of Pregnancy Act) was challenged as not being
in conformity with Article 2 ECHR. The Constitutional
Council refused to examine the issue on grounds that the
alleged failures of the legislature to respect
international treaty law were not within its authority, as
a statute contrary to an international treaty was not per
16 (1975) 2 MLR 336.
162In this case, Article 265 of the French customs code.
163Costa v. Ente Nazionaleper I'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), case 6/64, (1964) CMLR 425.
164Mauro Cappelletti, "The "Mighty Problem" of Judicial Review and the Contribution of the
Comparative Analysis", (1980) 53 Southern California Law Review 409, 420.
165D.1975.529.
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se unconstitutional. Its task was to review the
constitutionality of legislation, the Council said, but
not the conformity of legislation to treaties. The
pronouncement had been made upon reference by a
parliamentary minority who had argued from autochthonous
constitutional law, the Preamble of the 1958 Constitution
and from principles of substantive European human rights
law166 that the right to life included the life of the
foetus. The Constitutional Council explored the
constitutional issues in relation to the ECHR's operation
in France and found that Article 55 of the French
Constitution gave treaties an authority superior to
statutes but did not require or imply that respect for
this criterion be assured under Article 61. The Council
reasoned that it would be improper to declare the
nonconformity to the Constitution in the terms of Article
61 and preclude the promulgation of a statute which was
only inconsistent with treaty obligations.167 It also drew
a distinction between the review of constitutionality
which determines validity and has absolute effects, and
the review of the conformity of legislation to a treaty
that determines applicability and has relative effects.
The latter fell outside its jurisdiction and it was for
the ordinary judiciary, administrative or judiciaire to
rule on the matter. Article 55 did not confer
constitutional force upon the ECHR (the ratified treaty),
and moreover, Article 54 suggested that treaties lack such
force since they may be constitutionally challenged. In
the end, it maintained the constitutionality of the
disputed section of the domestic statute (the abortion
law) by holding that it had no jurisdiction to review
because the incompatibility of internal legislation with
the ECHR was not a case of unconstitutionality.
166Article 2 ECHR: "Everyone's right to life shall be protected by law."
167James Beardsley, id., 236.
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Only after 1975 did the case law slowly start to change,
when this court began to accept a number of cases in which
it had to look at whether a statute conformed with a
treaty, especially when the statute was directly related
to the implementation of that treaty.168 The very
important change, however, took place in the landmark
decision Election du depute de la 5e. circonscription du
Val d'Oise in 1988, where the Council made it clear that
it was willing to review the conformity of a domestic
statute with a treaty, the ECHR:169
Considerant que, prises dans leur ensemble, les
dispositions de la loi n° 86-825 du 11 juillet 1986,
qui determinent le mode de scrutin pour 1'election des
deputes a 1'Assemble nationale, ne sont pas
incompatibles avec les stipulations de 1'article 3 du
protocole n° 1 additionnel a la Convention europeenne
de sauvegarde des droits de l'homme et des libertes
fondamentales; qu'il appartient, par suite, au Conseil
Constitutionnel de faire application de la loi
precite;170
A commentator wrote that it was very important that the
Strasbourg jurisprudence also be followed, otherwise,
contradictory case law and different readings, detrimental
to a shared European public order, cannot be avoided.171
The Council of State, on the other hand, was the last
court to bring its case law in line with the
Constitutional Council and the Court of Cassation. In the
Nicolo172 case, it finally departed from the case law on
the inviolability of statutes, and accepted jurisdiction
to review the validity of a statute in relation to a
treaty. The old jurisprudence had strictly adhered to the
168Roger Errera, id., 134.
169Actually, Article 3 of Protocol 1.
170Decision number 88-1082/1117 of October 21, 1988, JORF, 25.10.88, p. 13474.
17 Dominique Rousseau, "Vers un ordre juridictionnel europeen des droits et libertes?
L'integration europeenne des Droits de I'homme au bloc de constitutionnalite", in:
Dominique Rousseau and Frederic Sudre (eds.), Conseil Constitutionnel et Cour
europeenne des droits de I'homme: droits et libertes en Europe. (1990), 129.
172[1990] PL 134, 135.
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principle lex posterior derogat priori and therefore, a
treaty or a statute subsequent to another statute or
treaty as case may be took precedence over the previous
piece of legislation. This traditional position was laid
down in cases such as Syndicat General des Fabricants de
Semoule de France113, Union Democratique du Travail174 and
Election des representants a l'assemblee des communautes
europeennes.175
As an example of the old position, but dealing with the
ECHR, in the case of Mrs. L...176 the Council of State
reached the conclusion in 1980 that the abortion law of
1975, which was passed after the publication of the ECHR,
should be given priority over the Convention in accordance
with the principle of lex posterior derogat priori.
We finally arrive at the watershed case on the position of
international law, Nicolo. Mr. Nicolo asked the Council
of State to annul the 1989 election to the European
Parliament arguing that a 1977 French statute, the
electoral law, was in violation of the Treaty of Rome.
The issues in these case were two: (i) whether the juge
administratif had jurisdiction to determine whether a
domestic statute is compatible with the clear stipulations
of an international treaty and if so, (ii) whether the
challenged electoral law, making one single constituency
out of the French territory including overseas
departements et territoires was compatible with the clear
stipulations of Article 277 (1) EEC. The Court answered
both questions in the affirmative and found that the
173Conseil d'Etat, March 1, 1968, # 62814, (1968) Recueil Lebon 149.
174Conseil d'Etat, October 22, 1979, # 17541, (1979) Recueil Lebon 383.
175Conseil d'Etat, October 22, 1979, # 18449,18546,18573,18581,18582, (1979)
Recueil Lebon 385.
176D.1981 .J.38. In this case, Mrs. L... obtained an abortion while being in the process of
divorcing her husband whom she had left some time before the abortion took place. Mr. L...
claimed to the Tribunal Administratif that the abortion was performed in violation of the right
to life of Article 2 ECHR. The court held that neither domestic provisions nor the ECHR have
been violated.
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electoral statute was not contrary to Article 227 (1) EEC.
Mr. Nicolo had argued that articles 277 (1) and (2) EEC
meant that the instrument applied only to the European and
not overseas territory of France, hence the illegality of
the election.
The report of the Commissaire du gouvernement cast light
on several important issues. It is worth stating that his
report confirms what has been said up to this point about
the position of international law in French law. The
document relates the proposed solution (which was adopted
by the Court) to the general pattern of the case law and
anticipates its future development, pointing out that up
to that moment the Council of State's interpretation was
that any statute passed after the publication of a treaty
should be given priority in accordance with the principle
of lex posterior derogat priori as follows:
On sait que vous avez juge, a cet egard, par une
celebre decision du section du ler mars 1968,
Syndicat general des fabricants de semoules de France
[...] que le juge administratif ne peut faire
prevaloir les traites sur les lois posterieures qui
leur sont contraires.
The Commissaire highlights the two prongs of the Council
of State's now old approach. One was Article 10 of the
statute of 16 and 24 August 1790 which forbids judges to
suspend the application of domestic statutes, while the
other was that, if the 1958 Constitution departed from the
theory of the inviolability of statutes, then, review was
in the hands of the Constitutional Council and not of the
Council of State. The Commissaire advocates bringing the
Council of State's jurisprudence into step with the Court
of Cassation and the Constitutional Council. As for the
Court of Cassation's case law:
Ce faisant, vous ne feriez que rejoindre la pratique
suivie par les juridictions judiciaires. On sait, en
effet, que par un important arret de chambre mixte du
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24 mai 1975, Administration des Douanes c. Societe
des Cafes Jacques Vabre [...] la Cour de Cassation a
[...] adopte cette meme solution [which is the
solution proposed by the Commissaire].
The Commissaire also pointed out to the judges of the
Council of State that the Constitutional Council had
already brought its case law in line with the new
interpretation:
[...] puisque a l'occasion d'une importante decision
du 21 octobre 1988, Election du depute de la 5e.
circonscription du Val d'Oise [...] le Conseil
Constitutionnel a clairement explicite sa pensee en
acceptant de controler, par voi d'exception, la
conformite d'une loi a un traite [...]
Finally, the Commissaire du gouvernement makes an appeal
to cartesian logic in a sentence that incidentally, says a
great deal about the French judicial style: "La France ne
peut simultanement accepter des limitations de
souverainete et maintenir la suprematie de ses lois devant
le juge: il y a la un illogisme que votre decision de 1968
nous parait peut-etre avoir sous-estimee."
Nicolo and the new reading of Article 55 of the
Constitution involve the acceptance of the primacy of
international law (in general) over domestic statutes
which therefore, lose their status as the cornerstone of
the legal system. As all other international law
instruments, the authority of the ECHR in France over
opposing legislation derives not directly from
international law but from the position of international
law vis-a-vis the' domestic legal system in accordance with
the French Constitution read as to give full effect to
Article 55. Since the ECHR seems to have been assimilated
into the French legal system as a law of constitutional
status, the three supreme courts are now agreed, and
French courts recognise the right to claim the application
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of the provisions of the ECHR and its Protocols before a
domestic court.
French courts also eliminated the double standard of their
Italian counterparts: in Italy, EU legislation has
priority over any opposing legislation by way of making an
exception177 while the ECHR (and the rest of international
law) is denied such status. The reason for this is that
in Italy the general rule dictates that incorporated
international law has the same strength as the ordinary
statute of incorporation. The French constitutional order
does not make distinctions between international law and
EU law.178
Thus the ECHR was transplanted into the French legal
order. Let us now turn to the issue of how it appears to
be taken root. In a line of case law dealing with
transsexualism, the civil chamber of the Court of
Cassation, has been adopting decisions which are not
unlike the European Court's ruling in B. v. France. After
this Strasbourg decision there were two sets of views
clearly set side by side in France. On the one hand, the
accepted French position which stressed the inviolability
of the civil status of a person and therefore, rejected
the possibility of making any changes to the registrations
concerning the civil status of a person after a sex-change
operation. For example, in Mme. X . . . c. Proc. Rep.
Bordeaux179 Article 8 ECHR was not used to protect the
right of privacy and order the rectifications sought.
Although Cassation did not admit the rectification of
civil status, some lower courts did, and since sometimes
the procureur general did not appeal from such judgments
they became res judicata. Judge Pettiti pointed out in
his dissent in B. v. France that:
177See case Frontini c. Ministero delle Finanze discussed below.
178Andrew West et al., The French Legal System. (1992),166-7.
179D.1991 .J.169.
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Subsequent to these decisions by the Court of
Cassation [he refers to 4 decisions passed in 1990
where it refused to order the rectification of the
civil status of transsexuals], the Colmar Court of
Appeal granted rectification of civil status to a
person who had in addition after the operation
obtained an amended passport showing her new sex. No
appeal having been brought by the procureur general,
the decision is final and binding and rectification
of civil status has taken place.180
On the other hand, the European Court re-focused the issue
in B. v. France as it based its judgment on the right of
privacy under Article 8 ECHR. The balance achieved gave
more weight to the right to privacy against the
inviolability of civil status as it did not afford France
a margin of appreciation sufficiently wide to refuse
changes to the civil status as the Court of Cassation was
doing. In December 1992, two domestic cases recognised
the right of two post-operative transsexuals to make all
the necessary changes in their documents to show the newly
acquired sexual identity although Cassation did not
acknowledge a European influence on the judgment. The
carefully worded decisions in Rene X.181 and Marc X.182
accepted that after treatment and surgery (which
incidentally, had been paid for by French social security
and carried out in public hospitals) "le principe du
respect du a sa vie privee justifie que son etat civil
indique desormais le sexe dont elle a l'apparence; que le
principe de 1'indisponibilite de l'etat des personnes ne
fait pas obstacle a une telle modification." Therefore,
it quashed two decisions of the Appeal Court of Aix-en-
Provence and ordered the substitution of "female sex" for
"male sex" in the applicants' birth certificates with all
180(57/1990/248/319).
1811SCASS. ASS. PLEN. 11 Decembre 1992, ReneX. (1993) La Semaine Juridique, II
Jurisprudence, p. 46.
18219CASS. ASS. PLEN. 11 Decembre 1992, Marc X. (1993) La Semaine Juridique, II
Jurisprudence, p. 46.
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the consequences this has in French law including family
relationships.
A controversial area of application of Article 6 ECHR was
that of disciplinary proceedings. The case X. . . et autre
c. Proc. gen. Bordeaux183 shows that the Court of Cassation
let the Convention infiltrate this area too, as the
appealed decision of the Bordeaux court (1st. chamber) was
deemed erroneous on grounds of the ECHR. The new judgment
of the civil chamber of the Court of Cassation was in line
with the "new reading" of Article 55 of the Constitution,
and gave treaties an authority superior to statutes,
without any condition of reciprocity. In addition,
Cassation said that the ECHR was not a mere declaration of
intention:
Cassation, pour violation de ce texte [Article 6 (1)
ECHR], de 1'arret qui, pour refuser que les debats
d'une instance disciplinaire dirigee contre les
avocats aient lieu en audience publique, comme ceux-ci
l'avaient demandee, apres avoir enonce, d'une fagon
erronee, que 1'art. 55 de la Constitution ne confere
aux conventions internationales conclues par l'Etat
frangais une autorite superieure a celle des lois
internes que sous reserve pour chaque accord ou traite
de son application par 1'autre partie et que tel n'est
pas le cas de la Convention europeenne des droits de
l'homme et des libertes fondamentales qui ne constitue
qu'une declaration d'intention a 1'egard des Etats
signataires [...]
In various other cases the Court limited itself to apply
the appropriate article of the ECHR without further
explanations. It simply resorted to the wording
"meconnait les prescriptions des art. 6, 1, et 6, 3, de la
Convention des droits de l'homme la cour d'appel qui
[...]"184 or an equivalent expression, therefore making it
difficult to see in the adjudication process the use made




The failure of the Council of State to recognise the
pre-eminence of the Convention led to a number of
petitions to Strasbourg being declared admissible even in
the absence of the exhaustion of domestic remedies, since
Article 8 ECHR was inoperative before national courts. On
December 21, 1990, the Council of State decided the case
Confederation nationale des associations familiales
catholiques et autres regarding the distribution and
administration of the abortion pill RU 486 by the Ministry
of Health. The Council of State simply said that it was
not in breach of French law or the ECHR, without any
further justification.
Eu egard aux conditions ainsi posees par le
legislateur, les dispositions issues des lois des 17
janv. 1975 et 31 dec. 1979, relatives a 1'interruption
volontaire de la grossesse, prises dans leur ensemble,
ne sont pas incompatibles avec les stipulations de la
Convention europeenne de sauvegarde des droits de
l'homme et libertes fondamentales (art. 2-4)185
A substantial infiltration of the Strasbourg jurisprudence
can be observed, however, in the immigration case law.
The influence of the European standards taken from
Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v. the United Kingdom186
and Berrehab v. The Netherlands187 in the reversal by the
Council of State of previous case law on Article 8 ECHR.
As a consequence, Article 8 ECHR and the Strasbourg
jurisprudence are taken into account whenever an alien
files a petition for review of administrative decisions
refusing visas or residence permits. In Beldjoudi
(January 18, 1991) and Belgacem and Babas (both cases
decided on April 19 , 1991) 188 the Council of State drew on
the right to respect for family life to review decisions
ordering over-staying aliens to leave France.
185D.1991.IR.33.
186(1989) 11 EHRR 360.
187(1989) 11 EHRR 322.
188[1991] PL 458, 459.
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In 1992 the Council of State passed judgment on an
application for review of a refusal of the Ministry of the
Interior to rescind a deportation order against Minin.1Q9
Minin's ECHR right to respect to family life was balanced
against the threat he posed to public order and the
outcome was a finding that the deportation order was not a
disproportionate interference under Article 8 ECHR. Minin
was born in France in 1938 from Italian parents but had
refused to choose French nationality at 18. In 1972, he
was ordered to leave the country after a three year prison
sentence for theft, but he illegally returned and
committed armed robbery. He was sentenced to prison
again. While in prison, he married a Frenchwoman, with
whom he later had a child. Minin asked the Ministry of
the Interior to quash the 1972 deportation order on the
basis of Article 8 ECHR and the status of his family at
that time: his parents, brother, sister, wife and child
all lived in France and were of French nationality:
En refusant d'abroger l'arrete d'expulsion pris a
l'encontre d'un etranger plusieurs fois condamne a des
peines de prison, en se fondant sur le fait que
l'interesse, rentre clandestinement en France, a
commis deux agressions a main armee pour lesquelles il
a ete de nouveau condamne a dix ans de reclusion
criminelle, le ministre de l'interieur, eu egard a la
gravite de la menace que la presence de l'interesse
sur le territoire frangais fait peser sur l'ordre
public, ne porte pas au droit de l'interesse au
respect de sa vie familiale une atteinte
disproportionnee aux buts en vue desquels ce refus lui
est oppose et ne meconnait done pas les stipulations
de l'art. 8 de la Convention europeenne des droits de
1' homme [ . . . ]190
To sum up, the case law suggests that the ECHR will
probably extend its influence on further areas of French
domestic law. If there is one constant element in all the
cases reviewed it is the tenacity of the complainants and
189Roger Errera, "Recent Decisions of the French Conseil d'Etat", [1992] PL 343.
190D.1992.IR.148.
- 83 -
their lawyers to bring the ECHR to the attention of the
domestic courts. This is whenever there is a question of
rights and freedoms either directly protected by the
Convention or tenuously connected with it, as judge
Pettiti191 pointed out that for example the ECHR is a sort
of universal panacea for French lawyers. Accordingly, the
published case law in France shows the drastic increase in
the number of judgments in which the ECHR is mentioned in
the past few years. This has repercussions for another
group of users of the Convention law and case law: those
on the government side, for example, the Ministere Public,
the reporting magistrates or the Commissaires du
gouvernement in their reports to the Council of State.
The tendency for them is, however, to resort to the ECHR
as a reaction to their opponents' claims, because by far,
it is (unsurprisingly) the individuals and their lawyers
who take the initiative on pleading the ECHR. On the
other hand, if what may be termed (for want of a better
term) as a "complicity" between the national judiciaries
and Strasbourg is encouraged by mutual confidence now that
the Convention based rights can be fully claimed in
domestic law, then there might be even more hope for a
harmonised approach, particularly if such an approach is
followed all over the member states.
191Louis-Edmond Pettiti, ibid.
(b) Italy
The statute of incorporation of the ECHR had two
consequences in Italian law192: with regard to the form, it
gave the ECHR the force of a domestic statute, and with
regard to the substance, it "transformed"193 the Convention
into an internal law.194 The validity and effect of
internationally recognised human rights principles are not
"constitutional"195 because these principles constitute
sources of knowledge (a new jus gentium) about the
significance to be attached to fundamental rights but
without any special legal force (forza di resistenza) vis¬
a-vis the rest of the statutes in the domestic hierarchy
of norms.
The position of the ECHR in Italian law is weak, however,
as both the Constitutional Court and the Court of
Cassation treat it as ordinary law, on which it is not
possible to base claims to annul domestic legislation
enacted after its ratification. International law on
treatment of aliens and EU law are both exempted from such
weakness. In contrast, the (new) French approach to grant
all international instruments validity superior to
parliamentary laws (and not by way of granting exceptions
or making the ECHR's status follow the status of EU law)
gave the incorporated ECHR a firm position vis-a-vis
domestic laws.
192The Convention was signed by Italy on November 4, 1950, and the First Protocol on
March 20, 1952. The ECHR was incorporated into the Italian legal system on August 4,
1955, when Parliament passed Law No. 848 with the text of the Convention annexed to it. A
general bibliography on the ECHR in Italy is the following: Sabina Mazzi, "Bibliografia italiana
sulla convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo", in (1986) 22 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale
Privato e Processuale 291.
193Article 1 of the Law No. 848 authorised ratification, which took place on October 26,
1955, and Article 2 ordered its execution into domestic law.
194A. Z. Drzemczewski, European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law: A
Comparative Study. 146, and Capotorti, in A. H. Robertson (ed.), id., 42.
199A. H. Robertson (ed.), id.,117 - 118.
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For the Italian Constitutional Court Article 10 (1) of
the Constitution is aimed at the automatic conformity of
the national legal system to customary international law
and not to international treaties.196 Besides,
constitutional control in Italy, unlike France, is always
incidental, i.e. the question must be referred to the
Constitutional Court in the process of proceedings already
being heard by another court.197
In 1960, in Regione Trentino-Alto Adige c. Presidente del
Consiglio dei ministri, the Constitutional Court stated
what was the position of international treaties in Italian
law by arguing that Article 10 (1) of the Constitution
covers "generally recognised norms of international law"
but not "specific pledges undertaken by the State on the
international level" (that is, treaties)198. A domestic
statute would not be declared unconstitutional for the
sole reason that it is against an international treaty.199
Nonetheless, questions of Convention-based
unconstitutionality could be raised concerning treaties on
the treatment of aliens, although the authority for doing
so comes from Article 10 (2) of the Constitution.
Judgment n. 120 of 1967 spelled out the conclusion that
"the principle of equality also applies to aliens where
respect of these fundamental rights is concerned." The
Court reasoned as follows:
[Article 3 should be applied] in conjunction with
Article 2 and Article 10 paragraph 2, of the Italian
Constitution, the first of which recognises for all,
Italian nationals and aliens alike, the inviolable
196Enzo Cannizzaro, "Trattato (adattamento al)" in: Enciclopedia del diritto. (1992), vol. XLIV,
1414. Also relevant for this stage are V. Vigoriti, "Italy: The Constitutional Court" (1972) 20
AJCL 404; G. Bognetti, "The Political Role of the Italian Constitutional Court" (1974) 49
Notre Dame Law Review 981; A. Pergola and Del Duca, "Community Law, International Law
and the Italian Constitution" (1985) 79 AJIL 598, and Giovanna Michele Palmieri,
"L'esperienza italiana in tema di ricorsi individual alia comissione europea dei diritti
dell'uomo", (1980) 63 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 45.
197Alessandro Pizzorusso, "Giuridizione costituzionale e diritti fondamentali", (1981) 36
Rivista di diritto processuale 340, 341.
198Decision n. 32 of 1960, (1980-1981) 5 The Italian Yearbook of Int'l Law 251, 252.
i"G. Gaja, "Italy" (chapter 5) F. G. Jacobs and S. Roberts (ed.), id.
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human rights, while the other lays down that the legal
status of foreigners is regulated by law in conformity
with international rules and treaties.200
Incidentally, an example of a lower court applying the
constitution based exception to the "traditional" position
on the validity of international law could be the case
Perovic, where a Rome Court of Appeal found that, owing to
the special protection afforded by Article 10 (2) of the
Constitution, "the rules of the ECHR in regard to the
foreigner enjoy 'forza di resistenza'."201 For that
reason, the court could resort to Article 6 ECHR to
override a municipal law requirement of using the Italian
language in all legal proceedings, with the sole exception
of the languages of ethnic minorities in some regions of
the country. The Convention was mentioned in support of
the decision to serve legal documents to foreign
defendants in a language which they understood, although
this exception did not extend to all the steps in the
prosecution of the action.
Yet this reasoning could not be taken further in order to
cover the whole of the ECHR in all situations because it
is dependent on the exception made by Article 10 (2) of
the Constitution, as it was made clear in the
Constitutional Court judgment n. 188 of 1980, re Lintrami
and others.202 The case concerned the constitutionality of
the requirement set down in Articles 125 and 128 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure regarding the appointment of a
defence attorney even if a defendants insists on carrying
200English version from: A. H. Robertson, Privacy and Human Rights. 118,
201(1980) 23 Rivista italiana di diritto e procedura penale 953, 956.
202At a hearing before the Turin Pretore (first instance court competent to deal with cases
where the penalty imposed may be imprisonment of up to 4 years, a fine or both) the
defendant Mr. Arialdo Lintrami put forth in the following terms that he did not wish not carry
out his own defence nor have a defence attorney to carry it out for him: "I will not defend
myself because there is nothing to defend myself from and I do not recognise the Italian
courts of justice or the judge or whomever could accuse and sentence me. I disallow any
previous appointment I had made and invite the court appointed lawyer that will be assigned
to me not to defend me because I do not wish to be defended", (1980) 25 Giurisprudenza
costituzionale 1612, 1615.
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out his or her own defence. The thinking that human
rights treaties do not normally come under the special
category of Article 10 (2) of the Constitution is
illustrated by the Constitutional Court's dismissal of the
case: "The Court cannot but reassert its settled
jurisprudence which rules out international treaty
provisions, even if general, from the scope of Art. 10 of
the Constitution."203 The Court added that:
[...] -in the absence of a specific constitutional
provision- treaty provisions implemented in Italy have
the same force as ordinary statutes. Therefore, the
very possibility of raising, under this aspect, a
question of constitutionality is barred, even more
when [...] treaty provisions are invoked as such as
tests for the constitutionality of statutory
provisions204
The dottrina (scholarly writings) protested against this
approach and unsuccessfully argued in favour of giving the
ECHR constitutional standing based on the interplay of
Articles 2, 10 and 11 of the Constitution. Here it
becomes necessary to look at the Constitution again.205
The two first paragraphs of Article 10 are as follows:
"(1) Italy's legal system conforms with the generally
recognised principles of international law" (where the
principle 'pacta sunt servanda' is apparently given effect
in domestic law); and "(2) The legal status of foreigners
is regulated by law in conformity with international rules
and treaties." Other writers suggested the
constitutionalisation by the operation of the "general
clause" of Article 2 which states that Italy recognises
and guarantees the inviolable rights of man.206 Some took
the matter further and proposed the constitutionalisation
203(1980) 25 Giurisprudenza costituzionale 1612, 1627.
204(1980) 25 Giurisprudenza costituzionale 1612, 1626.
2o5The English translations of the articles of the Italian Constitution are from: Blaustein, A. B.
& Flanz, G. H. (ed.) Constitutions of the Countries of the World, vol. 8.
206Article 2 of the Constitution lays down that: "The Republic recognises and guarantees
the inviolable rights of man, both as an individual and as a member of the social groups in
which his personality finds expression, and imposes the performance of unalterable duties
of a political, economic and social nature."
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of the ECHR such as the Constitutional Court had already
done with EU law,207 which enjoys supremacy due to the
application of the principle "lex posterior generalis non
derogat priori specialis" instead of the usual "lex
posterior derogat priori"208 as decided in the case n. 183
of 1973, Frontini c. Ministero delle Finanze.209 in
Frontini the Constitutional Court conceded that Article 11
of the Constitution210, which had been written to favour
Italy's admission to the United Nations and to other
organisations for the promotion of "peace and justice"211
implied that the constitutional law-givers were "[...]
inspired by programmatic principles of a general value,
which were concretely realised in the European Community
and other European regional organisations." Moreover,
Article 11 was resorted to again to define EU law as an
"independent and separate legal system" in S.p.a. Granital
c. Amministrazione delle Finanze212 in 1984. In Lintrami,
the Constitutional Court rejected the views that the ECHR
could be granted the same treatment as EU law via Article
11: "[...] Art. 11 of the Constitution cannot even be
taken into account, as one cannot single out any
limitation to national sovereignty with regard to the
207G. Gaja, "Italy' (chapter 5) in: F. G. Jacobs and S. Roberts (ed.), The Effect of Treaties in
Domestic Law. 87.
208Alfonso Celotto, "La prevalenza del diritto comunitario sul diritto interno: orientamenti
della Corte Costituzionale e spunti di teoria generale", (1992) 37 Giurisprudenza
costituzionale 4481, 4488. See, also: G. Alpa, L'influenza del diritto europeo sul diritto
italiano. (1982).
209(1974) 2 CMLR 381.
2i°Francesco Francioni, "Italy and the EC: the legal protection of fundamental rights", in:
Francesco Francioni (ed.). Italy and EC Membership Evaluated. (1992),195.
211Article 11 of the Constitution lays down that: "Italy condemns war as an instrument of
aggression against the liberties of other peoples and as a means for settling international
controversies; it agrees, on conditions of equality with other states, to such limitation of
sovereignty as may be necessary for a system calculated to ensure peace and justice
between nations; it promotes and encourages international organisations having such ends
in view."
212 Decision n. 170 of 1984, (1984) 1 Giur. It. 1521. The Constitutional Court intended to
reach the same conclusion previously adopted by the ECJ, namely that ordinary courts
should apply those EU provisions with direct effect irrespective of conflicting national
legislation. Contrary to the ECJ's approach, however, the the application of EU law was
made dependent on rules already existing in Italian law, that is the combination of Article 11
of the Constitution and the statute implementing the Treaty of Rome.
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specific treaty provisions in question."213 It does not
seem unreasonable, then, to share the scepticism of those
Italian scholars who did not foresee a quick evolution of
the constitutional case law towards granting primacy to
Strasbourg law.214
The cases thereafter consistently reaffirmed this
position. In a judgment concerning an accused person's
right to defend himself, the Constitutional Court mentions
two decisions of the European Commission on Article 6
(3,c) ECHR, which were not used, however, to depart from a
solution offered by municipal law and the Constitutional
Court rejected the question of Convention-based
constitutionality.215 Moreover, in judgment n. 17 of 1981
the Constitutional Court did not find the ECHR helpful to
define rights granted by the Constitution and the decision
was based entirely on municipal law:
One cannot assume that on the basis of a provision
such as the one contained in the European Convention
on Human Rights, implemented in Italy through an
ordinary statute, the balance of the interests in
question should be reserved by the Constitution to the
courts, with the consequence the the legislator could
have no discretion in arranging for certain
proceedings to be conducted in camera.216
A further criticism is that when the constitutionality of
Law n. 15 of February 6, 1980 (concerning exceptional
measures to protect the democratic order and public
security against terrorism), was challenged in the course
of proceedings against the criminal defendant Mr. Giuliano
Naria, the Constitutional Court missed the opportunity to
make a pronouncement on whether the rules extending the
period of pre-trial detention by a third were in line with
213(1980) 25 Giurisprudenza costituzionale 1612, 1627.
214Guido Raimondi, "La convenzione europea dei diritti deH'uomo nella gerarchia dellefonti
dell'ordinamento italiano. Nota minima in margine alia sentenza Ciulla", (1990) 3 Rivista
internazionale dei diritti dell'uomo 36, 39.
215(1980-1981) 5 The Italian Yearbook of International Law 251, 254.
216(1980-1981) 5 The Italian Yearbook of International Law 251, 256-257.
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the ECHR. Mr. Naria had been held for 4 years in pre¬
trial detention. The judgment of February 1, 1982,
reaffirmed that the ECHR had the force of an ordinary
statute, held that (unsurprisingly) Art. 5 (3) ECHR - a
non self-executing article - did not provide clear
criteria as such for assessing the reasonable length of
pre-trial detention and concluded that therefore that the
domestic statute was not unreasonable. Unfortunately the
extensive Strasbourg case law on the issue of Article 5
ECHR was not resorted to. The argument echoes the
civilian's concern with the status of a rule in the
domestic hierarchy of norms: "[the ECHR] on one hand, does
not place itself at the constitutional level, and on the
other, it does not contain substantial criteria for want
of specificity".217
The matter was again considered in the case n. 315 of July
5, 1990. On this occasion, the Constitutional Court
issued the usual denial of the constitutional status of
the ECHR and dismissed a claim of unconstitutionality of
Articles 1 and 2 of the law of January 23, 1989 n. 22218
made with reference to Articles 3 and 24 of the
Constitution and Article 6 ECHR. The domestic statute
required lawyers to have a specific authorisation from
their clients (criminal defendants in contempt) so as to
challenge a sentence passed by default. The Court
confirmed previous jurisprudence:
Whereas the regretted non-compliance with Article 6
(3,c) of the European Convention on Human Rights -
even if we put aside the often quoted teaching that a
treaty provision "does not place itself at the
constitutional level" [...] the aforementioned reasons
as regards the right of defence therefore lead us to
reject the claim that Article 2 of the law 23.1.1989
n. 22, which substitutes Article 192 (3) of the Code
217(1982) 27 Giurisprudenza costituzionale 85, 100.
218These articles superseded Articles 183 (bis) and 192 (3) of the Code of Criminal
Procedure of 1930.
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of Criminal Procedure 1930, is not in conformity with
the treaty provision.219
Therefore, the pattern is as follows: if the decision
concerns the treatment of aliens, the Court seems willing
to give the ECHR overriding effect but such result comes
from the Italian Constitution with its alien protection
clause and not from the ECHR itself. In all other cases,
the Court does not "constitutionalise" the ECHR, and
treats it as an ordinary statute.
Likewise, the Italian Court of Cassation does not give
the ECHR any constitutional status.220 Notwithstanding the
formal assertion that the ECHR is directly applicable in
Italian domestic law, Cassation's position has always been
that the rules of the ECHR are programmatic, intended for
the guidance of the legislature and mandatory only between
the member states. Furthermore, the rulings of the
European Court of Human Rights are deemed to lack domestic
coercive force.221 For example, in the decision n. 3295 of
June 3 , 1985,222 the Court of Cassation rejected a petition
for review on grounds that the administrative courts where
the application for review was filed lacked jurisdiction
to hear the case.223 The appellant sought a declaration of
"unconstitutionality" by reference to Article 6 (1) ECHR
of several of the prohibitions which were embodied in the
Italian Constitution so as to ensure that the existence of
the republican system of government per se was not
challengeable. The application was dismissed because in
the Court's view Article 6 (1) ECHR "does not make any
reference to the possibility of putting into question a
219(1990) 35 Giurisprudenza costituzionale 2017, 2024.
220The case law shows remarkably little influence from the Convention, in spite of the
number of Italian criminal cases dealing with Arts. 5 and 6 ECHR that are heard in Strasbourg.
221Jorg Polaciewicz and Valerie Jacob-Foltzer, The European Human Rights Convention in
domestic law: The Impact of the Strasbourg case-law in States where direct effect is given to
the Convention. (1991)12 HRLJ 65,39.
222(1986) 28 YECHR 317.
223The Court of Cassation has the final word on issues of jurisdiction between the
administrative and ordinary courts.
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law of the state or the provisions of the Constitution",
although it recognised that:
Article 6, paragraph 1 of the European Convention on
Human Rights when it lays down everyone's right to a
fair and public hearing by an independent and
impartial tribunal established by law obliges every
state party to the Convention to grant the people
within its jurisdiction access to a court of law of
such characteristics.
Even if taken into account, another aspect which shows the
Convention's weakness is that judges do not consider it as
leges perfectae22A i.e capable of supporting a decision on
its own. As the Court of Cassation put it in the case of
January 25, 1986, "If the programmatic norms [of a treaty]
are not respected, they can only give rise to a lawsuit
before an international organisation"225 and then deployed
its traditional stance as follows,
The accused cannot maintain that a rule of the Italian
legal system is against the norms of the Constitution
because it conflicts with the European Convention on
Human Rights. The law that ratified the Convention
gives it the value of an ordinary law [ . . . ] The
Constitution is the fundamental law of the State and
it cannot be modified by an international
convention.226
Although in re Castro221 the Court of Cassation rejected a
leave to appeal because it was filed late, some
interesting considerations concerning the ECHR were, in
terms of the common law system, stated obiter. At the
request of the Italian Ministry of Justice, the Public
Prosecutor with the Florence Court of Appeal issued a
warrant of arrest against a Mr. Castro on August 3, 1988.
The defendant was already under arrest for fraud in
224Mario Chiavario, "La convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo ed il suo contributo al
rinovamento del processo penale italiano", (1974) 57 Rivista di Diritto Internazionale 454,
464.
225(1986) 29 YECHR 305.
226(1986) 29 YECHR 305.
22 /(1990) 73 Rivista di diritto internazionale 1037.
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Geneva. On August 12, 1988, he was served this Italian
arrest warrant while in prison. He later challenged it
arguing that in the 1983 case Angelopoulos the Court of
Cassation had admitted appeals against arrest warrants
issued by Public Prosecutors in extradition cases. The
defendant argued that any other pronouncement by the court
would be incompatible with Article 5 (4) ECHR. The
finding of the Criminal Division of the Court of Cassation
on May 8, 1989, explained that only self-executing rules
of the ECHR enjoy immediate operation in Italy, as
follows: "if an international rule is like a complete
domestic statute, with its essential elements, that is, if
the act is able to create rights and duties without any
other act, the domestic adoption of the international rule
is automatic [...]"228 Article 5 (4) ECHR is not self-
executing, and for that reason, the Court said, it was
made operative in Italy by means of various domestic
provisions, among them, some prescriptions laid out in the
Code of Criminal Procedure. Those provisions grant a
right to challenge arrest warrants in extradition cases
(such as the one issued against the applicant) before the
Court of Cassation. Unfortunately for the applicant,
however, there are also time limits and since the
challenge was made ex-tempore, the Court did not grant
leave to appeal.
There are no differences of opinion between the
Constitutional Court and the Court of Cassation on the
authority the ECHR. For example, in the 1992 case Di
Bella c. Consiglio dell'ordine dei giornalisti229 the
applicant invoked Article 6 ECHR in his challenge of
constitutionality. The Court of Cassation declined to
"constitutionalise" the Convention in the reference it
made to the Constitutional Court. The case concerned the
challenge of the constitutionality of the closed hearings
228(1990) 73 Rivista di diritto internazionale 1037,1043.
229(1993) 43 Giustizia Civile 706, 708.
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which had taken place before a Milan first instance court
and then, Court of Appeal, in an action against a
disciplinary decision of the Council of the Order of
Journalists. The constitutional question which in the end
was submitted to the Constitutional Council was whether
Article 64 of Law n. 69 was compatible with Article 101
(1) of the Italian Constitution. For the Court of
Cassation, the Convention simply does not enjoy a
sufficiently high rank in the domestic hierarchy of norms,
therefore, the Italian Parliament is theoretically free to
pass laws in conflict with it. The resistance of the
Italian legal system to let the parties to a case plead
the unconstitutionality by reference to the ECHR is based
on the fact that the authority of the ECHR derives from
the legislative act of incorporation (order of execution)
and not from the ECHR as such. The principle lex
posterior [...] denies the incorporated Convention a
position of complete firmness against opposing subsequent
domestic legislation.
The "traditional" position is the one applied also in, for
example, disciplinary cases. In a case of July 5, 1985
the Disciplinary Chamber of Council of the Judiciary held
that the requirement of publicity of the proceedings in
Article 6 (1) ECHR was applicable in disciplinary cases
against magistrates. The ECHR was resorted to in order to
strike a balance between on the one hand, the protection
of the rights of the magistrate as a citizen and holder of
an office which enjoys independence versus, on the other,
the general interest in the buon andamento (to be
organised in a way that ensures proper functioning) of the
judicial system. The Court chose publicity, as follows:
Within the framework of these fundamental principles
[mentioned above] the court holds that the rule laid
out in article 34 (2) of Law 31.5.1946 n. 511 which
requires the debate on the attribution of
responsibility be held behind closed doors has been
tacitly set aside by Law 4.8.1955 n. 848. This belief
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is based on the resolution of some interpretative
questions which, as said, are contained within those
constitutional principles that rule judicial
discipline.230
The tribunal declared that the domestic law requirement of
a hearing behind closed doors had been made void by the
ECHR and ruled that "the statutes of adaptation of an
international treaty have the same strength of ordinary
laws, therefore, they enjoy 'repeal force' of the laws
already in existence that do not conform to them."231 This
approach was scarcely satisfactory for A. Pizzorusso232 who
wrote that the court achieved its objective (the
application of the ECHR) the "easy way", i.e. without
departing from the "traditional" principle lex posterior
derogat priori. The court, as most courts would have
probably done in the circumstances, neatly sidestepped the
(wider) concerns of the dottrina, and said that "to decide
this case it is not necessary to dwell on the matter of
the 'constitutionalisation' of the norms of the
Convention" and thus avoided a discussion on whether the
ECHR could be used as an interpretative device of laws
passed after Law 4.8.1955 n. 848 or of constitutional
rank.
While it is to be conceded that normally the ECHR is not
pleaded before the administrative courts or rather, that
as soon as an issue is considered to affect subjective
rights233 it will then be heard by the ordinary courts,234
230Poro It.,1986, III, 43, 48.
23iForo It.,1986, III, 43, 47.
232|Motes to the decision, Foro It.,1986, III, 43, 45.
233jhis exclusion of "legitimate interests" can be explained only by making a reference to a
distinction typical of the Italian legal system, which is the opposition between subjective
rights (diritti soggetivi) and legitimate interests {interesi legitimi). In cases of violations of
subjective rights the ordinary courts (and the Court of Cassation) are competent. Under
Article 113 of the Italian Constitution when there is a legitimate interest of a person
complaining of a rule made in the public interest, the administrative courts (and the Council of
State) are competent. It is often difficult, however, to determine whether a legal relationship
involves a "right" or a "legitimate interest". Since administrative law is not codified, it is one
area of Italian law in which precedent plays an important role. Case law is decisive to
distinguish rights from legitimate interests. Italian lawyers have developed a body of
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the expansive pressures of the ECHR on the Italian legal
system can nevertheless be observed in the following
example, Sheldia c. Ministero Interno235 before an
administrative regional tribunal (T.A.R.) in the region of
Friuli Venezia Giulia. The case concerned a petition of
political asylum by a citizen of Albania. Among the
various international rules which, in typical civilian
style, the court found that "applied" to the situation,
the T.A.R. considered that "it is particularly relevant
the ECHR of November 4, 1950 (with its Protocols) which
protects the fundamental rights of individuals regardless
of citizenship."236 The petition was, however, rejected on
the consideration that from the questioning of Ms. Sheldia
it did not appear to the court that she had suffered any
specific persecution nor that she would on her return to
Albania:
From the transcript [of the interrogatory] it does not
appear, moreover, that the applicant had suffered any
specific persecution and, therefore, the grounds for
denial of the application, put briefly, appear to be
sufficiently well founded. Not even in her story does
she put forward any reason that may lead us to presume
a possible persecution as her comments only reflected
the unfortunate current situation in Albania.237
All in all, the weak position of the ECHR in the domestic
rank of norms places important limits to its
"infiltration" although the presence of Convention law is
becoming more and more noticeable within the Italian legal
system.
precedents of what is and what is not to be considered one or the other of these notions. In
a sense, the Council of State and the administrative courts are not fully independent,
because when the case law does not provide an answer to the choice of court, the Court of
Cassation has the final word in issues of jurisdiction. See: M. Cappelletti et al. The Italian
Legal System: An Introduction. (1967),116.
23 4a. Z. Drzemczewski, id. ,150.
23 5poro amministrativo, 1992, at 2021.
236poro amministrativo, 1992, at 2021, 2023.
237Foro amministrativo, 1992, at 2021, 2025.
- 97 -
(c) United Kingdom
The ECHR is not part of United Kingdom law238 and, like any
other international treaty, requires to be incorporated by
a deliberate act of Parliament. The local conditions that
obtain concerning human rights law have two salient
features: one is that liberty is residual and the other,
that only if the courts or another governmental
institution will afford a remedy is there a right. This
common law approach reveals a "logic" which is the exact
opposite of the one purported by the substantive law of
the ECHR where rights are laid out in writing: the ECHR
"is just the sort of Continental charter that was despised
by Dicey."239 In the absence of substantive rights, the
common law deals with problems only when they arise, so
people are free as long as they do not breach the law or
invade the persons or property of others. In this context
of no bill of rights, freedom is considered "residual"
because it is what is left after considering the right of
others, the limits established and legal provisions.240
The local legal systems, as was the case in the two
countries already studied, will influence the operation of
a "transplanted" ECHR (either incorporated or not241) with
the scope of existing rules and exceptions, remedies,
238The United Kingdom was the first country to ratify the ECHR and recognise the right of
individual petition of Article 25 of the Convention and the optional competency of the Court
established in Article 47. It ratified the First Protocol, but not the Fourth and the Sixth
Protocols.
9K. D. Ewing and C. A. Gearty, Freedom Under Thatcher: Civil Liberties in Modern Britain.
(1990), 14.
240Claire Palley, The United Kingdom and Human Rights. (1992), 111-2.
241As regards the debate over a Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom, various proposals
have been examined by the British government and Parliament particularly since the 1970s.
In 1977, for example, the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights in Northern
Ireland recommended the creation of a Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom to advance the
protection of rights in Northern Ireland (Cmnd 7009, 1977). In 1978, a select committee of
the House of Lords was not agreed on the desirability of a Bill of Rights, however, if one was
to be created, it should be a Bill to incorporate the ECHR in domestic law (HL 176 (1977-78)).
Later, the House of Lords approved a Bill to incorporate the ECHR: HL Bill 54 (1980-81)
which failed in the House of Commons. (And other Bills in both Houses have also been
introduced.) In addition, in the 1980s, Charter 88 and the Institute for Public Policy
Research also put forward proposals for a Bill of Rights largely based on the ECHR.
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classifications, methods and so on. P. S. Atiyah242
highlighted some (potential) consequences of the
introduction of a "full-blown" British Bill of Rights,
that could
[...] bear upon methods of judicial selection, the
styles of legislative drafting, and a complete
reappraisal of the relative values of certainty and
justice in the individual case. It could even raise
conflicts of ultimate values - such as are involved in
the clash between utilitarian and rights-based
theories - and, even more difficult perhaps for the
English lawyer to swallow it, it could leave the
resolution of such ultimate conflicts to the judges
from time to time, rather than to some legislative
directive. All these possible changes could bring
with them further significant changes whose outcome is
likely to be unforeseeable at the outset. For
instance, alterations in the mode of judicial
selection may need to be quite dramatic to cope with a
British Bill of Rights. It may be necessary to open
the door to much more politically minded lawyers, and
to break up the cosy homogeneity of the present
English bench. This in turn may lead to fundamental
alterations in the role of the bar, and its whole
professional raison d'etre as an independent
profession may come under question as judges are drawn
from the ranks of other lawyers.
Even if the ECHR in its present position does not produce
all these effects243, there is nevertheless infiltration to
municipal law because "in a reluctant, informal way, not
only the relevance of the Convention but its superiority
is conceded."244 As Professor C. Munro pointed out: "The
law relating to civil liberties in the 1990s could not be
summed up as 'judge-made'. Its sources are more diverse,
and the shape of the law is conditioned by the
superimposed E.C.H.R."245 There is a paradox lying behind
242P. S. Atiyah and Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Analo-American Law: A
Comparative Study of Legal Reasoning. Legal Theory and Legal Institutions. (1991), 427.
243Ronald Dworkin, in A Bill of Rights for Britain. 1, wrote of a decline in the "culture of
liberty" (the community's shared sense of the importance of freedom and its protection) as
one of the reasons why formal legal protection of freedoms is lower in the United Kingdom
than in other European countries.
244Ferdinand Mount, The British Constitution Now: Recovery or Decline?. (1992), 231.
24BColin R. Munro, "The British Constitution in the 1990s", (1994) 31 Coexistence 159,
171.
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such impact: although there are no formal limits to the
validity of Parliamentary legislation, the Convention,
which has not been incorporated, is nevertheless able to
keep domestic legislation under check.246 it has been
suggested that Article 25 ECHR creates a situation similar
to incorporation.247
(c.l) English law
England is a dualist country as regards international law.
Municipal legislation should be interpreted as far as
possible to be in conformity with the ECHR, unless to do
so would be contrary to the intention of Parliament.
Parliament does not intend to infringe international
law248 : in Salomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise249
Lord Diplock explained that "we can refer to the
convention [on the Valuation of Goods for Customs Purposes
of 1950] to resolve ambiguities or obscurities of language
in the section of, and the schedule to, the statute." A
similar approach can be observed in Post Office v Estuary
Radio, Ltd.250
As regards the ECHR, in the 1975 case R v Secretary of
State for Home Affairs, ex p. Bhajan Singh231 Lord Denning
said that it should be used as an interpretative
instrument:
The Court can and should take the Convention into
account. They should take it into account whenever
246A. Drzemczewski, "European Human Rights Law and the United Kingdom", (1976) 92
LQR33, 36.
247Sir Humphrey Waldock, "The Effectiveness of the System set up by the European
Convention on Human Rights", (1980) 1 HRLJ 1,11.
248R Higgins, United Kingdom, id., 135.
249[1966] 3 All ER 871,876.
2 5 0[1967] 3 All ER 663,682. See also National Smokeless Fuels Ltd. v. Inland Revenue
Cmrs. [1986] STC 300
2 51 [1975] 2 All ER 1081 or [1975] 3 WLR 225.
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interpreting a statute which affects the rights and
liberties of the individual. It is to be assumed that
the Crown, in taking its part in legislation, would do
nothing which was in conflict with treaties. So the
court should now construe the Immigration Act 1971 so
as to be in conformity with a Convention and not
against it.
Of his decision in Birdi v Secretary of State for Home
Affairs252, Lord Denning took some of his previous
statements back and said, "I would like to correct one
sentence in my judgment in Birdi's case. I said: 'If [an
Act of Parliament] did not conform [to the convention] I
might be inclined to hold it invalid.' That was a very
tentative statement, but it went too far."253 Lord Denning
held the same position in 1976, when said in R v Chief
Immigration Officer, Heathrow Airport and another, ex
parte Salamat Bibi2SA that "if there is an ambiguity in our
statutes or uncertainty in our law, then these courts can
look at the convention as an aid to clear up the ambiguity
and uncercainty", however, he expressed that "I would
dispute altogether that the convention is part of our
law. "
In the early 1980s, Lord Scarman found the ECHR relevant
as an aid to statutory interpretation in some cases: R v
Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex p. Phansopkar255
and in Ahmad v Inner London Education Authority256. in the
latter, Lord Denning said that although the ECHR "is not
part of our English law [.. . ] we will always have regard
to it." He found fault with the style of drafting of the
ECHR, no doubt because it was unfamiliar from a common
lawyer's perspective: "But it is drawn in such vague terms
that it can be used for all sorts of unreasonable claims
and provoke all sorts of litigation."
252[1975] 2 All ER 1081.
2 53 [1975] 2 All ER 1081, 1083.
254[1976] 3 All ER 843, 847.
255[1975] 2 All ER 497,510.
256[1978] 1 All ER 574.
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Ackner L J said in Fernandes v Secretary of State for the
Home Department257 that although the ECHR was "not part of
the law of this country" it "may be resorted to in order
to help to resolve some uncertainty or ambiguity in
municipal law." The same approach was that of Webster J
in the 1984 case R v Secretary of State for the Home
Department, ex parte McAvoy.258
As regards the 1990s, let us begin with Brind and others v
Secretary of State for the Home Department259 where there
is an important limitation on the application of the ECHR
as regards delegated legislation. The House of Lords
"rejected this approach: the presumption that legislation
complies with treaty obligations does not apply so as to
limit the meaning of clear general words, but can be
applied only when there is a real ambiguity, i.e. where
the words are capable of bearing more than one meaning."260
It was not for the judges to allow the ECHR take further
root "by the back door". The issue discussed in this case
was whether the Home Secretary acted ultra vires when he
directed the IBA and BBC to stop broadcasting direct
statements by representatives of proscribed organisations
in Northern Ireland. The House of Lords gave a negative
answer and dismissed the appeal.
Under the Broadcasting Act 1981, in respect of the IBA,
and the licence and agreement of operation, as regards the
BBC, the Home Secretary could require these two
broadcasters "to refrain from broadcasting any matter or
classes of matter specified in the notice." The
appellants, journalists, applied for judicial review of
the Home Secretary's decision on grounds that his direc-
2 5 [1981 ] ImmAR 1 (CA).
HI 934] 3 All ER 417, 421 (QBD).
'[1991] 1 All ER 720.
2C0Lord Browne-Wilkinson, "The Infiltration of a Bill of Rights", [1992] PL 397, 404.
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tives were ultra vires and in dissonance with the duty to
preserve due impartiality imposed on the IBA and BBC, and
in addition, that he acted in breach of Article 10 ECHR,
without necessity, disproportionately and perversely.
Since the ECHR was not part of English domestic law and
there was no presumption that an administrative discretion
had to be exercised in conformity with it. The exercise
of such a discretion could only be reviewed by the courts
in accordance with the domestic principles of judicial
review, since the continental test of proportionality had
not been "borrowed" by English law.
Although Lord Templeman concurred in dismissing the appeal
he did not rely on the domestic principles of Wednesbury
reasonableness to reach his conclusion "[...] The subject
matter and date of the Wednesbury principles cannot in my
opinion make it either necessary or appropriate for the
courts to judge the validity of an interference with human
rights by asking themselves whether the Home Secretary has
acted irrationally or perversely."261 The domestic court
should ask:
whether a reasonable Secretary of State, on the mate¬
rial before him, could reasonably conclude that the
interference with freedom of expression which he
determined to impose was justifiable. In terms of the
Convention, as construed by the European Court of
Human Rights, the interference with freedom of
expression must be necessary and proportionate to the
damage which the restriction is designed to prevent262
The ECHR exercises pressures to transplant legal notions
"borrowed" from other legal systems. Sophie Boyron263
observes that the opinion of Lord Ackner shows a concern
towards doing away with one of the main organising princi¬
ples in English law, the distinction between appeal and
261 [1991] 1 All ER 720, 726.
262[1991] 1 All ER 720, 726.
263Sophie Boyron, "Proportionality in English Administrative Law: A Faulty Translation?",
(1992) 12 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 237, 262.
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review. An acceptance of the civilian principle of
proportionality would make English judges apply the test
of whether the interference complained of corresponds to a
pressing social need. Proportionality would involve a
judgment on the merits, which is the function of appeal.
Unlike French administrative judges, English judges do not
have the power of appeal in administrative law.
In R v Chief Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, Ex parte
Choudhury26i the applicant sought summonses alleging
blasphemous libel concerning Allah (Almighty God) against
the author and publishers of "The Satanic Verses." The
petitioner sought judicial review of the magistrate's
decision refusing to extend the common law offence of
blasphemy outside the Christian faith. The application
was dismissed. On appeal it was held that the freedom of
religion protected by arts. 9, 10 and 14 ECHR did not
require the extension of the law of blasphemy to the pro¬
tection of Islam. Next, the Appeal Committee of the House
of Lords dismissed an application for leave to appeal.
Although in this case domestic law (the English common law
on blasphemy) was unambiguous and thus, it was not
necessary to resort to the ECHR to clear up any obscurity,
Watkins L J said that:
nevertheless, he [Mr. Lester, Q.C., who was counsel
for Viking Penguin Publishing Co. Ltd.] thought it
necessary, and we agree, in the context of this case,
to attempt to satisfy us that the United Kingdom is
not in any event in breach of the Convention. Indeed,
he went further and asserted that if this application
were to succeed and result in successful prosecutions,
the rights of Mr. Rushdie and of Viking Penguin, as
protected by Articles 7 and 10 of the Convention,
would be violated.265
2G4[1991 ] 1 QB 429.
26-[1991 ] 1 QB 429, 449.
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This brings us to the question of the extent of the
expansion of the non-incorporated ECHR in English law.
One issue is whether the ECHR can be used as an aid to
interpretation in non-statutory English law. The answer
in the affirmative is easier to give after Derbyshire C C
v Times Newspapers Ltd and others. 266 In this case the lo¬
cal authority filed an action against the publishers,
editor and two journalists of the newspaper claiming dam¬
ages for printing articles alleging to reveal
improprieties in the authority's investment and control of
its superannuation fund. The Court of Appeal reversed the
first instance determination. The Court held that
although individuals within the authority could sue for
malicious falsehood or criminal libel, it would stamp out
legitimate criticism and impose additional restrictions on
the freedom of expression if a local authority were to
have the right to sue for libel in respect of its
governing and administrative reputation when there is no
allegation of financial loss. The lower court was wrong
to conclude that it could not resort to the ECHR to
resolve an ambiguity in the common law. Balcombe L J
said:
I do not agree with his finding [the finding of the
lower court judge] that there was no uncertainty in
English law on this point. He was faced with two
conflicting decisions: one (Manchester Corp v
Williams) of a Divisional Court which was prima facie
binding upon him unless he could find a valid ground
on which to distinguish it and one (the Bognor Regis
case) by a judge of co-ordinate jurisdiction. There
was no decision of the Court of Appeal or the House of
Lords on the point267
The European jurisprudence was mentioned as follows:
Of more immediate relevance to the present case the
European Court of Human Rights has held in Lingens v
Austria that the prosecution and conviction, under the
266[1992] 3 All ER 65.
267[1992] 3 All ER 65, 79.
Austrian law of criminal defamation, of a magazine
publisher in Vienna for printing two articles critical
of the Austrian Chancellor, was a violation of art
10268
On the other hand, Lord Keith reached his conclusion upon
English common law but also examined the relevant ECHR
case law and found English common law in line with the
ECHR. Finally, a statement of Balcombe L J reminds us of
his concern to make sure that English municipal law does
not violate the ECHR, "where the law is uncertain, it must
be right for the court to approach the issue before it
with a predilection to ensure that our law should not
involve a breach of art 10."269 Similarly, in the case
Rantzen v. Mirror Group Newspapers (1986) Ltd. and
others270 although the court respected the ECHR, the
decision was nevertheless based on English common law:
If one applies these words it seems to us that the
grant of an almost limitless discretion to a jury
fails to provide a satisfactory measurement for
deciding what is 'necessary in a democratic society'
or 'justified by a pressing social need'. We consider
therefore that the common law if properly understood
requires the courts to subject large awards of damages
to a more searching scrutiny than has been customary
in the past.271
This case dealt with an action for defamation brought by a
television presenter against the defendants for articles
in a national newspaper which she alleged meant that,
knowing a teacher to be guilty of sexually abusing
children, she had nevertheless protected him because of
his past services t her in assisting the preparation of a
programme about the sexual abuse of children. The jury
awarded her damages of £ 250,000, and this decision was
26ft[i992] 3 All ER 65, 78.
[1992] 3 All ER 65, 78.
270[1993] 4 All ER 975.
271 [1993] 4 All ER 975, 994.
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appealed by the defendants. The Court of Appeal reduced
the figure to £ 110,000.
So far, therefore, it could be said that the infiltration
of the Convention took place in the minds of the lawyers
who plead it for their clients, and to same extent to the
minds of the judges who base their decisions on English
common law which is found in line with the ECHR.
Nonetheless, the ECHR has characteristics which make it be
seen as "alien" by English judges because of its foreign
drafting style, the fact that it involves more policy
choices than that are used to and perhaps also the
perception that:
[...] in some - although by no means all - areas the
Convention encroaches on difficult and delicate areas
of individual or social morality. Of course such
issues arise in English law areas as well, but the
judges are anxious not to tread further in those
areas than they must.272
The debate over the possibility of incorporation reveals
that the ECHR has not percolated to the minds of
politicians in equal measure.
(c.2) Scots law
T. B. Smith wrote that:
At the end of the eighteenth century Scots law was a
Civilian system comparable to that of France. Since
then, especially as Scotland did not codify, English
law has been by far the greatest foreign influence
upon Scottish legal development, while French and
other non-British law is only occasionally referred
to in court. [...] With Ceylon, Quebec, Louisiana and
South Africa, Scots law is a "mixed" system
containing concepts and techniques of both Civil
272Francis G. Jacobs, 'The Convention and the English judge" in: F. Matscherand H.
Petzold (eas.). Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension. Studies in honour of
Gerard J. Wiarda. (1988), 275r
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(Romanistic) law and Anglo-American law. To some
extent Scots law has been able to bring English law
into closer touch with Civilian ideas [ . . . ]273
Nevertheless, as regards the ECHR, Scots law274 did not
seem especially welcoming of the continental (or
otherwise) ideas set out in the ECHR and pursued the
dualist approach to its logical end in cases such as Kaur
et al v Lord Advocate275 where Lord Ross rejected the
possibility of any infiltration of the Convention, "In my
opinion the Convention cannot be regarded in any way as
part of the municipal law of Scotland". He went on, "I
accept that the Convention sets forth a number of very
important principles relating to human rights, but the
provisions of the Convention have never entered into the
law of Scotland."
This case was the first that dealt in Scotland with the
question of the status and authority of the ECHR in
municipal law. It answered two questions: the first, what
authority the ECHR has as regards the sources of law and
the second, from where it derives such authority. The
answer to the first was the same as in English law: the
ECHR is a treaty with no binding force. Lord Ross draws
our attention to the fact that the position in English and
Scots law on this question was the same: "I respectfully
agree with what Lord Diplock said Salomon [ . . . ] Under our
constitution, it is the Queen in Parliament who legislates
and not Her Majesty's government, and the court does not
require to have regard to acts of Her Majesty's government
when interpreting the law."276 Answering the second
question, Lord Ross found "extremely difficult to
comprehend" the English approach which maintained that the
273T. B. Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative. (1962), 44.





ECHR was relevant when interpreting a statute. The ECHR
has not been "transplanted" to Scots law, therefore, he
said "If the Convention does not form part of the
municipal law I do not see why the court should have
regard to it at all."
Subsequent cases repeated this position. Lord Ross' view
was ratified in 1985 by the Inner House of the Court of
Session in Moore v Secretary of State for Scotland, "In
our view Lord Ross was perfectly correct in holding that
the Convention plays no part in our municipal law so long
as it has not been introduced into it by legislation."277
Both Kaur and Moore "stand as twin watchdogs at the door
of the legal system prohibiting entry of the Convention
without legislative authority."278 What is the authority
of the ECHR in Scotland according to those cases? Both
cases denied the ECHR any capacity as a source of law
because no "transplant" had taken place. The pressure of
the ECHR to percolate is there, however. Example: in 1989
Lord Templeman appeared to derive guidance from Article 10
ECHR in finding the limits on the government's claims to
restrain publication in the Scottish case of Lord Advocate
v Scotsman Publications Ltd279 and was seen as "a welcome
thaw in the approach of the Scottish courts to the
Convention, earlier authorities having discounted its
terms as entirely irrelevant to the process of
interpreting domestic law, and having explicitly
distinguished Scots law from English law on this point".280
The constitutional implications of "transplanting" the
ECHR to United Kingdom "soil" are far reaching. The
perception appears to be that, if the conceptions of the
ECHR are left run freely within the domestic legal system,
the present situation, which Lord Templeman described, as
2771985 SLT 38, 41.
27bJ. L. Murdoch, "The European Convention on Human Rights in Scots Law", [1991] PL
40.
2791989 SLT 705,710. (HL)
28ofsjeil Walker, "Spycatcher's Scottish Sequel" , [1990] PL 354, 367.
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regards the separation and balance of powers and the
issues United Kingdom judges are expected to adjudicate
on, will have to be changed:
[...] it is for Parliament to determine the restraints
on freedom of expression which are necessary in a
democratic society. The courts of this country should
follow any guidance contained in a statute. If that
guidance is inconsistent with the requirements of the
Convention then that will be a matter for the
Convention authorities and for the United Kingdom gov¬
ernment. It will not be a matter for the courts.
There is resistance to the transplant, however, changes
seem to be taking place anyway. Another Scottish case, Re
Budh Singh281 is less hostile to the Convention. In Singh
the Outer House of the Court of Session had to decide
whether the standard adopted by the Home Office amounted
to a failure to respect the applicant's family life in
breach of Article 8 ECHR. Although this is one particular
case, in Lord Morison's argument Scots law appears to come
to terms with the Convention:
[...] I agree with observations made with regard to
Article 8 of the Convention in the context of illegal
entry, by the European Court of Human Rights in the
case of Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali, in a
judgment delivered on 28 May 1985 dealing with an
issue similar to that raised in the present case.
Second, he required that the "European" principle
contained in Article 8 ECHR be reflected in Home Office
policy282 in those terms "[...] if the policy of the Home
Office is one which ignores the obvious humanitarian
principle of respect for family life, it would in my view
be unreasonable and subject to the Court's review [...]"
Ultimately, however, there is no equivalent to a
281 July 13, 1988, LEXIS.
282 Rebecca M. M. Wallace, "Human Rights in Europe", in: The Laws of Scotland. Stair
Memorial Encyclopaedia. (1992), 9.
Derbyshire C C case in Scotland as yet, so the
infiltration of the ECHR in Scots law283 is very limited.
Conelusions
Although not all the member states of the Council of
Europe have been taken into consideration in this chapter,
the intention was to look at the "transplanted" ECHR as it
inspires (or not) the process of interpretation of rules
on the protection of human rights in the domestic courts
in civilian, common law and mixed jurisdictions, and if
so, to what extent. The statute books of the member
states show that the status of the ECHR is different in
each of them. In the previous chapter, it was pointed out
that if legislative measures are taken in reaction to the
ECHR no matter the legal tradition, statutory responses
tend not to differ greatly. A similar look at their case
books is therefore more helpful to see the positions of
national courts in relation to the interpretation of the
"transplanted" Convention and the extent to which the
"transplant" has been taking root.
A common element in all the countries is their
responsibility in international law since they signed up
for the ECHR. The supranational instrument was apparently
"transplanted" to them this way, however, the position of
the ECHR in domestic law is not the same everywhere. The
tension between unity and diversity appears as one between
the "infiltrated" or "transplanted" ECHR and the diversity
of local legal systems (and conditions) which introduce
283The case Martin v City of Edinburgh District Council 1988 SLT 329, 330, makes an
incidental reference to the ECHR. In this case the Outer House of the Court of Session
found that the Council had failed in their duty as trustees of public and charitable funds when
they made some investments in South Africa. Lord Murray said that the case dealt solely with
the actings of members of the Council, but in the dicta of the case, it was recognised,
although in a rather sweeping statement, that "[this case] is not about the legality or morality
of apartheid. [...] apartheid would not be legally enforceable in Scotland if only because of its
apparent incompatibility with the Race Relations Act 1976, and with art. 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights."
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the pull of diversity and determine different outcomes in
different jurisdictions. It is not possible, however, to
speak of an outright "rejection" of the ECHR because the
struggle between unity and diversity is an on-going
tension and besides, transplants may take time to take
root.
Local conditions opposing the "transplant" are various.
National courts are reluctant to let provisions of
international law prevail over national law, especially in
this sensitive area. Pleading the ECHR in domestic law is
often tantamount to an obstacle course.284 National judges
may not be aware of the ECHR, Strasbourg case law may not
be readily accessible to them and adequate searches
involve time and expense. Researching the law of the
Strasbourg human rights system requires different skills
from those used in a national system. No doubt, also, the
relatively recent start of the teaching of the Convention
system at law school level and in refreshing courses
contributed to the comparatively low awareness of the ECHR
by the legal profession. The case law, which has been
deployed in this chapter in chronological order as far as
possible, shows that the ECHR is applied according to
domestic instincts (that is, ignoring the Strasbourg case
law) at first in all jurisdictions but after some time,
both practising lawyers and the bench gain more confidence
and gradually tend to overcome their reluctance to seek
guidance from the ECHR.
The ECHR "infiltrates" its own assumptions into the legal
systems of the member states and these may clash with the
existing ones. The assertion "One system's common sense
is another system's absurdity"285 sums up the many
284And it does not get any better before the Strasbourg organs where the complainant has
to face various material and logistic difficulties. See, e.g. Andrew Drzemczewski, "The need
for a radical overhaul", NLJ, 29.01.93, 134.
285David Pugsley, The Strange Case of the Exploding Motorbike and other Cases French
and Italian. (1991), 1.
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challenges that defy outsiders to a legal system and
Strasbourg was no exception to these considerations.
Moreover, the ECHR touches upon an area of public law
where the "spirit" of the law is strongly influenced
everywhere by its origins, its historical development and
the political opinions of the government and the governed,
as human rights policies have a far-reaching impact on the
legal system of any country.286 Constitutional law issues,
important or otherwise, are involved in the domestic
application of the ECHR. They make up, together with the
domestic legal system, the different "soils" to which the
ECHR is "transplanted". A constant element is that the
ECHR (through those who claim it) tries to percolate
through to domestic law in order to be applied by domestic
courts and fill in the gaps of municipal law or to
eliminate uncertainties in the domestic statutory and non¬
statutory law of rights and freedoms. As it was the case
of English law in colonial Africa, local conditions
determine that "transplants" grow differently in the
different "soils". Some of the questions involved,
however, were only concerns over constitutional
"correctness" although their sway should not be
underestimated. In the United Kingdom, the ECHR is viewed
as capable of altering the separation and balance of
constitutional powers or what judges are expected to
adjudicate on. Many have suggested the entrenchment of a
Bill of Rights as a possible solution for the difficulties
of the ECHR in the United Kingdom, although apparently,
this option runs counter to the constitutional argument of
continuing parliamentary sovereignty. Constitutional law
complications do not stop at the British side of the
Channel. French judges were so much influenced by the
doctrine of the inviolability of statutes which was part
and parcel of the theory of the separation of powers as it
286lt was precisely in the field of human rights where the constitutional courts of Federal
Germany and Italy were more reluctant to give the green light to a supranational system which
they considered too weak a constitutional foundation to protect the rights and freedoms of
their citizens.
- 113 -
was understood in France, that before the Council of
State's decision in Nicolo (1989), the three supreme
courts were not agreed on the position of international
law (ECHR included) in domestic law. Besides,
demonstrations of national pride such as "La France est le
terrain, est la patrie des droits de l'homme" surely slow
down the process of infiltration. Unsurprisingly, Judge
Pettiti complained in 1988 about the difficulties to
convince French judges that they could contradict a
domestic statute.287 In France, for example, the hurdle
concerning the position of international law (and hence,
the ECHR) in domestic law had to be cleared first before
deriving any guidance from the ECHR. The cases show that
national judges now stop to ponder how far the ECHR and
also the Strasbourg decisions are binding on them. In
Italy, the decisions mix the position and the use that can
be made of the ECHR, as in the United Kingdom. After
1989, however, the French have the edge on the Italians
and the British on the domestic use of the ECHR as the
stronger position of the ECHR in that country facilitates
claiming the Convention before a domestic court, grants
the Convention supremacy over opposing legislation and
perhaps allows more room for a "complicity" between
Strasbourg and the domestic courts. In contrast, in
Italy, the ECHR law has to face the vulnerability of its
weak position in the domestic hierarchy of norms. For the
civilians, the position of a statute in domestic law has
to be clarified first, then, it can be "applied"
(deductively) to a situation. The difference between
France and Italy in this respect illustrates that the ECHR
took firmer "roots" in the first than in the latter. The
differences have to do, among other things, with the
different conditions encountered by the "transplanted"
Convention. In Italy, no statute is unconstitutional on
the sole basis of being contrary to the ECHR because the
287Louis-Edmond Pettiti, ibid.
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ECHR is regarded as ordinary legislation and as such it is
under the constant threat from other enactments under the
principle legi posterior derogat priori. Several
unsuccessful attempts to "constitutionalise" the ECHR were
made by scholarly writers in order to negotiate this
obstruction but Italian courts do not accept such thesis
nor the argument that the ECHR could be assimilated to EU
law. This situation may, in turn, drive citizens to look
for justice elsewhere and therefore partly explain the
Italian record in Strasbourg.288
The language barrier289 is another serious obstacle which
contributes to the slow "infiltration". It is not just an
issue of the availability of translations of European case
law, but the difficulty has to do with the legal habits
and customs deeply linked to a legal system's vocabulary
(and jargon) that make case law translations so difficult.
Domestic systems are not the only culprits in the slow
"growth" of the Convention law. Although the observation
does not necessarily reflect negatively on the Strasbourg
system, it is well known that the European organs took
several years to reach the present position where a
sizable body of sufficiently varied case law290 is made
available to the member states and which is able to
provide interpretational guidance if resorted to. Extra¬
legal factors also had an influence in this matter. To
name one, the perception that unlike the law applicable to
international business transactions (for example, shipping
or bills and payment) or to rights of immediate commercial
288Giorgio Grigori, II aiudice italiano di fronte alia Convenzione europea. (1980), 217.
289Martin Weston, An English Reader's Guide to the French Legal System. (1991),143.
The author is a translator at the Registry of the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasbourg and highlights the importance of carrying out conscious translations instead of
transpositions word for word as legal translations are full of "culture-bound" legal terms.
2 1 'For instance, in the United Kingdom report: Legislation on Human Rights with particular
reference to .he European Convention on Human Rights: A Discussion Document. June
1976, the issue in 1975 as regards whether the UK should be enjoined to interpret the
ECHR in accordance with the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights when there
were only 12. The case law of the Commission was more abundant, but this is not binding.
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value (for example patents and copyrights) the need for a
harmonised approach to the protection of human rights is
less pressing.291
Nonetheless, the impression overall is that the
"transplant" seems to be taking its time to "grow". It is
too early to detect a full start even in those countries
where the ECHR has been incorporated (or where it is
pleaded more often), but there is a trend in the
developments surveyed in this chapter showing the
direction in which things are moving. Even in
jurisdictions reluctant to resort to the Convention, the
courts had at least to reach a decision on whether or not
to use the ECHR pleaded before them. The possibility of a
"complicity" between national and supranational judiciary
gives evidence of the ECHR "taking root" and means that
national judiciaries would become more aware of the
developments in Strasbourg in which case they could show
more enthusiasm for the European case law and import
"European" solutions more readily. This eagerness would
come out of reciprocal understanding and not of the fear
of a reversal by the European organs. "By looking at what
actually happens, we can see that a system of European
public law is progressively taking shape. By reflecting
upon its course, we can also discover that the system will
continue to develop." 292 It is a very slow process293 and
the differences of legal systems and approaches to the
adjudication of human rights in the member states are not
bound to disappear too soon.
For various reasons (the status and capacity to achieve
primacy in municipal law play an important part in this),
however, the ECHR does not resolve all possible conflicts
291 In addition, commercial relations are more developed than international relations between
national administrations or between the citizens of one state and the administration of
another. See J. Schwarze, European Administrative Law. (1992), 76-77.
292T Koopmans, "European Public Law: Reality and Prospects", [1991] PL 53, 63.
293P. van Dijk and G. J. H. van Hoof, id., 14.
- 116 -
between remedies available in domestic law and itself.
Those are the cases that will be resolved outside the
legal systems of the nation-states: the European organs in
Strasbourg. The present situation where many complainants
seeking protection of their Convention rights must still
rely on the enforcement procedures in the ECHR itself and
take their cases to Strasbourg, may make us sceptical
about the extent of the impact of the Convention on the
day-to-day work of the domestic courts. The right of
individual petition of Article 25 ECHR together with the
passage of time, marked an expansion of the ECHR's
infiltration, but this time through the European
judgments, all over the member states.
The constant pressure put by the ECHR on the member
states, "knocking at their doors" and seeking to
infiltrate their municipal law, appears to be the main
agent of further harmonisation. The continuous reference
to the transplanted Convention by the domestic courts,
especially requested by the individual complainants, works
as a unifying element despite the different answers given
by the different systems to the same questions, proving
that "transplants" of laws "grow" differently in different
environments. Had it been otherwise the Strasbourg






Purely paper declarations, however,
are rightly discredited. Our
statement will have force only if
it is converted into action, and
the most immediate and practical
way of doing this is by the
adoption of a Charter of Human
Rights, coupled with a definite
method of enforcement.294
Freedom and respect for the
individual are not mere words, but
are powerful and dynamic forces
binding men throughout the free
world and leading us to the true
goal - a united free world capable
of sustaining itself in peace and
war against whatever force may
assail it.299
Introduction
The infiltration of the ECHR in domestic law should not
leave us with the impression that the Strasbourg system
sternly sets standards for the member states to follow.
In fact, the ECHR and its system, in a truly democratic
fashion, was produced out of the (legal) traditions of the
member states and created with influences from the bottom
up. The aim of this chapter is therefore not to describe
the familiar contents of the ECHR or to dwell on the
diplomatic and political history of the drafting, which
294Lord Layton, intervention at the "First session of the Consultative Assembly Held at
Strasbourg 10 th August to 8th September 1949, sittings held from 16 th August to 8th
September 1949", Section A: sittings of the Consultative Assembly (1st session, 5th
sitting), in: Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume I, (1975).
295Mr. Ernest Davis, British Foreign Secretary, at the ceremony of signing the ECHR, 40.
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will only be mentioned to cast incidental light as the
backdrop out of which the ECHR emerged. The goal is to
concentrate on the impact of the thought patterns of the
legal traditions as they appeared in the interventions of
the delegates in the drafting sessions and their advice on
the way rights were to be laid out. The tension between
unity and diversity became alive in the delegates'
interventions as a struggle between the appeal to
universal (or at least "Europe-wide") human rights
principles and the effect of the multiplicity of the
national legal (and political) systems that they, perhaps
even subconsciously, brought to the discussions. This
study is based primarily on evidence drawn from the
travaux preparatoires of the ECHR and the first protocol,
and along with secondary sources, the works of some
participants to the negotiations are taken into account.296
The Strasbourg system of protection: the appeal of
universal principles
The origins of the Council of Europe bear the hallmark of
the "Europe-wide" principles present on the minds of the
founding fathers. In 1948, at The Hague Congress of the
European Movement there was an initiative to create a
Consultative Assembly at the suggestion of the Belgian and
French governments to which the United Kingdom counter-
proposed a Council of Ministers. A study committee which
was set up in January 1949 suggested the implementation of
both proposals. The United Kingdom agreed to this other
initiative on condition that only recommendations
unanimously approved by the Council could be addressed to
296The Committee of Experts in charge of the largest part of the drafting work in February
and March 1950 discussed many documents, i.e. recommendations of the Assembly,
proposals and amendments of the delegations, papers prepared by the Secretariat, general
accounts of the interventions and so on. No verbatim reports of the actual interventions in
the discussions were made at the time. The reports of the Conference of Senior Officials
which met in June 1950 were published as a collected edition of the travaux preparatoires.
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governments.297 The Scandinavian countries and Italy were
brought into consultation and a conference of ambassadors
drew up the Statute of the Council of Europe, a compromise
solution, which was signed on May 5 , 1949.298 Some of the
ideas of the founding fathers were translated into the
creation of the following bodies: a Consultative Assembly,
a Committee of Ministers and a General Secretariat.
Insisting on the common traditions shared by all
Europeans, in the First Session of the Consultative
Assembly a resolution was adopted which read: "that the
aim of the Council of Europe is the setting up of a
European political authority with limited functions but
real powers." (September 6, 1949) The decision to draft a
European Convention was reached when it became clear that
it would take a long time to turn into binding treaty
obligations the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
passed on December 10, 1948, by the General Assembly of
the United Nations.299 it should be said that the ECHR was
the first convention concluded between the member states
of the Council of Europe.
The pull towards unity and universality can be seen in the
goal to reaffirm the principles of the Western European
countries' political faith and their common spiritual and
moral values in relation to the threat of communism.300
The system they sought to create was devised to protect a
297This compromise was a result of the prevailing Continental position favouring a European
Assembly and the British reluctance in going along with the European ideas that they had
helped, in a sense, to initiate. Arnold J. Zurcher, The Struggle to Unite Europe 1940-1958,
(1958), 38. Also relevant for this study are: U. Leone, Le oriaine diplomatiche del Consialio
d'Europa. (1966) and C. Melchiorde Molenes, L'Europe de Strasbourg: Une premiere
experience de parlamentarisme international. (1971).
298lmportant dates in the calendar of the Council of Europe are as follows: 1949: foundation
of the Council of Europe; 1950: signature of the ECHR; 1953: entry into force of the ECHR
(on September3, 1953); 1954: creation of the European Commission of Human Rights;
1955: entry into force of the right of individual petition; 1959: creation of the European Court
of Human Rights; 1961: signature of the European Social Charter; 1965: entry into force of
the European Social Charter; and 1989: signature of the European Convention for the
Prevention of Torture and Inhuman and Degrading Treatment. In the early 1990s: entry of
East European countries.
299Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights in a Nutshell. (1988), 83.
30OA. H. Robertson, op. cit.,4.
- 120 -
European (and Western) asset, "the dignity of man"301
founded on the "Greek notion of the individual, the Roman
notion of the citizen and the Christian notion of man".302
All these values were threatened by totalitarianism:
Nazism and World War II in the Convention authors' very
near past and the Soviet tyranny in the authors' cold war
present. Within the Council of Europe, these aspirations
would be reached by actively promoting a greater unity
between its members by the conclusion of agreements and by
encouraging common action in numerous fields except
military. For the system, the safeguard of rights and
freedoms of the individual was a prerequisite for
democracy as well as the respect for the rule of law.303
In the words of the Irish Minister at the ceremony of
signature of the ECHR:
The present struggle is one which is largely being
fought in the minds and the consciences of mankind.
In this struggle I have always felt we lacked a
clearly defined charter which set out unambiguously
the rights we as democrats guarantee to our people.
This Convention is a step in this direction.304
The pull of diversity was also vigorous, and despite
(some) founders' idea of the Council of Europe as a germ
for a united Europe, it was conceived as an inter¬
governmental organisation for co-operation between
states.305 The Statute of the Council of Europe was signed
in London on May 5, 1949. It proved a disappointment for
the "strong" Europeans because too much was surrendered to
the British Government who, although it appeared in favour
of union in reality it was not:
301Polys Modinos, "Effects and Repercussions of the European Convention on Human
Rights", (1962) 11 ICLQ 1097, 1097.
302Polys Modinos, op. cit., 1107.
303The Council of Europe. Its development and future perspectives. Publications and
Documents Division of the Council of Europe, (1990), 1.
3Q4Charterof Freedom, op. cit.
3 0 5Xhomas Ouchterlony, "The Council of Europe in the New Europe", address to the
European Communities Studies Group, Europa Institute, University of Edinburgh, October
11, 1991, 2.
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What had come into being had been strongly colored by
the Continental effort to placate official British
opinion. The aim had been to bring Britain into a
European structure and, in pursuance of that aim, so
much had been compromised and so much had been
surrendered of what was essential to even a modicum
of union, that the final result was far less than the
minimum that many Continental advocates of union
believed was compatible with their ideals.306
The failure of all proposals with a constitutional content
in November 1949 and again in November 1950 has been
attributed to the British veto and the situation
eventually led six members to press ahead and create the
Europe of the Six.307 The United Kingdom itself was pulled
by two forces moving in opposite directions at that time:
on the one hand, the fraternity of English-speaking
nations308 expressed in terms such as "Great Britain is
herself the centre of a free and worldwide commonwealth of
States"309 and on the other, its ties with the Continental
Europeans. Obviously, the United Kingdom is in
geographical proximity to the Continent and after the war,
it shared with the continentals the general weakness in
which the country was left, the Marshall aid and also, the
fact of being associated in a movement leading to
integration and which counted influential United Kingdom
people among its members.310
306Arnold J. Zurcher, op. cit., 41.
307Walter Lipgens, Sources for the History of European Integration (1945-19551 A Guide to
Archives in the Countries of the Community. (1980),171.
3 08Perhaps an observation on the state of the "special relationship" made by the outgoing
United States ambassador to the United Kingdom in April 1994 is an indication that the
situation is already much changed:"[...] America's transatlantic policy is European in scope.
It is not a series of individual or compartmentalised bilateral policies, and never has been. It is
the policy of one continent to another. There is a simple observation that if Britain's voice is
less influential in Paris or Bonn, it is likely to be less influential in Washington." The Times.
April 20, 1994. "Britain belongs to Europe; Raymond Seitz on the state of the special
relationship".
309Sir Winston S. Churchill, "Council of the European Movement; A Speech at the Salle des
Beaux Arts, Brussels, 26 February 1949", in: Randolph S. Churchill (ed.),"ln the Balance;
Speeches 1949 and 1950 by Winston S. Churchill", (1951), 29.
310Jacques Freymond, Western Europe Since the War, (1965), 45.
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Nonetheless, some important "Europe-wide" ideas of
universal appeal were present in the creation of the
Council of Europe. As the newly created institution
required that all member states accept "the principles of
the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all persons within
its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental
freedoms"311, the First Session of the Assembly considered
the measures necessary to fulfil a mission which
eventually led the Council of Europe to produce the ECHR.
The insistence on the preparation of a single code of
rights, Europe-wide, in a sense was putting in practice
the lesson so painfully learnt in the war that respect for
human rights concerned individual people and their
countries as well as the international community.312 The
internationalisation of protection, meaning
Europeanisation in the context of this supranational
regional organisation, was well put by the Norwegian
Minister, Mr. Halvard Lange, at the ceremony of the
signature of the ECHR in Rome:
Until to-day this protection of human rights has been
achieved on a purely national plane. The Convention
which we are signing today brings the protection of
the fundamental rights of the individual on to a
European plane.313
The German Minister Dr. Hallstein, a strong314 supporter of
the European idea, thought that:
To have achieved this agreement is an act of
essential progress in the grand European idea, and we
are very happy about it. We are also convinced that
it opens the way for further progress either in
developing this agreement or in other fields of
European activity.315
311Art. 3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe.
312 Rolv Ryssdal, The future of the European Court of Human Rights. (1990), document
ECOUR90296.AB),1.
313Charter of Freedom, special edition of the News from Strasbourg, November 1950.
314Arnold J. Zurcher, op.cit.,168.
315Charter of Freedom, op. cit.
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The French representative's intervention in the Second
Session of the Consultative Assembly revealed that the
oppressive experiences of World War II were fresh on the
minds of the Ministers, who wanted to safeguard democracy
and prevent dictatorship at all cost. Mr. Teitgen's idea
had even a wider scope, as he suggested to devise an
international mechanism which could be "triggered" should
any member state slip into the path of dictatorship316 in
order to revert promptly such state of affairs:
intervention by the European Court must be possible
immediately after a totalitarian dictatorship has been
set up. It is from the very first day, from the day
of the assassination of a Matteotti, from the day of a
Reichstag fire, it is from that very moment that it
must be able to intervene, and to intervene on grounds
such as these: "You have suppressed free institutions,
you have just suppressed or reduced the scope of
universal suffrage and free opinion, you are now
getting ready to suppress political opposition,
consequently the European guarantee operates and is
set in motion." If we were to reject this
possibility, our system would lose the greater part of
its political efficacy.317
These notions are powerful guiding ideals for the
Strasbourg system and they periodically emerge in the
decision-making process of the European organs as the
archetype of one European system of human rights
protection. In the case law of the European Court of
Human Rights there are still echoes, as will be seen, of
the ideas behind the proposal made at The Hague Congress
in 1948 to invite all European governments to subscribe to
a common declaration on fundamental personal and civic
rights, and which, in the end, fructified in the decision
to draft the ECHR.
316A. H. Robertson, Human Rights in Europe. 2nd. ed. (1977), 3.
317 First part of second session of the Consultative Assembly, Collected Edition of the
Travaux preparatoires, volume V, 294.
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The effect of the multiplicity of the national
legal (and political) systems on the origins of the
ECHR: the legal traditions shaping the drafting of
the Convention
While political considerations played an important part in
the final shape of the ECHR, the struggle between the
"enumeration theory" and the "definition theory" which
divided the participants to the discussions is at least
quite suggestive because the positions correspond
surprisingly with the divide between the legal traditions.
As the late A. H. Robertson put it, the trial of strength
was one that boiled down to "fundamentally a difference
between the civil law approach and the common law
approach"318 visible in the efforts of the member states to
shape the ECHR to a degree in the image of their own
national law and way of legal thinking. Indeed, it has
been pointed out (tongue-in-cheek) that those differences
of approaches can usually be observed in negotiations
between the British and the French, "the British
distrusting the attitude of the French who start with
general considerations and postpone negotiations about
details, and the French not understanding why the British
talk endlessly about what the French consider as 'nickels
and dimes' among the issues to be discussed."319 There was
an element of this in the legal drafting discussions.
Admittedly, the delegates' interventions may have been
biased or perhaps obscured by policy considerations or
simply rhetoric. Moreover, it may well be that in truth
they were wrapping in legal arguments, for the sake of
their presentability, more profound differences among them
which they declined to voice for diplomatic and political
reasons. If this was the case, then they must have
318A. H. Robertson, "The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights",
(1950) 27 BYIL 145, 151.
319J. F. Nijboer, "Common Law Tradition in Evidence Scholarship Observed from a
Continental Perspective", (1993) 41 AJCL 299, 320.
- 125 -
certainly been very well packaged as legal arguments, so
as to make, for example, A. H. Robertson, depict the
struggle in terms of a gulf between civilian and common
lawyers. The lawyers (and diplomats) from each country
have their own different ways of understanding things of
which they may even be imperfectly aware. As the legal
traditions of the member states point in different
directions in many areas of the law, among those, legal
drafting, not surprisingly, the discussions held in
1949/1950 in Strasbourg show to a remarkable extent the
imprint of the characteristic styles of legal thought in
the relevant legal families.
This drafting controversy should be set against the wider
context of the tensions between an adhesion to universal
principles versus the scattering effect brought by the
diversity of traditions of the national legal systems.
Today in the Strasbourg human rights system, these
pressures between the European and the national elements
still appear in its various tasks. It goes without saying
that each member state still has its own history, culture,
and very relevant to us, at least one legal system.
From the First Session of the Consultative Assembly,
therefore, the discussions were imbued with the awareness
of diversity inherent in the idea of Europe. The
important question was, therefore, could a European human
rights system be devised so as to be suitable "for
Scotchmen and Sicilians, for Germans and Frenchmen, for
the English and the Neapolitans?"320 The answer from the
320The answer from, for example, the nineteenth century English economist and journalist
Walter Bagehot would have been "no". According to K.C. Wheare, "Lecture on a Master
Mind 1974: Walter Bagehot", (1974), 12, Bagehot had developed the view that national
character was a paramount factor in determining a country's political and constitutional
questions. Perhaps Jean-Jacques Rousseau was more accurate when he suggested that
the issue was the other way around and pointed out that: "II est certain que les peuples sont,
a la longue, ce que le gouvernement les fait etre" (quoted by R. C. van Caenegem, Judges.
Legislators and Professors: Chapters in European Legal History. (1985), 72, from
Rousseau's article on Political Economy in the Encyclopedie of 1735.) Whatever the case,
notions of national character are viewed with suspicion today and even more so by those
- 126 -
Assembly was in the affirmative and on August 19, 1949, it
debated the proposal to establish an organisation within
the Council of Europe to ensure the collective guarantee
of human rights. Viewed from the mid-1990s, the human
rights field is one where several legal systems overlap,
therefore, it seems that the Danish representative was
correct when he observed: "Coming as we do from very
different nations, we can have scarcely any doubt on this
point. We shall continue to be what we are - Europeans,
but at the same time Englishmen, Frenchmen, Greeks,
Norwegians, Swedes, Dutch, Irishmen, Belgians,
Luxembourgers, Italians, Turks and Danes, born and
bred. "321
The proposal for a collective guarantee of human rights
was referred to the Committee on Legal and Administrative
Questions with Sir David Maxwell Fyfe322 (President) from
the United Kingdom, Mr. Antonio Azara (Vice-Chairman) from
Italy and Mr. Pierre-Henri Teitgen (Reporter) from France.
The latter supplied the Assembly with a report and a draft
based on the Universal Declaration that had been passed by
the United Nations on September 8, 1949. In order to look
into the Assembly's proposals and prepare a draft, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe called a
committee of governmental experts to Strasbourg in
November 1949. This committee of experts met in February
and March 1950 and prepared a draft Convention based on
the proposals of the Consultative Assembly. They failed,
however, to reach agreement on other items, for example,
the creation of a European Court.
In this committee of (legal) experts there was a patent
division between civilian and common lawyers, who could
not agree on whether rights should be merely enumerated or
"strong" Europeans of the mid-twentieth century who answered this question with a clear
"yes".
321Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume I, 66.
322Later Lord Chancellor Kilmuir.
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conversely, defined in detail, that is, with the inclusion
of the permitted limitations and restrictions. in the
course of its sessions the committee set up several
subcommittees to examine and co-ordinate the submission of
amendments, proposals and drafts by the members.323 The
activities of one of those sub-committees seems specially
interesting.324 The record acknowledges that there were
differences in the methodology which appeared as soon as
they convened and reads as follows: "Right from the
beginning of the discussions, two main schools of thought
were expressed in the Committee with regard to the method
to be adopted for carrying out the mission with which it
had been entrusted".325 The record also disclosed that at
this stage the United Kingdom (and the Netherlands, which
is also mentioned on this occasion) appeared favouring a
precise definition of the rights to be safeguarded, while
France and Italy backed a proclamation of general
principles:
Certain members, however - particularly the
representatives of the United Kingdom and the
Netherlands - considered that the fundamental rights
to be safeguarded, and, even more important, the
limitations of these rights, should be defined in this
Convention in as detailed a manner as possible. These
members felt that it would be impossible for States to
undertake to respect rights which had not been defined
sufficiently precisely.326
Although the Belgian representative shared the views of
his Italian and French counterparts he did not flatly
oppose the "definition theory" showing therefore a
pragmatic approach and a willingness to compromise
probably convinced that yet to come perfection was no
323Meetings of the Committee of Experts held in Strasbourg from 2 to 8 February 1950 and
6 to 10 March 1950, in: Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, (1975), 8.
324 Committee consisting of Mr. de la Vallee-Poussin (Belgium), Mr. Chaumont (France), Mr.
Perassi (Italy), Mr. Salen (Sweden), Mr. Ustun (Turkey) and Sir Oscar Dowson (United
Kingdom) who met on the mornings of February 4th to the 6th. Collected Edition of the
Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, 252-4.
325Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, 252.
3 2 6Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, 254.
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good: "Even an incomplete Convention might render useful
service, pending the conclusion of a better one."327
On the other hand, the position of the United Kingdom was
clearly repeated by Sir Oscar Dowson later in the same
minute. There is an additional minute which repeats
almost word for word the paragraphs just quoted in which,
however, the United Kingdom appeared as the only one
insisting on the detailed description of rights328 and the
dissimilarity between the United Kingdom and the rest of
the member states becomes deeper.329 The United Kingdom
representative's intervention supplies further details
about his country's dissatisfaction with the (mere)
listings of the Assembly's draft: "how could a country
feel sure that its laws were consistent with the
obligations it would assume on accession if it did not
know precisely what were the obligations involved?"330
In addition, not all the continental countries appeared to
rally to Italy's support, whose representatives put the
opposite view on Convention drafting and with almost equal
vehemence. The contrast between the British and the
Italian position on the issue is conspicuous. The Italian
representatives' view appeared to be guided by the idea
that a general and abstract statement set down in
statutory form will then be "applied" to a concrete
situation by a court, as it was impossible to spell out
all the numerous restrictions rights could be subjected
to. They insisted on the need to set out general rules
and supported their opinion against detailed definitions
with the following example:
In any case, in order to cover them all by the
Convention it would be necessary to add to the
327Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, 258.
328Meetings of the Committee of Experts held in Strasbourg from 2 to 8 February 1950 and
6 to 10 March 1950, in: Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, (1975), 8.
329Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, 10.
330Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, 10.
- 129 -
detailed list of restrictions a certain number of
general rules. As an example, it might be well to
draw the attention of the Ministers to the list of
restrictions which the United Nations Commission had
drawn up with regard to freedom of expression [...]
The restrictions enumerated in this list contained a
large number of general principles which deprived them
of the precision for which the partisans of the United
Nations Commission's methods were aiming. (For
example the idea "detrimental for public decency or
morals" - exception No. 4 "proper conduct of
political elections" - exception No. 7 "national
safety" - exception No. 9 "profanity" - exception
No . 11 -; etc.)331
The conclusion that can be drawn from this opposition is
that the two contrasting points of view appear to depict
in some degree the different way sources are perceived in
the United Kingdom and Continental Europe. Although in
practice statutory law has supplanted the common law as
the dominant source, there is still a tendency to consider
the common law as a provider of solutions to an endless
series of specific disputes and not as a source of general
rules of conduct for the future. This is an assumption
that, by colouring the way of thinking, shapes the style
of legislation, which, in the interest of certainty, shows
a good deal of concern with specifying how the rules
should be applied in particular circumstances.332 In
addition, there is another element. The idea of a Bill of
Rights as such may run counter to a system where there are
no formal limits to the validity of Parliamentary
legislation and where freedom is considered "residual"
because rights are not spelled out in writing.333
The tone of the discussions - as it appears from the
interventions reported in the Travaux - was of very
entrenched and firm positions. It can be inferred from
3 3Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, 12.
332John Bridge, "National Legal Tradition and Community Law: Legislative Drafting and
Judicial Interpretation in England and the European Community", (1981) Journal of Common
Market Studies 351, 354.
333See Chapter 3.
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the footings of the reported interventions that the
discrepancies between the participants sprang mainly from
their familiarity with their respective legal systems and,
it can be hypothesized, from the expectation that the
other system would fail in achieving the proposed goal,
that is, to produce a "workable" Convention. It is
speculated that the participants in these discussions were
generalising from their experience in their systems and in
certain measure failed to understand how different the
situation was or could be in a European context. Perhaps
due to the infancy of the first European attempts at
integration in 1949 and 1950 they found it difficult to
think in European terms particularly as regards the
different ways things can be done in different systems.
The report keeps revealing that the polarisation between
the traditions was quite marked at all times. Finally,
the representative of the Netherlands joined the French on
a remark on methodology where the "definition" approach
was attributed to the British representatives alone.334
The "enumeration" theory was also seen as capable of
increasing the chances of approval by their respective
countries, as it would give them more leeway to implement
a Convention which was to be "transplanted" to their legal
orders. The methodological preferences propounded by the
Belgian and French representatives were supportive of this
position. They joined the Italian representative to
insist on the importance of making a statement of the
general principles of law the Convention should take into
consideration.335
These negotiations revealed how deeply ingrained certain
practices can be in a legal system. Similarly, the
tensions produced by such deep-rooted practices and of
334Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, 12.
335Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, 14.
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multinational membership can be observed in the
adjudication work of the European Court and in the
screening activities of the Commission. Lawyers of
dissimilar credentials must contribute to a "European"
outcome acceptable in all member states. Patterns of
behaviour tend to recur, and the tension between the legal
traditions will re-appear many times in the Court under
the external appearance of the divisions between the
majority ruling and the dissenting opinions capable of
splitting the Court as sharply as the different
assumptions on legal drafting divided those involved in
the preparation of the Convention.
As it is also the case of the Court, not all outcomes can
be explained as the product of the struggle between the
legal traditions involved. Nonetheless, legal
considerations had their weight, particularly in view of
the fact that what was being drafted was a legal document.
The committee of experts submitted a report to the
Committee of Ministers with a number of alternative texts
adducing an impossibility to merge the common law approach
of the text of the articles defining human rights
submitted by the United Kingdom and the continental
approach, in the form of the listings of the Assembly's
draft. Above all, this realisation can be taken to mean
that in the end the participants recognised that it was
possible to reach a Convention by either of the two legal
approaches, and having exhausted all legal considerations,
then the final selection was to be made on political
criteria. They said that: "the choice between the two
systems should be decided in the light of political rather
than legal considerations"336 and for this purpose, four
alternatives were submitted, the Assembly's and the United
Kingdom's proposals which included the creation of a
336Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, 16.
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Commission only and the same two proposals including the
creation of a Court in addition to a Commission.337
The Committee of Ministers was issued with a number of
alternative texts and after considering this report, they
convened a meeting of senior officials in order to take
the required political decisions. The senior officials
met in June 1950 and prepared a draft Convention adopting
a compromise formula. The Committee of Ministers'
attitude appeared to reinforce the conclusions just
stated. In their view:
The Committee decided that it was impossible to
amalgamate the text of the Articles defining human
rights in the United Kingdom proposals and the test
of the Articles listing these rights in the
Assembly's draft, since the systems on which these
two drafts were based were essentially different.338
In August 1950, the Committee of Ministers considered the
report of the Senior Officials together with the comments
issued by the Assembly's Committee on Legal and
Administrative Questions. On August 7, 1950, they adopted
a revised text that watered down the original proposals of
the Assembly as the right of individual petition was made
conditional and the jurisdiction of the Court optional.339
The revised text was subsequently submitted to the
Assembly and again considered by the Legal Committee,
whose report was approved by the Assembly on August 25,
1950. At the meeting in Rome in November 1950 the
Committee of Ministers dealt with the drafts again. Mr.
Teitgen, the French representative, explained why the
Assembly's original draft of the ECHR was replaced by a
337Appendix to the Report of the Committee of Experts on Human Rights: Draft Convention
of Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Doc. CM/WP 1 (50) 15
appendix; CM/WP 1 (50) 14 revised, A 925, 16th March 1950, in: Collected Edition of the
Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, (1975), 50.
338Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume IV, 16.
339Group of Officials of the Secretariat, Manual of the Council of Europe: Structure.
Functions and Achievements. (1970), 262-3.
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list of defined rights and freedoms, and although he did
not find it satisfactory, the change of approach accepted
by the Committee of Ministers was a result of the United
Kingdom insistence:
At the request of the United Kingdom experts, the
Ministers have set out to replace our list by a
series of definitions. They have tried to state in
positive terms what is included and what is not
included in the rights and freedoms to be
guaranteed.340
The legal gulf between the British and the continentals
did not escape the attention of Mr. Teitgen when he
reinstated France's position, which was similar to the
worries of the Italian representative. The continental
way of drafting was probably on his mind when he made a
connection between drafting and legal interpretation:
The definitions put forward by the British might well
be dangerous, indeed, if they were to be taken as
restrictive, for it is extremely difficult to list
all the possibilities contained in a single freedom
and all those excluded therefrom. There is always a
danger that the list will be incomplete. It would be
easy for me, indeed, to take the Committee of
Ministers' text and to demonstrate to you, in respect
of certain of the freedoms there defined, that the
formula proposed contains either obscurities or
serious gaps. 341
The (civilian) ideal of the law as capable of regulating
an area in a complete way, with no gaps, overlappings,
contradictions or ambiguities could be achieved if the
gaps which were left anyway by the definitions were to be
filled in the process of legal interpretation by general
principles of (international) law. The continental lawyer
in him was speaking when he placed that condition on his
proposal to accept definitions:
340Speech of Mr. Teitgen at the 2nd Session of the Consultative Assembly, Collected
Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume V, 284.
341Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume V, 286.
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We should be prepared to accept definitions, we should
grant the concession requested by the United Kingdom,
but we should add - and this seems essential to me -
that these definitions propounded to us shall be
interpreted in the light of the general principles of
law obtaining among civilised nations. If we act this
way, whatever obscurities and lacunae may subsist in
these definitions would be removed by the simple fact
of this supplementary note on this interpretation.342
The legal advisers of the Ministers did not reach
agreement on the majority of the proposed amendments so
the ECHR was signed on November 4, 1950, substantially in
the form approved by the Ministers in August.
As said, the political input determined the final shape of
the draft Convention prepared by the Committee of
Ministers when they met in June 1950. They adopted a
compromise formula on the question of the enumeration or
definition. The draft combined the two texts submitted by
the experts and the result apparently corresponded more
closely to the definitions of the rights and freedoms and
of the limitations to which they might be subjected,
although it nevertheless contained certain features of the
enumeration proposed by the other alternative.343 It left
undecided the issue of the right of individual petition,
which was referred for decision by the Ministers
themselves.
The final shape of the ECHR at the crossroads of
legal and political diversity
What do we have so far? First, that the struggle between
unity (in the "European" ideals) was challenged by
diversity of political and legal goals shown in two
schools of thought. The thinking behind these two ways of
342Collected Edition of the Travaux preparatoires, volume V, 286.
343A. H. Robertson, The Council of Europe: Its Structure. Functions and Achievements.
2nd. ed, (1961), 163.
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doing things in law coincide with the assumptions that
guide the legal traditions, civilian and common law. The
document which eventually entered into force on September
3 , 1953 , 344 was born therefore at the crossroads of the
traditions.
Lastly, let us consider a few further examples of the
struggle as reported by A. H. Robertson. 345 In these
examples the civil lawyers appeared again rather
comfortable with generalisations but their common law
colleagues showed their preference for detailed
definitions, almost giving the impression that they feared
any loss of their capacity to legislate for the very rare
case. He wrote that at a certain point the civilians
wanted to incorporate the open-ended words "Everyone has
the right to life, liberty and security of person" of
Article 3 of the United Nations Declaration textually in
the ECHR, but the common lawyers considered that the
"right to life" required a statement of the circumstances
in which someone could be lawfully deprived of their life.
Article 2 of the ECHR spelled out those limitations, for
example, when deprivation of life "results from the use of
force which is no more than absolutely necessary" in self-
defence, to carry out a lawful arrest or in action to
suppress a riot or insurrection. Similarly, the civilians
also wanted to incorporate word-for-word the requirement
that "No one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest,
detention or exile" of Article 9 of the UN Declaration.
The long Article 5 ECHR defines the circumstances in which
detention is lawful, following the common lawyers'
proposals, and one might speculate, based on what is
traditionally understood as a good drafting practice in
the common law that no doubt clarified the contents of the
344The (substantive) rights and freedoms protected were taken from the Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights of the United Nations. Part III of the Covenant approximately
corresponds to Section I of the ECHR. Section IV of the ECHR spells out the powers and
procedures of the European Court of Human Rights.
34- He was a member of the Council's Secretariat at the time the discussions took place.
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article. There are further examples, such as Article 6
ECHR which goes into detail to define the notion of a
"fair trial", and so on. The common law influence on the
ideas carried by these articles will be seen more clearly
in confrontation with some civilian institutions and
practices as will be addressed in Chapters 7 to 10.
It has been said in another context that whenever
representatives of many countries seek to reach an
agreement they may resort to some sort of artificial
compromise using terms that are ambiguous, or too open,
"If the parties to a proposal cannot agree, it may be
necessary to fall back on putative agreement by
propounding an imprecise formula to paper over the
cracks."346 As pointed out by Mr. Robert Schuman, the
French Minister, the political goal of arriving at an
agreement was very important at that moment. Schuman said
at the ceremony of signature that although the ECHR had
imperfections it was a step in the right direction.347
Besides, the gaps between statute and reality which were
bound to appear sooner or later would be filled in by
means of legal interpretation.
For present purposes the important point is that the ECHR
was produced out of a compromise of various traditions.
For example, at a meeting with the British Prime Minister
and the ministers most directly concerned with the ECHR
issue on October 18, 1950, the Attorney-General, Sir
Hartley Shawcross, reportedly observed that the lack of
clarity in the Convention (so much complained of in the
United Kingdom) was in reality a reflection of a
compromise between the different legal systems of the
countries involved.348
346F. A. R. Bennion. Bennion on Statute Law. London: Longman. 3rd, ed., (1990), 248.
347Charter of Freedom, op. cit.
348Geoffrey Marston, "The United Kingdom's Part in the Preparation of the European
Convention on Human Rights, 1950", (1993) 42 ICLQ796, 819.
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The condition of the ECHR as an element "alien-from-our-
system" has been acknowledged by various writers.
Observers from both sides of the divide between the legal
traditions are unanimous in attributing this "exotic"
condition to the ECHR to the influences of the "other"
tradition. Paradoxical though it may seem, despite the
efforts of the United Kingdom in the drafting stage the
document produced was full of principled and open ended
articles. So open-ended in fact that Francis G. Jacobs,
writing in 1987, explained that the vagueness of the
document made the English bench find its drafting style
"unfamiliar" despite the common law influences on it. He
asserted that "there is the unfamiliar style of drafting:
in contrast with the tightly drawn style of domestic
legislation, the provisions of the Convention - although
they often distil established principles of English law -
are regarded as vague and insufficiently precise."349
(Conversely, from a civil lawyer standpoint the detailed
nature of statutes in common law jurisdictions may appear
as prolixity.350) It has been said that Lord Jowitt, the
Lord Chancellor when the ECHR was being drafted, was very
critical of the lack of precision in the document and
also, of the fact that cases arising out the ECHR would be
heard by a court where judges coming from various
different systems of law would sit behind closed doors.351
All of that was certainly unfamiliar for a common lawyer.
At the other side of the divide, things were not much
different. For example in Austria, there were also
complaints concerning the "unfamiliarity" of the text, but
this time the criticism was based on too much common law
influence. Shortly after ratification, Austria
experienced the consequences of its legal system not being
349Francis G. Jacobs, "The Convention and the English judge" in: F. Matscher and H.
Petzold (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension. Studies in honour of
Gerard J. Wiarda. (19881. 274.
350Ugo Mattei, Common Law: II diritto anglo-americano. (1992), 254.
351Geoffrey Marston, op. cit., 818.
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fully in line with the Convention, so it has been reported
that the general opinion in the 1970s was that "tried and
tested Austrian legal institutions should not be exchanged
for the unfamiliar, relatively vague principles - often
based on Anglo-American legal thinking - of the
Convention."352 Viewed from another civilian country, the
ECHR's common law influences become more noticeable, as
they speak of the (slow) penetration of common law notions
into the Italian (civilian) legal order by means of the
ECKR: "Speedy trial, the right to confrontation, and the
abolition of the investigating magistrate, are reforms of
procedural policy drawn from the Convention on Human
Rights, which today plays the role of a "cultural bridge"
between common law and continental criminal justice
systems."353 These comments are a measure of the mix of
the traditions that took place in the document which also
acts per se as a vehicle for the infiltration of legal
thinking from "other" traditions into one's own. It is,
therefore, the "mix" of traditions what makes the ECHR be
perceived as "alien" despite the fact that the document
was not an elaboration created in solitude, since it
includes approaches and notions extracted "bottom-up" from
the traditions of the member states. This "mix" quality
in the document itself is echoed in the outcome of the
process of decision making in Strasbourg. In this
dissertation, the influences of the legal traditions on
the "yardstick", the ECHR, will be made visible in their
confrontation with the behaviour and practices of the
member states. The analysis of the European jurisprudence
will show the clashes and how the ECHR fares in these
encounters. This topic is addressed in Chapters 7 to 10.
352Andreas A. Khol, "Influence of the Human Rights Convention on Austrian Law", (1970)
18 AJCL 237,241.
353Ennio Amodio, "L'attivitta del Consiglio d'Europa e il processo penale italiano" in: Mauro
Cappelletti and Alessandro Pizzorusso (eds.), L'influenza del diritto europeo sul diritto
italiano. (1982), 579 and 582. (quoted from English summary at page 706)
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Over and above, on the "alien" nature of the ECHR, F.
Mount appropriately asked, "Might not the differences and
difficulties dwindle with the years, as the law fills out
with case law and statute law?", and his answer, thinking
of the situation in the United Kingdom, but which could be
extended, however, to the rest of the member states: "It
may have been only in the early years of the European
Convention's operation that it appeared so foreign, so
hopelessly alien to our own conceptions of how the law
protects our liberties."354 He highlights another issue:
the ECHR as a bridge between the traditions in the field
of human rights and its expansion. It is a fair bet that
when the Convention was signed, and in spite of the
"European" rhetoric, none of the Ministers of the member
states expected the system to develop into what it is
today. It has been pointed out that, perhaps in spite of
those not in favour of deeper European unity the the
"strong" Europeans aimed the system in the direction of
their policy anyway. 355 What ECJ Judge David Edward356
wrote concerning the United Kingdom may well apply all
over the member states:
These institutions were not intended by Britain to
have the effect they have had. The idea of those who
wrote the European Convention on Human Rights -
principally an official in the Home Office - was that
they were writing down liberties of the British
people as guaranteed by the Common Law. The intended
targets were Hitler and Milosevic, rather than the
Home Office, but that is not quite how it has turned
out!357
Whatever the case and whatever the role of the political
compromise arrived at, it appears that the ECHR is an
open-ended document and that even if the "definition
theory" was followed, it fell short of the expectations of
354Ferdinand Mount, The British Constitution Now: Recovery or Decline?. (1993), 231.
355Arnold J. Zurcher, op. cit., 49.
356Judge at the ECJ.
357David Edward, "Nations, states, people and commerce", in: Geraldine Prince (ed.), A
Window on Europe: The Lothian European Lectures 1992. (1993), 54.
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the early 1950s. It will be discussed in Chapter 6 that
constitutional interpretation (as is carried out in Canada
or the United States) appears to be the most appropriate
way of construing the open-ended clauses of the Convention
and its Protocols.
Conelusions
The discussion carried out in this chapter indicates that
the legal traditions, among other influences, had an
impact on the final product: the ECHR. The member states
differ in their institutional structure, legal culture,
legal education and training, and even as regards the
conceptual frameworks which they tend to favour to discuss
matters and these elements had their share of impact on
the final shape of the ECHR. To assess this influence one
option is to study the ECHR article by article in light of
diplomatic documents, drafts and interventions of the
participants. In this dissertation, another alternative
is followed, which is to look at the impact of the
underpinnings of the ECHR in their confrontation (and how
they end up as a result) with practices and legal
institutions of the member states.
The aim of this chapter has also been to show that these
influences on the ECHR were "bottom-up" and that they
appeared as a gulf between the "enumeration theory"
supported by the civilians and the "definition theory"
favoured by the common lawyers. It was also admitted that
these fault-lines between the delegates could have also
been hiding their motives for opposing what other
delegates were supporting but done so in more diplomatic
(and respectable) terms. In addition, there were other
disagreements concerning whether a Court should be
created, whether the right of individual petition should
be granted, whether the ECHR was to be extended to
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colonial territories and so on358 but those were not
included in this discussion because the confrontation
"definition" versus "enumeration" was deemed more fruitful
from the point of view of the encounter of the legal
traditions: they reveal the way legal thinking and
reasoning is carried out in the different systems.
The tension which appeared in the drafting emerges in
different guises in the rest of the chapters, such as, for
example, the one "transplanted" ECHR being modified by the
diversity of "soils" to which it has infiltrated, or the
tendency towards one or several systems of protection of
human rights for Europe that pervades the decision making
process of the Court (and also the Commission). There is
therefore a parallel between the attitudes of the
delegates and those of the judges sitting in the European
Court for the reason that whenever there is a coming
together of lawyers and judges from different legal
systems - perhaps because legal training is so much
jurisdiction-based - tensions and pressures arise when
they are reluctant to leave hold of their usual way of
thinking in legal matters. Civilians point to the
"unfamiliar" common law influence and the common lawyers
to the opposite aspect. Its articles are open-ended
despite the influence of the "definition" theory and as
any bill of rights, it requires appropriate techniques of
interpretation.
The other conclusion is that the ECHR as a compromise was
also a harbinger of the (other) compromises "convenient to
everybody"359 that the European Court strives to reach in
its own adjudication process. Another observation is also
very clear. By reading the reports one receives the
impression that in the negotiations the United Kingdom
358See, on these issues: A. H. Robertson, op. cit., (1961),165-7.
3 59The existence of "des compromis qui conviennent a tout le monde" was put to me by a
judge of the European Court in private conversation.
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enjoyed a considerable political and diplomatic "pull"
vis-a-vis its Continental friends. Perhaps the reason was
victory in the war and that the "special relationship"
with the United States was at a high point to the extent
of giving the United Kingdom a diplomatic "punch" beyond
its weight, although this is for political scientists to
determine.
Diversity and its effects were acknowledged by the
countries' representatives, and it was in the lengthy
discussions that the multiplicity of approaches to the
protection of human rights in Europe appeared, in turn, a
source of richness and inspiration and also, of strain.
All the above therefore goes to show that the ECHR was
born at a crossroads and, as it will be seen, it is
applied at a crossroads to produce an outcome, its







Comparative analysis of the
procedure in Strasbourg
Introduction
The human rights judicial function of the European organs
is carried out through a particular Strasbourg procedure
within the framework of the ECHR and which is therefore
(mainly) statutorily described. The Rules of Procedure
of the European Commission of Human Rights (hereafter
Rules of Procedure) 360 and the Rules of Court361 contain
relevant rules and additionally, the case law of the
Court and Commission has become a source where
(procedural) rules are further spelled out.362
Therefore, the purpose of this chapter will be to
establish (a) the extent to which civilian elements have
been adopted by the Strasbourg Court procedure and (b)
the important (procedural) points of similarity and
difference between Strasbourg and the legal traditions of
the member states. The comparative method adopted will
360Text as of October 1, 1990.
361Text as of April 20, 1992. Relevant for this stage is: Paul Mahoney, "Developments in the
Procedure of the European Court of Human Rights: the Revised Rules of Court", (1983) 3
YEL 27.
362This work takes into account the machinery as it is today. This is the mechanism which
has handled the cases discussed in this dissertation. Protocol 11 was signed by all the
Foreign Ministers of the Council of Europe on May 11,1994, and it will enter in force a year
after the process of ratification by the High Contracting Parties to the ECHR is completed.
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rely on four "signposts" to highlight the influences of
the traditions, as follows: that the procedure consists
of stages, that it leans towards an inquisitorial style,
that it could be described as "contradictoire" and that
it favours written over oral exchanges.363 Some exercise
of choice in this selection could not be avoided.
The system of protection of the Council of Europe is a
supranational forum which brings together the legal
orders of the member states in a complex dialectic
relationship of mutual "transplants" and "borrowings"
which break the "isolation" from one another.
Nonetheless, a question remains. Can the Strasbourg
machinery and its procedure (operating as a whole and
identifiable system of law for the application of the
ECHR) take on the task of becoming a single system of
protection of human rights in Europe?
The procedure in Strasbourg:
The procedure at Strasbourg consists of a series of
successive steps designed to find out whether there has
been a breach of the Convention. It is fashioned in a
way analogous to public (administrative) law procedures
in a civilian jurisdiction. "The Commission of Human
Rights of the Council of Europe has adopted many of the
practices of the French droit administratif"364 which are
observable in, among other chararcteristics, its rather
inquisitorial and fact-finding methods. Similarly, the
363The selection was based on the descriptions of the procedure carried out by continental
writers such as: Francois Monconduit, La Commission europeenne des droits de I'homme.
(1965), Giorgio Lodigiani, La Commissione nella Convenzione europea dei diritti dell'uomo.
(1969) and concerning the Court, Gerard Cohen-Jonathan, La Convention europeenne des
droits de I'homme. (1989).
364W. Paul Gormley, "The Significant Role of French Administrative Jurisprudence as
Presently Applied by the Court of the European Communities, with Emphasis on the
Administrative Law Remedies Available to Private Litigants", (1963) 8 South Dakota Law
Review 32, 62.
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Court tends to seek the truth rather than to function as
an umpire in a contest between prosecution and defence.
The phases of the procedure:
The procedure consists of stages
Although the procedures of any court tend to be organised
in stages, those in Strasbourg bear resemblance to their
counterparts in the litigious procedure before the French
Council of State. The contentieux administratif in
France can be divided in the following steps: the
initiation of the proceedings, the "instruction", the
judgment and the execution.365 in Strasbourg, the first
two steps are the resolution of the issue of
admissibility (which parallels the initiation of the
proceedings) and the work of the Commission on the merit
(which parallels the instructory phase). The other two
stages are the examination of the case by the deciding
organ (Court or Committee of Ministers) in order to issue
a judgment (a stage which parallels the trial phase in a
Civilian administrative - or criminal - trial), and
finally, the execution of the decision. The first action
is the individual or state complaint made to the European
Commission.366 In the case of an individual complaint, a
365For further details on this division in stages of the French administrative procedure see L.
Neville Brown and J. F. Garner, French Administrative Law. (1983), 58.
366lndividual complaints normally arrive at the central post office of the Council of Europe
and from there they are forwarded to the Secretariat of the Commission for screening.
Those letters are the first contact with the Commission's Secretariat and they are not officially
registered immediately. The Secretariat opens a provisional file and sends the applicant a
form to fill out, although applicants can submit other documents in addition or instead of this
form. P. van Dijk and G.J.H. van Hoof criticised that for the layman who receives an answer
from the Commission's Secretariat it may be impossible to infer form the standard letters
whether they contain "information" from the Secretariat and not an actual decision of the
Commission. In their opinion, therefore, such practice should be changed. (See P. van Dijk
and G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights.
(1990) 2nd. ed., 62) On the other hand, E. Fribergh, 'The Commission Secretariat's
Handling of Provisional Files", in: Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension.
Studies in Honour of Gerard Wiarda, op. cit., points out in pages 185 and 186 that the
answers are carefully drafted so as not to mislead the applicant into believing that the
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provisional file367 is opened only if the applicant's
letter discloses a grievance.368 a pronouncement of
inadmissibility by the European Commission369 ends the
case as a final judicial decision370 in view of the ab¬
sence of appeals to the European Court or any other body
against that decree.371
In the admissibility stage the supranational Strasbourg
machinery, in common with other international tribunals,
examines whether all (relevant) domestic remedies have
been exhausted. The European Court has explained that
this phase "[...] dispenses States from answering before
an international body for their acts before they have had
an opportunity to put matters right through their own
Commission has decided the case. To avoid errors, he wrote, the Secretariat routinely circu¬
lates the letters among all lawyers (however, it appears from Mr. Fribergh's article that the
language of the letter seems to be a limitation in the number of lawyers that can do this,
although one may wonder whether it would be possible to resort to translations), and newly
appointed lawyers are not entrusted with this screening task until they have completed a
period of training. See also: Ralph Beddard, Human Rights and Europe: a study of the
machinery of Human Rights. (1973).
367A provisional file is different from a registered application. Laurids Mikaelsen, European
Protection of Human Rights: The Practice and Procedure of the European Commission of
Human Rights on the Admissibility of Applications from Individuals and States. (1980) at 39,
explains that provisional files are a sort of journal to enter not formally registered cases,
which, at a later stage may or may not be registered. The opening of a provisional file is left to
the discretion of the Secretary (of the Commission's Secretariat) who is answering the
request, under Rule 13.
368According to Rule 13 (b) of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, all
communications should go through the Secretary of the Commission Secretariat, who "shall
be the channel for all communications concerning the Commission". This Secretary is autho¬
rised under Rule 30 (4) to correspond with applicants in languages other than French or
English, the official ones. To simplify access to the Commission, all communications and
their supporting documents are accepted in any language of the member states, and the
answers to the applicants are given in the language they used in their letters to the
Commission.
369There is one member to the Commission for every state which has ratified the ECHR, and
no distinctions are made between countries which have granted the right of individual
petition or not. Roger Kerridge, "Incorporation of the European Convention on Human
Rights into United Kingdom Domestic Law", The Effect on English Domestic Law of
Membership of the European Communities and of Ratification of the European Convention
on Human Rights. M. P. Furnston et al. (1983), at 268 pointed out that it may seem unfair that
a member of the Commission from a country that has not recognised the right to individual
petition could hear a case against another member state when an individual application is
brought against a country that has recognised the right of individual petition.
370Laurids Mikaelsen, op. cit., 15.
37 3lt should be said that only a proportion of cases are ruled admissible so as to enter the
post-admissibility stage of the proceedings.
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legal system [...]"372 For this reason both private and
inter-state applicants must comply with the requirement
laid down in Article 2 6 ECHR. 373 If it appears that the
petitioner has not exhausted all available domestic
remedies, the Commission has the power to reject the case
summarily.
In line with the international law on the subject, the
Commission's and Court's case-law reveal that non¬
effective or unduly prolonged domestic remedies need not
be exhausted. Likewise, a complainant's failure to
resort to a domestic remedy because any attempt to do so
has been persistently unsuccessful in the past will not
result in the automatic rejection of the application.
This is true even if the national courts reverse
themselves while the case is before the Commission,
provided that the case has reached the Commission before
the change in the national case law,374 although a
reasonable effort to exhaust potential remedies must be
made.
Article 26 ECHR also contains what has been termed the
six-month rule. This rule requires that the application
be filed with the Commission "within a period of six
months from the date on which the final decision was
taken." The rule is similar to a statute of limitations
and it makes the supranational remedy unavailable if a
complaint has not been filed within a reasonable time.
"Final decision" means the last domestic remedy to be
exhausted pursuant to Article 26.
372De Wilde, Oomsand Versyp case, (1981) 4 EHRR 1.
373ln addition, Article 27 (3) ECHR provides that, "the Commission shall reject any petition
referred to it which it considers inadmissible under Article 26." The latter spells out the
requirement of the exhaustion of domestic remedies. We should note that the grounds of
inadmissibility set out in Articles 27 (1) and 27 (2) apply only to private petitions filed under
Article 25 of the ECHR.
374Vagrancy case, (1979-80) 1 EHRR 373.
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If the case is declared admissible, it then moves on to
the next stage, which could be termed the "instruction".
In this examining phase, the Commission works in some
measure as a commission of inquiry in order to establish
the facts of the case. The Commission, fulfilling a
political rather than a judicial role,375 will then
attempt to reach a friendly settlement between the
applicant and the respondent government; if the set¬
tlement is reached, that marks the end of the case.376
Otherwise the case moves to another stage where the
Commission will issue a non-binding Report.377 The
document is nevertheless usually viewed as an extremely
important source of information and as a rule, it becomes
the basis of the examination. Incidentally, Article 29
ECHR authorises the Commission to declare an application
inadmissible if it is later found not to satisfy all the
requirements of the ECHR even though it has been declared
prima facie admissible.
Once the "instruction" stage is finished, the Report378
with the Commission's findings is transmitted to the
Committee of Ministers, together with any proposals the
Commission wishes to propound. The European Court has
determined that it has to be "seized of a case" (etre
saisi d'une affaire) by the member states379 or the
375F. E. Dowrick, "Juristic Activity in the Council of Europe; 25th year", (1974) 23 ICQL 610,
618.
376Article 28 (b) ECHR .
377Under Article 31 ECHR the Commission is required to "draw up a Report on the facts and
state its opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a breach by the State concerned of
its obligations under the Convention"
378Since the entry into force of Protocol 3 in 1970 the application is examined by one or
more rapporteurs appointed by the Commission from one of its members, as required by the
provisions of the Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure. Under Article 25 of the ECHR the
rapporteur may decide to invite the parties to submit further written evidence or
observations, answer questions or give explanations. Under Rule 54 (3) (b) the rapporteur
must draft a report for the Commission in accordance with Rule 57 (in case a friendly
settlement has been reached), Rule 60 (when there is no friendly settlement), or Rule 62
(when a case that has been accepted is struck off the list).
379When a state has brought the case before the court, the name and the address of the
person whom the state has appointed as its agent within the meaning of Rule 28 of the
Rules of Court must also be mentioned as required by Rule 32 (1) of the Rules of Court. This
agent may be assisted by advocates or advisers.
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Commission380 as required by Article 47 ECHR within the
period of three months provided for in Article 32 ECHR.
In three cases dealing with delays in civil proceedings
in Italy, Istituto di Vigilanza381, Figus Milone382 and
Goisis,383 the Court found that it could not go into the
merits because the Commission's requests to bring the
cases before the Court had been made out of time. The
Court said, therefore, that:
[...] In order to seise a court, it is not
sufficient to decide to seise it. The decision must
be implemented. [...] That being so, the finding is
inescapable that the Commission exceeded - albeit by
only one day - the time allowed it. Furthermore, no
special circumstance of a nature to suspend the run¬
ning of time or justify its starting to run afresh
is apparent from the file.384
A copy of the request or the application is transmitted
to the members of the Court and to each of the States
mentioned in Article 48 ECHR385 in so far as they
themselves have not submitted the case to the Court.386
If the Court is not seized of the case, the Committee of
Ministers will then decide "whether there has been a
violation of the Convention."387
3 8°jhe Commission delegates one or more of its members to take part in the consideration
of the case before the Court; they may be assisted by other persons (Rule 29 (1) of the
Rules of Court). The delegates are appointed by the Commission in a plenary session.
Under Rule 63 (1) of the Rules of Procedure, they represent the whole Commission and




3 84jhe Court used the same text in all three cases. See cases (42/1992/387/465) and
(43/1992/388/466) at para. 14, or case (46/1992/391/469) at para. 19.
3 8 5Article 48 ECHR lists the following as authorised to bring a case before the Court: the
Commission, a High Contracting Party whose national is alleged to be a victim, a High
Contracting Party which referred the case to the Commission or a High Contracting Party
against which the complaint has been lodged.
3 86Furthermore, Rule 32 (1) of the Rules of Court sets down that the respondent
government be invited to supply the Registrar with the name and address of its agent. Other
governments that may participate are requested to inform the Registrar within two weeks
whether they will appear as parties. When it is not the Commission who brought the case
before the Court its members also receive a copy of the application.
387Article 32 (1) ECHR. P. van Dijk and G.J.H. van Hoof, op. cit., 102, argue that the
responsibility to make this decision was given to the Committee of Ministers because in the
1950s, when the ECHR was being drafted, it was assumed that only a few states would
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The Report of the Commission may contain concurring and
dissenting opinions and is drafted in the form of a
judicial opinion, but it is not a judgment, because the
Commission - as an investigative judge in a civilian
jurisdiction - lacks the power to adjudicate on the case.
Only the Committee of Ministers or the Court can issue
decisions binding on the parties.
The final step concerns decision-making. This stage
resembles in some measure the trial phase in
administrative or criminal proceedings in a civilian
country. Such examination is mainly conducted on the
basis of the Commission's Report despite its non-binding
nature.
In Strasbourg there is no consolidated trial within the
meaning of the term in common law jurisdictions; rather,
the successive steps of the judicial proceedings are
accomplished within a period of time, as is the tendency
in civilian nations. The comparative point is that this
type of procedure is quite unlike the pattern of the
procedure in the common law world, where the ideal is to
concentrate as many procedural steps in one hearing as
possible.
If the examination of the case takes place before the
Court,388 the proceedings take place before a Chamber of 9
accept the jurisdiction of the Court and that more states would be willing to ratify the treaty if
the power to make a final decision on breaches of the ECHR was given to their political
equals.
388Under the Rule 32 of the Rules of Court, the request or application is written, and must
contain the following data: the parties to the proceedings before the Commission; the date
on which the report was transmitted to the Committee of Ministers; the object of the request
or the application. An application must be signed by the applicant or the applicant's
representative. The complaint must not be the same as one already examined by the
Commission or previously filed at another international body, and it must be within the range
of the ECHR. By means of these data the Court is able to determine whether all the pro¬
visions for the filing of an application or a request met the requirements of ECHR. The
Commission has prepared a special form to make it easier for the plaintiff to submit a proper
application.
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judges.389 After the request or the application has been
filed and the constitution of a Chamber has taken place,
its composition is disclosed to the judges, agents of the
parties and the President of the Commission. Then the
examination of the case at the trial stage may start390
and the judgment of the Court will be sent to the
Committee of Ministers to supervise its implementation, a
stage which approximates the "execution" phase in the
French or other continental administrative proceedings.
The judgment of the Court is law only for the party to
the case, therefore, the decisions of the Court - despite
the fact that the principles established are as a rule
followed in successive decisions - are not formally
binding precedents (stare decisis) for the States Parties
in general.391
The procedure leans towards an inquisitorial style
Unlike the common law preference for "accusatory"
criminal proceedings and "adversary" civil trials, both
French administrative and criminal procedures392 (although
not civil procedure) as well as the Strasbourg procedure
tend to be "inquisitorial". Similarly, not only may the
European Commission or Court take upon themselves the
task of finding the facts if they are not content with
the facts as established by the parties, but in general
they approach the issues of the case as a commission of
inquiry.
389Rule 21 of the Rules of Court.
390lt should be said that the Court can order interim measures to the parties although it can¬
not enforce them (the ECHR nowhere confers the right to order interim measures). The
same applies to any interim measures taken by the Commission. In fact, it would appear to be
a prerogative of the Commission rather than on the Court to recommend interim measures if
only for the Commission's involvement at a much earlier stage, when the chances that an
imminent damage may be prevented or limited are higher. When the Court has ultimately
been seized of the case, even more time has elapsed since the facts concerned have taken
place. Those interim measures may be requested by a party, the Commission, or any other
person concerned.
391Thomas Buergenthal, International Human Rights in a Nutshell. (1988), 112.
392L. Neville Brown and J. F. Garner, op. cit., 58.
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The underlying assumption appears to be that the European
organs are not satisfied with merely providing a forum
for the parties to battle out their differences. The
Commission, for example, "may proprio motu or at the
request of a party, take any action which it considers
expedient or necessary for the proper performance of its
duties under the Convention".393 The individual
applicants, after the initiation of the case, may find
themselves displaced in some measure, since the
Commission takes over the burden of activating the
proceedings. Once the Commission issues its Report, the
power of initiative rests in its hands or in those of the
member states.394 Although the individuals who filed an
action against a member state exercise their own right,
it is understood that the outcome of their complaints has
an incidence on the European public order.395 The need to
protect this public order goes beyond the actual case and
can justify in part an inquisitorial "search for the
truth". There is also a parallel between this
investigative approach and the footings of a Council of
State-type of court. The French Council of State, for
example, was established to allow an individual who had a
dispute against the administration to resort on appeal to
a body other than the actual agency who made the decision
in the first place. (The latter was the interested party
defendant.) Likewise, and although this does not
necessarily reflect negatively on the impartiality of any
national judiciary, citizens who had a Convention-based
dispute could take their cases to a supranational court
beyond the system of courts of the respondent government.
The idea that individuals could seek redress against
their own governments before a special system of courts
seems therefore to have percolated through to the
393Rule 34 of the Rules of Procedure of the European Commission.
394Rolv Ryssdal, 'The European Court of Human Rights and Gerard Wiarda, op. cit., 1.
395Frangois Monconduit, La Commission europeenne des droits de 1'homme. (1965).
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international level in Strasbourg from the (national)
French doctrine of the separation of powers, particularly
one of its consequences, the distrust of the ordinary
system of law courts to handle disputes against the
government. In this respect, and despite the influences
of the International Court of Justice, it has been said
that the Strasbourg system works as an administrative
tribunal because both the Court and the Commission
function "as an international administrative court."396
As it was the case of the French Council of State or the
ECJ, the existence of the Strasbourg system and its
supranational yardstick set aside the idea of the
immunity of the state from legal proceedings.397 The idea
of the protection of the individual vis-a-vis the powers
of the administration imbued in the Council of State was
borrowed by the ECJ. This is an observation which
applies equally well to the Strasbourg system:
Specifically, the Community Court's power,
functions, jurisdiction, and procedure will always
bear a striking resemblance to that of the Conseil
d'Etat for the reason that both tribunals are
striving for similar goals, namely the protection of
the individual citizen against the arbitrary action
of the executive organs of government.398
As said, the Commission subjects all the pleas to a
preliminary examination bearing on their admissibility,
which includes a determination of whether domestic
remedies have been exhausted. If the application is
declared admissible, the Commission's next responsibility
is to examine the facts. These activities are
inquisitorial in style as the Commission will not act as
a detached arbitrator. If need arises it is authorised
to carry out an on-the-spot investigation as an
investigative judge, directing the procedures, rather
396W. Paul Gormley, op. cit., 53.
397W. Paul Gormley, op. cit., 60.
398W. Paul Gormley, op. cit., 77.
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than leaving to the parties the task to present their
case to the judge.399 Normally, though, the parties are
invited to make written observations and subsequently to
submit oral arguments at one or more hearings.
Article 28 (a) ECHR provides us with another example of
the powers of the Commission to conduct an inquiry and
examine the case, as it authorises the Commission to hold
hearings, receive written submissions, examine witnesses
both at its seat in Strasbourg and, if necessary, by
interviewing them in prisons or elsewhere. The
Commission may put questions to the agents, legal
advisers or representatives of the parties. Paradoxical
though it may seem, the power to perform ex officio
examinations is not expressly given to the Commission by
the ECHR or its Rules of Procedure, but as early as 1958
the Commission declared that by virtue of its office it
could, for example, carry out tasks to
L...J find out whether, in the submitted case, there
appears to be a breach of the Convention or not; the
Commission will conduct this investigation ex officio
to determine whether the object of the complaint
falls, by its own nature, on the field of application
of the Convention, without the requirement for the
applicant to point out a specific article of the
Convention.400
Article 33 ECHR (and also, Rule 17 of the Rules of
Procedure) further advances the enquiring features of the
organ, because it sets down that "The Commission shall
meet in camera." Unlike the civilian tradition,401 the
common law objects to closed hearings and emphasises the
exemplary role of justice in society, which must be seen
to be done. Whatever the case, it may be conceded that
the secrecy may help to pull off a friendly settlement,
399For example, in the Greek case.
4"application # 202/56, in: (1955-1956-1975) 1 YECHR 192.
401Louis-Edmond Pettiti, "La Commission et la Cour europeenne des droits de l'homme",
Les droits de I'homme et la nouvelle architecture de I'Europe. Mario Bettati et al. (eds)
(1991), 38.
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perhaps because government officials may feel more free
to voice their views.402
In addition, another active role of the Commission is to
take the (discretionary) decision whether or not to refer
a case to the Court. Neither the Court can choose its
cases nor the individual petitioners can compell
submissions. The current practice of the Commission
suggests that it tends to refer cases where it has found
a violation of the ECHR, or which raise important legal
issues or where there is a significant divergence of view
in the Commission regarding their outcome. If none of
these conditions is present, the Commission will most
often allow the Committee of Ministers to pass a
decision.
Another telling argument in support of the view of the
Commission as an inquisitorial organ is that, once it has
defined the issues of the case in a Report, it then turns
into a sort of A-G before the Court (although in the
system as it stands there is no A-G as in the ECJ). As
"an independent and advisory organ with respect to the
questions of fact and of law concerning a case before the
Court,"403 it does not take sides against the respondent
government, rather "before the Court, it becomes an
assistant, an "amicus curiae", whose tasks partially
resemble those of an Advocate-General."404 Now, an
intriguing observation can be made if its "Advocate-
General" role is put side by side with the requirements
of the ECHR as interpreted by the European Court in the
Borgers case.405 As will be discussed in Chapter 9, the
402Henry G. Schermers, The European Commission of Human Rights from the Inside: Some
Thoughts on Human Rights in Western Europe. (1990),13.
403van Dijkand van Hoof, op. cit., (1984) 137.
404Hans Christian Kruger, "Le mecanisme de protection de la convention europeenne des
droits de I'homme", in Mady Schaffer (ed.) L'avocat et I'Europe des 12 et des 21: la defense
des droits de I'homme' ['integration communautaire perspectives 1992. (1988), 37.
405(1993) 15 EHRR 92.
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Court found the office of the Belgian Avocat General (who
arguably acts as an independent adviser to the court
making recommendations as to the outcome to the case) not
to satisfy the (common law inspired) criteria of
procedural fairness and equality of arms laid down in
Article 6 ECHR. It may be questionable, therefore,
whether the addition of functions comparable to a degree
to those of an "Advocate-General" to the Commission,
fully complies with the guidelines of Article 6 ECHR
since the Commission was the organ who did the
"instruction" of the case.
Likewise, there are inquisitorial underpinnings in the
procedure before the Court. A Chamber of the Court may
procure itself information in different ways. For
example, it can order ex proprio motu the appearances of
witnesses, experts, or any persons in another standing
whose evidence or statements seem likely to be of
assistance, at the request of one of the parties, the
delegates of the Commission, the original applicant or a
third party (who had been either invited or granted leave
to submit written comments).406 A passage in the Lawless
case407 serves to illustrate the way the Court understands
its powers of examination since its early years, when it
said that,
[...] the Court may also hear the Applicant in
accordance with Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, and,
as part of the enquiry, may invite the Commission, ex
officio, or authorise the Commission at its request,
to submit the Applicant's observations on the Report
or on any specific point arising in the course of the
debates; [...]
406Rule 41 (1) of the Rules of Court.
407Lawless case, European Court of Human Rights, Preliminary objections and questions of
procedure, in: (1960) 3 Yearbook 492, 516. When the Court is acting of its own accord,
such persons are summoned by the Registrar. The member states are expected to lend the
Court assistance to make communications, notifications or summonses addressed to
persons in their territory other than the agents of the parties. The responsibility has been in¬
ferred from the spirit of the ECHR.
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Both the Commission and the Court enjoy a degree of
discretion to apply their rules in a flexible way.4°8
Rather like a civilian trial judge, the President of the
Chamber directs the oral hearings.409 For example, the
President of the Chamber of the Court orders whether, and
if so when, memorials and other documents are to be
filed.410 Until the expiry of the time-limit the parties
may file preliminary objections. The Chamber gives its
decision on such objections after receipt of the replies
or comments of every other party and of the delegates of
the Commission, or joins the objections to the merits.411
The Strasbourg procedure as a whole appears to be guided
by a substantive law idea known in (for example) French
administrative law as the principle of legality, which
determines that the administration incur in liability if
it fails to act both in form and motive in accordance
with the law. When a complaint is raised against the
administration, the litigious section of the Council of
State will normally request the file of the case to check
whether a decision was made in accordance with the legal
fiction that presumes that the administration (or, in our
case, the governments of the member states of the
Strasbourg system) acts bona fide and takes decisions
following the conception of the supremacy of law, that
is, whether the principle of legalite was respected. It
has been said that this principle is wider than the ultra
vires doctrine in English law:
408Rule 26 and 27 of the Rules of Court. The Title in the Rules of Court dealing with the
procedure opens with the general principle that for the consideration of a particular case the
Court may derogate from some of the rules with the agreement of the parties and after
having obtained the opinion of the delegates of the Commission. In the provision relating to
the use of the official languages before the Court the possibility of derogation is mentioned
again.
409Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The President of the Chamber also prescribes the order in
which the agents, the advocates or advisers of the parties, the delegates of the Commission,
any other persons assisting the delegates and the original applicant shall be called upon to
speak.
4i°Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
411 Rule 48 of the Rules of Court.
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This is something much more than the English
doctrine of ultra vires, there being no question of
a mere observance with statutory limitations, and it
also goes further than observance of the principles
of natural justice; but both these ideas, so
familiar to the English administrative lawyer, can
be detected as constituents of the principle of the
legalite.412
The notion that the administration is unlike a private
party is unknown in the common law tradition. In
contrast, a single, but striking example where the
continental assumption of "legalite" and the idea that
the government is different from individuals can be seen
in operation at the European level in the way the
European Court handled the case Artico v. Italy,413 In
this case the Court found a breach of Article 6 (3) (c)
ECHR in the failures of the Italian government in making
effective the applicant's right to legal assistance. The
Strasbourg organs tackled the issues in a manner
comparable to a Council of State. They assumed that the
respondent government takes decisions guided by the
principle of legality and therefore, as the Council of
State would do in similar circumstances vis-a-vis the
administration, they requested to see the file of the
case to check on the "legalite". This proved impossible.
The difficulty was that the Commission had to rely mainly
on the applicant's assertions and the documents he
produced because:
when the Commission had asked the Government for
certain details about the course of the 1972 and
1973 proceedings before the Court of Cassation, the
reply had been that the registry of that Court could
not supply them because, after the applications to
quash had been declared inadmissible, the files had
been returned to the courts from which they
originated.414
412L. Neville Brown and J. F. Garner, op. cit., 132.
413(1982) 3 EHRR 1.
414(1982) 3 EHRR 1, para. 29.
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The Italian government adduced the impossibility of
making over the applicant's file and sought the dismissal
of Mr. Artico's prima facie evidence on grounds of its
insufficiency and that the burden of proof lay upon him.
The European Court responded as a Council of State would
have done. The failure by the national authorities to
produce the file was taken as silence, and the silence of
the administration worked against the respondent
government (as it would have happened in a civilian legal
system), therefore, the European Court took the
allegations against the government as established.415 At
any rate, the operation of the presumption of legality
made the European Court avoid an entirely new
"instruction" of the case. This would have represented a
waste which the Court would have probably not been able
to afford particularly in view of the growing backlog of
applications and its limited resources. The fact that a
new "instruction" of the case was avoided was not an
indication, however, that the Court was giving up on the
(inquisitorial) ambition to discover the truth as it was
made plain when the government was reminded of its duty
to collaborate "with the Convention institutions in
arriving at the truth". In addition, in Artico, the
European Court reiterated an explanation concerning its
inquisitorial powers already put forward in Ireland v.
the United Kingdom to the effect that, if need arises,
the Court can seek material ex proprio motu:
The Court refers on this point to its judgment in
Ireland v. the United Kingdom: 'In the cases
referred to it, the Court examines all the material
before it, whether originating from the Commission,
415lncidentally, an observation made in this case, that "the Court refuses to believe that the
administrative or practical difficulties relied on by the Government are insurmountable in a
modern society" (at para. 30) led an Italian commentator to write (tongue-in-cheek) that: "It is
really comforting to see that the Court did not believe in the existence of such organisational
failures in a basic public service as the Italian Government was trying so hard to demonstrate!"
(Tullio Scovazi, "Le prime esperienze dell'ltalia davanti alia Corte Europea dei Diritti
dell'uomo", (1984) 20 Rivista di diritto internazionale privato e processuale 37, 46.)
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the Parties or other sources'; if necessary, the
Court 'obtains material proprio motu' and 'will not
rely on the concept that the burden of the proof is
borne by one or other of the two Governments
concerned'. Mutatis mutandis, these remarks apply
just as much or even more to a case deriving from an
application made pursuant to Article 25, since
neither the individual applicant nor the Commission
has the status of party before the Court.416
Such an unambiguous statement, together with the issues
discussed so far, highlights the inquisitorial footing of
the Court's spirit and this is in plain contrast with,
for example, the good description of the adversarial
procedure supplied by Lord Justice Clerk Thomson in the
Scottish civil case Thomson v. Glasgow Corporation:
Our system of administering justice in civil affairs
proceeds on the footing that each side, working at
arm's length, selects its own evidence [...] It is
on the basis of two carefully selected versions that
the judge is finally called upon to adjudicate. He
cannot make investigations on its own behalf; he
cannot call witnesses; his undoubted right to
question witnesses who are put in the box has to be
exercised with caution; he is at the mercy of the
contending sides whose whole object is not to
discover truth but to get his judgment. That
judgment must be based only on what he is allowed to
hear. A litigation is in essence a trial of skill
between opposing parties conducted under recognised
rules, and the prize is the judge's decision. We
have rejected inquisitorial methods and prefer to
regard our judges as entirely independent. Like
referees at boxing contests, they see that the rules
are kept and count the points. It follows from this
that a party to a litigation is entitled to conduct
it on the footing that the rules will be observed
and that they will not be altered while the contest
is in progress.417
The assumptions behind a system determine in part the
choices that are made. In view of the existing
inquisitorial underpinnings, it is not surprising that
the Commission is allowed to examine breaches other than
416(1982) 3 EHRR 1, para. 30.
417(1962) S.C. (HL) 36, 52, and also cited by Lord Hope, op. cit.
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those the complaint was filed against.418 For example,
the case Foti and others v. Italy419 concerned the
applicants' prosecution for acts committed in the course
of demonstrations that had taken place in Italy between
1970 and 1973. The Commission decided to examine of its
own motion the question whether a hearing had taken place
"within a reasonable time" as required by Article 6 (1)
ECHR and declared the application admissible. The
Italian authorities disputed the reach of the ex proprio
motu powers of the Commission but the European Court
rejected the following objection of their lawyers:
The Commission is without any doubt empowered to
decide upon the characterisation in law to be given
to a matter, but solely on respect of the facts
impugned before it. The original complaint
formulated by the three applicants under Article 6
para. 1 was directed against the transfer of their
trials to the Potenza Regional Court and against
that alone. By taking it upon itself of its own
motion, as from 9 May 1977, to review observance of
their right to a hearing "within a reasonable time",
the Commission has thus failed to confine itself to
applying the maxim "da mihi facta, dabo tibi ius",
thereby exceeding its jurisdiction.420
The inquisitorial foundations in Strasbourg have a
bearing on the handling of questions of law. There is an
inquisitorial foundation behind the European Court's
surveys of the laws of the member states when it sets
about to find a "common denominator" derived from what is
said to be a "European consensus"421 or a "European public
policy"422 and particularly, in the use made of the
outcome of the inquiry in the construction of the ECHR423
418Neumeistercase, para. 16.
419(1986) 71 ILR 366.
420(1986) 71 ILR 366, 378.
42 Laurence R. Heifer, "Lesbian and Gay Rights as Human Rights: Strategies for a United
Europe" , (1992) 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 157.
422Pablo Antonio Fernandez-Sanchez, Las obliaaciones de los estados en el marco del
Convenio europeo de derechos humanos. (1987), 44.
423More details on that approach will be supplied in chapters 7 to 10.
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and the use of the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation.
These practices are in contrast with what judges are
expected to do in adversarial systems. As a rule, judges
will not research legal arguments outside court.424
Admittedly, it may be speculated that the readiness to
resort to some inquisitorial measures by the judges may
depend, among many other things, on their training and
their temperament. Even the actual composition of the
chambers of the European Court may carry weight on the
selected approach.425 The fact that the majority of the
judges are civil law trained may also influence their
understanding of how proceedings should be conducted as
well as their readiness to resort to the available
inquisitorial devices, even if it is argued that the
Court is unique, with its own practices426 and way of
interpreting the ECHR.427 interestingly enough, Judge
Pettiti made the comparative point that the purpose of
drawing out the judges' names from among all the others
was to avoid the unevenness in the jurisprudence that may
result from the separate work of permanent "Anglo-saxon"
or "civilian" chambers.428
42 4As regards Scottish civil cases see The Right Honourable Lord Hope, op. cit., 11.
425For more on this see chapter 10 of this dissertation.
426prangoise J. Hampson, "The United Kingdom before the European Court of Human
Rights", (1989) 9 YEL 121,128.
42 7 For further details see John G. Merrills, The Development of International Law bv the
Furopean Court of Human Rights. (1988) in which he stresses that the Strasbourg
interpretation is independent from the interpretation of the law or of the concepts used in
the domestic jurisdictions of the member states.
428Louis-Edmond Pettiti, op. cit., 32. Further, it is also interesting to observe that a
somewhat similar comparative issue has apparently been taken into consideration at the
United Nations Security Council in the appointment process of a chief prosecutor for the
tribunal set up to try suspected Balkan war criminals. In "Cells finally ready for war criminals",
Ian Williams of The European. July 22-28, 1994, reports that: "Disputes over procedure,
funding and powers have delayed action by the tribunal. For example, the Security Council,
which was concerned at the presumed Anglo-Saxon common law bias of Goldstone [the
appointed prosecutor, from South Africa] and his Australian deputy, Graham Blewitt, wanted
a second deputy from a Roman law country. But South African civil law is Roman Dutch, with
English court procedures added on, so Goldstone should be in a good position to bridge
the gap."
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The procedure could be described as
"contradict oire,,i2<^
In common with French administrative procedure, the
Strasbourg procedure can be described as
"contradictoire", denoting the tendency to give each side
the opportunity of contradicting what the other one has
said but without putting them in the same procedural
position or turning the adjudicating organs into
(completely) neutral arbiters. The adversarial
connotations of the procedure are quite unlike the ideal
of the common law world, where the archetype is that each
party is to press its respective viewpoints before a
judge who acts as an impartial umpire. In Strasbourg, a
case is argued by way of "contradiction" in the sense of
a watered down version of the adversarial proceedings of
the common law world, because the organs intervene to
ensure that the individual and the state are equals
throughout the proceedings but this equality is achieved
by means of the organs' active participation in an
inquiry into the conduct of the respondent government.
It should not be forgotten that all supranational systems
of protection of human rights are underlain by the
paradox of the two contradictory roles played by the
governments. Governments are the supporters of the
system as a whole but also, as respondent parties, they
are the "perpetrators" of the alleged breaches. This
particular situation may partly justify the need for the
Strasbourg machinery of approaching all cases guided by
the ideal of an "inquiry" rather than letting unequal
parties battle out their differences:
429Gerard Cohen-Jonathan, La Convention europeenne des droits de I'homme.
(1989),172.
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There seems to be something of an inconsistency
between, on the one hand, the collective guarantee
of rights, which may assume that the object of all
the High Contracting Parties, the Commission, and
the Court is the furtherance and protection of human
rights, and the notion of a respondent State. The
government has to argue that its domestic law is in
conformity with the requirements of the Convention.
To do anything less might be held to imply a breach
of its obligation under Article 1 of the Convention
to '...secure to everyone within their jurisdiction
the rights and freedoms...' contained therein. If a
government is forced on the defensive, it will have
to adopt the three-tiered defence familiar in
criminal law. One, the dispute falls outside the
Convention; two, if not, there has been no
interference in the exercise of the right and,
three, if there has been an interference, it was
justifiable.430
The procedure is slowly becoming a unique "blend" of
elements from the legal traditions of the member states.
The passage of time brought more procedural rights for
the individual through the injection of further
adversarial elements, allowing them to become much more
involved in the lawsuit.431 Specifically, individual
applicants can participate and be represented before the
Court to the extent that they enjoy an status (almost)
comparable to that of the Commission or the states
parties to the proceedings.432 This separated further the
system from the normal practices of international courts
where individuals have no standing and also marked an
advance of the procedural elements of common law ancestry
leading to further openness of the proceedings.
Incidentally, this openness is paralleled by a similar
requirement placed on the member states by the case law
of the European Court.433 When a case is referred to the
Court individual applicants may indicate that they wish
430Frangoise Hampson, "The United Kingdom before the European Court of Human
Rights", (1989) 9 YEL 121,131.
431See particularly Rules 30 (Representation of the Applicant) and 33 (Communication of
the Application on Request) of the Rules of Court.
432Jhomas Buergenthal, op. cit., 111.
433See the analysis in Chapters 7 to 10.
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to participate in the proceedings and if so, they are
entitled to representation by counsel. Technically
speaking, however, those improvements in the individuals'
locus standi particularly after the 1983 amendment of the
Rules did not make an individual applicant a party to the
case: 434 they still cannot seize the Court435 for example.
In this sense, the respondent governments, as subjects of
international law, appear to be the only one party before
the Court436 and the absence of complete procedural
equality still calls for the equalising intervention of
the Strasbourg organs to compensate for the individual's
disadvantage. For these reasons, the procedure is best
described as "contradictoire" in terms of the tradition
of French procedures rather than in the adversarial
understanding of the common law. Nonetheless, the (slow)
move towards granting equality to the parties started
with the hearings of the De Becker case, where the
applicant was admitted as a witness to give evidence
before the Commission, which incidentally, may appear as
a rather surprising practice for those trained in the
civil law.437 Further, in the Lawless case the Court
considered that the participation of the applicant was by
means of the Commission's Report, the observations made
by the delegates of the Commission and evidence given by
the applicant before the Court as a witness, as the Court
"[...] may also hear the Applicant in accordance with
Rule 38438 of the Rules of Court [...]"439 ; an approach
that was, however, very cautious. In the 1970s the case
of De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp440 prompted the Court to take
another step forward authorising the Commission to avail
434John G. Merrills,op. cit., 5.
435Article 48 ECHR. Protocol Number 9 contains provisions authorising an individual to
seize the Court, however, it has not become effective yet.
436Hans Christian Kriiger, "Le mecanisme de protection de la Convention europeenne des
droits de I'homme", L'Avocat et I'Europe des 12 et des 21: La defense des droits de
I'homrne: L'intearation communautaire perspectives 1992. Mady Schaffer (ed.), (1988), 37.
437Frangois Monconduit, op. cit. .
438Now Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.
4393 Yearbook492, 516.
440(1981) 4 EHRR 1.
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itself of the assistance of the lawyer for the
applicants.
The "inquiry" requires investigations, the examination of
evidence, the questioning of witnesses and so on. The
Court will normally ask the following questions: first,
whether there are restrictions placed on a protected
right and whether those limits are "prescribed by law"441,
"in accordance with the law"442 or subject "to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general
principles of international law"443; second, if so,
whether the restrictions have a legitimate purpose;
third, if so, whether the restrictions are proportional
to the achievement of the purpose sought; and fourth, if
so, whether the restrictions are "necessary in a demo¬
cratic society."444 The approach is one that does not
arrive at the conclusions on liability exclusively by the
process of pitting one side against the other, each
pressing their respective positions before an umpire, who
then allows the facts appear from this contest. The
method of the inquiry starts legal reasoning from the
statutory texts and this practice paves the way for
justifying the decisions in a deductive manner laid out
as a syllogism.445
The situation changes if the organs are to deal with
inter-state applications, as the role of the Commission
is more detached, probably because there is already
"equality" between the member states parties to the case.
By ratifying the ECHR a state is deemed to have accepted
the jurisdiction of the Commission to receive complaints
from other member states alleging a breach of the
Convention. The applicant state is not required to
441Articles 9 (2), 10 (2) and 11 (2) ECHR.
442Article 8 (2) ECHR and Article 3 Protocol 4.
4 43Article 1 Protocol 1.
444Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 ECHR and Article 2 Protocol 4.
4 45For more on this see chapter 6 of this dissertation.
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demonstrate any special interest or relationship to the
victim of the violation or in its subject matter. Most
inter-state applications were filed against states which
had not recognised the right to individual petition and
thus could be held internationally accountable for a
violation of the ECHR only by inter-state proceedings.446
The procedure favours written over oral exchanges
The preference for written exchanges is another example
of the affinity between Strasbourg and continental
courts447 particularly since the European organs perceive
their role as being responsible for the inquiry into the
issues of the case and the parties are simply not allowed
to fight their differences to a finish. The procedure is
a reflection of these assumptions and therefore, it is
not geared towards providing the parties with equal
opportunity to make the better case nor it is concerned
with establishing a framework for the parties to conduct
a dialogue between themselves and with the tribunal.
On the other hand, another integrant part of this "mix"
of systems and traditions is provided by the approaches
of legal practitioners to the cases. While it is
conceded that the style of handling litigation is
influenced by various tactical and strategic
considerations variable from case to case, lawyers
nevertheless follow certain paths related to their
backgrounds and expectations. A contrast made between
English and continental lawyers on how they handle the
cases procedurally before the EU organs could apply
446Thomas Buergenthal, op. cit., 88.
447See for further details: P. van Dijk and G. J. H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the
European Convention on Human Rights. The two heads of the applications' division look
through the letters that arrive at the Secretariat in order to assign each one of them to an
individual lawyer of the Secretariat for further processing. Unsurprisingly, the choice of
lawyer will be determined by the language in which the letter is written (unless French,
English or German) and the State against which the complaint is directed.
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equally well to Strasbourg. It has been said that
English lawyers have two contributions to make in
relation to legal practice before the EU organs, and
which their continental colleagues are not likely to
possess: unsurprisingly, the first is their expertise in
their particular national law, but more importantly,
there is their "essentially 'national' skills, ie a
distinctive (by European norms) approach to litigation,
and the art of oral advocacy."448 The point is, however,
that those "national" skills may clash with the
Strasbourg "contradictoire" procedure. Frangoise Hampson
found a gulf as a result of contrasting the attitudes of
common lawyers and their continental counterparts in
their handling of the cases:
British lawyers may be more prone to scoring points
off one another or seeking to discredit the other
side than their continental colleagues. This is
perhaps a product of an attempt to make the better
case rather than to persuade the court on the basis
of the issues involved. There is a danger that, in
the eyes of the judges, this trivializes major
issues relating to the moral, legal and political
■ order of Europe.449
For these reasons, one of the weighty elements in
efficient supranational litigation is the lawyers' grasp
of their differences with practitioners and judges from
other traditions. They have to familiarise themselves
also with the underpinnings of the supranational
procedure which might be very different from their own,
so as not to remain "trapped" in their national law ways.
Comparative law presses home the general idea that one's
legal system is not the only one in the world and that by
simply understanding it one cannot necessarily ask the
right questions elsewhere. For practitioners, the
awareness of the tensions between the footings of the
448Nicholas Forwood QC, "Working with European Lawyers", November 1989, Counsel:
The Journal of the Bar of England & Wales, 17.
449Frangoise Hampson, op. cit., 129.
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ECHR, its system and those of national law may help in
sharpening their approach to litigation on a
supranational level and at the same time highlight the
uniqueness of the Strasbourg system in relation to the
other legal orders of the member states.
The Commission considered its procedure to be written
under the requirement of Article 33 ECHR that it should
meet in camera, and although the principle was not taken
to extremes, the preference is unsurprising in view of
other inquisitorial underpinnings. The absence of free
exchanges between counsel and court (perhaps also due to
the language barrier) and the time-limits placed on
lawyers to speak make the Strasbourg court-rooms feel
altogether different from those in the common law world.
The Rules set down that, "The proceedings before the
Court shall, as a general rule, comprise as their first
stage a written procedure in which memorials450 are filed
by the Parties, the applicant, and it it so wishes, the
Commission [...]. "451
Orality is of course not banned and the weight of the
oral procedure before the two European organs should not
be underestimated. Upon the declaration of admissibility
of an application, the parties or their representatives
can deliver oral defence speeches or agree to confront
each other directly.452 Thus the Commission can make
arrangements for those special sessions. The Rules of
Court also open the possibility to concentrate the
450Rule 37 (4) of the Rules of Court requires that such memorials be filed in 40 copies.
451Rule 37 of the Rules of Court.
452lncidentally, although proceedings at the Commission are normally conducted in either
French or English, which are the official languages of the Council of Europe, witnesses can
use a language other than those two, and the Council of Europe will provide assistance for
the interpretation. (For further details see: Council of Europe document DH (54) 3, p. 12.
and also, Council of Europe document DH (55) 9, p. 32. According to the usual practices at
the Council of Europe, the parties can resort to a language other than the official languages if
they make the necessary arrangements.)
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proceedings in one oral stage.453 Despite various
concessions towards orality, however, the normal practice
is still to require written memorials and other written
documents from those intervening in the proceedings, and
further, in several copies.454
Is the European law of Human Rights an
identifiable body of law from the point of view of
the procedure?
While there is an ever-increasing number of applications
examined by a machinery operating under various
procedural rules,455 they all provide a framework to
accommodate the divergencies between the member states
rather than claim to be the rules of procedure for a
single system of human rights protection. Moreover, as
the number of member states increases with the admission
of several countries of Eastern Europe, their various
influences even on the procedural aspects of the system
are therefore likely to increase. Procedurally, the
European Court and the French Council of State have
various points of similarity and share the same "spirit".
The procedure in Strasbourg is laid out in steps largely
equivalent to those of the litigious administrative
procedure in French law (or the many legal systems to
which these French ideas where transplanted), the overall
attitude of the Strasbourg organs is that of an inquiry,
and the procedure reflects these assumptions.
453Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. For example, it was done in the Ringeisen case ((1979-
80) 1 EHRR 455), where the Court decided after consultation with the agent of the Austrian
Government and the delegates of the Commission that no (written) memorials were to be
filed.
4 54 Rule 37 (4) of the Rules of Court: filed documents are transmitted by the Registrar to the
judges, the agents of the parties, and the delegates of the Commission and subsequently,
to the President of the Chamber, who, after consultation with the parties concerned, will fix
the date of the opening of the oral proceedings (Rule 38 of the Rules of Court). Rule 32 of
the Rules of Court requires that 40 copies of the application of a Contracting Party or the
Commission to institute proceedings before the Court be filed with the Registrar.
455Set down in the ECHR, the Rules of Procedure of the Commission, the Rules of Court
and the organs' case law.
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The study of the procedural rules or the travaux
preparatoires did not disclose, however, that the
doctrine of the margin of appreciation is one of the
tools used in decision-making, and its existence shows
another civilian "infiltration": "neither the Commission
nor the Court has ever taken express notice of the
municipal roots of the margin doctrine, and its mixed
martial and civil/administrative law origins seem to have
merged in the Strasbourg case law".456
The various common features between the French tradition
and the Court of Human Rights do not authorise, however,
to say that both courts are identical or that they follow
the same procedures. The Commission, for example, does
not fulfil the role of an A-G before the Court, the
judges can issue separate opinions and also, the
"administration" whose acts come under scrutiny is not a
domestic one but the ("sovereign") governments of the
member states. This all goes to say that the civilian
elements borrowed "grew" differently in the supranational
level. In this limited sense, the European procedure
could be identified as a body of law, however, it is
necessary to insist that there are other systems of human
rights protection coexisting with Strasbourg. The
Strasbourg procedure itself requires the exhaustion of
all domestic remedies revealing that it comes second to
whatever (other) remedies are available in municipal law,
therefore, reinforcing the idea that human rights law
does not come from a singular power source. The
diffusion of the law takes place because of the presence
of a multiplicity of political and legal power centres
that subject the individual to many institutional
systems. Every one of those multiple systems operates
only as regards certain legal relationships. No single
456Howard C. Yourow, "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European
Human Rights Jurisprudence", (1987) 3 Connecticut Journal of Int'l Law 111, 123.
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system prevails over all others and in addition, all of
them can work together without major incompatibilities.457
It has been argued that several systems operating
together give more power to the judges through the
exercise of judicial review:
A new pluralism is emerging. Statutory law now has
many companions and competitors: the "higher law" of
the constitutions; the law of the Communities, which
also claim a "higher law" status, higher even that
that of national constitutions; written and
unwritten "general principles", both national and
transnational; and national and transnational bills
of rights. At the same time a new role for
adjudicators naturally emerges because the
adjudicators' role is always enhanced and magnified
by pluralism and competition of lawmaking sources.
Pluralism and competition demand comparison and
control. They demand judicial review.458
Recourse to Strasbourg is neither simple nor speedy,459 to
the extent of having received the following depiction:
"The problems of the organs of the European Convention
can be summarised in only two words: overload and
delay."460 The system that was set up in the 1950s (and
which has undergone relatively few changes461) became
perhaps "a victim of its own success."462 and some
projects of reform were devised to provide solutions.
The sheer number of applications still awaiting
resolution, the admission of new member states and the
repeated calls for reform supply further support to the
view that the machinery and the procedure as they stand
today could simply not take over the other systems of
457Neil MacCormick, "Beyond the Sovereign State", (1993) 56 MLR 1,8.
458Mauro Cappelletti, "The "Mighty Problem" of Judicial Review and the Contribution of
Comparative Analysis", (1980) 53 Southern California Law Review 409, 443.
459Rolv Ryssdal, 'The European Court of Human Rights and Gerard Wiarda, in: F. Matscher
and H. Petzold (ed.), Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension. Studies in
honour of Gerard J. Wiarda. (1988), 1.
460Leon R. Poffe, "The European Convention on Human Rights: Merger Proposal for
Commission and Court", (1989) 2 Leiden Journal of Int'l Law 90, 91.
461Rolv Ryssdal, The future of the European Court of Human Rights. European Court of
Human Rights documents (1990) (ECOUR90296.AB), 9.
4 62Andrew Z. Drzemczewski, "The need for a radical overhaul", (January 29, 1993) NLJ 126.
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protection already in existence if that were the
intention. It is hoped that some decongestion will be
achieved by the changes Protocol 11 will bring to the
existing mechanism.463
When Protocol 11 enters into operation, a permanent Court
will replace the present semi-permanent Court and
Commission, and the Committee of Ministers will no longer
be able to determine whether the ECHR has been violated.
The adjustments, sizable as they are, do not seem however
to involve any radical departure from the (civil law
based) "spirit" of the system discussed in this chapter.
The right of individual petition and the jurisdiction of
the new Court (with respect to individual and inter-state
applications) will be mandatory. After the filing of an
application, preliminary contacts will be made with the
Registry of the Court. Upon registration an application
will be assigned to a Chamber which will appoint a judge
rapporteur who will carry out the activities presently in
the hands of the Commission.464 if at least one judge in
the three-member Committee considers that the application
is admissible, then it will be communicated to the
respondent government. Written observations will be
filed and the fact-finding will be performed. There will
be a possibility of a friendly settlement at this stage.
If unsuccessful, then a Chamber will decide the case.
Only in exceptional circumstances will a Grand Chamber
pass judgment.465
463Andrew Drzemczewski, "Putting the European house in order", NLJ, May 13, 1994, 64.
464protocol 11, Article 27: It establishes that Committees are composed of 3 judges,
Chambers of 7, and a Grand Chamber of 17.
465Protocol 11, Article 30: a relinquishment of jurisdiction to the Grand Chamber will take
place should a serious question of interpretation of the ECHR or its Protocols arise, or where
the resolution of a case might contradict previous case law. This relinquishment of
jurisdiction can take place before issuing judgment and unless one of the parties to the case
objects. The parties can request that a case decided by a Chamber be referredt to the Grand
Chamber (Article 44).
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There were two main projects of reform. One proposed the
creation of a single court (backed by Switzerland)466 in
order to "remove the competitive element which certain
observers have on occasion detected already in the
present relations between the Commission and the
Court."467 The unsuccessful project (proposed by the
Netherlands and Sweden) envisaged the Commission
operating as a court of first instance and the European
Court exercising appellate jurisdiction. It is clear
that both schemes acknowledged the maturity of Strasbourg
and reinforced the judicial over the political activity
of the system as they proposed doing away with the
ability of Committee of Ministers to make decisions on
breaches of the ECHR.468
4 6 6See, for further details: "Report of the Committee of experts for the improvement of
procedures for the protection of human rights (DH-PR) to the Steering Committee for Human
Rights (CDDH)", Council of Europe Document H (89) 2.
467AndrewZ. Drzemczewski, op. cit., 134.
468See previous chapter: the new situation might therefore put the system further along the
ideas of the "strong" Europeans in the stages that led to the drafting of the ECHR. Before
the signature of Protocol 11, apparently the majority of the Commission members favoured a
two-tiered judicial system that would enable the Commission to operate as a court of first
instance capable of issuing binding decisions. The minority of the Commission favoured a
single court, though. The majority of the judges of the European Court preferred either
limited institutional reforms or the Dutch-Swedish proposal, but the Parliamentary Assembly,
however, supported the single court concept. (See: Alastair R. Mowbray, "Reform of the
Control System of the European Convention on Human Rights", [1993] PL 419.)
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Conelusions
The aim of this chapter has been to examine the extent to
which civilian elements have been adopted by the
Strasbourg procedure and the main finding was that the
continental tradition influenced the most the "spirit" of
the European Court and machinery particularly through
"borrowings" from to the French administrative law
practices (or from other continental countries inspired
by the French example). Despite the existence of a
machinery and a procedure of such inspiration, the
European Court is not a clone of any French or more
generally, any civilian tribunal. The analysis showed
that transplants "grow" differently in different
environments. Although Strasbourg follows broadly in the
tradition of continental public law procedures as regards
the Court's powers, functions and jurisdiction, it also
contains several unique features. There is no A-G,
judges can issue separate opinions and as time passes the
development of the Court's "autonomous concepts" and
standards adds up in order to set the system apart from
its continental roots. These roots, however, were made
plain by the following characteristics: the procedure
consists of stages broadly equivalent to those of the
(French) litigious administrative proceedings, it leans
towards an inquisitorial style, it could be best
described as "contradictoire" rather than adversarial in
the common law sense of the expression, and it favours
written over oral exchanges.
The European system of human rights protection works
superimposed to the heterogeneity created by other
systems in the member states without replacing them.
There is a vertical tension between the national and
supranational spheres and Strasbourg provides a shared
framework to diversity. The interpretation of the ECHR
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takes place in the environment created by the Strasbourg
machinery and its rules of procedure where the various
traditions of the member states come together. The
tendency towards one procedural system for Europe that
the mere existence of the Strasbourg machinery may
suggest is set aside by the cultural and legal diversity
it must accommodate. Moreover, if all other systems of
protection were to disappear overnight, the Strasbourg
system would not be capable of moving in to fill the
vacuum. Although the procedure is mainly statutorily
described (in the tradition of the continental legal
orders), a crucial tool to manage the complex partnership
between Strasbourg and the member states is the civilian
doctrine of the margin of appreciation, which is not
expressly mentioned among the rules of procedure.
Finally, this study shows that it is through a civil law
influenced procedure that the common law as well as the
civil law inspired elements of the ECHR (discussed in the
previous chapter) are to be "applied" to situation. The
outcome of the "application" of the ECHR to a case
through this control machinery will be spelled out in a
judgment (as will be discussed in the next chapter) whose
form of justification is deductive. These inferences
underline the intricacy of the system and the challenge
of ECHR interpretation: to render the meaning of the ECHR
whose origin is at the crossroads of traditions into the
various contexts provided by the cases (themselves at
similar crossroads) heard by the European organs through
a procedure which has continental administrative roots.







The style of the
European Court judgments
and the hierarchical position
of the ECHR in the Strasbourg system
But the words of a treaty are not
enough for there to be
harmonisation of its subject
matter. There must be
harmonisation of all the
jurisprudence that goes with it.469
Introduction
This chapter examines the style of the judgments of the
European Court in the light of the typical assumptions of
the Western European legal traditions that had influenced
the development of the human rights system of the Council
of Europe: civilian, common law and the mixtures of them.
The study concentrates on the process of legal
interpretation. The purpose of this examination is to
determine the impact of the style on the decision making
process, the hierarchy and handling of sources and their
(relative) importance in relation to the authority
enjoyed by the European Court in its system. "Style" is
469The Right Honourable Lord Hope, "From Maastricht to the Saltmarket; A Lecture
delivered before the Society of Solicitors in the Supreme Courts of Scotland" (1992), 13.
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understood as the distinctive manner of the European
Court of expressing itself, which is visible in the shape
and argumentation of the judicial decisions. The
analysis will consequently be based on the evidence of
decided cases read from the point of view of uncovering
their legal reasoning and the interpretation of rules.
Judgments will be divided into three parts to assist
understanding: major premiss, minor premiss and a
conclusion, a segmentation based on the deductive form
they take. A premiss is taken to mean one of the two
propositions in a syllogism from which a conclusion is
drawn, and for the present purposes, the major premiss
lays down the legal rules, of statutory origin or
extracted from the jurisprudence, the minor premiss deals
with the facts, and the conclusion is the dispositif of
the judgment, logically derived from the two premisses.
The topic of statutory interpretation in Strasbourg will
be discussed as well as the question of judicial review
of government conduct by reference to a supranational
bill of rights. Finally, the subject of the subsumption
of the facts into the rules will be put, and to close,
the conclusions of the chapter will be drawn.
The form and content of a European judgment
Are the European Court decisions identifiable as
"European"? If we use the term "European" in the context
of the Convention system and equate it to
"supranational", that is, opposed to "national", then an
affirmative answer is possible.
It was natural that in such a system the legal traditions
of Western Europe, civilian, common law and the mixtures
of them had contact with Strasbourg and influenced it in
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different ways. In fact, it appears that the civil law
has left an important imprint on the configuration of
decision-making: the European Court has developed its own
version of the syllogistic style in which legal reasoning
gravitates towards a logical deduction from premisses.
Such an arrangement is in contrast with the common law
"style". Professor N. MacCormick470 pointed out (tongue-
in-cheek) that English lawyers and writers usually
praised the "illogical" quality of their system, and
thought it an odd continental practice to be "logical".
Of course a dichotomy of logical versus illogical is an
overstatement, but there is something in the distinction.
A syllogistic style in a common law ruling would
certainly be out of the ordinary; however, if one looks
hard enough, and most importantly, recasts the words of a
judgment, then a logical argument in three statements can
be discerned: two premisses with a conclusion following
from them as a matter of course. A considerable effort
of re-organisation may be necessary to achieve that end
but the point here is that although a deduction
eventually takes place in a common law judgment, the
justification relies on the weighing model, i.e. the
opinions bring out why the judges reached the
pronouncements they did as their assertions may be
helpful for use in future cases. The possibility of re¬
writing decisions does not erase the dissimilarities
between the legal traditions in the arrangement of a
ruling and in the identity of the propositions from which
their reasoning departs and is grounded.
In Strasbourg, two periods are recognisable in the style
of the case-law. In the 1960s it was that of (higher)
continental law courts, as for example, the reasoning of
the preliminary ruling of the Belgian Linguistics471 case
47°N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory . (1978), 39 and 41.
474(1979-80) 1 EHRR 252.
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in 1967, where the section dealing with the law was a
single complex sentence with subordinate clauses showing
the reasoning steps and ending up in a short ruling "the
Court decides...". The parallel with the decisions of
the French Court of Cassation was obvious: an opinion of
that tribunal is usually in the form of a single sentence
with the following parts: "The Court, having seen" (there
usually follows the statutory texts cited by the
parties), then a few "whereases" to end with "for these
reasons quashes" or "rejects" the petition.472 Hardly a
writing style to let the judges blend in any case law.
It was clear that the Court was still learning its trade.
From the judgment on the merits in the Belgian
Linguistics case in 1968 an arguably less cumbersome mode
of expression473 was introduced in order to deal with many
issues: a long series of paragraphs beginning with the
word "whereas." There is no single collective judgment
like that of the ECJ or still many continental courts so
the style is in this aspect closer to the common law
countries474 where judges normally disclose individual
opinions.475 Nevertheless, in the case of the ECJ there
is an opinion delivered by the A-G which can throw light
on the issues of the case even though the ruling of the
ECJ may point in a different direction afterwards,
although that is very rarely the case. In Strasbourg
there is no equivalent to an A-G, which leaves the
European Court's own decision to bear all justificatory
weight.
472See, for example: Andrew West, The French Legal System. (1992).
473J. G. Merrills, The development of international law by the European Court of Human
Rights. (1988), 26.
474Although this is not universal, e.g., the Inner House of the Court of Session in Scotland
now frequently issues a 'Judgment of the Court' and conversely, the practice of issuing
corporate judgments is not the norm in every civil law jurisdiction: the German Constitutional
Court discloses the votes of the judges.
475J. G. Merrills, op. cit., 21 and 22.
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The changes in Strasbourg have not ousted the generally
civilian approach, however: the Court's argumentation
mode still tends to the professorial, logical and
structured discussion of the law and the facts, and the
style is still under argued from the common law
perspective. In a system influenced in many ways by the
civilian tradition, it is not surprising that the
European Court takes notice of professors and many of its
judges are academics. Law professors have traditionally
been highly regarded on the Continent,476 a situation, as
is well known, dissimilar from that in common law
jurisdictions; the contrast has to do with the different
historical development of both legal traditions. The
professors, jurists and commentators developed the
meticulous style of argumentation so well-suited to
elicit principles from the Roman texts rediscovered in
Northern Italy in the eleventh century477, or the
Napoleonic codes issued and exported in the nineteenth.
The ancestry of the Strasbourg's internally orderly style
which tends to place justification in an external source
can therefore be traced to that scholarly method.
The civilian style of the Court and some separate
opinions (particularly those written in a tone that would
please a law professor, even with scholarly citations478)
is challenged sometimes by other separate opinions argued
from a common law stance, which is more discursive and
dialogic. In the following example it has been a
deliberate intention of this writer to pair two
dissenting opinions in these contrasting styles. The
case of Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom479
476R. C. van Caenegem, Judges. Legislators and Professors: Chapters in European Legal
History. (1987), 64.
477M. H. Hoeflich, "Law & Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell", (1986) 30
American Journal of Legal History 95, 97.
478For example, see the very well argued dissenting opinions by Judge S. K. Martens in
Cossey v. United Kingdom (1991) 13 EHRR 622 and Borgers v. Belgium (1993) 15
EHRR 92, both of which shed considerable light on the issues.
4 7 9 (5/1992/350/423-424).
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concerned the arrest and detention of two suspects under
the PTA.480 The European Court found that the British
authorities' refusal to provide judicial control of some
detentions was within their margin of appreciation,
particularly in view of a derogation of 1988 following
the Brogan and others case. Judges Pettiti and Walsh did
not share those views and said so in very different
styles. The opinion of the Irish Judge Walsh, as is the
case of decisions in common law countries481, is
discursive and with narrative elements. "A reason put
forward by the Government for being unwilling to bring an
arrested person before a judge "promptly" after arrest
(or not at all until it is decided to charge him) is the
possible embarrassment to the judges in knowing what was
in the mind of the arresting officer ...", he writes. He
immediately disagrees with what the United Kingdom
proposed, "It is quite wrong to suggest that the
adversary procedure of the common law requires such
disclosure, particularly on the first appearance in
court."482 He then sifts the facts of the case into their
bearing on the law. After pointing out that Article 5
(3) ECHR safeguards against arbitrary executive arrest or
detention that could give rise to complaints under
Article 3 ECHR "which cannot be the subject of
derogation", he writes "In the present case ..." and
lists the actual facts, that is, the number of hours of
detention and interrogation of both applicants, and
closes the paragraph with "The object of these
interrogations was to gain "sufficient admissions" to
sustain a charge, or charges." He disagrees with the
reasoning of the European Court as regards the
availability of the safeguard of habeas corpus: "The
480Section 12 (1) (b) of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984.
481See: Robert S. Summers, "Statutory Interpretation in the United States" at 446 and
Zenon Bankowski and D. Neil MacCormick, "Statutory Interpretation in the United Kingdom"
at 392, in: N. MacCormick and R. Summers, Interpreting Statutes: A Comparative Study.
(1991).
482(5/1992/350/423-424) dissenting opinion of Judge Walsh, para. 5.
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Court, in paragraphs 62 to 67 inclusive of its judgment,
overlooks the information before it to the effect that
the so-called safeguards are, in practice, illusory as
their availability within the first forty-eight hours of
detention is solely dependent upon police willingness"
and concludes "Even the great historic remedy of habeas
corpus, theoretically available almost instantly, can be
put out of the reach of the arrested person by reason of
non-access to the world outside the detention centre."483
All this discursive reasoning became a necessary
introduction to his conclusion "In my opinion there has
been a breach of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in
respect of the detention of each of the applicants."484
He also found a breach of Article 13 ECHR.485
It should be said, however, that Walsh's style has
company in Strasbourg. Let us briefly take the case of
Campbell v. the United Kingdom where the European Court
found a breach of Article 8 ECHR as regards the control
exercised by the Scottish prison authorities on a
prisoner's correspondence to and from his solicitor and
with the European Commission of Human Rights. It is
sufficient to illustrate the style to quote just a part
of a paragraph of Sir John Freeland's partly dissenting
opinion, written in the argumentative style of the common
law. He hypothesises a solution which he then discards
because the circumstances were different:
If I were satisfied that it had been established
that a particular item of correspondence between the
applicant and his solicitor indeed concerned either
contemplated or pending proceedings and had been
opened by the prison authorities without their
having had a reasonable cause to suspect abuse, I
would therefore had been prepared to vote for a
48 3 (5/1992/350/423-424) dissenting opinion of Judge Walsh, para. 12.
484 (5/1992/350/423-424) dissenting opinion of Judge Walsh, para. 13.
48-(5/1992/350/423-424) dissenting opinion of Judge Walsh, paras. 14 and 15.
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finding of a violation of Article 8 in this respect.
That is, however, not the case.486
Coming back to Brannigan and McBride v. the United
Kingdom, the French Judge Pettiti challenged the finding,
but not the style of the Court's judgment. His logically
inferred manner is another variety of the civilian
logical mode of thought, somewhat reminiscent of the
practices of the Italian courts487, where the necessary
conclusion follows logically from a series of given
premisses laid down in steps and which give no space to
the weighing model of the common law. His steps488 were
the following: "The European Court has jurisdiction to
carry out a review of the derogations from the guarantees
recognised as essential for the protection of the rights
set out in the Convention ...", then, "Even if it is
accepted that States have a margin of appreciation (...)
the situation relied on must be examined by the European
Court." Mr. Pettiti recognises that "The fact of
terrorism and its gravity in Northern Ireland is
incontestable" on top of which he adds another argument,
"... the derogation cannot constitute a carte blanche
accorded to the State for an unlimited duration ..." He
then adds further arguments while steering his opinion
towards the conclusion he wishes to propound, and makes
references to the case Ireland v. United Kingdom, to the
arguments of the United Kingdom in the present case, to
the Italian experience with terrorism where (apparently)
judicial involvement in extended police custody was
retained, and finally, to the dissenting opinions of two
486(52/1990/243/314) partly dissenting opinion of Judge Sir John Freeland, paras, are not
numbered.
487On judicial interpretation in Italy, see: M. La Torre, E. Pattaro and M. Taruffo: "Statutory
Interpretation in Italy", in: N. MacCormick and R. Summers, Interpreting Statutes: A
Comparative Study. 240. At page 242, those writers argue that Italian rulings are not
concerned with explaining to the parties why a certain decision was reached, but with
justifying the legal correctness of the conclusion to the lawyers. Judges in Italy are
professional lawyers who speak to other professional lawyers by means of arguments that
only lawyers can appreciate.
488(5/1992/350/423-424) dissenting opinion of Judge Pettiti, paras, are not numbered.
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Commissioners. After stating that "The [U.K.'s] argument
based on the recourse to habeas corpus does not appear
convincing ..." his conclusion follows inevitably from
the points made, "From that point of view the conditions
of the incommunicado detention were contrary to Article
5." He closes his reasoning, "In the Brannigan and
McBride case, in my opinion, the Government's action fell
outside the margin of appreciation which the Court is
able to recognise" and reminds us of what in his view
should have been the controlling principle to test the
respondent government's behaviour, "The fundamental
principle which must prevail and which is consistent with
British and European tradition is that detention cannot
be extended from four days to seven days without the
involvement of a judge, who is the guarantor of
individual freedoms and fundamental rights."
Accordingly, the different approaches to legal reasoning
separate the legal traditions:
The difference in justificatory structures between
civil law and common law systems is one of the few
differences of justificatory practice between
countries in our project that largely tracks the
traditional 'civil law - common law' divide. The
difference cries out for explanation. Perhaps one
factor is that judges in the UK and the USA were
themselves once lawyers who practised law in the
'discursive' or dialogic style. Also the British
and American judiciaries have traditionally played
larger roles in their systems than most of the other
judiciaries in their systems. Perhaps, then, those
judiciaries feel less need to proceed by way of
deductive subsumption than do judges whose
legitimacy has been more in doubt and only
relatively recently fully won.489
The topics discussed in this chapter are organised
following the particular syllogistic style of the
decisions of the European Court.




To illustrate the reasoning of the European Court,
excerpts from the Moreira de Azevedo490 case will be used
to illustrate that reasoning starts from the rules (major
premiss), then moves to the facts (minor premiss) and
finally a conclusion is set out. (Although other examples
are also provided). The facts of the case concerned a
Portuguese national victim of a shooting incident in
1977. As a result of his injuries he had to take sick
leave from work. The assailant (the victim's brother-in-
law) was convicted and ordered to pay damages, however,
the conviction was quashed on appeal. Later, the
applicant appealed to the Supreme Court but his petition
was rejected, so he took his case to Strasbourg, where he
claimed that the outcome of the criminal proceedings were
relevant to his plea for damages, that he was entitled to
a hearing and that proceedings had taken too long
overall. The European Court found Article 6 (1) ECHR
applicable to his case.
In the judgment, a major premiss put down the applicable
rule as the basis to build the rest of the syllogism.
Alleged violation of Article 6 § 1
Before making any ruling on the alleged violation of
Article 6 § 1, the Court has to decide whether the
provision is applicable. (...) In the Court's
opinion, the right to a fair trial holds so
prominent a place in a democratic society that there
can be no justification for interpreting Article 6 §
1 of the Convention restrictively. (...) the case
concerned the determination of a right; the result
of the proceedings was decisive for that right (...)
to intervene as an assistente [private prosecutor]
is equivalent as filing a claim for compensation in
civil proceedings. By acquiring this status Mr
Moreira de Azevedo demonstrated the importance he
490(1991) 13 EHRR 721.
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attached to the criminal conviction of the accused
but also to securing financial reparation for the
damage sustained (...)491
The Court here has to say what the law is, but what is
the situation as regards the relative value of sources?
The legal traditions give different answers. To carry
out a comparative study of the use of sources in
Strasbourg it is necessary, therefore, to keep in mind
that:
The proper object of comparison for the civil law
methods of code interpretation is not the common law
system of statutory interpretation but rather the
methods of legal reasoning from precedents, the
techniques of case law, the ways of distinguishing
cases, of determining holdings and dicta, of
ascertaining the ratio decidendi of previous cases,
and thus finally distilling the rule of law
applicable to the issues of a present case.492
The Strasbourg system makes much of the rules contained
in the "statute book" of the Convention, not a
restatement of previous laws or case law, which did not
exist at a European level, but rather a "creation of
reason", which functions to some extent as a code in a
codified civilian system. By means of deductive
reasoning a decision will be reached in the course of a
process that stresses quite markedly the preference for
statutory law.
Specifically, the underlying assumption echoes an idea
that has been applied to the (unfulfilled) expectations
of nineteenth century codifiers, that is, the "myth of
codification."493 The ideal of codification was to
regulate an area of the law in a complete and systematic
way, with no gaps, overlappings, contradictions or
491 (1991) 13 EHRR 721, para. 69.
492Konrad Zweigert and Hans-Jurgen Puttfarken, "Statutory Interpretation- Civilian Style",
(1970) 44TLR 704,709.
493Genaro R. Carrio, "Judge Made Law under a Civil Code", (1981) 41 La. L. Rev. 993,
993.
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ambiguities, all of which arguably made a code easy to
apply. Although the situation in the system of the
Convention is different (the ECHR does not have the
comprehensiveness of any nineteenth century code nor it
is subordinate to other higher laws in Strasbourg), and
also, for the analogy with constitutional interpretation
and judicial review as will be discussed later, at any
rate, it is thought provoking to see in Strasbourg echoes
of the (expansive) civilian methodology of interpretation
which the stiffness of codification has prompted in
civilian jurisdictions:
a code regulates a whole area of the law - such as
private law, commercial law, or criminal law - and
considering its coverage, is fairly short and
concise. Normally, its language is general and very
abstract, giving rise to a large amount of statutory
construction. [This] is the basic reason that civil
law rules of statutory interpretation show a
pronounced tendency toward extending the scope of
application of a statute rather than toward
restricting it, a tendency reinforced by the fact
that even the more specialized parts of a code are
not kept up to date by the legislature.494
The Strasbourg system treats the ECHR and its Protocols
as the treasure trove of all the statutory rules needed
in decision making. This position at the highest point
in the rank of sources is accordingly reminiscent of the
role played by a Constitution for a Constitutional Court.
In addition, there is a secondary source of rules in
Strasbourg: the major premiss also contains rules
extracted in a civilian fashion from previously decided
cases. That jurisprudence495 is an expanding body with a
de facto persuasive (not binding) value. Even though
today the practices of continental courts lead to results
494Konrad Zweigert and Hans-Jurgen Puttfarken, op. cit., 708.
495Frederic Sudre, "Les libertes protegees par la Cour europeenne des Droits de
I'homme", in: Dominique Rousseau and Frederic Sudre (eds.), Conseil Constitutionnel et
Cour europeenne des droits de I'homme: Droits et libertes en Europe. (1990). 17.
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comparable to the common law doctrine of stare decisis,496
the important differences in the method of deriving and
handling rules cannot be overlooked. In the common law
world, the ratio decidendi is identified by studying the
precedent (the entire previous decision) against the full
facts of the case, and in some circumstances, a close
similarity between the facts of the present case and the
precedent is required. The underlying idea is that every
court is bound by all decisions of superior courts; and
until the mid-1960s, the doctrine also required in the
United Kingdom that the Court of Appeal and the House of
Lords treat their own previous decisions as absolutely
binding.497 "Precedents" in the civil law world produce
only a very general rule of law, however, usually not
founded on recent leading cases (which, on the other
hand, may only illustrate one aspect of a doctrine).498
For example, in Italy499, courts do not scrutinise whether
the facts of the precedent and of case to decide are
sufficiently similar. The different footing of the
traditions was put, with lucidity, by Sir Otto Kahn-
Freund500, as follows, "[The principle of precedent]
differs from l'autorite de la jurisprudence in
Continental countries, not because it permits and compels
the courts to lay down legal rules - this they do
everywhere - but because it refuses to permit the courts
to change or to abrogate rules thus laid down." This
should be handled carefully, with the caveat that the
Strasbourg Court is at the top of the system, as a
496Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, op. cit., 266.
497Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 3 All ER 77. The 1966 Practice
Statement whereby the Lord Chancellor (Gardiner) announced that the House of Lords
would regard itself as free to depart from its own previous decisions was an important
change in the UK practices of precedents.
498Cf. T. B. Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative. (1962), 90, where doing otherwise in
Scots law apparently gave Donoghue v. Stevenson a false common law pedigree of
precedent to what was a Civilian doctrine.
499Robert S. Summers and Michele Taruffo, in: N. MacCormick and R. Summers, op. cit.,
489.
50 "Sir Otto Kahn-Freund, "Common Law and Civil Law - Imaginary and Real Obstacles to
Assimilation", in: Mauro Cappelletti (ed.), New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe.
(1978), 150.
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Constitutional Court, and those Courts are more free to
reverse themselves if need arises.
Nevertheless, that qualification voiced, we should not be
prevented from noticing methodological501 differences
between the legal traditions in this respect. In
Strasbourg the case law does not yield a ratio decidendi
but a general statement similar to a statutory rule (the
ratio legis502 as it is termed in civilian countries) that
buttresses rules already found in statutory form (ECHR).
The rules found in previous cases are used sanitised of
the facts, which makes for a weak control of the Court
over future cases.
For example, in the Case of Oerlemans v. the
Netherlands,503 where the "civil" character of the issue
under Article 6 (1) ECHR was in dispute, there is no
discussion on the facts of the precedents, just a brief
reference to the Skarby and Fredin judgments from which
the Court derived an applicable (abstract) principle. A
"see, inter alia" suggests that there were other cases
laying down the same rule, but those were omitted from
the judgment.
The Government also pleaded, in the alternative,
that there was no right of a "civil" character at
issue.
However, in the light of the Court's case-law there
can be no doubt that the property right in question
was "civil" in nature within the meaning of Article
6 § 1 (see, inter alia, the above-mentioned Skarby
and Fredin judgments, Series A no. 180-B, p. 37, §
29, and Series A no. 192, p. 20, § 63).
In sum, Article 6 § 1 applies to the present case.
501Liana Fiol Matta, "Civil Law and Common Law in the Legal Method of Puerto Rico",
(1992) 40 AJCL 783. That author has compiled several cases decided by the Supreme
Court of Puerto Rico which confirm the methodological differences between the civil law
(acquired through the Spanish influence) and the common law (through the American
influence) in the handling of sources, style, interpretation and so on.
502«onrad Zweigert and Hans-Jurgen Puttfarken, op. cit., 709.
50342/1990/233/299, paras. 47, 48 and 49. This case is discussed in Chapter 8.
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Let us look at the case Borgers v. Belgium which set
aside Delcourt v. Belgiumso/l based on the importance of
the appearances of a fair trial. The rule extracted from
the case law was that justice must not only be done, but
must be seen to be done, however, it was cut off from the
facts of the cited cases and deductively applied to
Borgers.
It is, however, necessary to consider whether the
proceedings before the Court of Cassation also
respected the rights of the defence and the
principle of the equality of arms, which are
features of the wider concept of a fair trial (...)
This has undergone a considerable evolution in the
Court's case-law, notably in respect of the
importance attached to appearances and to the
increased sensitivity of the public to the fair
administration of justice (see, among other
authorities, mutatis mutandis, the following
judgments: Piersack v. Belgium of 1 October 1982,
Series A no. 53, pp. 14-15, § 30; Campbell and Fell
v. the United Kingdom of 28 June 1984, Series A no.
80, pp. 39-40, § 18; Sramek v. Austria of 22 October
1984, Series A no. 84, p. 20, § 42; De Cubber v.
Belgium of 26 October 1984, Series A no. 86, p. 14,
§ 26; Bonish v. Austria of 6 May 1985, Series A no.
92, p. 15, § 32; Belilos v. Switzerland of 29 April
1988, Series A no. 132, p. 30, § 67; Hauschildt v.
Denmark of 24 May 1989, Series A no. 154, p. 21, §
48; Langborger v. Sweden of 22 June 1989, Series A
no. 155, p. 16, § 32; Demicoli v. Malta of 27 August
1991, Series A no. 210, § 40; Brandstetter v.
Austria of 28 August 1991, Series A no. 211, §
44) .505
The case law was handled as jurisprudence constante.
Borgers was not a trivial case where even a common law
court would have only listed the cases to which it was
adhering, but with this case, Strasbourg was reversing
Delcourt. The citation was not part of any argumentation
to explain the substantial aptness of the decision
B04(1979-80) 1 EHRR 355. For further details on the Delcourt and Borgers cases see
chapter 9.
50S(1993) 15 EHRR 92, para. 24.
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arrived at, rather, it merely yielded the principle
(rule)506 and was quoted as a footnote. Underlying this
method is the civilian jurists' assumption that by means
of general and basic concepts507 - the outcome of a
rationalisation and classification process - it is
possible to get to grips with the chaos of human events.
Those principles are usually best stated in statutory
rules, but if extracted from case law, they are equally
abstract and disconnected from any factual situation.
Let us now look at the cases quoted. There is no
inductive inquiry into how the extracted rule was
limited, extended or refined, and no tentative solution
was devised, tested, and eventually, turned into the
Borgers ruling. The factual diversity is striking, but
since such assortment is confined to a parenthesis, it
does not interrupt the terse style of the judgment. In
Piersack v. Belgium508 the European Court found a breach
of the fair trial principle of Article 6 (1) ECHR because
the judge who presided over the court which convicted Mr.
Piersack of murder had previously been the senior deputy
procureur who took the decision to prosecute. In
Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom509 the Court had
found breaches of Articles 6, 8 and 13 ECHR as regards
the restrictions imposed on prison inmates who sought,
inter alia, legal advice concerning internal disciplinary
proceedings. Sramek v. Austria510 dealt with the right to
a fair hearing of an American citizen whose purchase of
land in the Austrian Tyrol was not authorised under
existing national laws on grounds that apparently too
many foreigners owned land in the region. The European
506Cf. Manuel Rodriguez Ramos, "Interaction of Civil Law and Anglo-American Law in the
Legal Method in Puerto Rico", (1948) 23 Tulane Law Review 1, 23, for an example in the
opposite direction, product of the Anglo-American infiltration of the doctrine of stare decisis
in the Puertorican legal system.
507Julio Cueto-Rua, 'The Future of the Civil Law", (1977) 37 La. L. Rev. 645, 646-7.
508(1983) 5 EHRR 169.
509(1985) 7 EHRR 165.
510(1985) 7 EHRR 351.
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Court found a breach of Article 6 ECHR because Ms. Sramek
had not received a fair hearing before the Regional Real
Property Authority but her monetary compensation claims
were dismissed because there was no evidence that a
differently composed authority would have decided in her
favour. In the case of De Cubber v. Belgium511 the
European Court found a breach of Article 6 (1) ECHR
because one of the judges who convicted the applicant of
forgery had previously been the investigating judge. In
Bonisch v. Austria512 a domestic ruling was deemed in
breach of the right to a fair hearing. The applicant had
been found responsible for exceeding the tolerances for
residual benzopyrene (a carcinogenic substance) in the
meat smoking processes in use in his factory. The
domestic decision was based on the evidence of a court-
appointed expert who had previously drafted a report for
the prosecution. In Belilos v. Switzerland513 the
European Court found that the Police Board of the
Municipality of Lausanne, who had fined Ms. Belilos for
participating in an unauthorised demonstration, was not
an impartial tribunal as required by Article 6 (1) ECHR.
In Hauschildt v. Denmark514 the applicant had been
convicted of breaches of financial laws as regards the
flow of money between his company and associated
companies abroad. The Court found violations of Article
6 ECHR because some of the judges involved in the con¬
viction had previously participated in various pre-trial
decisions. In Langborger v. Sweden515 a violation of
Article 6 (1) had occured because the tenant applicant
had not had a fair hearing concerning changes in his
lease agreement. In Demicoli v. Malta516 there was a
breach of Article 6 ECHR as regards the impartiality of
511(1985) 7 EHRR 236.
512(1987) 9 EHRR 191.
513(1988) 10 EHRR 466.
514(1990) 12 EHRR 266.
515(1990) 12 EHRR 416.
516 (33/1990/224/288)
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the proceedings for defamation against Mr. Demicoli,
editor of a political satirical periodical. Finally, in
Brandstetter v. Austria517 the handling of evidence was in
breach of Article 6 (1) ECHR.
Running through all this heterogeneous collection of
criminal offences, administrative violations and
complaints against unfair administrative procedures,
then, is the one common feature: in one way or another
they all fell short of the requirements of a right to a
hearing and/or impartial tribunal which are important for
the appearance of a fair trial. It is left to the
hypothetical readers the task to work out for themselves
the reasoning of the Court, as they are asked to "see,
among other authorities" and to keep in mind that all the
cases are to be read mutatis mutandis. The reasons for
choosing those "precedents" is not really made explicit.
The lack of substantiation makes it difficult to study,
for example, how the Court measures the elements resorted
to in deciding the scope of the margin of appreciation:
Especially vexing in any attempt to uncover the
meaning of the consensus factor is the consistently
unsubstantiated nature of the Court's
pronouncements. Each of these opinions relies upon
the precedential value of other opinions in which a
European consensus, or lack thereof, figured
importantly, but a student of the Court is not
informed as to how the Court measures the existence
or non-existence of any one particular consensus.518
Finally, the jurisprudence constante in Strasbourg, in
contrast with the common law principle of precedent, can
only keep a weak control over future decisions.519 Where
the margin of appreciation afforded to the member states
517(1993) 15 EHRR
518Howard C. Yourow, "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European
Human Rights Jurisprudence", (1987) 3 Connecticut Journal of Int'l Law 111,158.
5 !9Cf: 'Statutory interpretation in Italy", in: N. MacCormick and R. Summers, op. cit., 241,
where a system not based on legally binding precedents seems unable to prevent
inconsistent case law on the same issue.
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is substantial, the possibility of contradictory findings
that are "good law" at the same time cannot be ruled out.
For example, in Cossey and Rees v. United Kingdom the
European Court decreed, inter alia, that the right to
marry was subject to national laws, which in the United
Kingdom banned marriage between persons of the same
biological sex at birth, but in B. v. France the Court
decided otherwise due to differences in domestic law. As
a result,
the Cossey decision is not completely redundant. A
difference in domestic laws meant that the court
could neatly distinguish the situation of
transsexuals in the two countries. Only if the
court had decided B.'s case on new scientific
evidence or social grounds would Cossey no longer
stand. It therefore remains "good law," at least as
far as transsexuals in the United Kingdom are
concerned.520
In addition, the Court appeared to have used "political
antennae" not to ask a member state to carry out (perhaps
extensive) changes in its administrative law system.521
The Court's methodology of interpretation of the
rules in the "statute book" of the ECHR
The old positivist idea that deciding a case involves
nothing more than "applying" a rule to the facts that
still pervades judicial thought in many continental
countries522 appears to have percolated through to the
European Court, where much heed is paid to the statutory
text, as shown by the hierarchy of sources in use. This
section of the chapter deals with a range of issues on
interpretation of statutory rules in Strasbourg. It will
520Susan Millns, "Transsexuality and the European Convention on Human Rights", [1992]
PL 559, 564.
521More on this in Chapter 8.
522Konrad Zweigert and Hein Kotz, Introduction to Comparative Law. (1987), 272.
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highlight the inadequacy of methods of statutory
interpretation that concentrate on the statutory texts
alone because, here again, the ECHR as a Constitution, is
written in open-ended language for which teleological
arguments are helpful. Elements for the analysis will be
drawn from statutory interpretation in domestic law and
from interpretation elsewhere, however, as the
environment where the ECHR operates is different from
those, the differences are predominant.
For the sake of discussion, interpretation will be
divided in three levels, textual, contextual and beyond
those two, the use of other arguments of interpretation.
Although those three levels will be dealt with
separately, they are at the same time, ingredients of one
total process of construction which has been divided only
to facilitate the analysis. In (almost) no case is the
distinction hard and fast.
The first of the three levels is the textual or
linguistic, which seems particularly important in
statutory interpretation in common law countries.523 in
the civil law, the plain meaning rule or "sens clair" has
much the same meaning and has fallen into disfavour
although in practice it may reappear now and then.524 it
examines the rules according to the ordinary meaning of
words, except if there are grounds for taking the words
as being part of a specialist terminology, which then
should apply. Thus, to construe a provision of the ECHR
or its Protocols, the European Court should start from
the text of the ECHR and give words their everyday
meaning. Let us consider a few examples. The
clarification of the meaning of the word "necessary"
523N. MacCormick and Z. Bankowski "Some Principles of Statutory Interpretation" in: Jan
van Dunne (ed.) Legal Reasoning and Statutory Interpretation. Rotterdam Lectures in
Jurisprudence 1986 - 1988. (1989), 46 to 53.
524Konrad Zweigert and Hans-Jiirgen Puttfarken, op. cit., 713.
- 197 -
within Article 10 ECHR was done in the case Engel and
Others v. the Netherlands (No. 1),S2S in which the Court
interpreted the phrase "right to liberty" of Article 5
ECHR. in this case the five applicants were draftees in
the Dutch armed forces and on a number of occasions had
been subject to various penalties for offences against
military discipline. The Court said:
(...) In proclaiming the 'right to liberty',
paragraph 1 of Article 5 is contemplating individual
liberty in its classic sense, that is to say the
physical liberty of the person. (...) As pointed out
by the Government and the Commission, it does not
concern mere restrictions upon liberty of movement
(...) This is clear both from the use of the terms
'deprived of his liberty' 'arrest' and 'detention',
which appear also in paragraph 2 to 5, and from a
comparison between Article 5 and the other normative
provisions of the Convention and its Protocols.
Periodically though, the Court has to bring out the
meaning of words after a study of the two authentic texts
of the ECHR, English and French. The Golder case depicts
a struggle with both languages which were out of step on
the expression "independent and impartial tribunal
established by law" of Article 6 (1) ECHR:
The clearest indications are to be found in the
French text, first sentence. In the field of
contestations civiles (civil claims) everyone has a
right to proceedings instituted by or against him
conducted in a certain way - 'equitablement'
(fairly), 'publiquement' (publicly), 'dans un delai
raisonnable' (within a reasonable time), etc. - but
also and primarily 'a ce qui sa cause soit entendue'
(that his case be heard) not by any authority
whatever but 'par un tribunal' (by a court or
tribunal) within the meaning of Article 6 (1) (...)
The English text, for its part, speaks of an
'independent and impartial tribunal established by
law' (...)526
525(1979-80) 1 EHRR 647, para. 58.
526(1979-80) 1 EHRR 524, para. 32.
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Those difficulties of non-equivalence between the English
and French texts were predictable. H. P. de Vries527
wrote that it is with the Italians that the French share
a lingua franca of concepts, reasoning, analysis of
problems, and so on due to the important French influence
on the Romanic family within the civilian tradition.
Moreover, J. F. Nijboer made the interesting observation
that there is a gulf between the language on evidence and
proof in English and in other continental European
languages:
The English language has much more variation and
precision (refinement) in the field of evidence and
proof than the continental languages. On the other
hand, there are many more abstract, substantive
legal concepts that can easily be translated, for
example, from German into Spanish, French or Dutch,
but that do not have a current equivalent in the
English language.528
Whenever the words cannot yield a meaning, an option is
to look on the context surrounding a rule as a source of
arguments that give meaning to a rule within a legal
system. In a study of statutory interpretation in
various countries, although it was said that in civilian
jurisdictions the jurisprudence fixes to a considerable
extent the meaning of the codes, it was observed,
however, that systemic arguments were widely used except
in common law jurisdictions such as the United States and
the United Kingdom, where, "if a statute is not by its
terms applicable, courts frequently assume that any prior
law continues to control, or that the matter is left to
the common law decision making, and refuse to apply the
statute by analogy."529
527Henry P. de Vries, Civil Law and the Anglo-American Lawyer: A case-illustrated
introduction to civil law institutions and method. (1976), 5.
528J. F. Nijboer, "Common Law Tradition in Evidence Scholarship Observed from a
Continental Perspective" (1993) 41 AJCL 299, 304.
529Robert S. Summers and Michele Taruffo, "Interpretation and Comparative Analysis", in
N. MacCormick and R. Summers (eds.), op. cit.,471.
- 199 -
In Strasbourg, the use of interpretative methods centred
on the ECHR as a system (using legal analogy, for
example) reflects the preference for legal reasoning
based if possible on the text of the ECHR. On occasion,
rules can be drawn more narrowly from the most immediate
context of the provision being interpreted or, looking
for a wider setting, rules can be drawn from the whole of
the ECHR as an integral system.530 Let us turn our
attention to two examples. An expression was found to
have a particular meaning within the ECHR in The Sunday
Times case. The Convention was treated as a coherent
context in which certain expression made sense, "(...)
the Court emphasises that the expression "authority and
impartiality" of the judiciary has to be understood
within the meaning of the Convention. For this purpose,
account must be taken of the central position occupied in
this context by Article 6, which reflects the fundamental
principle of the rule of law"531, or in the Golder case
when it observed that the expressions set out in the ECHR
are part of a context of which the Preamble is also a
piece, "As stated in Article 31 (2) of the Vienna
Convention, the preamble to a treaty forms an integral
part of the context. Furthermore, the preamble generally
is very useful for the determination of the "object" and
"purpose" of the instrument to be construed."532
Nevertheless, the textual and contextual approaches to
interpretation are insufficient: the Preamble mentions
some purposes of the human rights system.533 This basic
philosophy enables Paul Mahoney to reject the possibility
of an evolution towards a lower, as opposed to a higher,
530J. Bengoetxea and H. Jung, "Towards a European Criminal Jurisprudence? The
Justification of Criminal Law by the Strasbourg Court", (1991) Legal Studies 230, 262.
53X(1979-80) 2 EHRR 245, para. 55.
532(1979-80) 1 EHRR 524, para. 34.
533The Preamble, linking the ideas of democracy and the protection of human rights, states
that "the aim of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity between its
Members and that one of the methods by which that aim is to be pursued is the
maintenance and further realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms."
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level of human rights protection. 534 Like a constitution,
the ECHR, "(...) was clearly not intended to last for
only a day, but to provide for future generations the
kind of continuing protection that a national
constitution provides for individual liberty."535 The
ECHR, as a Bill of Rights, does not follow the model of
minute regulation typical of statute law in the common
law world536 and it becomes necessary to turn to
teleological and purposive interpretations, and this has
been recognised in Strasbourg when they speak of "the
ECHR as a living instrument" and seek guidance from the
purposes of the system. The case law supports this view,
for example, The Sunday Times case537 stated that
teleological arguments drawn from the explicit or
implicit objectives of the ECHR and its Protocols may
help to clear up differences in meaning between the two
versions as regards the expression "prescribed by law"
("prevues par la loi") .538
Specifically, a methodological problem well known in
domestic law arises whenever a judge is asked to construe
open-ended expressions. In this particular sense a
supranational document such as the ECHR can be compared
to any statute with expressions such as "ordre public",
"morals" and the like, as for both the question of
interpretation is whether or not it is necessary to
conjure up the spirit of the law-givers to find the
appropriate meanings. Writing on statutory
interpretation, Ronald Dworkin539 rejected the "speaker's
534pau| Mahoney, "Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of
Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin", (1990) 11 HRLJ 57, 67.
535Paul Mahoney, op. cit., 64.
536J. G. Merrills, op. cit., 78.
537For a discussion of this case and the differences between the legal traditions as regards
the notion of "law" see chapter 8.
538(1979-80) 2 EHRR 245, para. 48: "Thus confronted with versions of a law-making treaty
which are equally authentic but not exactly the same, the Court must interpret them in a way
that it reconciles them as far as possible and is most appropriate in order to realise the aim
and achieve the object of the treaty."
539Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire. (1986), 320.
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intent" technique that propounds that meaning comes
exclusively from the author because it is uncertain how
to determine the appropriate intent in hard cases: whose
intentions of those voting for a bill are to be
consulted, the overall average?, the majority?, a
plurality?540 and worse, if the issue to be adjudicated
upon is not covered by a statute, then information on how
the legislator would have resolved it is almost
impossible to find. As regards the ECHR this issue could
be put as to whether interpretation should follow
historical or updating standards. In Dworkin's statutory
interpretation, construction is performed as if the
author of a statute and the interpreter engaged in a
dialogue. A "constructive interpretation" takes place541
because the interpreter simultaneously sticks to the text
and supplies meaning if it is absent or has been
misunderstood by the author.542 The European Court
appears to follow in the steps of Dworkin's judge
Hercules, who "does not amend out-of-date statutes to
suit new times, as the metaphysics of speaker's meaning
would suggest. He recognizes what the old statutes have
since become."543
Let us look at an example in ECHR law. The expression
"inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" set out in
540lncidentally, it is interesting to note that the traditional United Kingdom position that
courts may not resort to the debates of Parliament reported in Hansard as an aid to the
interpretation of statutes was changed by Pepper (Inspector of Taxes) v. Hart, [1993] 1 All
ER 42.
541 In Law's Empire. Dworkin wrote at page 52: "Roughly, constructive interpretation is a
matter of imposing purpose on an object or practice in order to make of it the best possible
example of the form or genre to which it is taken to belong."
542Ronald Dworkin, op. cit., 55-56. A "constructive interpretation" is then closer to an
"artistic interpretation." As an example, he described how Shakespeare would have liked
the character of Shylock to be played in a current production, where the producer, "must
find a conception of Shylock that will evoke for a contemporary audience the complex
sense that the figure of a Jew had for Shakespeare and his audience, so his interpretation
must in some way unite two periods of "consciousness" by bringing Shakespeare's
intentions forward into a very different culture located at the end of a very different history. If
he is successful in this, his reading of Shylock will probably be very different from
Shakespeare's concrete vision of that character."
543Ronald Dworkin, op. cit., 350.
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Article 3 ECHR can be given very different meanings: is
it the understanding at the time of the ECHR's signature
or, on the contrary, an updated one? Ruling for the
applicant in Tyrer v. United Kingdom the European Court
held that sentencing a young offender to a birching
punishment in the Isle of Man amounted to a violation.
Employing the technique of evolutive interpretation,544
the European Court applied contemporary notions, played
down the relevance of local traditions, and found that
the breach had taken place for the reason that "(...) the
Convention is a living instrument which, as the
Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the
light of the present day conditions (...)."545 Although
the answer given may raise further questions of, for
example, judicial policy or perhaps whether the Court
moved too far too soon, it brings home the perception
that the European Court matches a Constitutional Court.
Further, the Tyrer546 case mirrors concepts of the United
States Constitution such as "cruel and unusual
punishment" which - in Ronald Dworkin547 words - are not
(historically specific) conceptions. Since the
Constitution is made up of concepts and not of
conceptions, the historically specific conceptions of the
framers can be disregarded.
At this point, a word about interpretation and drafting.
Although the drafting of the ECHR was influenced by the
United Kingdom (whose delegates insisted on the
incorporation of more detail to the text), the
interpretation of the ECHR in Strasbourg does not bear
many similarities with statutory interpretation in a
common law jurisdiction. Not only because the typical
form of reasoning in the common law is reasoning by
544Paul Mahoney, op. cit., 61.
545(1979-80) 2EHRR 1, para. 31.
546For further details on this case see chapter 7.
547Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously. (1981), 134.
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reference to precedent,548 but because the literal meaning
of a (usually very detailed) statute is the first concern
of any British court despite more sympathy towards
purposive interpretations in recent times.549 On the
other hand, the ECHR cannot be compared to a code in a
codified civilian jurisdiction - although, as seen, code
and ECHR share a few characteristics. Nor can it be
entirely compared with a statute (in the civil or common
law worlds) despite the fact that a few thoughts on
statutory interpretation were useful to understand the
work of the European Court. The closest comparison is,
therefore, with the Constitution because constitutional
texts need updating interpretation to become applicable.
The Tyrer case has not been the only one where such
actualising approach has been resorted to, and there have
been other cases dealt with in similar fashion. In
Marckx v. Belgium550 the distinction between legitimate
and illegitimate family, which had been a typical feature
of the civilian legal tradition for so long, was found
discriminatory and in breach of Articles 8 and 14 ECHR.
Likewise, illuminated by current conditions, the Court
found the criminal laws in Northern Ireland prohibiting
homosexual acts in private between consenting male adults
to be in breach of the ECHR, because "the Court cannot
overlook the marked changes that have occurred in this
regard in the domestic law of the Member States"551
548M. A. Eisenbera. The Nature of the Common Law. (1988), 52. The continued
application in new cases of a rule adopted in a precedent can be rationalised, however, on
grounds very different from those employed in the precedent itself.
549P. S. Atiyah, "Common Law and Statute Law", (1985) 48 MLR 1. As an (old) example
of analogical interpretation in English law, the article mentions the Edison Telephone Co
case of 1880 [1880] 6 QBD 244, in which it was held that a telephone conversation was a
telegram transmitted by telegraph within the meaning of the Telegraph Act 1869.
550(1979-80) 2 EHRR 330. The Court acknowledged that "at the time when the
Convention (...) was drafted, it was regarded as permissible and normal in many European
countries to draw a distinction (...) between the 'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' family."
551 (1982) 4 EHRR 149, para. 60. See further discussion of this case in chapter 7.
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Over and above these considerations, any court has to
find a balance between opposing interests, views and
readings of rules, and the Strasbourg Court is no
exception. Moreover, a particular difficulty in the work
of the Strasbourg Court is that the meanings it gives to
the Convention law should, as far as possible, be able to
"travel" to a variety of legal systems which are to be
treated equally. Teleological arguments are helpful to
measure the behaviour of the different governments to the
same standards as they help to find general principles
which can be shared. For example, to open the way for
the Court to offer a guarantee of procedural due process
also in administrative proceedings, a new reading of
Article 6 ECHR had to extend the due process clause
beyond the area of cases strictly involving criminal
charges. The expression "the determination of civil
rights and obligations" was treated as "autonomous", that
is, independent from any other legal system. A line of
case law started with Ringeisen (No. I) 552 , where the
applicant received the protection of the ECHR after
having sold and accepted payment for a number of plots of
land and found that the Austrian District and Regional
Real Property Transactions Commission would not approve
the sale. Another example, in the same line of case law,
is Ronig.553 It concerned the withdrawal - also through
administrative proceedings - of the authorisation to
practice medicine and run a clinic enjoyed by a German
doctor. The Court decided that the proceedings in
question were related to civil rights and obligations
because the relationship doctor-patient was contractually
based and consequently, private. Therefore, the
complainant's rights were protected.
Yet not all the judges shared in the adopted teleological
construction. In a dissenting opinion, Judge Matscher
sss^gyg-so) 1 EHRR 455, para. 94 .
553(1979-80) 2 EHRR 170.
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cast a negative light on the actual teleological
interpretation carried out expressing concern over
straying into judicial legislation.554 Likewise, Judge
Sir.Gerald Fitzmaurice's dissent in the Golder case re¬
flects fears of the Court's "trespassing on the area of
what may border on judicial legislation" 555 when reasoning
against the majority's teleological reading of Article 6
(1). In another dissenting opinion, Sir Gerald described
the evolutive interpretation performed in Marckx as
"virtually an abuse of the powers given to the Court."
In addition to recognising the need for a purposive
interpretation, however, the European Court has said that
a strict construction should be normally reserved to
finding the limits to the exercise of rights and
freedoms.556
Minor premiss
Once the meaning of the applicable articles has been
established through interpretation and the rules had been
set out in a major premiss, then the Court is ready to
proceed to the subsumption of the facts into the law.557
Subsumption means that the rules take the facts on board.
The Court chooses the relevant facts in order to shape,
not their substance but their format, to what the
categories of the rule need in order to apply. In this
the legal traditions move in opposite directions, since
the common law tends to reason from the facts of the
case.558
554(1979-80) 2 EHRR 170, dissenting opinion at page 207. (paras, not numbered)
555(1979-80) 1 EHRR 524, dissenting opinion at page 548. (para. 2)
556W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, "Les methodes d'interpretation de la Cour europeenne
des droits de I'homme" in: Daniel Turp and Gerald A. Beaudoin, Perspectives canadiennes
fit europeennes des droits de la personne: Actes des Journees Strasbourgoises de
l"institut Canadien d'etudes juridiques superieures 1984. (1984), 195.
557J. Bengoetxea and H. Jung, op. cit., 258.
558Stressing the arguments, F. J. Nijboer, op. cit., 320, pointed out that reasoning in both
traditions is reversed: the Anglo-American tradition starts with an establishment of the facts
to reach from there the application of substantive provisions and concepts while the
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Let us see an example. In the case of Moreira de
Azevedo, the Court started with more general ideas and
concepts which were laid down in the major premiss. The
legal rule (Article 6 (1) ECHR), laid out in universal
terms, contains a description of legal facts which are
relevant to provoke the consequences also formulated in
the rule.559 Starting from there, the Court subsumed the
facts, that is, adapted their format to fit into a
conception of what is required for the application of the
consequences set down in the rules stated in the major
premiss. In the case of the example, the European Court
deemed the ECHR applicable to Portugal as a High
Contracting Party:
(...) The Court notes that the incident in question
took place on 23 January 1977 and that the accused
was arrested and interviewed on the same date.
However, the period to be considered did not begin
to run at that date, but on 9 November 1978, when
the Convention entered into force with regard to
Portugal (...)560
Then, the Court pointed out that there was a controversy
betv/een an individual and a government:
(...) According to the Government, Mr. Moreira de
Azevedo did not take the steps necessary to expedite
the proceedings and displayed a passivity which
reflected acceptance of their length. This the
applicant disputed ( . . . )561
Finally, the violation in question fit into a category
defined in the ECHR: the Court found that the factual
situation disclosed a breach, which took place because
the case was not heard within a reasonable time:
Continental starts with the general ideas and concepts and from there adapts the facts into
what the law requires as factual premisses for the application of the law.
5E9The process of subsumption in the ECJ is described in: Joxerramon Bengoetxea, 'The
Justification of decisions by the European Court of Justice", (1990), 12, European
Jurisprudence, papers of the Europa-lnstitut, Universitat des Saarlandes.
560(1991) 13 EHRR 721, para. 70.
561 (1991) 13EHRR 721, para. 72.
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(...) By requiring that cases be heard "within a
reasonable time", the Convention stresses the
importance of administering justice without delays
which might jeopardise its effectiveness and
credibility (...) 562
Although in an actual judgment the issues "As to the
facts" are placed before the issues "As to the law" the
reasoning in Strasbourg starts from the rules, because
the "facts" are pigeonholed in the categories of the
"law." Under the sub-title "As to the facts", the Court
addresses "The particular circumstances of the case" and
the applicable municipal law under the label "Relevant
domestic law and practice". National statutes, along
with national case law, are dealt with as an issue of
fact, as they show evidence of the state of the law in
the member state whose conduct is being examined as
regards an alleged breach of the ECHR. This is the usual
practice of international courts.563 Usually the origin
of a violation of the ECHR can be traced to the existing
legislation or case law of a member state, the absence of
legislation protecting a right, or perhaps a decision of
a state authority in the application of an existing law,
although the law itself might not be challenged.564
The Court also makes a reference to the "Proceedings
before the Commission." There is no substantive
discussion of the correctness of the judgment, however,
the tone throughout the "As to the facts" section is that
562(1991) 13EHRR 721, para. 74.
563A decision of a court or a legislative measure may constitute evidence of a breach of the
ECHR and thus generate responsibility for the respondent state. In general, the concept
of "municipal law as mere facts" is, however, a complex issue in public international law,
since various other questions are involved: it may be necessary to prove and hear evidence
on municipal law, the international court may undertake its own researches, the
interpretation of municipal law by national courts is binding on the international tribunal (in
order to avoid contradictory versions of the law in a state from different sources), however,
international courts cannot declare the internal invalidity of municipal law, and so on. For
further details, see: Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law. (1990), 40.
b64As an example of this see the case Gillow v. United Kingdom (1989) 11 EHRR 335,
dealt with in Chapter 7.
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of mentioning the factual circumstances of the case to
which the law of the ECHR will apply.
Take another example, in Windisch v. Austria the Court
objected to the handling of the evidence on which the
applicant had been convicted. The facts of the case
which disclosed unacceptable constraints on the
applicant's defence were placed in two categories of
Article 6 ECHR: para. 3 (d), concerning the examination
of witnesses and para. 1, regarding the requirements of a
fair trial. Finally, the Court asserted that: "In this
circumstance, the use of this evidence involved such
limitations on the rights of the defence that Mr Windisch
cannot be said to have received a fair trial. There has
been a violation of paragraph 3 (d), taken together with
paragraph 1, of Article 6."565
5 6 5(25/1989/185/245) 27 September 1990, at 8.
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The test of government behaviour that takes place
in the minor premiss
Insofar as a member state behaviour is measured against a
supranational law, the assessment of whether the factual
situation discloses a breach of the ECHR suggests a
degree of judicial review of government action. The
European (supranational) organs put limits to the
governmental powers of the member states in the area of
human rights guided by rules set down in a supranational
bill of rights. The conclusion that this practice
amounts to a transnational system of judicial review
follows the line of argument advanced by Professor M.
Cappelletti: "The "transnational" character of judicial
review is revealed here not only by the fact that the
review is based on a transnational bill of rights - the
European Convention - but also by the further fact that
the adjudicative bodies are themselves transnational in
nature."566 In general, judicial review requires a higher
law against which (hierarchically inferior) legislation
or other measures are gauged. The ECHR, like a
Constitution, is the higher law in the Strasbourg system,
whose values are being ultimately upheld by the European
Court, carrying out activities akin to the judicial
review performed by a constitutional court in a domestic
jurisdiction.567 In this sense, the ECHR system
"represents a striking combination of elements inherent
in, or analogous to, both constitutionalism and feder¬
alism because the rationale of the protection of a higher
law is transposed onto a transnational - if not federal -
level."568 Dominique Rousseau wrote that the challenge
for Strasbourg was "the creation of a European charter of
566Mauro Cappelletti, "The "Mighty Problem" of Judicial Review and the Contribution of the
Comparative Analysis", (1980) 53 Southern California Law Review 409, 429.
567Rolv Ryssdal, The future of the European Court of Human Rights. European Court of
Human Rights: Report# ECOUR90296.AB (1990), 1.
568Mauro Cappelletti, op. cit., 432.
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human rights through the emergence and development of a
European constitutional jurisdiction."569 The complexity
of the environment where the Court interprets and applies
the ECHR brings up the issue of the differences in the
municipal law of the member states, particularly
important when different legal traditions are involved.570
Not only does the European Court carry out judicial
review but likewise, the issues adjudicated upon are
similar to those decided by a constitutional court, and
even its justificatory practice in this respect seems
closer to such courts (or to the ECJ) than to the
International Court of Justice which abides by the
restrictive interpretation of public international law.571
Could the European Court be a target of the criticisms
that the Convention has left too much power to define the
open-ended clauses of the ECHR in its hands? What about
the legitimacy of the adjudicator in relation to a
"counter-majoritarian"572 nature of judicial review? It
has been said that "(...) today everyone seems to agree
in theory that constitutional adjudication generally is
judicial policy-making, is choice among or allocation of
competing constitutionally recognized values; hence the
need to justify and legitimize their nature and rank."573
It may be said, as it has been expressed on the further
capabilities of disinterested perspectives of the United
States Supreme Court justices as compared to other organs
of power "because they are not electorally accountable,
or as subject to interest group pressures as elected
569Dominique Rousseau, "Vers un ordre juridictionnel europeen des droits et liberies?
[.'integration europeenne des Droits de I'homme au bloc de constitutionnalite", in:
Dominique Rousseau and Frederic Sudre (eds.), Conseil Constitutionnel et Cour
europeenne des droits de I'homme: droits et liberies en Europe. (1990), 130.
570This issue will be dealt with in chapters 7 to 10.
571J. Bengoetxea and H. Jung, op. cit., 268.
572Alexander Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of
Politics. (1962), 16.
573Knud Krakau, "Liberal and Conservative Criticism of Judicial Review in the United States
and Germany" in: H. Wellanreuther (ed.), German and American Constitutional Thought.
(1990), 395.
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officials are, or dependent on others, or, as a general
proposition, looking to advancement."574 It may be easier
to justify the settlement of disputes by non-elected
judges, however, if the topic is analysed from the point
of view of Dworkin's rights thesis. He distinguishes
principles, which are propositions that describe rights,
from policies, which describe goals.575 In his view,
judicial decisions in civil cases are and should be
generated by principles and not policies. When judges
weigh an individual's right, that right is not measured
against the community's good (policies) but against the
rights of others (rights). In hard cases, then, the
reasoning in Strasbourg could be described as about
rights and not about policies. Even in those cases where
lawyers disagree as to the outcome, the judge has no
discretion, and although the answer might be difficult to
find or judges might err, there is always one right
answer. In Strasbourg, this opinion may help to
encourage the Court to anchor the justification in the
argumentation of the judgments themselves and to rely
less on the deductive model of justification.
On the other hand, it may also help the European Court's
development to think of the symbolic power of review
under a Bill of Rights which in the eyes of Western
democracies outweighs concerns about loses of sovereign
power.576 In the Council of Europe system there is an
underlying political value in the institution of judicial
review, and of the member states "being watched" by a
supranational organism. This can be inferred from its
growing membership, absence of withdrawals, the expansion
of the list of rights protected, the addition of
574Harry W. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution: The Supreme Court and the Process
of Adjudication. (1990), 30.
575Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, op. cit., 82.
576Philip Zylberberg, "The Problem of Majoritarianism in Constitutional Law: A Symbolic
Perspective", (1992) 37 McGill L. J. 27, 69.
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Protocols and so on.577 Perhaps this realisation may
diminish the need of resorting to its "political
antennae" in order to avoid putting governments in an
impossible position, or to justify its judgments
deductively. As Joseph Story wrote last century that a
non-restrictive interpretation of the American
Constitution "(...) can never be a matter of just
jealousy; because the rulers can have no permanent
interest in a free government, distinct from that of the
people, of whom they are a part, and to whom they are
responsible."578 Less stress on the deductive style of
the judgments (with all their consequences) may
strengthen the position of the European Court as an
oracle of human rights law in Europe. It would bring the
justification (through a discussion of the aptness of the
decision taken) to the judgments themselves. John Philip
Dawson had argued, for example, that in Rome, neither the
praetors (magistrates) nor the iudices (judges) were the
oracles of the law because the reasons for their
judgments have not been preserved and as a consequence,
the jurists were the oracles.579
Conclusion of the syllogism
The process of logical deduction started with the major
premiss (rules), was followed by a minor premiss (facts)
and culminated in a conclusion ("For these reasons, the
Court ..."), where the Court spelled out in a ruling the
results of the subsumption. More importantly, the
conclusion appears a the result of logical deduction.
There is a parallel with the ECJ here. It has been
pointed out that the ECJ, keen on appearing as a non-
577Philip Zylberberg, op. cit., 72.
578Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: With a
Preliminary Review of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States. Before the
Adoption of the Constitution. (1858) 3rd. ed., volume I, Book III, Chapter V (§ 413), 293.
579John Philip Dawson, The Oracles of the Law. (1968), 106-7.
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political organ, "has carefully crafted its opinions to
present the results in terms of the inexorable logic of
the law."580 In our example of the Moreira de Azevedo
case, the conclusion that a "reasonable time" was
exceeded, that the facts could be pigeonholed in a
category of the ECHR and therefore produced a breach of
Article 6 (1) ECHR, was spelled out in the the
dispositif, as follows:
For these reasons, the Court unanimously:
1 - Dismisses the Government's preliminary
obj ection;
2 - Holds that Article 6 § 1 applied to the
present case and that it was violated ; (...)
Accordingly:
(...)
(b) invites the Government and the applicant to
submit to it writing within the next three months
their observations on the question and in particular
to communicate to it any agreement they may reach;
(c) reserves the subsequent procedure and
delegates to the President of the Court power to fix
the same if need be.581
If, as a result of the subsumption the Court finds that
the consequences formulated in the rule (major premiss)
are not applicable, then the ruling will be of non¬
violation of the ECHR. For example Article 6 was found
not to have been breached in Oerlemans v. the
Netherlands582 and the Court stated that as follows:
C. Conclusion
58. Accordingly, there has been no violation of
Article 6 § 1.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
Holds unanimously that there has been no violation
of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. (...)
580Anne-Marie Burley and Walter Mattli, "Europe Before the Court: A Political Theory of




The pronouncement by the Court, as the final part of the
judgment, reveals the compact and concise style in both
the surface and the underlying patterns of reasoning,
although the present Strasbourg judgments tend not to be
magisterial and brief as, for example, those of the
French courts. It also marks the culmination of a
process guided by "narrative coherence"583 where the Court
tried to make sense of all the facts and applied the law
to them.
Conelusions
This chapter examined the interpretation of the
Convention within an analysis of the style of the
judgments of the European Court. One of the purposes was
to set the scene for further comparative studies on the
adjudication and interpretation processes in the next
chapters. Ordinary statutes and Constitutions do not
convey their respective meanings in identical ways. The
interpretation of Convention law was compared to
statutory interpretation in domestic law, to code
interpretation in a civilian jurisdiction, and finally,
which appeared as the most satisfactory, to
constitutional interpretation. To begin with, and not
surprisingly, the ECHR appeared at the highest point in
the hierarchy of norms used in Strasbourg. Further, a
particular style of jurisprudence is developed by the
European Court, which reveals its preference for
statutory law, partly because the Court itself is the
creature of statute but also because all the validity of
583What D. Neil MacCormick names "narrative coherence" is a test of truth or probability in
questions of fact and evidence upon which proof by direct observation is not available. "(...
) we treat the natural world as explicable in terms of explanatory principles ('laws') of causal
and probabilistic kind, and the world of human affairs as being explicable in terms of
explanatory principles of a rational, intentional and motivational as well as causal and
probabilistic kind.", D. Neil MacCormick, "Coherence in Legal Justification'^ in: Theorie der
Normen. (1984), 48.
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the human rights system rests ultimately on the the ECHR
and its Protocols. A body of case law is being developed
at the supranational level and it absorbs legal
approaches and principles from many diverse legal
systems. Paradoxical though it may seem, the case law's
deductive style weakened, in part, the position of the
Strasbourg Court in the system of the Convention. The
way judgments are argued shows that the Court clings to a
deductive model that shifts justification to the
Convention's rules instead of relying on substantive
arguments set down in the judgment itself. If compared
to common law judgments, they tend to be under argued,
and this is particularly noticeable in view of the
absence of an A-G in the style of the ECJ. The
continental influence on the European Court and the way
the procedure is organised584 lead to the adoption of a
deductive model that shifts the rationality of the
judgments from the text of the decision to the ECHR.
Judgments appear as an inexorable deduction made from the
text of the Convention. This situation comes into view
also by contrasting the judgments and those separate
decisions that defy this situation with a different model
of justification. The passage of time, the increase of
the case law and possibly the incorporation of elements
of the weighing model in the decisions will determine
that the Court may eventually overcome some of the
limitations of the deductive approach. For the time
being, the cases reviewed showed that the European Court
handled its own case law as jurisprudence constante585
rather than the common law stare decisis. This approach
provides for a weak control over future decisions, and
this, in turn may impose some limitations on the effect
of the system of the ECHR on the harmonisation of
European law and perhaps also the aspiration of the Court
534This aspect was discussed in the previous chapter.
5 ;5lr. a manner comparable to the development of the jurisprudence by the French Council
of Slate.
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of becoming the oracle of European human rights law. All
this elements pull interpretation in the direction of
diversity.
Nevertheless, there are elements moving in the opposite
direction. A constitutional role for the European Court
was found in the judicial review of member state
behaviour, and in such circumstances it appeared that the
rationale of protection provided by a higher law in
domestic law has been transposed onto a supranational
level. There is value in the institution of judicial
review, and of the member states "being watched" by a
supranational organism. In addition, the adjudication of
a supranational Bill of Rights written in open-ended
language and conceived to last for future generations
requires the use of teleology in order to provide the
sort of continuing protection that a national
Constitution is capable of. An actualising
interpretation is necessary to give meaning to concepts
such as "inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment",
"respect for his private and family life" and so on, for
which the textual and contextual approaches alone are
insufficient.
All in all, the different aspects discussed in this
chapter indicate that the ECHR is interpreted in a
contrasting environment and many factors influence the
interpretation process and the final meaning given to the
applicable rules. The jurisprudence of the ECHR as
applied by the European Court is developing its own
unique identity. Although the family traits of the legal
traditions are visible, the jurisprudence is not
identical to any of its many parents because those
various influences were made to "grow" differently by the
Strasbourg machinery. On the other hand, the analysis of
interpretation cannot be used to predict the outcome of a
case although it shows where the justification of the
- 217 -
decisions lie. It also helped to set the scene for a
further examination of the other factors operating in the
process of decision making such as the effect of various
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The scales remain the symbol of
justice, here too; but here too
the balance is hard to find and
only rarely does one succeed in
arriving at the point of perfect
balance with such persuasive force
that nobody can dissociate himself
from it.'586
Introduction
The day to day work at the European Court brings it into
contact with the different legal systems of the member
states of the Council of Europe. A comparative analysis
of the human rights jurisprudence offers, therefore, the
opportunity to discover whether, and if so when, the dif¬
ferent legal systems and traditions shape the judicial
process and the outcome of the cases. The legal
traditions, however, operate in conjunction with other
factors in the decision making processes and although they
influence the outcomes they do not determine them in their
entirety. There are many sources of variation at work
such as policy considerations, the margin of appreciation
586Judge G. J. Wiarda's final words in a speech delivered on November 20, 1986, quoted by
Egbert Myjer, "Dutch interpretation of the European Convention: a double system?", in: F.
Matscher and H. Petzold (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension:
Studies in honour of Gerard J. Wiarda. (1988), 430.
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afforded to the member states, the area of the law touched
upon by a particular case and so on.
The analysis in all four chapters concentrates on the
European Court's jurisprudence, although the Commission's
will also be used if helpful to cast light on some point.
The Court, the only organ empowered to interpret and apply
the ECHR, 587 is not bound by the opinion of the Commission
or its fact-finding: "The Court is not, however, bound by
the Commission's findings of fact and remains free to make
its own appreciation in the light of all the material
before it".588 In this first chapter of a set of four, the
use of the comparative method as a tool of interpretation
and research is addressed. A brief reference to questions
of policy and to the weaker harmonising powers of the
Council of Europe as compared to the EU will be made. In
addition, the diversity of legal systems of the member
states is mirrored by a similar multiplicity within the
Court,589 since its members have been appointed from those
various legal systems: in Chapter 10 the influence of the
Court's composition on decision making will be assessed.
Comparative law in Strasbourg
The cases bring from their legal systems of origin many
characteristics, idiosyncrasies and even complications,
intertwined with the facts and domestic law, which have
all to be dealt with in Strasbourg. The Court's judgments
in fact serve not only to decide cases but, more gener¬
ally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules in¬
stituted by the Convention, and therefore contribute to
the observance by the States of the obligations undertaken
587Article 45 ECHR.
588Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, (1992) 14 EHRR 1, para 74.
589A similar statement can be made of the Commission.
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as Contracting Parties.590 In doing so, the Court draws
inspiration from the member states and at the same time
its jurisprudence has an impact on their national laws.
The existence of differences between systems and
traditions is a reality in Europe and a strong argument
can be made for their preservation as part of national
legal identities. For example, one specific instance in
the Report of the Commission in the case Ireland v United
Kingdom casts light on the extent of these differences.
In the case they appeared as a confrontation between the
"common law" and "civil law" influences on the approaches
of the lawyers' handling of the procedure in general.
While the Commission was carrying out the fact-finding
investigation, the Irish government insisted on the need
to cross-examine witnesses, which is a practice very much
ingrained in the adversarial nature of the criminal
procedure of any common law jurisdiction, and
objected to the procedures which were adopted for ob¬
taining this evidence and have submitted that it
should not be received. They have, referring to the
terms of Article 28 of the Convention, submitted that
an investigation carried out by the Commission under
that Article should be undertaken with the
representatives of the parties, and accordingly the
Commission should, when it decided to hear witnesses,
do so in the presence of the representatives of the
parties, who should be accorded the right to question
witnesses.591
The Commission thought otherwise, however. The point of
interest is that the differences between the traditions
may cause confusion if not addressed skilfully. The lack
of common ground in this case highlights the different
assumptions underlying a legal system, a situation which
was well put, in another context, by Lord President Hope
quoting Judge Edward:
590Article 19 ECHR.
591/re/and v. U.K., Report of the Commission, App. 5310/71, Series B, vol. 23-I, 178-179.
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(...) the legal methods which we adopt reflect the
assumptions we make when choosing them. These
assumptions are often unspoken and rarely recognised.
As [Judge Edward] put it, "legal systems differ, not
just because they belong to the common law family or
the civil law family, but because each of them is the
product of the history, culture and traditions of the
people it sets out to serve".592
It has to be said that many of the distinctions frequently
drawn between the civil law and the common law simply do
not apply any more. Sweeping generalisations can be mis¬
leading and useless. In a surprising number of cases the
legal systems at both sides of the divide arrive at the
same solution, albeit through different paths.
Nevertheless, various fundamental differences in legal
method and reasoning continue to survive and it is equally
misleading to ignore them when interpreting a text such as
the ECHR which is bound to apply to a variety of legal
systems. Despite the concurrence of the legal systems in
many areas, if the same (hypothetical) legal question was
asked in, for example, Edinburgh, London, Paris or Rome,
the answers might well not be the same.
Another point concerns the terms used in this section. To
begin with, a legal system or legal order is understood as
an operating set of legal institutions, procedures and
rules.593 This definition can be applied to the English,
Scottish, French, Italian and other legal systems in the
world. Each legal order has a connecting thread594 running
through it to the extent that it was possible to classify
a group of systems into families even though their legal
institutions, procedures and rules were not exactly the
same. Similarly, Professor Watson has said that the
affinities between any two civil law systems are greater
592The Right Honourable Lord Hope, "From Maastricht to the Saltmarket", S.S.C. Biennial
Lecture, 1992, 5.
593J. H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition: An Introduction to the Legal Systems of Western
Furope and Latin America. (1969),1.
594£. Orucu , id., 310.
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than those between any civil law system and any common law
system. 595 The theory of "legal families", 596 which seeks
to divide the vast number of legal systems of the world
into a few large groups, is therefore grounded on such
observations. In this sense, for example, the systems of
England, New Zealand, California and New York as
derivatives from English law can be called "common law"
systems, while the systems of France, Germany, Italy or
Switzerland, which have an important connection with Roman
law should be called "civil law" systems.597 There are
also the mixtures of the two, like Scots law or the Roman-
Dutch law of South Africa.
The metaphor of distinct legal families must be used cau¬
tiously, though, because of the important points of
convergence and the fact that the groupings are very
contingent. Classifications are vulnerable to historic
changes, for example, the contemporary Japanese598 legal
system can be taken out of the oriental family and put
with those systems of European origin. Not long ago, the
Eastern European countries would have not qualified for
membership of the Council of Europe because of the
socialist influence on their legal orders. Further, some
classifications seem to take into consideration only one
aspect of a legal system: Japanese and Latin American
private law belongs in the Continental family, but due to
the American influence, their constitutional law may be
grouped with that of the United States.
595a. Watson The Making of the Civil Law. (1981V 1.
596K. Zweigert and H. Kotz Introduction to Comparative Law. (1987), 64.
597J. H. Merryman, id., 1. This author explains that what binds the civilian nations together is
that their "indigenous" legal institutions have been combined with the form and substance of
Roman civil law, and the authochthonous legal contribution does not go to basic legal
attitudes, notions, organisation and style of the legal system because those are drawn from
Roman law. (at p. 13/4)
598K. Zweigert and H. Kotz, id., 66.
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To make groupings, some authors place the legal systems of
the world in "cultural perspective"599 in order to put
together systems on the basis of traditions rooted in the
beliefs and emotions of a people600 or even the particular
mythology601 of the law so familiar to their respective
lawyers (and judges). A "legal tradition" has been
defined as a set of deeply rooted, historically condi¬
tioned attitudes about the nature and the role of law in
society, the organisation and operation of the legal
system, the way law is made, applied, studied and
taught. 602 As Roy Goode wrote:
there remain striking differences between legal writ¬
ing in continental Europe and legal writing in
England; between the things that interest us and the
things that interest our civil law colleagues;
between a case-based system, where the facts are
considered of decisive importance and figure
prominently in the judgment, and a code-based system,
where the key feature is the statement and
application of principle, whilst the facts are
relegated to the background and stated only very
briefly; and between the civilian approach and the
common law approach to the formulation and
interpretation of enacted law.603
Dissimilarities still persist so it is possible to speak
of a comparative method. Within each tradition
differences tend to be of degree between the countries
belonging to it, as "a legal tradition is, first and
foremost, about a mentalite rooted in history."604 That
said, we can address the role of the comparative method
both in the process of decision making in Strasbourg and
for us in this dissertation.
5"J. H. Merryman, id., 2.
sooHarold J. Berman Law and Revolution: the Formation of the Western Legal Tradition.
(1983), 558.
601 Peter G. Stein , "Judge and Jurist in the Civil Law: a Historical Interpretation ", (1985) 46
La. L. Rev. 241, and James C. Hair, "A Comparison of the Roles of American and Civil Law
judges in the Development of the Law." (1969)2 Vanderbilt Int'l 39.
602E. Orucu op. cit, 311.
603Roy Goode, "The European Law School", (1993) 13 Legal Studies 1, 3.
604 Pierre Legrand Jr., "The Common Law mentalite: An Italian Primer", (1993) 13 Legal
StLjdies 271.
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Comparative law as a tool of interpretation: the
survey of the status of the European law in a cer¬
tain area.
Comparative law is daily business in Strasbourg as it is
inextricably connected with the interpretation of the
Convention. From the outset, the comparative method
becomes a part of the balancing activity of the Court.
When seized of a case, it tries to make sense of the
litigation within the context of the legal system from
where it comes. Although the member states are said to
be, in the Convention's own words, "countries which are
likeminded and have a common heritage of political tradi¬
tions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law"605, their legal
orders differ, for example, in their legal vocabulary,
their categories for organising and systematising rules,
their techniques of interpretation and their structures,
sources, hierarchies, courts, organisation of the legal
profession and so on.606
Before the Court, these features typical to a legal order
or shared by a legal family can be seen in actual cases,
as will be discussed. To begin with, this pluralism can
be seen in operation in the close connection between the
comparative method and the adjudication process whenever
an alleged breach is gauged against a set of common
principles, a sort of "common law", coming from the
general body of the laws of the member states taken as a
whole, and incidentally, by which the ECHR itself was in¬
spired.607 Such law derives from what is said to be a
605Preamble to the ECHR.
6°6e. Orucu, "An exercise on the internal logic of legal systems" (1987) 7 Legal Studies
310, 310.
607W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch," Reliance in the Case-law of the European Court of
Human Rights, on the Domestic Law of the States", (1980) 1 HRLJ 13, 15.
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"European consensus"608 or a "European public policy"600 on
a certain matter. It is not necessarily the lowest common
denominator. The Court usually uses generalisations such
as "the law of the member States of the Council of
Europe", "the law of the Contracting States" or some other
similar wording in order to suggest that this shared law
is mainly "discovered" by comparative research. By way of
analogy, as it has been said of the ECJ, in Strasbourg "to
evolve common principles from the various constitutional
systems of the member States a comparative method is
needed. "610
The Court borrows from the national legal systems, for
example, principles such as proportionality or due process
of law.611 In the words of a senior official in the
Court's Registry: "...there's an attempt to draw common
principles "fished" ... from the traditions of all the
member states and the general principles which seem to be
common to all of the member states rather than a
deliberate attempt to amalgamate common and civil law
traditions ..."612 The amalgam, nonetheless, is the
outcome of this process. The comparative method is, in
addition, useful to guide the production of a solution
that can be transplanted to other legal systems. Scheuner
observed a similar concern in the system of the EU:
The comparative analysis cannot cling to particular
details, but must follow the general trend of the
evolution of legal prescriptions; it must lead to a
result acceptable in all member States. Its object
must be to find the rules best suited to express a
608Laurence R. Heifer, "Lesbian and Gay Rights as Human Rights: Strategies for a United
Europe" (1992) 32 Va. J. Int'l L. 157.
609Pablo Antonio Fernandez-Sanchez, Las obligaciones de los estados en el marco del
Cnnvenio europeo de derechos humanos. (1987), 44.
610U. Scheuner, "Fundamental Rights in European Community Law and in National
Constitutional Law", (1975) 12 CML Rev .171, 185.
611Marc-Andre Eissen, "L'interaction des jurisprudences constitutionnelles nationales et de
la jurisprudence de la Cour europeenne des Droits de l'Homme" in Dominique Rousseau and
Frederic Sudre, Conseil Constitutionnel et Cour europeenne des Droits de I'Homme (1990),
211.
612Meeting with a senior official at the Court's Registry, on September 14, 1992.
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common tradition and compatible with the structure of
the Community.613
A difficult equilibrium is sought in Strasbourg between
the respect owed to the interests of the community
represented by the respondent governments versus the
rights of the individual plaintiff that turns to the
Convention for redress (it is not impossible that within
the interests of the community the government may be rep¬
resenting the interests of other individuals). For
example, this is the "fair balance" performed in James v.
United Kingdom:614
Not only must a measure derpriving a person of his
property pursue, on the facts as well as in
principle, a legitimate aim 'in the public interest',
but there must also be a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the aims employed and the aim
sought to be realised. This latter requirement was
expressed in other terms in the Sporrong and Lonroth
judgment by the notion of the 'fair balance' that
must be struck between the demands of the general
interest of the community and the requirements of the
protection of the individual's fundamental rights.
Yet the respondent government should not be seen as
representing the interests of the community all the time.
Occasionally it merely represents its own interests, as
for example, in the numerous Italian delay cases where the
European Court found a breach of Article 6 (1) ECHR. The
respondent government tried to justify the delays and to
protect the right of its national judiciary to take time
to decide, attributing the procrastination in a series of
cases615 to the workload of the relevant courts and their
backlog of cases, although, since Vocaturo v. Italy,616 the
613U. Scheuner, ibid.
614(1986) 8 EHRR 123, para. 50.
615Selection often Italian cases decided in 1991: Cappello (22/1991/274/345), Caffe
Roversi S.p.a (25/1991/277/348),Gana (36/1991/288/359), Barbagallo (38/1991/290/351),
Cooperativa Parco Cuma (50/1991/302/373), Tusa (44/1991/296/367), Lorenzi, Bernardini




European Court had found those reasons not admissible as
an excuse. Incidentally, and not to mention that these
cases highlight certain inefficiencies of a legal system,
many of them were rather simple, so one may wonder whether
they should have ever been heard at all by the European
Court as they may represent a misuse of (scarce) judicial
resources in Strasbourg.617
Generally speaking, adjudication in Strasbourg can be
defined as an independent international judicial review of
the laws, policies and practices of the member states
where the ECHR becomes the yardstick to measure the
behaviour of the governments and limit their abilities to
restrict rights. The European judges construe the ECHR as
a "living instrument", as any constitutional judge would
do with a basic law thought to survive the passage of
time. The active judicial role is acknowledged sometimes.
In Tyrer v. the United Kingdom the Court ruled that the
ECHR should be construed as a "living instrument", and in
Marckx v. Belgium618 it understood the Convention "in light
of present-day conditions". The latter would appear to
support the view that changing times are more important
than the travaux preparatoires or the intentions of the
framers. It can be a matter of opinion whether this sort
of interpretation619 is tantamount to treaty revision.
Both the ECHR's language and structure give the judges
room to bring it up to date by way of interpretation. The
comparative method surely has to be counted as another
617John Andrews, "Trial Delays in Italy" (1991) 16 EL Rev. 359, 360. Also relevant for this
stage are: John Andrews, "Trial Delays in Italy" (1983) EL Rev .146, "Natural Justice in Italy"
(1984) EL Rev. 290 and "Trial in absentia in Italy" (1985) EL Rev. 368, as well as: John
Andrews and A. Sherlock 'Trial within a reasonable time" (1988) EL Rev. 68 and V. Andrioli,
"La Convenzione europea dei Diritti dell'Llomo e il processo giusto" (1964) 7-8 Temi
Romana, Rassegna di Giurisprudenza 442.
6l8(1979-80) 2 EHRR330.
619The "dynamic" interpretation of the ECHR also opens up a new opportunity for counsel to
the applicant when the complaint against the government is filed with the European organs.
The restrictions within the legal system under which the plaintiff could not obtain protection
for his rights may be removed to a certain extent, and new, "European" standards apply to
the case.
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ingredient of particular importance in its interpretation
and development. As we have seen so far, one use of the
comparative method was to build benchmarks for the Court
to judge the allegedly offensive behaviour of the de¬
fendant government against a general body of the law of
all other members, or at least some of them. The use of
the comparative method helps the Court to set a common
level of protection620 which the member states are bound to
implement, although it should be added that this common
denominator is not identical to sum of the laws of the
member states.621
Let us look at a few examples. In Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v. the United Kingdom622 the Court resorted to
the opinion of experts to find out what was the European
consensus on sex discrimination and equal protection under
the law. In Winterwerp v. the Netherlands No. 1623 the
Court resorted to a similar procedure to find out the
Europe-wide opinion as regards the notion of mental
illness. The Court observed that the phrase "persons of
unsound mind" had a meaning that "is continually evolving
as research in psychiatry progresses". The idea behind
the practice in those two cases was that the general trend
of protection of human rights evolves regardless of
whether a particular contracting state has altered its own
domestic law or case law. The system cannot be static,
because its progress is fed by the evolution of standards
in changing times. This is clear in Soering v. the United
Kingdom, where the Court, after repeating that "the
Convention is a living instrument which ... must be
interpreted in the light of the present-day conditions"
resorted to the "virtual consensus in Western European
legal systems" that capital punishment for some peacetime
62 °W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, op. cit., 16.
621W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, op. cit., 15.
622(1984) 7 EHRR 471.
623(1979-80) 2 EHRR 387.
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offences "is, under current circumstances, no longer
consistent with regional standards of justice ..."624
The criteria shift according to the changes that take
place in Europe so that with the passage of time some
standards may become tougher on the member states and more
protective of the individual. It is a truism that the
laws of the member states are in perpetual adjustment
because the legal systems that produce them are all func¬
tional. The evolving standards become a part of the
Convention system, and consequently the Court acquires
tools to guide future judgments and build standards that
are more demanding on the member states.625 incidentally,
it would appear that the Court believes in the
transplantability of certain principles "discovered" this
way for it uses them to test the conduct of fellow member
states. The issue of the legitimacy of the European Court
in relation to elected legislatures may re-appear in light
of these "transplants". Over and above all these
considerations, variety of legal systems is a precondition
for the viability of a comparative survey.
In F. v. Switzerland626 - where a temporary prohibition to
re-marry was imposed on a Mr. F after his third divorce -
the current status of the "European common law" was
introduced by means of a Swiss report on a partial reform
of family law which had been presented to the Swiss
Department of Justice and Police in 1965. The report
advocated the setting aside of the waiting period in
question, a proposal which had also been made by a Swiss
Committee of Experts on Family Law Reform. The
comparative survey allowed the European Court to follow
suit on a stronger footing.
624(1989) 11 EHRR 439, para 102.
62BThomas A. O'Donnell, 'The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: Standards in the
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights", (1982) 4 (4) Human Rights
Quarterly 474, 481.
626(1988) 10 EHRR 411.
- 230 -
The survey can also be introduced by way of "finding" it
in the international treaties already signed by the member
states. The Court did so in Inze v. Austria (a case
concerning the hereditary rights of illegitimate
children), in those terms:
The question of equality between children born in and
children born out of wedlock as regards their civil
rights is today given importance in the member States
of the Council of Europe. This is shown by the 1975
European Convention on the Legal Status of Children
born out of Wedlock . . .627
By testing the respondent government's conduct against the
"consensus" the Court gained perspective and authority.
Where the Court's findings are based on standards drawn
from the common practice of fellow member states, they
bring with them the influence of the traditions of the
entire European legal environment. They form a European
public policy.
At the same time, this practice acts as a safeguard for
the Court. To avoid an erosion of its credibility and ef¬
fectiveness, the Court relies on the sense of justice and
shared moral precepts of contemporary European society.
In no case does the Court apply directly the law of a
single member state. It applies the result of the survey
produced in Strasbourg, handling it as an issue of fact
and not limited by it.628 The extent and grounds on which
those surveys are based can, however, be disputed in
individual cases:
But how can one find out whether the situation in the
member States is uniform or similar, or whether
considerable differences exist? It must be admitted
that in practice it is only in rare cases that a
627(1988) 10 EHRR 394, para. 41.
628W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, op. cit., 19.
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thorough comparative investigation is possible and is
actually undertaken. 629
Judge Matscher, for example, in his dissenting opinion in
the Ozturk v. Germany630 case was dissatisfied with the
narrow scope of the comparative survey: "In my view,
autonomous interpretation would call for comparative
studies of a far more detailed nature than those carried
out so far by the Convention institutions." The issue
required of comparative research was the concept of
"criminal offence" in Germany. The Austrian judge thought
that there was no "common denominator" in this matter and
proceeded to support his statement with his own, albeit
limited, comparative research, as follows:
in the law of the Federal Republic of Germany -the
State concerned- 'regulatory' offences
{Ordnungswidrigkeiten) clearly lie outside the realm
of criminal law; the same is true of Austrian law
(Verwaltungsstraftaten) and French law, Netherlands
law (and possibly the legal systems of other European
countries) are preparing to move in the same direc¬
tion .
There are, however, other components of the decision
making process operating in the opposite direction. One
of those factors is the work of the Court to make sure
that there is sufficient evidence for a change in the
relevant area before embarking on a new interpretation.
The probing procedure looks for the values which were
protected by a given provision in order to check whether
there was any change in current (and European) democratic
society. The comparative law survey is therefore closely
connected to the doctrine of the margin of appreciation as
a limitation on the Court's creativity. The consensus-
forming elements range from a European legal opinion on a
certain area, to the international treaties or regional
629Rudolph Bernhardt, "Thoughts on the interpretation of human rights treaties" in
Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension. Studies in honour of Gerard J. Wiarda.
F. Matscher and H. Petzold (eds.), (1988), 67.
630(1984) 6 EHRR 409, judge Matscher's dissent.
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legislation in force in the member states, to the opinion
of experts or even European public opinion.631 The effect
of all those elements is balanced out, however, by the
fact that the contracting states are entitled to a degree
of deference, or "margin of appreciation for their ac¬
tions" as the Court has acknowledged in, for instance,
James v. the United Kingdom or Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v. the United Kingdom to give just two
examples.
The doctrine of the margin of appreciation concerns the
latitude allowed to the contracting states in their
observance of the ECHR:632 it examines the degree to which
the European Court (and the Commission) will inspect the
member state practice complained of and check whether the
government acted beyond its powers. If wide, it involves
judicial restraint and is pro-government; if narrow, a
more thorough examination will be made and is pro-
applicant. One view of the doctrine is that it is
"objectionable as a viable legal concept"633 because it is
"not capable of precise formulation"634, however, for other
authors, it is "one of the most important safeguards
developed by the Commission and Court to reconcile the
effective operation of the Convention with the sovereign
powers and responsibilities of governments in a
democracy".635 Sometimes the doctrine may appear as an ab¬
dication by the Court of its responsibility to put the
ECHR into effect.
The breadth of the margin usually depends on factors such
as the nature of the right and its restrictions, the type
of issue of the case, its context and the obligations
631Laurence R. Heifer, op. cit., 165.
632Thomas A. O'Donnell, op. cit., 475.
633R. Higgins, "Derogations Under Human Rights Treaties", (1976-77) 48 BYIL 281, 315.
63 4C. Morrisson, "Margin of Appreciation in European Human Rights Law", (1973) 6 Revue
des droits de I'homme 263, 284.
635H. Waldock, "The Effectiveness of the system set up by the European Convention on
Human Rights", (1980) 1 HRLJ 1,9.
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assumed by the member state concerned (i.e. whether there
are derogations). As said, it is tied up to a comparative
survey. If it is revealed that there are (wide) dispar¬
ities in the legal practices of the other member states or
even other democratic states and as a result, the
"European consensus" is low, then most often the member
states are afforded a wider margin of national discretion.
In the Handyside case the Court asserted that "by reason
of their direct and continuous contact with the vital
forces of their countries, State authorities are in
principle in a better position than the international
judge" to decide the proper application of the Convention
to specific contexts, and in the words of the Court "it is
for the national authorities to make the initial assess¬
ment"636 of whether a particular action or law is in line
with the ECHR. The Court was aware that "(...) it is not
possible to find in the domestic law of the various
Contracting States a uniform European conception of
morals. The view taken by their respective law of the
requirements of morals varies from time to time and from
place to place (...)"
The doctrine may be a substitute for a proper gatekeeping
device such as the certiorari procedure of the American
Supreme Court, and in this sense it may have been used to
avoid hearing certain thorny issues, for example, what is
obscenity. 637 In James v. the United Kingdom the Court
repeated a similar argument where the variability of the
local conditions were taken into consideration, and said
that "because of their direct knowledge of their society
and its needs, the national authorities are in principle
better placed than the international judge to appreciate
what is 'in the public interest'"638
636(1979-80) 1 EHRR 737, para. 48.
637Thomas A. O'Donnell, op. cit., 482.
638(1986) 8 EHRR 123, para. 50.
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If the degree of consensus among the legal systems of the
member states is "high" (or "higher" if compared with
situations such as those discussed above), then the room
for national discretion will be confined. In the Sunday
Times Case No. 1 the Court said that "... the domestic law
and practice of the Contracting States reveal a fairly
substantial measure of common ground in this area (...)
Accordingly, here a more extensive European supervision
corresponds to a less discretionary power of
appreciation".639 At times then, the Court will require a
stricter compliance with its Europe-wide archetype of a
single system of protection. For example, Professor
Bradley640 made the point that in Tyrer v. UK the Court
rejected the concept of devolution and endorsed one human
rights policy for all the member states, setting aside
arguments to the contrary. One of the main issues in this
case was whether flogging young offenders, which seemingly
had a long tradition in the Isle of Man, constituted a
degrading punishment in violation of Article 3 ECHR. The
Court, apart from not letting the United Kingdom
government act independently in this matter reminded us
"... that the Convention is a living instrument which, as
the Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in
the light of present-day conditions."641 Soering v. the
United Kingdom642 is another example of this. The
rationale behind these cases can be loosely compared to
that of delegated power from the central government to a
minister where a breach occurs if the range of the
delegated responsibility is overstepped. It goes without
saying that, unlike ministers, member states have the
powers to begin with (they are sovereign entities), but
the idea is the exercise of discretion within boundaries,
and when a member state crosses a threshold, then a
639(1979-80) 2 EHRR 245, para. 59.
640A. W. Bradley, "The United Kingdom before the Strasbourg Court: 1975-1990", in: W.
Finnie, C.M.G Himsworth and N. Walker (eds.), Edinburgh Essays in Public Law. (1991), 204.
641(1979-80) 2 EHRR 1, para. 31.
642(1989) 11 EHRR 439, para 102.
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violation takes place. In Inze v. Austria the European
Court put forth the theory in those words:
The Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of
appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent
differences in otherwise similar situations justify a
different treatment in law; the scope of this margin
will vary according to the circumstances, the subject
matter and its background.643
The Lawless case644 was the first where the Court had made
use of the doctrine. The Commission had also addressed
the margin of discretion to be afforded to the government
in a situation of emergency. The leeway given to the
authorities in this case, according to some commentators,
had been too wide.645 A less than ideal or bad way of
implementing the ECHR does not automatically amount to a
violation even though the Court may feel that there was a
better way of doing things. This leads us to believe that
the Court is reluctant to use the doctrine to iron out
diversity and pragmatically enough, national legal systems
are left free to implement the protection in their own
national terms and traditions. For this reason, this
practice placed another constraint on the Court in the
form of a requirement that judgments would only enunciate
interpretations to the extent strictly necessary to decide
a particular case and would not go any further.
In addition, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation
confirms in an indirect way that the European system comes
second to the member states as regards the protection of
rights. National authorities, and not the Strasbourg
mechanism, are primarily entrusted with the responsibility
for securing the rights and freedoms within the domestic
legal order.646 European actions should not replace those
643(1988) 10 EHRR 394, para. 41.
644 (1960-61) 1 EurCtHR (ser B), 408.
64 5jaime Oraa, Human Rights in States of Emergency in International Law. (1992), 9.
646Article 26 ECHR.
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of national authorities except where necessary. in this
sense, Strasbourg can be termed as "subsidiary" vis-a-vis
the protection afforded in municipal law. If the law or
the case law of a member state are within the "margin" of
compatibility with the ECHR, the Court steps back: "...
the 'fair balance' that must be struck between the demands
of the general interest of the community and the
requirements of the protection of the individual's
fundamental rights . . . "647 The point that needs to be
made is that this attitude can be connected to the concern
of the European Court to protect the existing differences
and diversity of the legal systems of the member states
reflecting their various legal cultures. For example, in
the Belgian Linguistic (No.2) case the Court found that
"[it] cannot disregard those legal and factual features
which characterise the life of the society in the States
which (...) has to answer for the measure in dispute".648
The Court steers the interpretation of the Convention
through the tension between opposites. Interpretation
does not go entirely unchecked in any one direction. The
comparative method as an interpretative device helps the
Court define a standard to measure allegedly offensive
conducts. The awareness of the Court that the system of
the Convention as a whole rests upon the consent of the
contracting states runs through the jurisprudence:649 the
international law maxim that in case of doubt a treaty is
to be interpreted in favour of the freedom of the state
concerned is not unknown for the judges. The Court's
jurisdiction and enforcement powers are limited by the
extent to which the European governments abide by its
decisions. In an extreme case, a member state faced with
an unfavourable judgment could pull out of the Convention
647(1986) 8 EHRR 123, para. 50.
648(1979-80) 1 EHRR 252, para. 10.
649Frangois Ost, "Dynamique de la relation Europe-Etats; Originate des methodes
d'interpretation de la CEDH" in Delmas-Marty (ed.1 Raisonner la raison d'Etat: Vers une
Europe des droits de I'homme (1989), 458.
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system altogether, although it would still be bound by the
decision of the Court in the instant case under Article 65
ECHR. The enforcement organs could be seriously impaired
if some displeased state withdraws from the system.650
Even if a complete withdrawal is not attempted, a member
state can express its displeasure by failing to comply
with a decision or by delaying its enforcement. The
balance the Court is asked to perform is very delicate,
because it must not be so threatening to the states that
they may decide to leave the system, but at the same time,
it must review state compliance with the Convention and
censure if appropriate,651 which are the reasons for
existence of the entire Strasbourg system.
Some policy considerations
Interpretation cannot always be explained as a purely
legal balance and policy reasons may explain a particular
resolution of a case. It has been said that "the vague
language of the Convention has to be applied in concrete
circumstances, and the Court must grant some latitude to
the member states in face of their diversity".652 The
absence of a set of clear principles governing the
doctrine of the margin of appreciation makes the
Strasbourg machinery run another risk, that of being
perceived as unfair. Howard C. Yourow was very critical
of the situation:
Without the benefit of a self-developed, principled
margin analysis, the Strasbourg machinery may in the
longer run be misperceived as unfair to those
challenging human rights violations before a Court
which is hypersensitive about its own image and the
need and images of the national authorities upon whom
ssoThomas A. O'Donnell, op. cit., 477.
65iMark Janis and Richard S. Kay, European Human Rights Law. (1990), 96.
652jhomas A. O'Donnell , op. cit., 478.
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its very survival as a potentially effective power
depends.653
C. C. Morrison654 saw an element of judicial self-restraint
in the doctrine of the margin of appreciation. Van Hoof's
criticism of Judge Martens' dissenting opinion in Brogan
is based precisely on what he considered to be an
excessively self-restrained attitude on the part of the
judge. According to that author the Dutch judge reduced
the theory of the reason of state to a reasonableness
test. Judge Martens had said that "the Court can find
that the United Kingdom (...) overstepped the margin of
appreciation it is entitled to (...) only if it considers
that the arguments for maintaining the seven-day period
are wholly unconvincing and cannot be reasonably
defended." He added that "the Court should respect the
United Kingdom Government's choice and cannot but hold
that they did not overstep their margin of appreciation."
On the other hand, it would appear that at the European
Court there is scope for judicial activism, which can be
understood not only:
(...) as an attitude or as a legal climate, but also
as part of the particular setting in which it makes
its influence felt. It may have some of its roots in
the minds of the judges, but as a historical phe¬
nomenon, it is also firmly rooted in society, looking
as it does for the balance between the powers of in¬
stitutions and the challenges of social evolution.
And one only hopes that judges know how to strike the
balance.655
The tension between judicial activism and strict
constructionism is apparently necessary for a healthy
653Howard Charles Yourow, "The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of
European Human Rights Jurisprudence", (1987) 3 Connecticut Journal of Int'l Law 111,
153.
654C. C. Morrison, The Developing European Law of Human Rights (1967)
655Thijman Koopmans 'The roots of judicial activism", in: F. Matscher and H. Petzold (eds.),
Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension. Studies in honour of Gerard J. Wiarda.
(1988), 327.
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stability at the Court.656 The Court strikes a balance
between being too conservative -and thus running the risk
of being accused of failing to uphold the ECHR- or too
liberal -and running the risk of being accused of making
improper incursions into judicial legislation.657 The
Court is torn in its policy choices between choosing a
rather "liberal" or pro individual plaintiff
interpretation of the Convention and the need to respect
the margin of appreciation of the member states. For the
individual plaintiff the ideal interpretation of a human
rights treaty is one that is broad when finding the
meaning and scope of the liberty at issue but restrictive
when it comes to setting its limits.
The comparative method is, of course, double edged. It is
obviously helpful to understand the legal system of the
defendant state and, therefore to pay due respect to the
governments and any national sentiments involved.658
Nonetheless, the transplantation of alien principles taken
from other legal traditions without the intervention of
local legislatures and by means of the comparative method
may raise the issue of the legitimacy of the European
Court. This situation is connected to two other elements.
One is that judges in Strasbourg seem aware of the fact
that the judicial review they perform may run counter to
local legislation which has been passed by the
democratically elected legislatures of the member states.
The other one is the ground rule that sovereign states and
their organs shall strike the first balance of rights,
according to the local legal system and prevalent
traditions. It may be argued, however, that the concern
over a more lenient attitude towards the member states has
became less important today after several years of the
656Paul Mahoney, "Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of
Human Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin", (1990) 11 HRLJ 57, 88.
657J. G. Merrills, The development of international law bv the European Court of Human
Rights. (1988)157.
658The national judge of the defendant state always sits in the Court.
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operation of the Convention. Moreover, its mechanism
appears now well established and able to distance itself
from the contracting states when necessary. Whatever the
case, the reason of state is still a component interwoven
with the interpretation of the Convention and as such it
has to be acknowledged as a piece in the adjudication pro¬
cess .
To clarify and systematise the study of the defence of the
reason of state, Mireille Delmas-Marty659 linked this issue
to the rights, derogations, exceptions and restrictions
laid down in the ECHR and its Protocols. In her view, a
first group of rights appears to be almost "immune" to the
reason of state since they are not subject to any explicit
balancing. There is no interest of the society to justify
any interference.660 Those rights concern, for example,
the prohibition of slavery, or of torture or inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.661
Two other groups of rights are vulnerable, however, to
certain degrees of curtailment because of the reason of
state. Some liberties are protected unless a notice of
derogation662 under Article 15 ECHR is entered. Derogation
could take place "in time of war or other public emergency
threatening the life of the nation" and is permitted "to
the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation". The member state is required to keep the
Secretary General of the Council of Europe informed of the
"measures which it has taken and the reason therefor." In
Lav/less and Ireland v. the United Kingdom the reason of
state was not, however, so supreme a notion that it could
659Mireille Delmas-Marty, Raisonner la raison d'etat: vers une Europe des droits de I'homme
(1989), 497-8.
660Margaret G. Wachenfeld, "The Human Rights of the Mentally III in Europe under the
European Convention on Human Rights", (1991) 60 Nordic Journal of Int'l Law 109, 277.
66iJhey are set down in Articles 3, 4 (1), 7 ECHR and in Article 4 of Protocol 7.
662|y|ireille Delmas-Marty and Gerard Soulier "Restraining or Legitimating the Reason of
State?", in: Mireille Delmas-Marty (ed.) The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights: International Protection versus National Restrictions , (1992), 8.
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not be examined by the Court as to whether the dangers
invoked were those "threatening the life of the nation."
Another group of rights are subject to exceptions that
qualify them on a permanent basis: for example, the
deprivation of the right to life would not be unlawful in
a case of self-defence, or in order to effect a lawful
arrest or to prevent the escape of someone lawfully
detained. Similarly, the right of personal freedom can be
limited in case of lawful detention and so on.663 In the
case Ashingdane v. the United Kingdom the Court found that
the limitations placed to the personal freedom of the
applicant were lawful and did not breach Articles 5 and 6
ECHR. Mr. Ashingdane had been committed to a mental
hospital after conviction for a number of offences. Due
to an improvement in his condition he was to be
transferred but the relocation hospital refused admission.
The Home Secretary did not order the transfer to proceed.
Neither the European Court nor the Commission found a
breach of Article 6 (1) ECHR. The balance of rights was
performed granting the member state a margin of
appreciation to set its own policy on access to courts as
it was not for the European Court to suggest the best
policy on this matter:
(...) the right of access to the courts is not
absolute but may be subject to limitations; these are
permitted by implication, since the right of access,
'by its very nature calls for regulation by the
State, regulation which may vary in time and place
according to the needs and resources of the community
and of individuals.' In laying down such regulation,
the Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of
appreciation. Whilst the final decision as to obser¬
vance of the Convention's requirements rests with the
Court, it is no part of the Court's function to
substitute for the assessment of the national
authorities any other assessment of what might be the
best policy in the field.664
6"Those rights are set out in Articles 2, 4 (2), 5, 6 ECHR and in Articles 1 and 2 of Protocol
6.
664(1987) 7 EHRR 528, para. 57.
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The limitations placed on the right were however subject
to supranational scrutiny by the Court, who checked
whether it was proportional to the aim sought. Otherwise
the ECHR system would have been emasculated:
(...) the limitations applied must not restrict or
reduce the access left to the individual in such a
way or to such an extent that the very essence of the
right is impaired. Furthermore, a limitation will
not be compatible with Article 6 (1) if it does not
pursue a legitimate aim and if there is no reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be achieved.665
The defence of the reason of state arises, finally, in
those permanent restrictions which concern interferences
accepted in a democratic society.666 For example, in
Dudgeon v. the United Kingdom661 with regard to homosexual
offences under Article 8 ECHR, the Court recognised the
right of the member states to decide on the most
appropriate protection of morals in their jurisdictions,
fixing the age of consent in relation to homosexual
behaviour. On January 21, 1976, the police searched Mr.
Dudgeon's address in Northern Ireland under the Misuse of
Drugs Act 1971. During the search a quantity of cannabis
was found and this led to the incrimination of a person.
In the search, some of Mr. Dudgeon's personal papers
describing homosexual activities were found and seized,
and later used as grounds for questioning him at a police
station. The papers were afterwards handed over to the
Director of Public Prosecutions with a view to instituting
proceedings for the offence of gross indecency between
males. The director, in consultation with the Attorney
General, decided not to bring proceedings. Although the
European Court acknowledged the policy issue of "(...) the
665(1987) 7 EHRR 528, para. 57.
666Those restrictions are laid out in Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 ECHR and 1 of Protocol 1, 2 of
Protocol 4 and 1 of Protocol 7.
667(1982) 4 EHRR 149, para. 62.
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legitimate necessity in a democratic society for some
degree of control over homosexual conduct notably in order
to provide safeguards against the exploitation and
corruption of those who are specially vulnerable by
reason, for example, of their youth it nonetheless
found a breach of Article 8 ECHR in regard to the existing
legislation in Northern Ireland in relation to homosexual
acts between men aged over 21. Mr. Dudgeon was held to be
a "victim" even though he had never been tried for such an
offence. It was the nature of the system that was in
question, since its mere operation amounted to an
interference with Mr. Dudgeon's rights and therefore,
violated the ECHR.668
Another policy aspect to be taken into consideration stems
from the unmatched political approaches of the different
governments of the member states in rather fundamental
aspects of society, such as property rights. Let us take
the case Gillow v. the United Kingdom. 669 The Court found
that the refusal of licences under the Housing Law
1969/1975 to the applicants and their consequent
prohibition to occupy a house in Guernsey all of which led
to Mr. Gillow's conviction and fining, were unjustified
and disproportionate interferences to the legitimate aim
pursued by a domestic law. The European Court handled
with skill the government's policy designed to restrict
the right of a non-islander to buy property and live on
the island and avoided a frontal attack on the domestic
legal system although it found that the application of the
law to the actual case was in breach of the ECHR.
Concerning the policy issues involved in the legislation,
the Court said that "(...) whilst recognising the
relevance of the facts relied on by the applicants, the
Court considers that the Guernsey legislature is better
668Frangoise Hampson, "The United Kingdom before the European Court of Human
Rights", (1989) 9 YEL 121, 134.
669(1989) 11 EHRR 335.
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placed than the international judge to assess the effects
of any relaxation of the housing controls (...)"670
Frangoise Hampson wrote that "A government may be more
willing to arrive at a friendly settlement where the ap¬
plicant does not seek to challenge the system but merely
its application to him".671
To close this section, we should keep in mind that respect
for the member states' policy choices appears to be
important for the continuity of the system. It implies
that the Court tries also to understand considerations of
social, political or economic importance which might
constitute the underpinning of legislation or decisions of
a member state.
Adjudication in the system of the Council of
Europe: the work of the Court.
Convention law comes to life through legal interpretation.
To convey the meaning of the ECHR the Court performs a
balancing of competing forces with an apparent special
emphasis on the rights of the individual: "The Convention
therefore implies a just balance between the protection of
the general interest of the community and the respect due
to fundamental human rights while attaching particular
importance to the latter".672 There is a purpose to
develop the law of the ECHR but this objective is
counterbalanced by the existence of brakes and checks.
The struggle between the two forces takes different forms.
It could appear as a tendency towards judicial activism
struggling with strict constructionism, or the ideal of
further European integration versus the need to pay heed
to the national legal systems of the member states. Other
670(1989) 11 EHRR 335, para 56.
671Frangoise Hampson, op. cit., 136.
612Belgian Linguistics case, (1979-80) 1 EHRR 252, at page 282.
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pressures come from the rival interests of the applicants
pushing towards a higher protection of their Convention-
based rights versus the claim of the respondent government
that a certain action was within its margin of discretion
to conduct its own affairs. On other occasions, the
conflict appears a matter of judicial choice on the
construction of the provisions of the ECHR.
The case Huber v. Switzerland is an example. The
applicant, Ms. Huber, had been detained by the police on
the order of a Zurich District Attorney for examination as
a witness in a criminal investigation. After questioning
her, the District Attorney ordered her arrest on suspicion
of perjury, among other charges. This indictment led to
her conviction. She challenged her arrest and conviction
on grounds that the District Attorney was not "a judge or
other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial
power" but her arguments were eventually rejected by the
European Court.
Although the facts of the case are not particularly of
importance, it serves to illustrate the operation of those
forces competing against one another in the process of
decision making. The Court had to strike a balance
between the margin of discretion of the respondent
government and the ideal of a "universalised" (or
"Europeanised") compliance with the Convention. The
delegate of the Commission before the Court, Professor
Schermers, argued for a Europe-wide interpretation of the
rights set down in the ECHR. In his opinion there was one
single European law of human rights, and he said: "I think
the diversity of the laws in Europe and also the diversity
of legislation in Switzerland are one of the riches of
Europe [ . . . ] But as far as fundamental human rights are
concerned, they must be the same in Europe throughout."673
673Cour/Misc (90) 87, at 30. (Huber case. Verbatim record of the public hearings held on 28
March 1990.)
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He had already offered his own account of the existence of
much common ground among the member states on what is
basic for the protection of human rights:
[The members of the Commission and the Court] are
confronted with legal thinking in other member states
of the Council of Europe. Broadly speaking, this
experience shows how little are the differences in
what is considered to be essential for the protection
of human rights. In the long term this common legal
basis may prove to be the essential foundation for
further European integration.674
Or, as a judge of the Court expressed in another case, in
a dissenting opinion: "It is the function of national
authorities so to arrange their affairs as not to clash
with the requirements of the Convention. The Convention
is not to be remoulded to assume the shape of national
procedures . "675
On the other hand, the respondent government in Huber
argued for the acceptance of the variety of solutions and
the possibility of interpretations of the ECHR which took
account of different legal traditions: "The Court
endeavours, in all its decisions, to respect the
sovereignty of member States, in so far as there are no
clear violations of the Convention."676
Reservations were voiced on the approach of the Strasbourg
Commission concerning the ideal of one single system in
another case, particularly on the transferability of the
idea of integration (typical) of EU law:
[In the Scheisser case] Professor Schermers argued
that the strengthening of human rights goes side-by-
side with European integration. It might be said
that his is a concept of the European Communities.
It is a theme on which Professor Schermers had relied
674Henry G. Schermers, "Human Rights in Europe", (1986) 6 Legal Studies 170, 180.
67 5 Case of Brannigan and McBride v. the United Kingdom, (5/1992/350/423-424),
dissenting opinion by Judge Walsh, para. 11.
676Cour/Misc (90) 87,25.
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before. This is likely to elevate the Convention
above its purpose. Not only are not all the States
of the Council of Europe members of the Communities,
but some of the ones that are, like the United
Kingdom, certainly do not subscribe to the idea that
the Convention is part of the process of integration.
Of course 'integration' may be used in a non¬
technical sense to describe the political and social
coming together throughout the whole of Europe but,
however desirable, it is too early to discern a legal
component to this process, still less one in which
the Convention plays a part.677
There is of course a striking difference between the
Strasbourg Court and the ECJ on their attitudes towards
diversity. Except for the "public policy" exception under
Article 48 EEC which allows a degree of leeway or "margin
of appreciation" for the member states, the ideal of
integration in EU law is a great deal stronger than in
Strasbourg:
In the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human
Rights there is some recognition of the possibility
of variation between one country and another as to
the standards to be applied, but understandably, the
Luxembourg Court has generally sought to promote the
uniform application of law throughout the
Community. 678
In Strasbourg the opposition between unity and diversity
runs through the decision making process: the case law has
to move constantly between one and the other extreme, a
maximum and a minimum. Strasbourg's approach towards
harmonisation is weaker as Judge Martens observed in his
dissenting opinion in Borgers v. Belgium679 :
(...) the Convention does not aim at uniform law but
lays down directives and standards, which, as such,
imply a certain freedom for the member States. On
the other hand, the preamble to the Convention seems
to invite the Court to develop common standards.
These contradictory features create a certain
677Colin Warbrick, "The European Convention on Human Rights", (1990) 10 YEL 535, 592.
678M. H. Mendelson, "The European Court of Justice and Human Rights", (1981) 1 YEL
125, 163.
67 9(1993) 15 EHRR 92.
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internal tension which requires the Court to act with
prudence and to take care not to interfere without a
convincing justification.680
A single system, however, may bring about a defeat for the
reason that heterogeneity can provide some "raw material"
for the preparation of possible solutions and legal
interpretation.
More generally, any court has to strike balances between
rival interests, views and interpretations. The distinct
difficulty for the Strasbourg Court is to ensure equal
treatment of all member states, as a particular
construction has to be applied (ideally) to a variety of
legal systems, whose diversity pulls the system in the
direction of accepting different interpretations. This
partly explains the relevance of the comparative method as
a tool of interpretation for the Strasbourg organs.
Is the European law of Human Rights an
identifiable body of law from the point of view of
its harmonising effect?
The issues discussed so far bring us to the relationship
between the legal interpretation performed in Strasbourg
and the control over the harmonising effect of the
outcomes of the cases as the judgments have consequences
for the uniformity of application of Convention rules.
The point is, then, how far the Strasbourg Court can
exercise control of the uniformity of outcomes and how
strong the idea of harmonisation present in the system of
the Council of Europe is, particularly, in view of the
European human rights order articulated in the ECHR
itself. At this point it is thus necessary to compare
680(1993) 15 EHRR 92, Judge Martens'dissent, para. 4.2.
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briefly the Strasbourg system with another system which
stresses harmonisation, the EU.
Although both the ECJ and the European Court of Human
Rights sit in a position where they enter in a dynamic
relationship with a multiplicity of legal systems, the ECJ
is better equipped to achieve harmonisation in its area of
influence. The system of the EU is geared towards that
result. This vigorous aspiration is made clear in the
stress placed on the harmonisation of results by
directive. The idea of uniformity is embedded in the
ECJ's jurisprudence: there is to be one market and
therefore economic operators are not to benefit or suffer
from different regimes in different places. The
"metalegal notion" of one community cannot be conveyed if
the system did not apply equally everywhere.681 The
situation in Strasbourg is different. The Court can
declare that a right has been violated or grant monetary
compensation and/or just satisfaction to the applicant or
if appropriate, request the withdrawal of the offending
measure by the member state and the enforcement of its
judgments is monitored under Article 54 ECHR by the
Committee of Ministers.682 Beyond these options, however,
there are no other measures that the Court could possibly
take.
The ECHR has not superseded national law in its field of
application. Unlike human rights law, EU law depends on
the simultaneous and uniform application of its norms
throughout the EU territory and this is assured by the
direct applicability of the regulations683 and the doctrine
681Joseph H. H. Weiler, "Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of
the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights Within the
Legal Order of the European Communities", (1986) 61 Wash. L. Rev. 1103, 1122.
682To discharge this obligation the Committee of Ministers has adopted "Rules Concerning
the Application of Article 54 of the European Convention on Human Rights".
683Article 189 EEC describes a regulation as of "general application (...) binding in its entirety
and directly applicable in all member States"
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of direct effect684, under which a provision confers upon
individuals or entities rights which they may enforce
before their national courts. There is another element
involved too, the primacy of EU law over national law and
its being a separate legal order.685 The system of the
ECHR appears a good deal weaker in this respect. In
addition, the ECHR does not contain any rules governing
its applicability in the domestic legal order.
Furthermore, as regards the pattern of the harmonisation
capabilities in the EU, in addition to its contentious
jurisdiction, the ECJ has interpretative jurisdiction and
can use Article 177 EEC686 as a very powerful device for
this purpose. In contrast, Protocol 2 added a very lim¬
ited advisory jurisdiction to the European Court of Human
Rights in 1970. The Committee of Ministers can request
advisory opinions from the Court, but with the exclusion
of the interpretation of all questions within the scope of
its contentious jurisdiction. Under this rule, the
Strasbourg Court may, for example, interpret the provision
in Article 35 ECHR, that "the Commission shall meet as the
circumstances require" but not a right guaranteed in the
ECHR. In EU law, Article 177 EEC gives the ECJ powers to
issue preliminary rulings on the interpretation of the EEC
Treaty and on the validity and interpretation of EU
legislation, when a national court refers a question to it
because its interpretation or ruling is necessary for the
decision in a case. The ECJ will rule on EU law and the
case will be sent back to the national court for disposal
of that law (and national law if relevant) to the facts.
The EU system is based on co-operation between the
national courts and the ECJ in the application and optimum
interpretation of EU law. Under the ECHR, conversely, and
684 Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administrate der Belastingen, [1963] CMLR 105.
6S^Costa v. ENEL, [1964] CMLR 425 and Simmenthal v. Commission, [1980] 1 CMLR 172.
686Article 177 EEC was extended from giving preliminary rulings on matters of interpretation
of EEC law on reference from national courts to the principle of direct effects to EEC Treaty
articles, Directives, Decisions, and also to international agreements to which the EU is a party.
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on issues related to personal morals or privacy, for
example, there are considerable differences between the
member states:
With regard to certain issues, such as divorce,
abortion, homosexuality and pornography, considerably
divergent views are held by the various States of
Western Europe. The Convention does not require
harmonization, it only requires that all States grant
minimum protection to the individual. Without
preliminary rulings it is to be expected that at
least some national judiciaries will interpret
particular articles of the Convention more favourably
for the individual than the bare minimum.687
The powerful tools of harmonisation available to the ECJ
are controversial, however. Hjalte Rasmussen688 saw an
excess of judicial activism in the ECJ's judicial review
and suggested the use of policy input analysis as a brake.
In his view, several elements should be weighed (e.g.
through the press, for instance) within an "impact" study
necessary as a yardstick to measure the "legitimacy" of
the activism of the ECJ. On the other hand, Professor M.
Cappelletti argued for the preservation of the relative
freedom from the powers and pressures of the environment
enjoyed by (constitutional) courts in judicial review.689
Despite the wish to transfer standards across borders, the
use of the comparative method as a tool of interpretation
and the efforts to test the conduct of the member states
equally, the harmonising means available to the European
Court of Human Rights necessitate weaker results than
those achievable by the ECJ. The interpretation of human
rights law has limitations as many sources of variance
influence the outcomes. Nonetheless, harmonising effects
687Henry G. Schermers, "Preliminary Rulings under the European Convention on Human
Rights?" in: Adriaan Bos and Hugo Siblesz (eds.), Realism in Law-Makina: Essays on
international law in honour of Willem Riphaaen. (1986), 194.
688See: Hjalte Rasmussen, On Law and Policy in the European Court of Justice: A
Comparative Study in Judicial Policymaking. (1986).
689Mauro Cappelletti, "Is the European Court of Justice "Running Wild"?" (1987) EL Rev. 3,
6.
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are cumulative and may indirectly result from the
continuous application of this method.
Conelusions
The aim of this chapter has been to discuss the balancing
activity and the construction of Convention law in
Strasbourg in order to set the theoretical framework to
introduce comparative law as a tool of interpretation and
lay the ground to derive a tool of study from it in the
next chapter.
An overview of the various ingredients of Convention law
interpretation has also been attempted. The tension
between unity and diversity appeared as an opposition
between the following aspects: the idea of further
European integration versus the diversity of the members
states and their different legal systems; the wishes of
the applicant versus the aims of the respondent
government; a narrow versus a wide margin of appreciation
according to the existence or absence of European
consensus on a certain matter (and discovered through a
comparative law survey) and so on.
The interpretation of Convention law is a complex
procedure. A multiplicity of factors interact: policy
considerations brought into the adjudication process by
the respect for the reason of state by the Court or its
invocation as a defence by the respondent governments; the
need to afford a (variable) margin of appreciation to the
respondent governments and the general necessity not to
alienate the member states by taking inflexible lines on
protection. The connections between those elements and
one use of the comparative method as a survey was
established by means of highlighting the links between a
higher "consensus" in the "common law" on a certain area
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and the stricter scrutiny of the behaviour of the
respondent governments.
The pattern of legal interpretation that emerges is one
where various ingredients are closely interrelated and
interwoven and where none of them operates in isolation
from the others. At the same time, comparative law
appears to be more than just one of the elements since it
is present in all balancing efforts. Its importance will
be observed in a fuller perspective in the next three
chapters, where the Court will be seen engaged in a
dynamic relationship with a multiplicity of legal systems.
The Court carries out a balance of the interests in every
case it hears, in circumstances unique to this court: the
member states are sovereign (they are not members of a
federation); the obligations the Court imposes on them
when passing judgment are only binding in international
law (there is no direct effect in the EU sense of the
term); and finally, the legal systems of the member states
provide an environment of civilian, common law and mixed
legal systems. Despite the apparent similarity with the
system of the EU, in law the tools for harmonisation and
control of outcomes are weaker in Strasbourg. The
aspiration to transfer standards across borders inspired
by the pull towards unity is more difficult to achieve in
the system of the European Court of Human Rights where the








Comparative law analysis of




Is it possible to support the
universality of the concept of man
and, therefore, of his fundamental
rights in view of the legal
families which stand out of a
background of so varied spiritual
tendencies [...]? [...] As far as
I know I have yet to see a
comparative law study of human
rights dealing with this aspect,
which is, no doubt, well worth the
effort of fundamental research.690
The universal character of human
rights is intrinsically attached
to their definition rather than to
their application.691
Introduction
Against the background discussed in the previous chapter,
this chapter deals with the use of comparative law as a
tool to handle the differences between the legal systems
that percolate through to the adjudication process.
While much convergence has taken place between legal
690Joseph J. M. van der Ven, "Les Droits de I'Homme: leur universality en face de la
diversite des civilisations", EUI Working Papers, (1984) 22-23.
691Carlo Zanghi, "La protection des droits de I'homme: universalisme ou regionalisme?",
(1974) 7 RDH 641, 652.
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families and systems, the thesis that basic differences
between them still persist is reasserted and used in this
chapter to ground the comparative method. The method
will not appear in this chapter or the next two as a more
or less discretionary tool used by the Court in building
a yardstick by finding a "European shared law", but as a
tool to interpret Convention law in the midst of the
pressures and tensions produced by the different answers
furnished by the legal systems of the various member
states. Some comparative law issues spring from the
particular legal system in which the case has been
argued. The distinctive legal systems and traditions of
the member states are capable of interfering with the
harmonising work of the Court. The comparative method is
a tool of interpretation of Convention law for the Court
and here it is used as a tool of study, and as such, it
needs to be resorted to with due regard to its
limitations: apart from the different legal systems,
there are several (other) sources of variance for the
outcomes.
The comparative method: from a tool of
interpretation to a tool of study
What is the effect of the surviving differences between
the systems in actual cases and how can the effect of
these differences be made observable? The European Court
is a tribunal placed at the top of a multiplicity of
legal systems and it resorts to various comparative
techniques in the course of decision making. A
comparative method adopted as a tool of study in a sense
mirrors these activities of the European Court and,
operating "in reverse", it makes those differences
visible. Each case analysed will reveal the tension
between the traditions in microcosm. Despite the various
difficulties in identifying the criteria for
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distinguishing one legal system from the other and the
arbitrariness that might be involved in the selection
eventually made692, the chosen "differentiating qualities"
will provide a framework to make the comparative law
tensions come to light. Zweigert and Kotz have
classified the elements that determine the similarities
between civilian law systems. For the framework of this
discussion, their classification will be "amended" and
used as a tool to bring to light the differences between
the legal traditions, as follows: (1) the general
structure of the legal system of the respondent member
state, (2) the procedural law, (3) the rules of evidence,
(4) the institutions particular to the legal system of a
member state, and finally, (5) the classification and
rules of what is private and public law.693 This study
therefore counts on the possibility of identifying (with
a reasonable degree of certitude) the civilian and common
law elements present in the case law of the European
Court, in order to compare the tendencies towards
opposite solutions offered by the traditions and point
out the final choice of the Court (which, of course, may
have also been influenced by other factors). It should
be added that in the analysis of the cases those
"differentiating qualities" are probably at different
levels of generality or specificity but, applied to
individual cases, they will help us to avoid
generalisations and all-embracing "differences" and to
concentrate on the concepts and techniques694 used by the
Court. In Basil Markesinis' words:
692See previous chapter.
693See A. Watson The Making of the Civil Law, pp. 1 and 14; also K. Zweigert and H. Kotz
Introduction to Comparative Law , 69. The Argentine scholar Julio Cueto-Rua in "The
Future of the Civil Law" (1977) 37 La. L. Rev. 645 at p. 645 discusses the different
meanings attached to the expression "civil law": i- a system of law, i.e. the civil law, as
opposed to the expression "common law"; ii- the private law of the civilian legal systems, as
distinguished from public law; and iii- in a civilian legal system, that part of private law
applicable to persons concerning property, family, succession and so on, as distinguished
from, for instance, commercial law.
694Basil Markesinis, "Comparative Law - A Subject in Search of an Audience", (1990) 53
MLR 1,2.
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Thus, in a strange way the comparative method may
have more of a future by penetrating other subjects
than by trying to assert its own continued
independence under the unconvincing title of
comparative law. Even staunch supporters of what I
have described as the old approach detect in this
phenomenon a way of rekindling interest in foreign
law. I certainly do.695
Sir Otto Kahn-Freund wrote, in the context of EU law,
that an awareness of the contrasts between the legal
orders is a first step in the direction of harmonisation,
and his comments apply well to European human rights law:
We are here concerned not with Community Law, but
with a "European common law", and I consider the
articulation of the contrasts in interpretation, the
awareness of these contrasts, and a mutual
adjustment to different methods as among the most
significant requirements for a measure of harmony
and among the most difficult to achieve. To make an
obstacle articulate is the first step towards
overcoming it.696
1. The general structure of the system
l.a. The legal sources and their handling
Although in some areas the common law and the civil law
are gradually moving closer, yet the point of complete
assimilation has not been reached and, of course, it may
never be reached. Civil law judges697 tend to look first
at the enacted legislation and then at their colleagues'
decisions, because the jurisprudence, although very
important, is placed "behind" statutory law in the
hierarchy of sources. On the other hand, in the common
law world there is a tendency for statutes to
695Basil Markesinis, op. cit., 21.
696Otto Kahn-Freund, "Common Law and Civil Law - Imaginary and Real Obstacles to
Assimilation", in: Mauro Cappelletti (ed.) New Perspectives for a Common Law of Europe.
(1978),158.
697 J. Cueto-Rua, 'The Future of the Civil Law" (1977) 37 La. L. Rev. 645, 656.
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"supplement" the common law and to be very clear when
they displace a common law rule.698
One of the comparative problems for the Strasbourg Court
was how to treat all member states in the same way vis-a-
vis the different treatment the traditions assign to the
sources of law. The difference between the common law
and the civil law survives in the different value
attributed to precedents among the sources of law.699 For
example, the common law member states would have been
discriminated against in the Sunday Times Case (No. 1J700
if an institution such as contempt of court would have
been declared not to satisfy the conditions of
accessibility and foreseeability of an interference
"prescribed by law" for the sole reason that it was not
set down in statutory form.701
The case concerned an injunction restraining publication
of one article by the Sunday Times dealing with the
history of the testing, manufacture and marketing of the
drug thalidomide by Distillers, on grounds that it would
constitute contempt of court. The article was intended
to assist the parents of children born with deformities
caused by the drug in obtaining a better settlement of
their actions. A sharply divided European Court decided
that the injunction was not a justified interference and
therefore, found the United Kingdom in breach of Article
10 (2) ECHR.
698Sir William Dale, "The European Legislative Scene", (1992) 13 Stat. L. R. 79, 88.
699Ugo Mattei, Common Law: II diritto analo-americano. (19921 235.
700(1979-80) 2 EHRR 245, para. 47. Relevant for the study of this case are: Harvey Teff
and Colin R. Munro, Thalidomide the legal aftermath. (1976) and P. J. Duffy, "The Sunday
Times Case: Freedom of Expression, Contempt of Court and the European Convention on
Human Rights" (1980) 5 HR Rev. 17.
701J. J. Cremona, "The interpretation of the word "law" in the jurisprudence of the
European Court of Human Rights" , Selected Papers 1946-1989. (1990), 188, lists various
cases where the word "law" occurs.
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The Court acknowledged the comparative issue when it said
that deciding otherwise would have struck at the bed-rock
of the English legal system. it would have also been
contrary to the European ideal of the drafters of
treating all member states equally. For these reasons,
it did not matter to the Court that the law of contempt
was laid down in previous court decisions:
...'law' in the expression 'prescribed by law' covers
not only statute but also unwritten law.
Accordingly, the Court does not attach importance
here to the fact that contempt of court is a creature
of common law and not of legislation. It would
clearly be contrary to the intention of the drafters
of the Convention to hold that a restriction imposed
by virtue of the common law is not 'prescribed by
law' on the sole ground that it is not enunciated in
legislation: this would deprive a common law State
which is party to the Convention of the protection of
Article 10 (2) and strike at the very roots of that
State's legal system.
As a result, the Court deployed a fully transplantable
argument, that "law" in the phrase "prescribed by law"
covers statute and unwritten law.
Let us now turn our attention to two French cases which
mirror this case from the other side of the divide of the
legal traditions. The Court applied, however, the same
Sunday Times standard on the meaning of "law" in Kruslin
v. France and Huvig v. France. In April 1985 the
Indictment Division of the Toulouse Court of Appeal
committed a Mr. Kruslin for trial at the Haute-Garonne
Assize Court on charges of aiding and abetting a murder,
aggravated theft and attempted aggravated theft. One
decisive piece of evidence was the recording of a
conversation with a person whose telephone was being
monitored in connection with other proceedings under
another investigating judge. The Court of Cassation
dismissed an appeal filed by Mr. Kruslin.
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The other case concerned a Mr. Huvig, who ran a business
with his wife and was accused of tax evasion, failure to
make entries in accounts and false accounting. An
investigative judge asked the police to monitor the
Huvigs' telephone calls. The telephone tapping took
place for a period of 28 hours. A first instance court
convicted the couple in March 1982, and the Dijon Court
of Appeal upheld the convictions and increased the
sentences. The Court of Cassation dismissed an appeal by
the complainants.
The excerpts quoted in the following paragraphs are from
Kruslin: the judgments in both cases are almost identical
in the matter that concerns us. In both cases the
European Court was asked whether the expression "in
accordance with the law" within the meaning of Article 8
(2) ECHR had had a legal basis in French law. The French
Government submitted that by "law" the Court should
understand the law in force in a given legal system in
addition to the case law interpreting it. The delegate
of the Commission, Mr. Treschel702 challenged this
interpretation and disputed the possibility of
transplanting the standard developed in Sunday Times
advancing the comparative law argument that "... in the
case of the Continental countries, including France, only
a substantive enactment of general application - whether
or not passed by Parliament - could amount to a 'law' for
the purposes of Article 8 (2) of the Convention." He
pointed out that when the Court held that "the word 'law'
in the expression 'prescribed by law' cover ted] not only
statute but also unwritten law" it was thinking of the
common law system, and he went on to say that "That
system, however, was radically different from, in
particular, the French system. In the latter, case law
was undoubtedly a very important source of law, but a
702(1990) 12 EHRR 547, para. 28.
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secondary one, whereas by 'law' the Convention meant a
primary source."
The Court, however, insisted on the transplantability of
standards and resorted to the same argument used in
Sunday Times (No.l) to accomplish the result of finding a
basis in French law for the interferences complained of,
and this meant that "law" could meet the requirements of
the ECHR even if it was based on previous court decisions
in either the civil law or common law world:
French law, written and unwritten, does not indicate
with reasonable clarity the scope and manner of the
exercise of the relevant discretion conferred on the
public authorities. This was truer still at the
material time, so that Mr. Kruslin did not enjoy the
minimum degree of protection to which citizens are
entitled under the rule of law in a democratic
society.703
Finally, the comparative problem was further developed:
The term 'law' had to be understood in its
'substantive' sense not its 'formal' one. It
includes enactments of lower rank than statutes, case
law, etc. It would be wrong to exaggerate the
distinction between common law countries and
Continental countries. Statute law is important in
common law countries and case law in civilian
jurisdictions.704
Although in general the Court tends to follow the
continental preference for statutory law over case law as
a source,705 the requirements of accessibility and
foreseeability of a "law" can be satisfied (or not) by
either statute or case law, be it a civilian or a common
law country, demonstrating that so far the Court was able
to assimilate different systems. It is suggested that
one reason for the preference for statutory law is the
703(1990) 12 EHRR 547, para. 36.
704(1990) 12 EHRR 547, para. 29.
705On Strasbourg's preference for written law see Chapter 6 of this dissertation.
- 262 -
continental legal background of the majority of the
judges sitting in Strasbourg and also the fact that it
may be more clear cut for an international body such as
the European Court to check compliance with the ECHR in
the case of statutes rather than domestic case law.
Writing on the subject of the European organs, Judge
Pettiti pointed out that in Strasbourg cases concerning
the concept of "law" could be treated equally across the
divide between the civil law and the common law:
We have issued an interesting decision on this
principle because on this point in international
law, we propounded this interpretation saying that
in the same way that Anglo-saxon law can be
considered as equal to a non-codified legislation,
we can accept that a coherent body of jurisprudence
as that of the French Court of Cassation is equiva¬
lent to the law itself even though the use of such a
technical resource is not precisely codified.706
l.b. The legal system per se is affecting the
human rights of the individuals
In the course of the proceedings the European Court comes
into contact with the peculiarities of the legal systems
of the member states and these can influence the process
in various ways. For example, in a series of cases
concerning transsexuals, the comparative problem for the
Court was how to apply its standards to the essentially
different administrative legal systems of France and
England while treating them equally at the same time.
Unlike Sunday Times and the French telephone tapping
cases, where the comparative law problem was discussed
and resolved at a high level of abstraction (concerning
706Louis-Edmond Pettiti, "La Commission et la Cour europeenne des droits de I'homme",
in Les droits de I'honnme et la nouvelle architecture de I'Europe. Mario Bettati et al. (eds),
(1991) 35. On these two cases see: P. Lambert, "Les ecoutes telephoniques: arrets Huvig
et Kruslin c. la France, du 24 avril 1990, de la Cour europeenne des droits de I'homme",
(1990) Journal des Tribunaux 749.
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the sources of law), the cases addressed here brought the
Court into close contact with detailed administrative
regulations. At this level, the outcomes were different
according to the legal system of the member state
concerned.
The human position of the applicants was very much alike,
though, as all three allegedly suffered from gender
dysphoria syndrome, had undergone gender realignment
treatment and had already managed to obtain a degree of
social recognition in their "new" identity. Although
"there is no such thing a a true-sex change or a sexual
metamorphosis"707 Professor Jerold L. Taitz explained that
persons suffering from this medical condition may achieve
psychological relief with appropriate medical treatment,
and defined the condition known as gender dysphoria
syndrome or transsexualism as being,
...a rare psychological condition recognised by the
medical profession. A transsexual believes that
he/she is a member of the opposite sex trapped in the
wrong biological body. The syndrome may manifest
itself in various neurotic or psychotic forms,
leading even to suicide in extreme cases. Most
medical specialists consider that the only relief for
the condition is to align the transsexual's body with
his psychological gender by way of "sex-change"
surgery and hormonal treatment. After "sex-change"
procedures the transsexual takes on the form of
his/her post-operative sex. Although capable of
having sexual intercourse in the same physical manner
of their post-operative sex, transsexuals are
incapable of procreation. "Sex-change" surgery is
irreversible and presents a high percentage of risk
factor to the health of the transsexual, as does the
hormonal treatment.708
707 Jerold L. Taitz, 'The Law Relating to the Consummation of Marriage Where One of the
Spouses is a Post-Operative Transsexual", (1986)15 AAL141, 143. Incidentally, Judge S.
K. Martens in his dissenting opinion in Cossey makes a reference to page 144 of this article
where Professor Taitz reminded us that sex-change surgery is also available from female to
post-operative male.
7 08Jerold Taitz, "Transsexuals and Sexual Identity", (1988) 51 MLR 502,502.
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Several member states of the Council of Europe grant
medical treatment for this affliction under their
national health insurance system, as is the case of the
United Kingdom.709 In those countries, it may be
untenable nowadays to put the issue in the following
terms: "Is it technically correct to use the terms
fundamental human right to refer to one that is grounded
not in human nature proper but in a psychological anomaly
and in a subsequent surgical procedure, almost brutal and
always artificial?"710 Rather, to avoid inconsistencies
and in the interest of impartial treatment of all
citizens it follows that people in this situation may
also be entitled to suitable alterations of their records
under the prescriptions of Article 8 ECHR and even the
right to marry under those of Article 12 ECHR. This was
the legal relief the applicants sought in Strasbourg.
The similarities between the cases, however, ended at the
point where the particular "otherness"711 of the legal
systems involved percolated through the process of
adjudication and became the single most important factor
in determining inconsistent outcomes.
One ruling of the European Court reads: "attachment to
the traditional concept of marriage provides sufficient
reason for the continued adoption of biological criteria
for determining a person's sex."712 In consequence, the
biological sex criterion as used in the United Kingdom
was deemed to be in line with the Convention. Citing the
709J. K. Mason and R. A. McCall Smith in "Butterworths Medico-legal Encyclopedia", at
page 562 wrote that "...it is now generally agreed that sex change surgery is a legitimate
form of therapy and it is one which is available under the NHS."
710Javier Escriva-lvars, "Transexualismo y matrimonio. Comentario a la sentencia del
T.E.D.H. en el caso Cossey", (1992) 2 Suplemento Humana lura de derechos humanos
323, 346.
711This expression was taken from Csaba Varga, "European Integration and the
Uniqueness of National Legal Cultures", 732, in: Bruno de Witte and Caroline Forder (eds.)
The common law of Europe and the future of legal education. (1992), 721.
712(1991) 13 EHRR 622, para. 43.
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reasoning in its previous decision Rees713, the European
Court said in Cossey that Article 12 ECHR refers to the
marriage between persons of the opposite biological sex;
the purpose of such traditional approach being the
protection of the institution of marriage as the basis of
the family. Further, the right to marry was subject to
existing national legislation and so long as any
limitation laid out in those laws did not frustrate the
right itself, then there was no basis for European
intervention. In the Court's understanding of the case
at hand, the legal impediment set out in domestic law
could not be said to have had such a frustrating effect,
therefore the British government was not requested to
alter the basic makeup of its record system so as to
accommodate this type of entry. The United Kingdom
record system was designed to enter historical
information. Corrections of an initial error of fact
could be made but this was obviously not the situation of
Mr. Rees or Ms. Cossey. For this reason, the European
Court arguably shied away from shaking the whole
structure of the English civil registration system: "to
require the United Kingdom to follow the example of other
Contracting States is from one perspective tantamount to
asking that it should adopt a system in principle the
same as theirs for determining and recording civil
status".714 The space of time between Rees and Cossey was
short. Perhaps this time factor contributed to persuade
the Court that it should resort to the same pattern of
reasoning and refuse to distinguish the latter from the
former case all with the result that it allowed again the
same respondent government a wide margin of discretion in
the matter:
There have been certain developments since 1986 in
the law of some member States of the Council of
713On this case, see: Jerold L. Taitz, "The Legal Determination of the Sexual Identity of a
Post-Operative Transsexual Seen as a Human Rights Issue", (1989) 7 Medicine & Law 467.
714(1986) 9 EHRR 56, para. 42.
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Europe. However, the reports accompanying the
resolution adopted by the European Parliament on 12
September 1989 (OJ No. C 256, 9.10.90 p. 33) and
Recommendation 1117 (1989) adopted by the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe on
29 September 1989 -both of which seem to encourage
the harmonisation of laws and practices in this
field- reveal, as the Government pointed out, the
same diversity of practice as obtained at the time
of the Rees judgment. Accordingly, this is still,
having regard to the existence of little common
ground between the Contracting States, and area in
which they enjoy a wide margin of appreciation (...)
it cannot at present be said that a departure from
the Court's earlier decision is warranted in order
to ensure that the interpretation of Article 8 on
the point at issue remains in line with present-day
conditions.715
Judge Martens pointed out in his dissenting opinion in
Cossey716 that the essence of Mr. Rees' complaint had
shown not long before that "the legal system in force in
the United Kingdom (the BSD-system)717 was inconsistent
with his rights under Article 8 of the Convention" and
also, probably stressing the argument, that "The very
existence of such a legal system must continuously,
directly and distressingly affect their private life".
If a community is oppressing an individual, then it may
be necessary to generate "top-down" change from
Strasbourg:
(...) one gets the impression that the Court, at
least as far as family law and sexuality are
concerned, moves extremely cautiously (...) In my
opinion, this caution is not consistent with the
Court's mission to protect the individual against
the collectivity and to do so by elaborating common
standards. (...) the Court should take great care
not to yield too readily to arguments based on a
country's cultural and historical particularities.71
715(1991) 13 EHRR 622, para. 40.
716(1991) 13 EHRR 622, Judge Martens'dissenting opinion, para. 3.4.
1
'BSD-system, the system that holds that only Biological Sex is Decisive, that is, the
chromosomal factor is the only relevant foundation to determine gender.
718(1991) 13 EHRR 622, Judge Martens'dissenting opinion, para. 5.6.3.
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This brings us to the comparative problem again, and how
it determined a different finding in the French case B. v
France. Although the Court distinguished it from Rees
and Cossey, the judges did not acknowledge that the
outcome was similar to that advocated by the dissenting
opinion of Judge Martens in Cossey119. The judgment found
it essential to delve into the details of the
administrative systems involved in the instant case and
the precedents running a brief comparative study of the
French and the English legal systems under the title "The
differences between the French and English systems"720.
The gist of the comparison was that, unlike an English
birth certificate, a French one was intended to be
updated throughout the life of the person concerned. As
a consequence, the Court said that the correction
requested by Ms. B. had to be made since it would only
amount to an update of the register without any need to
introduce alterations in the established arrangement of
the registration system as a whole.721 It did not escape
the attention of the Court that numerous French courts of
first instance had already ordered similar insertions in
the register in the past without hardly ever being
challenged by the Procureur's office. Only the Court of
Cassation's jurisprudence had adopted the contrary po¬
sition, but the European Court understood that this could
be readily changed.
The cases produced conflicting decisions; Cossey
supporting the United Kingdom policy of no changes to the
records; B. v. France rejecting it with regard to another
member state, despite the fact that the factual
717Separate Opinion of Judge Martens: "Since I fully maintain the views expounded in my
dissenting opinion in the Cossey case, I acclaim the Court's decision, but cannot subscribe
to all its arguments (...)"
720(1993) 16 EHRR 1, paras. 49 to 51.
721See "France" in Chapter 3 "The effect of the European law of human rights on the
member states": on December 11,1992, the Court of Cassation in Rene X. and Marc X.
quashed two decisions of the Appeal Court of Aix-en-Provence and ordered the
substitution of "female sex" for "male sex" in the applicants' birth certificates.
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circumstances did not differ greatly, only the national
law was different. Although the European Court applied
the same ECHR standards and relied on its own case law,
the "otherness" of the legal systems of the member states
permeated through. The comparative point being made is
that the case law of the Court was unable to absorb the
differences between the national legal systems whose
underpinnings pulled in very different directions and
which determined in the end, that in one case the rights
of a person were protected but not in the other. The
Court simply could not create a remedy where it was not
available.722 Following the tendency to give a wider
margin of appreciation to the member states in questions
concerning morals, the Strasbourg institutions abstained
from requesting changes of policy and legal practice.
The situation may change in the future, and support for
one jurisprudence to be shared on equal terms by all
member states may gain momentum in this particular field.
If another British case reaches Strasbourg in the future,
the solution may be more in line with the French case. A
different composition of the Court may have an influence
on this too.
2. The procedural law of the member states
Although European national legal systems share many
principles, at least at the highest level of abstraction,
fundamental differences between them are revealed,
however, when we turn to the institutional structure
through which their norms are applied or many other
details, such as the assumptions behind legal thought.
More specifically, their typical mode of thought in
procedural matters is different, and these differences
present the European Court with comparative problems when
722See Chapter 6 for the effect of these conflicting decisions on the effect of the jurispru¬
dence constante in Strasbourg.
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it is called to decide whether certain specific
procedural law practices violate the rights protected by
the ECHR.
Let us devote our attention to a few Swedish cases in
Strasbourg. These cases concerned whether a public
hearing was required on appeals when both matters of law
and fact were at stake. The comparative problem appeared
when the handling of the issue of the hearing in Swedish
law encountered the requirements of Article 6 (1) ECHR.
In Ekbatani v Sweden, the applicant, Mr. John Ekbatani, a
United States citizen, arrived in Sweden in 1978 to do
research at the University of Gothemburg. Due to
financial difficulties he sought employment with the
Gothemburg Tramway Company but when he failed the Swedish
driving test he had an angry exchange of views with the
traffic assistant in charge of the test. The police
questioned him in this connection and he was charged with
the offence of threatening a civil servant. At the trial
hearing both the applicant and the traffic assistant were
heard, Mr. Ekbetani was found guilty and a fine was set.
He appealed, but the Court of Appeal confirmed the City
Court's judgment. The Supreme Court refused leave to
appeal.
The European Court followed an approach similar to the
common law in order to find that "there were no special
features to justify a denial of a public hearing"723 and
that therefore the ECHR had been violated:
In the circumstances of the present case that
question could not, as a matter of a fair trial,
have been properly determined without a direct
assessment of the evidence given in person by the
applicant -who claimed that he had not committed the
723(1991) 13 EHRR 504, para. 33.
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act alleged to constitute the criminal offence- and
by the complainant724
In Helmers v. Sweden725 the question was also whether an
Appeal Court could refuse a hearing when issues of law
and fact (new evidence had been introduced) were
discussed on appeals. The European Commission said that
Mr. Helmers should have been allowed to state his case at
a hearing.726 Helmers concerned a private prosecution for
defamation in addition to an action for damages
originating in a dispute over the University of Lund's
decision not to appoint the applicant to an academic
post. Mr. Helmers had appealed to the National Board of
Universities and Colleges against the decision which he
thought was biased. The Board requested a specially
established university committee to submit a written
opinion. Mr. Helmers considered that some statements
made in the opinion amounted to defamation and reported
the matter to the police, but the Chief District
Prosecutor chose not to bring charges. The applicant
then brought a private prosecution against one member of
the university committee and his secretary. There was a
hearing before the Lund District Court. Mr. Helmers's
private prosecution was dismissed and he appealed to the
Court of Appeal, which upheld the lower court decision
without allowing a hearing. The Supreme Court of Sweden
refused leave to appeal.
The European Court, however, gave the issue a
consideration more in line with a common law treatment
and found that a hearing would have been in order before
the Court of Appeal:
... taking into account the seriousness of what was
at stake for the applicant, namely his professional
724(1991) 13 EHRR 504, para. 32.
725(1993) 15 EHRR 285.
726(1993) 15 EHRR 285, para. 33.
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reputation and career, the Court finds that the
question of the defendants' guilt could not, as a
matter of fair trial, have been properly determined
by the Court of Appeal without a direct assessment
of the evidence given in person by Mr Helmers and by
the defendants, who claimed that they were innocent
of the accusations brought against them.
In Jan-Ake Anderson v. Sweden121 and Fejde v. Sweden728 the
Court, however, found that a hearing was not necessary,
and thus, the cases were distinguished from Ekbatani in a
way familiar to common lawyers.729 Fejde and Anderson
were simple cases, one involving a traffic violation
(driving a tractor on a highway) and the other involving
the possession of an unusable weapon. Both applicants
were convicted following public trials where they had
pleaded not guilty. On appeal, they complained of
defects in their trials, including the assessment of the
evidence and also about the severity of the sentences.
Their appeals were rejected without a hearing as the
courts of appeal relied on written submissions.
As regards the right to a hearing itself, the judgments
given by the European Court show the application of the
common law inspired criteria of Article 6 ECHR mixed with
civilian "qualifying" values. The Court recognised that
it was not always necessary to grant the same rights on
appeals as before the first instance court to satisfy
Article 6 ECHR. The Court followed an approach similar
to the continental position in this matter, which also
was that of the Swedish domestic courts, and held that
there was no breach of the ECHR. The judgment was based
on the fact that the issues on which the applicants had
sought a hearing and claimed a de novo assessment of the
evidence would not have been decisive for the outcome of
the appeal. The offences were minor and the convictions
727(1993) 15 EHRR 218.
728(1994) 17 EHRR 14.
729Wilson Finnie, "Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 1991", 1992
Juridical Review 287, 295.
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of no great seriousness. Although civilian judges might
be prepared to draw a distinction between important and
unimportant cases, where the need to hear the defendant
appears less pressing, such civilian approach stands
apart if contrasted with Judge Cremona's dissenting
opinion. Following the common law principle that a
hearing is habitual particularly where questions of both
fact and law were in dispute, Judge Cremona said in
Fejde: "In the circumstances, the appellate court's re¬
examination required a public hearing in order to comply
with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. As this was not
allowed, there was in my view a violation of that
provision."730 Incidentally, this dissenting opinion is
close to the reasoning of Judge Walsh in the German case
Hennings131, where the Irish judge's reasoning on the need
to grant a hearing without the state limiting the right
unilaterally bore no resemblance with the majority's
views.
A common "language" on the right to a hearing was
missing. The differences between the legal traditions
can be quite substantial and the centrifugal force of
these differences may not be easy to assimilate under a
single European law of human rights. Yet again, to a
degree because of the ECHR, many differences between the
civil law and the common law have faded away, but the
Anglo-American approach to criminal procedure still
differs fundamentally from the civilian technique732 or
from that of the mixed legal system of Sweden for that
matter. This provides evidence of their strength and
persistence.
730(1994) 17 EHRR 14, Cremona's dissenting opinion.
731Discussed in Chapter 10.
732J. A. W. Lensing, "Some Thoughts on Criminal Law and Procedure, European
Integration and Legal Education", in Bruno de Witte and Caroline Forder (eds.), The
common law of Europe and the future of legal education. (1992), 380.
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3. The rules of evidence in the member states
The two procedural traditions prevalent among the member
states are worlds apart on the ways evidence is elicited
and brought to the notice of the judge. Added to all
this, Article 6 ECHR is cast in the mould of a clearly
adversarial spirit, so tensions arise when its
prescriptions are applied to criminal procedure in civil
law systems. Incidentally, it has been speculated that
the different footings of some sections of the ECHR and
those of some aspects of French law may explain in part
France's delay in ratifying the ECHR and granting the
right of individual petition, as "(...) the Convention
was too much influenced by anglo-saxon legal thinking
although the French lawyers Rene Cassin and Pierre
Teitgen are among the most influential founding fa¬
thers . "733
The comparative problem led us to revisit the distinction
between inquisitorial and adversarial procedures. It may
be objected that the distinction is today deceptive, on
grounds that there are gladiatorial elements in the
procedural law of a civilian country and the opposite
observation can be made equally in the common law world.
A caricature of what are inquisitorial or adversarial
proceedings will certainly be of no help. Nonetheless,
where the principles underpinning a legal institution
point in one or the other direction, these tendencies
have an effect on the outcomes. Admittedly, "each system
of criminal justice is driven to compromise
principles"734, but since compromises can be made up of
different combinations of principles, it is possible to
733Jochen A. Frowein, "The ECHR and the Public Order of Europe", in: Andrew Clapham
and Frank Emmert (eds.), Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law: 1990. Vol. I
Book 2. (1992), 286, footnote 66. See, also, Chapter 4 of this dissertation.
73 4Abraham S. Goldstein and Martin Marcus, 'The Myth of Judicial Supervision in Three
"Inquisitorial" Systems: France, Italy and Germany", (1977-1978) 87 The Yale Law Journal
240, 283.
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detect leanings towards one tendency or the other in
concrete situations. Some national institutions have to
yield ground to the Convention requirements in order to
safeguard a Convention-protected freedom.
The adversarial spirit of some parts of the ECHR cannot
work easily with some civilian institutions. Take the
specific por reproducida (as reproduced) procedure in the
case Barbera, Messegue and Jabardo v. Spain.135 At a
hearing before a Spanish trial court 1,600 pages of the
file of the investigation were considered as having been
read out in court while in fact they were not although
they were admitted as evidence. The three applicants,
allegedly members of a Catalan separatist organisation,
were convicted by the Audiencia Nacional of the murder of
a businessman, a Mr. Buito. The respondent government
deployed a civilian argument to justify the por
reproducida procedure: that criminal procedure in Spain
is not concentrated in one single trial hearing as in a
common law jurisdiction. It is clear that the Spanish
government and Article 6 ECHR were speaking different
"languages" of criminal procedure. Article 6 (1) ECHR
implies openness, publicity and equality of the parties
to a case.
The Spanish procedure plainly clashed with the
requirements of due process of Article 6 ECHR in the
European Court's view. For the majority the adversarial
requirements embodied in the "equality of arms" principle
had not been met. The Court736 found, inter alia, that
the trial had been too brief and important pieces of
evidence had not been discussed in the applicants'
presence and under public scrutiny. The por reproducida
procedure appeared as unfair and had to give up ground to
the safeguards of Article 6 ECHR:
735(1988) 11 EHRR 360.
736(1988) 11 EHRR 360, para 89.
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... According to the Court's established case law,
waiver of the exercise of a right guaranteed by the
Convention -in so far as it is permissible- must be
established in an unequivocal manner. While the use
of the por reproducida procedure showed that the
defence accepted that the contents of the file need
not be read out in public, it cannot be inferred from
this that it agreed not to challenge the said
contents even where the prosecution relied on them
...737
The joint concurring opinion of judges Lagergren, Pettiti
and Macdonald threw more light on the issue when they
pointed out that the Spanish Audiencia Nacional's
"judgment imposed heavy sentences on the applicants" but
"...contained no analysis of the evidence that had been
taken or of its connection with the facts deemed to have
been established..." The issue should be connected to
the fact that two judges at the Spanish Audiencia
Nacional had been substituted at short notice, so the
defence lawyer had grounds for fearing that the new
judges would be unfamiliar with the 1,600 pages of the
investigation file which could raise reasons for concern
in view of the system of evaluation of evidence used in
Spain, where the government alleged that "...short
reasoning was now common practice in systems based on the
judge's personal belief, such as Spain's..." The eight
dissenting judges738, however, adopted an approach closer
to the civilian procedural tradition and thought that
this case was about a matter of procedural expediency and
therefore, the Spanish procedure was not out of step with
the ECHR. They based their dissent on three points: (a)
they did not consider that all the documents in a trial
should be communicated to the public; (b) the public in
this case had free access to the courtroom and (c) the
public had the opportunity to hear the defence consent to
the use of the por reproducida procedure.
737(1988) 11 EHRR 360, para. 82.
738(1988) 11 EHRR 360, dissenting opinion by Judge Bindschedler-Robert et at.
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Take another case. The comparative problem is similar as
it concerned a national practice grounded on assumptions
incompatible with those of the ECHR. In the
Unterpertinger739 case proof was based exclusively on
statements of witnesses made to the police in writing.
The European Court decided that this was in breach of the
defendant's rights to cross-examine them. Yet this
practice is common in most civilian systems. Cross-
examination is essentially alien to an inquisitorial
tradition where the accent is placed on the written
procedure.
Consider, for example, Kostovski v. the Netherlands.740
The applicant was convicted of armed robbery only on the
basis of sworn statements by two anonymous witnesses.
Although in a civilian jurisdiction the defence lawyer
may call witnesses, the court itself will do the
questioning, because witnesses are usually witnesses tout
court. As far as Article 6 (1) ECHR is concerned, there
are witnesses for the defence and the prosecution,
however, and a defendant is always entitled to cross-
examine them. To defend its position, the Dutch
government argued that although there was no strict
compliance with Article 6 ECHR, any anomalies were
justified by the express or implied limitations laid down
in paragraph 3.741 The test of the Court was to ask
whether the deviation from the ECHR standards had
affected the applicant's right to a fair trial paragraph
1 of the same article. The answer was in the affir¬
mative. The applicant had not had sufficient opportunity
to exercise his rights with respect to the anonymous
739(1991) 13 EHRR 175.
740(199O) 12 EHRR 434.
741Article 6 (3) (d) ECHR: (...) Everyone charged with an offence has the following minimum
rights: (...) to examine or have examined witnesses against him and to obtain the
attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions as
witnesses against him; (...)
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witnesses. As the Court had established in the
Unterpentiger v. Austria142, "... an accused should be
given adequate and proper opportunity to challenge and
question a witness against him, either at the time the
witness was making his statement or at some later stage
of the proceedings."743
Judgment was passed against the defendant governments in
all these cases. Writing in 1991, H. F. M. Crombag744
reported that after Kostovski the Dutch authorities did
no more than patching up the status quo.745 Some
practices and traditions are very ingrained in a legal
system and change may be resisted. The situation may
incidentally justify the conclusion that "transplants" if
not "rejected" may at least take time to "grow".
The pattern in the case law shows "sideways" transplants
between the legal traditions performed by means of the
comparative method. Nonetheless, although there is a
promotion of harmonisation and approximation of the legal
systems of the member states, the powers of the
Convention in that direction are relatively weak;
therefore divergencies continue. The European Court is
apparently not moving towards a single "European" system
but slowly trying to set down limits for the member
states.746 The transfers of values between the legal
traditions work both ways. For example, in Kostovski the
European Court rejected the government's arguments asking
74 2(1991) 13 EHRR 175.
743(1990) 12 EHRR 434, para. 41.
744Hans F. M. Crombag, "On the Europeanisation of Criminal Procedure" in Bruno de Witte
and Caroline Forder (eds.), The common law of Europe and the future of legal education
(1992), 410.
745Among the manoeuvres, H. F. M. Crombag mentions the apparent defence of the status
quo by the recommendations of a committee appointed by the Minister of Justice and also
the arguments of the Advocate-General before the Dutch Supreme Court suggesting the
use of anonymous witnesses by the police and thus almost ignoring the meaning of
Kostovski altogether.
746Colin Warbrick, "The European Convention on Human Rights", (1989) 9 YEL 385, 411.
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sympathy for an inquisitorial process, and in Brogan,747
it did not accept the British government's argument that
it had not been sympathetic enough to the special
requirements of an adversarial system.
Conclusions
The purpose of the chapter was to carry out a review of
European Court cases applying the comparative method as a
tool of study. A comparative test, therefore, based on
"differentiating factors" was used to make the common law
and civilian elements present in the interpretation of
Convention law visible in individual European Court deci¬
sions. (This method will be applied in the next two
chapters as well.) The comparative problems were studied
in the following areas: in the general structure of the
legal system of the respondent member state (considering
the legal sources and their handling and the cases where
the legal system per se is affecting the human rights of
the individuals), in the procedural law and linked to the
procedural approaches, the rules of evidence. On some
occasions the comparative problem appeared as an
intricate question of domestic law which the Court had to
decide and, if possible, make provisions for a remedy, as
in the vagrancy cases. In several occasions, a country's
answer to a legal question headed for a collision with a
requirement of the ECHR inspired by a different legal
tradition.
With regard to the transferability of standards, it is
apparently easier for the Court to treat member states
equally if working at a high level of abstraction, such
as the concept of "law" which covers both written and
unwritten sources. Sometimes, however, the Court could
747To be discussed in the next chapter.
- 279 -
not transfer standards, such as in the case of some
detailed administrative features of a legal system. The
contrast therefore is between the possibility of
identifying principles at the highest level of
abstraction and fundamental differences between
administrative practices in the member states.748 This is
what happened in the cases of concerning the
transsexuals, where the legal systems of the member
states in the end were instrumental in determining
conflicting answers in Strasbourg.
The process of decision making is also affected by other
differences between the member states, for example
considerations of policy, the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation, the weak harmonisation powers in Convention
law and so on,749 which altogether sometimes manage to
overwhelm the harmonising intentions of the Strasbourg
institutions.750 Although now and then the rulings of the
Court fail to spur the desirable reforms in the domestic
jurisdictions, the Convention institutions have been
setting down markers for the behaviour of the member
states and their cumulative effect may have a harmonising
effect in the long run.
748Cees Flinterman, "European Legal Education in the Future: Some Concluding
Observations" in Bruno de Witte and Caroline Forder (eds.), The common law of Europe
and the future of Legal Education. (1992), 115.
749Topics dealt with in Chapter 7.
750More cases dealing with national law institutions rooted in a tradition incompatible with
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This chapter should be seen as a continuation of the
comparative analysis started off in the previous one. As
was the case there, here again we should keep in mind the
idea that despite the convergences between the legal
families and the legal systems, very important
differences persist which have a considerable impact on
the interpretation of the European Convention.
The majority of the cases taken into consideration deal
with procedural institutions or practices which are
peculiar to a legal system or to a family of legal
systems. The points of divergence will appear as
incompatibilities between the assumptions on which these
institutions or practices are based and the underpinnings
of a particular section of the ECHR. Although most of
the institutions discussed are from civilian legal
systems, the study of disagreements between common law
institutions and the ECHR are not excluded.
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4. Institutions particular to the legal system of
a member state
In this context, the word "institution" refers to a legal
concept, principle, rule, doctrine or organ which is
peculiar to a legal order or tradition. A high
proportion of Strasbourg work is devoted to the tensions
between the characteristic approaches of a legal
tradition - as they appear in the underpinnings of an
"institution" - running into an ECHR which is not
"neutral." For example, the common law inspired751
section I of the ECHR clashes with some civilian
institutions such as aspects of the Ministere Public, the
submission of a draft ("croquis") of the decision by the
Prosecutor to the court or the use of one single "file"
with all the written proceedings in a case.
Interestingly enough, and giving further evidence of the
"mixed" nature of Strasbourg law, a similar tension has
been reported in other "mixed" or "bicultural"
jurisdictions, such as Louisiana and Quebec. Cases taken
to their respective federal Supreme Courts raise the
issue of one tradition imposing its standards on the
other, as cases coming from the "different" (civilian)
tradition may not stand many chances of "survival" in a
court dominated by the values of the common law. In
Canada, a high percentage of reversals in Charter of
Rights cases in appeals to the Supreme Court from the
Quebec Court of Appeal, may be attributed to reasons
which may be "(...) unclear, but may be linked to the
civil law training and orientation of the judges on the
Quebec Court of Appeal as opposed to the common law ori¬
entation of the majority of Supreme Court of Canada
7 51Judge Zekia's dissenting opinion in Wemhoff v. Federal Republic of Germany (1979-
1980) 1 EHRR 55, para. [16] and Stefan Trechsel, "The Right to Liberty and Security of the
Person - Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights in the Strasbourg Case-
Law", (1980) 1 HRLJ 88, 89.
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Justices."752 Moreover, a similar observation was made as
regards Louisiana. H. J. Abraham753 wrote that "(...) it
is interesting to note that more statutes of the State of
Louisiana have been declared unconstitutional than those
of any other state, Louisiana being the only one of the
fifty to employ civil law as its judicial [sic.] system."
On the other hand, the Strasbourg system, as has been
said of the legal system of Louisiana,754 is a laboratory
for discovering whether the different methodologies of
the traditions produce different substantive outcomes and
offers the opportunity to examine the role of the form of
a legal system in shaping the law.
Let us look at whether some civilian institutions could
be considered "fair" if they are tested according to
common law concepts. Articles 5 and 6 ECHR are liable to
stress procedural fairness over the civilian ideal of
finding out the actual truth and therefore relegating the
role of fairness as a limit on the means of investigation
rather than an aim in itself.755 These divergent
assumptions of the traditions lead to other differences,
such as the diverse types of public prosecution systems
or the role of the police in the different member states.
Those dissimilarities are an obstacle for the
establishment of a uniform system of criminal justice in
Europe. For now, the only harmonised element appears to
consist of some principles used by the Court as a bench
mark, and some civilian institutions have been failing
the test.
752F. L. Morton, Peter H. Russell, and Michael J. Withey, "The Supreme Court's First One
Hundred Charter of Rights Decisions: A Statistical Analysis", (1992) 30 Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 1,19.
753Henry Julian Abraham, The Judicial Process: An Introductory Analysis of the Courts of
the United States. England and France. (1986), 293.
754Kenneth M. Murchison, "The Judicial Revival of Louisiana's Civilian Tradition: A
Surprising Triumph for the American Influence", (1988-1989) 49 La. L. Rev. 1, 34.
755Stefan Trechsel, 'The Right to Liberty and Security of the Person - Article 5 of the
European Convention on Human Rights in the Strasbourg Case-Law", (1980) 1 HRLJ 88,
90.
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4.1. The Ministere Public:
It is often asserted that the presence of a public
official in charge of initiating and conducting
prosecutions is the hallmark of an inquisitorial legal
system. National differences are significant.
Prosecutors enjoy various degrees of discretion in
different systems, from very little in a system guided by
the principle of legality like the German or the
Italian756 to a very wide one in England and Wales where
in principle there is no state monopoly on prosecution.
In England, the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) was
created to replace the jury of indictment but its role is
very different from a continental procureur:
From the twelfth till the twentieth century the jury
of indictment operated continuously in England, but
in 1933 it was abolished. Its place was not taken
by some continental-style crown-procurator, however,
but instead a different and rather remarkable
novelty was introduced, the Director of Public
Prosecutions. He was indeed an official of the
state, who had to decide, on the basis of material
provided by the police, whether to prosecute or not
-a role comparable to that of the procureur- but
unlike the latter, he did not appear in court, did
not plead there against the accused or request the
latter's condemnation. This task was left to a
barrister, an advocate who for a fee would undertake
to plead for the crown against the accused just as
on another day he might accept the defence of a
suspect. Barristers were members of the bar and not
state officials (although some might come to
specialise in prosecution work). So much for the
absence of a Ministere Public in England.757
Several criminal law systems grounded on an adversarial
philosophy have adopted public prosecutors, though, such
as Scotland, and outside the Council of Europe system,
Canada and the United States. The Scottish prosecutors,
756Susan R. Moody and Jacqueline Tombs, Prosecution in the Public Interest. (1982), 13.
757R. C. van Caenegem, Judges. Legislators and Professors: Chapters in European Legal
History. (Goodhart Lectures 1984-1985), (1987), 35.
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like their continental counterparts, have a duty to
disclose any facts favourable to the accused ignored by
the defence.
This brings us to the question whether an "inquisitorial"
institution such as the Ministere Public of many civilian
countries, for example Belgium or others that borrowed
French institutions, can comply with the guidelines of
the ECHR. Although Strasbourg accepts that a fair trial
can be achieved in several ways, there are nevertheless
certain basic tenets laid down in the ECHR that seem to
be absent from the law of some member states. Let us
look at the issue in the cases Delcourt and Borgers where
the role of the Avocat General before the Belgian Court
of Cassation was discussed.
In Belgian law, the main function of the Avocat General
is to act as an independent adviser to the court and make
recommendations as to the outcome to the case. This
official is part of the Procureur General's department
within the Ministere Public. In the two cases mentioned,
the difficulty with this institution in relation to the
ECHR was the presence of those officials758 during the
(domestic) courts' secret deliberations while the private
parties and their attorneys were excluded. The problem
was, therefore, that such national practice cast doubts
on the availability of the due process of law to criminal
defendants. This situation was especially worrying in
criminal cases where the government was also a party to
the litigation. In contrast, the legal idea behind the
ECHR was very different. The Convention required that
both parties have a comparable opportunity to explain
their respective positions; the ECHR's "ideal" system was
one where the judge was an umpire and the prosecution an
758The function of the government lawyers appearing for the Ministere Public are to
prosecute criminal proceedings and other actions to which the government is a party, and in
addition, they can step in any other litigation to represent the public interest.
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adversary to the criminal defendant. Neither the
(national) judges nor the Ministere Public fulfilled
those roles in these cases.
In Delcourt v. Belgium159, the applicant was convicted and
sentenced for fraud and forgery, when the case reached
the Court of Cassation, the opening hearing was attended
by Delcourt himself and the representative of the
Ministere Public160, whose recommendation to reject the
appeal was accepted. On these grounds, Mr. Delcourt
lodged an application with the European Commission
claiming a violation of the "equality of arms" in
December, 1965. The Commission declared the application
admissible as it had accepted the complainant's belief
that the recommendation made by the representative of the
Ministere Public at the opening hearing had made him the
applicant's opponent.
The best ruling from Mr. Delcourt's point of view would
have been a declaration that Belgian criminal procedure
was in breach of the ECHR in this matter but the judges
ruled unanimously that it was not. The European Court
agreed with the root idea put forth by the government and
the finding was somewhat disappointing if seen through
the model of criminal procedure supported by Article 6
ECHR: a distinction drawn between the appearances and the
underlying principle enabled the Court to find that even
if the appearances were incompatible with the "shared"
law of Europe, the underlying principle was nevertheless
congruent with the ECHR.761 The Court seemed to have
taken the civil law view that a (criminal) legal pro¬
cedure is an inquiry into the (material) truth performed
by a nonpartisan and rational adjudicator. The stress
placed on finding the "truth" outbalanced in their view
7 5 9(1979-80) 1 EHRR 355.
760The official in this case was a member of the Procureur generals department.
761W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, "Reliance, in the Case-law of the European Court of
Human Rights, on the Domestic Law of the States", (1980) 1 HRLJ 13, 24.
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the formal parity in the standing of the parties, as
required by a fair trial in the common law world.
For the European Court in Delcourt the Ministere Public
was an independent official attached to a court as an
assistant and adviser, and obviously impressed by the
pedigree of the institution, it went on:
...the system now challenged dates back for more than
a century and a half. While it is true that the long
standing of a national legal rule cannot justify a
failure to comply with the present requirements of
international law, it may under certain conditions
provide supporting evidence that there has been no
such failure...
The solution was criticised in several scholarly writings
with comments along the lines of the following: "from
Delcourt a feeling can develop that controls provided by
the Human Rights Convention remain on paper when certain
"vested interests" are affected".762 It can be observed
that most of the Strasbourg judges were appointed from
what it has been termed "secrecy" countries, where
constitutional review of legislation by the courts had
not been instituted or where, under the current
procedural practices, there were no concurring and
dissenting opinions attached to the judgments.763 Those
elements may have also played an unacknowledged role in
the way the issue was eventually decided.764
Added to all this, the Court did not give a direct answer
to the question whether or not the Ministere Public was a
party pursuing the interests of the government and if so,
whether the official actually was the criminal
762Kurt H Nadelmann, Due Process of Law before the European Court of Human Rights:
the Secret Deliberation. (1972) 66 AJIL 509, 524.
763Kurt H. Nadelmann, id., 524.
7 64This issue is further developed in Chapter 10.
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defendant's opponent.765 The question was answered in
Borgers.
In Borgers, Strasbourg understood that the Ministere
Public's intervention affected the applicant's position
in the domestic trial, since he "becomes objectively
speaking his ally or his opponent".766 A violation of
Article 6 (1) ECHR followed because Mr. Borgers could not
respond to the submissions of the Ministere Public made
behind closed doors. On June 16, 1981, Mr. Borgers had
appeared before the Antwerp Court of Appeal accused with
forgery and the use of forged documents. He was fined
and sentenced to six months' imprisonment but his
conviction was suspended. Later the decision was quashed
by the Court of Cassation and the case was remitted to
the Ghent Court of Appeal for a new judgment. The court
in Ghent re-stated the sanctions set in Antwerp, but a
second appeal to the Court of Cassation failed.
Belgium, as in Delcourt, highlighted the respect for
diversity of approaches: there were several different
legal systems in Europe and their respective legal
features were no reason to condemn them. This argument
was, nonetheless, counterbalanced by the Europe-wide
requirements of a fair trial.
The main point of difference between the approaches of
the legal traditions in this case lies in their models of
criminal procedure. The Belgian practice, from a common
lawyer's perspective, seems an abnormality. Even the
Memorial767 to the European Court filed by Belgium
admitted that "The Belgian practice whereby the Public
Prosecutor's department may be present, in a consultative
765Kurt H. Nadelmann , op. cit., 513.
766(1993) 15 EHRR 92, para. 26. On this case, see also: A. Wauters, "L'arret Borgers de
la Cour europeenne des droits de I'homme", (1992) 69 Revue de droit international et de
droit compare 125.
767Cour (91) 4, 19.
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capacity at the deliberations of the Court of Cassation
may very well appear "unusual" or "unsatisfactory" to
lawyers from other legal systems, particularly common law
systems".768 From a civilian viewpoint, however, the
institution may not seem "unusual", especially if it is
surrounded by guarantees and practices which arguably
help to maintain the independence of the judges and the
Ministere's officials. Judge Martens' dissenting opinion
explained that the Procureur system was shared by a
family of legal systems, and the European Court was
dealing with its "Belgian variant." He also pointed out
that the overruling of Delcourt "may affect the
proceedings before the highest courts in several other
member States"769 making an allusion to the fact that the
institution under scrutiny was also a part of a legal
tradition. His rehearsal of the practices of the
Ministere Public in French, Italian and Dutch law could
also be understood as an elaboration in that direction.
On the other hand, it can be conjectured that because of
his expertise on the institution of the cassation770 and
the role of the Ministere Public as an "adjunct" or as an
"extraordinary member" of the Court of Cassation,771 he
was inclined to support the fairness of the practice
despite the appearances seemingly pointing in the other
direction. He wrote:
I am familiar both with the appeal on points of law
system and with the institution of the procureur
general at a Court of Cassation. In my opinion the
Belgian -and to a lesser degree the French variant
of this system- is unfortunate. Since it only
secures the benefits it implies when the procureur
general and the court of cassation keep their
distance from each other: this confers a greater
freedom on both -the procureur general to propose
new solutions and, if he thinks fit, to criticise
768Colin Warbrick, from a common lawyers' perspective, said : "It does!" in Colin Warbrick
"The European Convention on Human Rights", (1991) 11 YEL , 566.
769(1993) 15 EHRR 92, Judge Martens' dissenting opinion, para. 1.1.
770Judge S. K. Martens is also a judge at the Hoge Raad, the Dutch Supreme Court of
Cassation.
771(1993) 15 EHRR 92, Judge Martens'dissenting opinion, para. 2.4.
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the case-law- the court to disagree. However, there
are considerations of procedural expediency. I
cannot help feeling that it is disproportionate to
hold that the Belgian variant violates the very
basic principles of fair procedure referred to in
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.772
Finally, his appeal to the European Court to pass
judgments "that also convince those who are familiar with
the procedural traditions of the respondent government"773
highlighted once more the tension, running through all
the human rights systems, between the diversity of
approaches versus harmonised practices and the creation
of a European jurisprudence which can be shared by all
the member states.
When the Court took the view that Mr. Borgers, however,
had not had a fair trial, it was distancing itself from
the substance of the institution and even its history in
order to uphold a uniform approach of procedural fairness
for all of Europe. Appearances were very important for
the Court and the Ministere Public did not appear
neutral, independent or impartial. In the words of the
Court:
... Nevertheless the opinion of the procureur
general's department cannot be regarded as neutral
from the point of view of the parties to the
cassation proceedings. By recommending that an
accused's appeal be allowed or dismissed, the
official of the procureur general's department
becomes objectively speaking his ally or his
opponent. In the latter event, Article 6 § 1
requires that the rights of the defence and the
principle of the equality of arms be respected774
In doing so, did the Court impose the outlook of the
common law embodied in Article 6 ECHR on that of the
civil law? In taking this position, the judges adopted
772(1993) 15 EHRR 92, Judge Martens'dissenting opinion, para. 4.6.
773(1993) 15 EHRR 92, Judge Martens'dissenting opinion, para. 4.6.
774(1993) 15 EHRR 92, para. 26.
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an approach similar to the adversarial ideal of the
common law tradition. Under this light, Mr. Borgers and
the representative of the Ministere Public had not been
comparable contenders. Contests must be played fairly,
and the essential feature of fair play is the formal775
equality of the contestants. In a "battle" the parties
try to score points off each other because one can win at
the expense of the other. The representative of the
Ministere Public no doubt had a particular interest in
having his view of the law (this was a cassation
procedure) accepted by the Court of Cassation and
therefore, it would be hardly surprising if he had
strongly argued his case in the secret deliberations.
The Ministere Public's advocacy in the absence of his
opponent gave him the edge over the criminal defendant's
position and might have indeed given the proceedings the
appearance of a parody of a fair and public hearing.776
The European Court's attitude meant that a civilian
practice was measured with a common law inspired
conception of "due process" through the application of
the ECHR. The adopted position was similar to the three-
pronged benchmark of a satisfactory judicial trial in the
common law world: the openness of the courts, the right
to be heard, and the impartiality of the judge. These
elements are usually summarised in the often quoted
maxim777 that justice must not only be done, it must be
seen to be done. It is suggested that, as time passes
and the concept of a fair trial undergoes "a considerable
evolution in the Court's case-law"778 the European Court
feels in a stronger position to review member states'
actions, and if need be, by transplanting standards.
775H. F. M. Crombag, "On the Europeanisation of Criminal Procedure" in: Bruno de Witte
and Caroline Forder (eds.1 The common law of Europe and the future of legal education.
(1992), 399.
776Kurt H Nadelmann, op. cit. 509.
777P. S. Atiyah, Law and Modern Society. (1983), 43.
778(1993) 15 EHRR 92, para. 26.
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4.3. Austrian croguis
Among the considerably varied approaches to criminal
procedure of the member states, there is another angle of
the figure of the Prosecutor in a civil law country that
runs into the ECHR Europe-wide notion of a fair trial:
the submission of a proposal ("croguis") of the decision
that in the Prosecutor's view the court should adopt. As
was the case in Belgium with the withdrawal of the
Ministere Public to deliberate with the judges behind
closed doors, the submission of an outline of the
decision made the position of the Prosecutor quite
ambiguous in Austrian law. It put a question mark on the
due process of law, as far as the appearances were
concerned, because on the one hand, the Prosecutor was
the criminal defendant's opponent but on the other, he
was being invited to participate in reaching a decision,
which should be the reserve of the judges.
In Brandstetter v. Austria, then, the difficulty for the
European Court involved more than a mere disagreement on
the interpretation of legal rules. The question arose
out of the different tenets of a member state legal
system and those of the ECHR. The case involved three
applications concerning Article 6 ECHR. Mr. Brandstetter
was convicted of adulterating wine, of tampering with
evidence and of libelling a witness in the course of
judicial proceedings. The European Court treated each
suit individually and found no breaches of the ECHR
except as regards the handling of the defamation charge
before the Austrian court. The applicant claimed that he
had not had an opportunity to comment on the written
observations submitted by the Prosecutor to the court
("croguis"). The government argued that the submissions
had been filed according to a standing practice which
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must have been known to the applicant's lawyer who,
accordingly, could have asked whether a croquis had been
filed in the applicant's case. If so, he could have
requested leave to inspect the file under section 82 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure and thus could have made
comments on it.779 According to the European Court,
Section 82 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure did
not "seem to grant an unconditional right to inspect the
complete file but only the possibility to ask for leave
to do so"780 and consequently, it apparently sanctioned an
inequality between the parties. The European Court also
pointed out that the parties to the case differed as to
whether the "leave would have been granted at the
relevant time." In addition, as regards this defamation
charge, the domestic judgment was almost a verbatim copy
of the (unchallenged) Prosecutor's submissions to the
court.
The key point of conflict between the traditions was the
notion of "fairness". The Austrian procedure was on a
collision course with the notion of a fair trial born of
the common law which was subscribed by the European
Court. There had been no evenness between the parties
before the domestic judge, since the defence should have
had a right to be informed of the submissions so that
both could have had the same opportunity to make comments
on each other's observations and evidence. The Austrian
practice exposed itself as an example of fairness
resorted to only as a limit on the means of
investigation781 and as such, it could not satisfy the
Convention-based requirements. The European Court said
that it was "indirect and purely hypothetical"782 that the
appellants could have been aware of the filing of the
779(1993) 15 EHRR 378, para. 64.
780(1993) 15 EHRR 378, para. 64.
781Trechsel, Stefan, id. 91.
782(1993) 15 EHRR 378, para. 68.
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submissions and on that account, it found a breach of the
ECHR. In the Court's view, the possibility of making
comments on the arguments of the Prosecution by filing an
appeal to the Supreme Court did not make up for the right
to examine and reply directly, in truly adversarial
fashion, as soon as those submissions were made. As in
the judgment in Borgers, the European Court's yardstick
followed a common law guiding principle which required
further openness of the courts, a stronger right to be
heard, and a more apparent impartiality of the bench than
the provisions in Austrian law and practice had made
possible.
4.4. Pre-trial detention
As already discussed, the keynote of the clash between
the traditions often lies in the contrast between some
institutions and the requirements of the ECHR. The
application of the ECHR generates "sideways" transplants
between the legal systems as many institutions are being
checked for compliance by resorting to standards and
values more in line with other legal traditions. It is
misleading to conclude hastily, however, that it is only
the civilian institutions that face such dilemmas. Other
differences between the legal systems have repercussions
on the attempts at implementing the Convention in a
uniform way throughout Europe: there are also fault-lines
between the common law and the requirements of the ECHR.
Brogan is an example. It concerned, among other things,
the period of detention in the United Kingdom under
emergency legislation before a suspect was brought before
a court. The relevance of affording protection to a
person's rights lies in the highest risks of being
interrogated by unlawful means in this particular period
- 294 -
of detention.783 The issue that interest us was whether
the legal system of the respondent government was capable
of accommodating an element of judicial control over
detentions made under Section 12 of the Prevention of
Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 (hereafter, the
PTA) .
It is convenient at this point to mention the length of
the detention concerning the four applicants: McFadden,
Tracey, Brogan and Coyle were released after 4 days and 6
hours, 4 days and 11 hours, 5 days and 11 hours and 6
days and 161/2 hours respectively without having been
brought before a judge or indeed charged with any
offences. In England or Scotland, periods spent by
persons in normal pre-trial procedures (not under anti¬
terrorism laws) will probably not breach the ECHR because
they are much shorter than detention on remand in civil
law systems, where pre-trial procedures are more
inquisitorial.784 A long detention on remand may breach
Article 5 (3) ECHR but very harsh sentencing will not.
In Brogan, Strasbourg did not consider just the length of
the detention but linked the issue to whether there was
judicial control and therefore, found that the period of
detention in all four cases had breached Article 5 (3)
ECHR. Generally speaking, detentions on remand on the
Continent are subject to judicial supervision in the
hands of an investigative judge.
The European Court tried to make clear in the judgment
that it was aware of the particular demands of the fight
against terrorism in Northern Ireland. Article 5 ECHR
does not contain qualifying clauses protective of the
783Frangoise Hampson, "The United Kingdom before the European Court of Human
Rights", (1989) 9 YEL 121, 155.
784T. C. Daintith and A. B. Wilkinson, "Bail and the Convention: British Reflections on the
Wemhoff and Neumeister Cases", (1970) 18 AJCL 237, 237.
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reason of state as those included in other articles785
which concern the need to give a wider margin of
appreciation to the respondent government when the
interference complained of can be justified in a
democratic society. In spite of this, the European Court
tried to bring some flexibility into the adjudication
process through the doctrine of the margin of
appreciation:
The Court accepts that, subject to the existence of
adequate safeguards, the context of terrorism in
Northern Ireland has the effect of prolonging the
period during which the authorities may, without
violating Article 5 (3), keep a person suspected of
serious terrorist offences in custody before
bringing him before a judge or other judicial
officer.786
The key issue of difference between the legal reasoning
of the Court and the system of the respondent government
was that none of the safeguards available in domestic law
were judicial. Under the PTA, police requests for an
extension of detention were referred to the Secretary of
State and scrutinised by a Minister. Legislative control
was provided by Parliament, who monitored the need for
the continuation of the special powers under the PTA. In
addition, the operation of the system was reviewed
periodically by independent personalities.787 The system
as it stood might have been capable of controlling, for
example, the observance by the authorities of the
formalities of an arrest, but there was no control over
the substantive reasons of the suspicion against the
accused. The Court's majority and the Commission's
minority required judicial scrutiny of the powers given
by the PTA all the time.788 It is possible to speculate
785For example, Articles 8, 9, 10, 11 ECHR and 1 of Protocol 1, 2 of Protocol 4 and 1 of
Protocol 7.
786(1989) 11 EHRR 117, para. 61.
787(1989) 11 EHRR 117, para. 61.
788Stephen Livingstone, "A week is a Long Time in Detention: Brogan and Others v United
Kingdom", (1989)40 NILQ 288,295.
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that Strasbourg had in mind a civilian model of how to
carry out the substantive control at this point.
Although the judgment did not say so, the judicial
control requirements of the European Court might have
been easier to set up in a civil law environment where
the investigative judge carries out the investigation and
protects the suspects' rights at the same time. This is
not so in the United Kingdom, where these functions are
divided between the police and the defence lawyers. The
government made this distinction appear as a notion so
fundamental and ingrained in the legal system that it
could not be changed. Following the civilian idea,
Strasbourg found that the respondent government failed to
comply with those requirements so it overstepped its
margin of appreciation:
Judicial control of interferences by the executive
with the individual's right to liberty is an
essential feature of the guarantee embodied in
Article 5 (3), which is intended to minimise the
risk of arbitrariness. Judicial control is implied
by the rule of law, 'one of the fundamental
principles of a democratic society ..., which is
expressly referred to in the Preamble to the
Convention' and 'from which the whole Convention
draws its inspiration'.789
To understand the assumptions behind the idea of control
suggested by the European Court a brief background
reference to some differences in the organisation of the
police forces may be helpful. There is a split of the
traditions over the different models of organisation and
functions and in each country this touches upon beliefs
on how to conduct (criminal) proceedings and also deep-
seated notions of what is good administration. For
example, in France,790 the same police forces are called
differently according to the two distinct functions they
perform: the police administrative and the police
789(1989) 11 EHRR 117, para. 58.
790L. H. Levinson, "Enforcement of Administrative Decisions in the United States and in
France", (1974) 23 Emory L.J. 11, 14.
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judiciaire. The administrative functions involve
preventive or remedial measures while the judicial
functions are those concerning the investigation,
apprehension and prosecution of suspects. Judicial
control is provided by the judicial (and not the
administrative) system of courts, which has jurisdiction
over the performance of the judicial duties of the
police, although the police forces, as an organ, are
considered to be an administrative body.
Such division of functions is unknown in Scotland. The
police make no prosecuting decisions and report cases to
the procurator-fiscal, who may refer a case to the Crown
Office for the decision of an Advocate-Depute or a Law
Officer. Prosecution policies are set down by the Lord
Advocate and are binding on all procurators-fiscal. The
Lord Advocate is responsible for almost all criminal
proceedings, assisted by the Solicitor-General for
Scotland and a number of Advocates-Depute (practising
advocates retained to act for the Crown). There is no
such thing as an investigative judge to carry out the
duty of control. Although in law a private citizen with
a personal and special interest in the case may
prosecute, private prosecutions are infrequent. In such
case, permission must be sought first from the High Court
of Justiciary.791
In England and Wales, another system with no
investigative magistrates, in principle citizens may
prosecute unless this has been excluded by statute. In
practice, however, criminal prosecutions are brought by
the police, government departments (e.g. revenue
departments for tax offences) or local authorities.
Certain prosecutions need the consent of the Attorney-
General (e.g. some offences under the Official Secrets
791E. C. S. Wade and A. W. Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law. (1993), 404.
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Act). The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), who
controls the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS), is
appointed by the Attorney-General to work under his
general supervision. The DPP appoints a Chief Crown
Prosecutor to supervise the CPS in geographical areas and
the Crown Prosecutors, barristers or solicitors to
conduct proceedings. The CPS conducts all proceedings
instituted by the police, makes the decision to institute
proceedings in difficult or important cases and advises
the police on issues related to criminal offences.
Although the DPP can take over the prosecution started by
someone else, he/she cannot stop it. Occasionally, a
case can be taken over, no evidence offered and therefore
an acquittal will automatically follow. The Attorney-
General can (rarely) stop prosecutions by issuing a nolle
prosequi. Abuse of the power would be subject to
criticism in Parliament but may not be reviewed by the
courts.792
Let us consider now the arguments of the respondent
government on the issue of judicial supervision of
detention under the PTA. Once arrested, the accused
could be detained for up to 48 hours and then for up to a
further 5 days with the consent of the Home Secretary.
There was no absolute right to legal advice until after
48 hours and in addition, the right to have someone
informed of the arrest could be delayed beyond this
period.
The arguments of the respondent government carried with
them values that the European Court did not share. If
judges had to authorise the extension of detention beyond
48 hours, this argument went, the court would have to sit
behind closed doors and neither the detained person nor
his lawyer could be present or informed of the details,
792E. C. S. Wade and A. W. Bradley, op. cit., 402.
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"This would require a fundamental and undesirable change
in the law and procedure of the United Kingdom under
which an individual who is deprived of his liberty is
entitled to be represented by his legal advisers at any
proceedings before a court relating to his detention"793.
It would be an over-simplification to see the case as an
exclusive discussion of a "common law" versus a "civil
law" treatment of a point in law. The government was not
prepared to disclose the reasons for the detention to the
accused and counsel for fear, among other reasons, that
this might interfere with the investigation and
prosecution of acts of terrorism. Nonetheless, the
unwillingness of the British government to entrust a
judicial authority with the two functions of inquiring
into the matter of the detention and protecting the
rights of the accused show also the (common law)
assumptions guiding the government's reasoning and the
fact that a continental style of control was an "alien"
solution. In addition, we may also conclude that not all
of the assumptions underpinning Article 5 ECHR seem to be
common law inspired.
A respondent government might be inclined to derogate
rather than to put an end to expedient executive
practices, especially in cases of terrorism. Clearly
policy choices were operative in the legal reasoning of
the respondent government and the Court had to cope with
the effects of the defence of reason of state.794 At this
point, Judge Martens disagreed with his Strasbourg
brethren when he argued, perhaps from a position closer
to a "raison d'etat" approach, "that the Court should
respect the United Kingdom Government's choice and cannot
but hold that they did not overstep their margin of
793(1989) 11 EHRR 117, para. 56.
794Mireille Delmas-Marty, The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights.
International Protection versus National Restrictions. (1992). 2.
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appreciation".795 From our perspective of the tensions
between the legal traditions, two notions of criminal
procedure with all their different assumptions clashed
over the handling of the pre-trial proceedings. The
tension was not resolved as no harmonisation was
feasible, and eventually, the respondent government
entered a notice of derogation.796
In general, reasonable periods vary considerably across
the divide between the legal families. A detention will
become unlawful as soon as the reasonable suspicion
ceases to exist. The European Court approaches the issue
of reasonableness on a case by case basis, an attitude
strongly resisted by Judge Zekia in Wemhoff and
Neumeister. That judge disagreed with the use of
substantially different standards and said so in his
dissent in Wemhoff:
The Convention has aimed at setting a common
standard as to the right to liberty and safety of
persons or for the people living in the territories
of the member states of the Council of Europe. The
difference of standards therefore in such countries
cannot be substantially a great one.797
The other case worth considering as an example of the
tension between the legal traditions is Toth v. Austria.
Mr. Toth was arrested on January 11, 1985, and although
he was examined by an investigating judge less than
twelve hours later, his detention on remand lasted for
two years, one month and two days before a trial court
eventually convicted him. First of all, this case should
be seen as an illustration of the extensive powers of
detention of the investigative judge in a civilian
jurisdiction, which are in sharp contrast with the
795Fried van Hoof, "The Future of the European Convention on Human Rights. Judge
Martens' position on questions of construction: a dissenting opinion", (1989) 4
Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 451.
79tFrangoise Hampson, op. cit., 152.
797(1979-1980) 1 EHRR 55, dissenting opinion of Judge Zekia, para. [18],
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(normal) powers of the police in charge of an
investigation in the United Kingdom. The comparative
problem for the European Court was to apply the same
standards on the length of pre-trial detention under such
diverse legal orders. It is hardly surprising that
assimilation between the legal traditions could not be
achieved. Once again, the ideal of unity made manifest
in the creation of a jurisprudence which, to all intents
and purposes, could be shared by all of Europe, did not
appear as a workable solution vis-a-vis the differences
between the member states.
Mr. Toth complained that he had been denied a trial
within a reasonable time or release pending trial, but
the European Court found that the risk of repetition of
the offences and the danger of absconding justified the
refusal of release. The length of the proceedings,
however, could not be justified under the ECHR as they
could not be attributed either to the complexity of the
case or to the conduct of the applicant because his
appeals had not slowed down too much the examination of
the case.
The comparative problem for the European Court derived
from an oddity of the Austrian legal system which had
taken the civilian practice of keeping a "file" full of
written documents to the extreme of insisting on the use
of originals (and no copies) at all times. The delay,
therefore, was caused by shuttling this original file
around the prosecutor and judicial offices. The
investigation798 suffered considerably from such a burden
on occasion of each application for release or appeal
filed by Mr. Toth, or even requests from the
investigating judge or the prosecutor for an extension of
the detention. The European Court observed that the
7 "Wilson Finn.ie, op. cit., 307.
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rather odd practice produced "numerous interruptions
because the offices concerned relinquished the file,
sometimes for quite long periods, to their colleagues"799
and introducing the "European consensus" on the issue,
the Court could press the idea of uniform standards as it
pointed out that "...Preferred to the use of copies,
which is the practice in other member states of the
Council of Europe, such toing and froing of the file
occurred both before the indictment and after it."
The point was that the over-zealous Austrian practice had
affected the applicant's position in the trial. In
taking this point of view, the European Court followed
the common law ideal of adversarial proceedings. The
"equality of arms" had not been respected as a result of
those delays and Article 5 (4) ECHR had been violated.
The Court ruled unanimously on this matter:
In fact Mr. Toth did not have the opportunity to
challenge the reasons invoked to justify the
continuation of his detention. Any questions by the
Court of Appeal would have enabled the
representative of the prosecuting authority to put
forward his views; they could have prompted, on the
part of the accused, reactions warranting
consideration by the members of the court before
they reached their decision. As the proceedings did
not ensure equal treatment, they were not truly
adversarial800
As in Borgers the European Court's benchmark, based on
the ECHR, encompassed the common law ideal of adversarial
proceedings which requires further openness of the
courts, a more widespread right to a hearing, not to
mention a strong commitment to making clearly visible the
lack of bias of the bench.
799(1991) 14 EHRR 551, para. 77.
80°(1991) 14 EHRR 551, para. 84.
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4.5. Dutch Crown appeal
There are other institutions particular to a civilian
country, or to the continental tradition in general, that
cannot measure up to the common law inspired model of a
fair trial enshrined in the Convention. Take the Dutch
"Crown appeal"801 as an example. The Council of State
worked under the fiction (similar to the advisory
function of its French counterpart before the Law of May
24, 1872, was passed802) that it was merely advising the
head of state. The Council lacked the proper
jurisdiction of a court to pass judgment against the
administration. "Crown appeals" were heard by the
Administrative Litigation Division of the Council of
State, whose advice was almost always followed, but
decided by the Crown itself (de facto, a minister). This
was the crucial shortcoming that prevented the
institution from meeting the requirements of the ECHR.
This was also the comparative issue for the European
Court to resolve, as the institution appeared to allow
the executive to act as a judge in its own cause. In
reaching a decision the Court adopted an approach similar
to the common law ideal of openness.
Let us consider two cases. Benthem concerned an appeal
to the Crown against the grant of a licence for the the
supply of liquid petroleum gas (LPG) to motor vehicles in
a filling station. This was initially granted by the
municipal authorities but was revoked by the Crown after
a hearing before the Council of State in light of
stricter safety standards. As a result, the applicant
801Some central government departments used the Crown Appeal procedure very often in
areas such as environmental law to make local authorities follow the numerous guide-lines
and directives that kept coming out of the Department of Housing, Planning and the
Environment. Nico Verheij, "Dutch Administrative Law after Benthem's Case", [1990] PL
23, 24.
802|_. Neville Brown and J. F. Garner, French Administrative Law. (1983), 29.
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was required to cease operating his installation and went
bankrupt.
In Strasbourg, however, the advisory function of the
Council of State was found in breach of Article 6 (1)
ECHR: "a power of decision is inherent in the very notion
of "tribunal" within the meaning of the Convention."
Although the advice of the Council was "followed in the
great majority of cases" it was precisely its nature as
"only a practice of no binding force, from which the
Crown can depart at any moment" which made it fall short
of the Convention's standards.803 The yardstick resorted
to encompassed the common law ideal of adversarial
proceedings which requires openness, independence and
impartiality of the judge.804
Moreover, to highlight the common law principle of the
"importance of the appearances" the Court went on
criticising the ambiguity involved which compromised the
requirements of independence and impartiality necessary
in a fair trial, as follows:
... the Royal Decree by which the Crown, as head of
the executive, rendered its decision constituted,
from the formal point of view, and administrative
act and it emanated from a Minister who was
responsible to Parliament therefor. Moreover, the
Minister was the hierarchical superior of the
Regional Health Inspector, who had lodged the
appeal, and of the Ministry's Director General, who
had submitted the technical report to the Division805
To give effect to this judgment, an interim Act on Crown
Appeals was passed.806 After its expiration date, an
administrative division empowered to decide any
administrative appeal (instead of operating on the
803(1986) 8 EHRR 1, para. 40.
804(1986) 8 EHRR 1, para. 43.
805(1986) 8 EHRR 1, para. 43.
806jhe Act was passed on June 18, 1987, and came into force on January 1, 1988, with an
expiration date set for five years later.
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fiction of giving advice) would be created within the
Council of State, and similar chambers would be
introduced in regional courts.
After this judgment, the courts in the ordinary hierarchy
could review the lawfulness of an administrative decision
where an administrative appeal to a higher authority was
not considered to offer enough guarantees of a fair
procedure. The civil jurisdiction was excluded whenever
there was an administrative way of attaining a remedy and
a fair procedure.807
Finally, the "Crown Appeal" procedure was in dispute
again in Oerlemans. Mr. Oerlemans challenged the
designation of his land as a protected natural site
before the Council of State in November 1988, on grounds
that the designation would turn areas for pasturing
cattle into a wasteland. Among the reasons for the
dismissal of the appeal, the Crown said that Mr.
Oerlemans' use of the land for pasturing could be
continued without authorisation, in which case the
worries the applicant had expressed were unfounded. The
European Court did not find a violation of the ECHR
because the national courts had already responded to the
Strasbourg judgment in Benthem with a "getaway" clause
which allowed recourse to the civil system of courts, and
Mr. Oerlemans could have made use of it.808
Conelusions
Supranational supervision may help to bring about further
openness to the legal systems on both sides of the divide
between the traditions as the law of the ECHR,
interpreted under the common law inspired principle of a
807(42/1990/233/299), para. 31.
80 8(42/1990/233/299), para. 57.
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fair trial, can be more generous to the applicant than
the solutions offered in national law. The "civilian"
underpinnings of, for example, the Ministere Public, the
Austrian croquis and the Dutch Crown Appeal procedure,
were at loggerheads with Article 6 ECHR. These cases do
not necessarily mean that civilian countries, for
example, lack "open" proceedings as a matter of course.
The mix that may result, for example, from the Court's
operation and its insistence on the respect for the basic
tenets of a fair trial may bring further openness to the
proceedings in general. Similarly, T. Koopmans809
explained that a significant penetration of common law in
procedural matters in EU law has been taking place in the
past decade, especially with regard to the insistence on
the adversarial character of the proceedings.
No legal system is absolutely "pure." As is the case
with other courts, particularly in mixed or "bicultural"
jurisdictions,810 attempts at transplanting notions from
one legal culture to another in the process of decision
making may be resisted by all those who, for whichever
reason, aim at keeping the (unreachable) "purity" of a
legal tradition or allowing the member states to act
independently:
... attempts to impose a particular model, alien to
the legal culture of a Member State, are likely to
meet with minimalist adaptations of the existing law
to the alien imposition. This is not only a likely
response by the legal community guarding its
professional interests. It is also a functionally
correct response in the interest of preserving the
integrity of the existing system and shielding it
from the insertion of dysfunctional elements.
Reading article 6 of the European Convention on
human rights as prescribing a particular model of
809T. Koopmans, 'The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads of Legal Traditions",
(1991) AJCL 493,503.
810Such as for example, the concern over the inadequacy of the Canadian Supreme Court
as a court of last resort for appeals dealing with the civil law of Quebec. See, for example:
Peter H. Russell, The Supreme Court of Canada as a Bilingual and Bicultural Institution
(Documents of the Roval Commission on Bilinaualism and Biculturalism). (1969), 215.
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(criminal) procedure not actually practised in one
of the signatory states spells problems for the
implementation of the rulings of the European Court.
Unless there are redeeming advantages in switching
to a different procedural approach, a Member State
should not be expected to accept the imposition of
elements of an alien legal culture into its own.
Rather, the procedural guarantees should be
functionally interpreted in terms of strengthening
the functionally equivalent elements in the
different legal cultures.811
Evidence suggests that it is too soon to see a European
"ius commune" in the field of human rights; the law is
still "uneven" because national diversity is
considerable. There are two poles of attraction: one
which propounds the creation of one single system of
protection; while the other suggests the handling of
human rights by completely separate and "water-tight"
national systems. Both extremes are unlikely
possibilities as such but, as "ideal types", they provide
a theoretical framework for understanding the
"oscillation" of the European Court's case law. The
heart of the interpretation of the ECHR and therefore, of
an important aspect of the protection of human rights in
Europe, lies in the interplay between unity and
diversity. An observation made concerning the "mind-
broadening" effect of a "European Law school" in
principle capable of encouraging a two-way traffic
between systems and traditions may well apply to the
Strasbourg decision making process in this respect:
... I find a European Law School highly desirable,
because of its mind-broadening effects on students
and teachers. This mind broadening effect is very
important to let the process of European unification
be as flexible and diversified as possible, a process
in which the different legal traditions should stay
811Jurgen Backhaus, "Integration, Harmonisation and Differentiation of Law within the
European Context from an Economic Point of View", in: Bruno de Witte and Caroline
Forder (eds.), op. cit., 527.
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clearly recognisable and should stimulate each
other's creativity.812
Convention law rather than a monolithic system is, thus,
a dynamic framework for diversity: the differences
between the legal families and systems interact in all
areas. The efforts of the Court to treat the countries
equally and to "transplant" basic ideas and principles
from one tradition into another may make the legal
systems come closer but not erase the disparities.
812Nikolas H. M. Roos, "Dinosaur-Complex versus Legal Pluralism", in: Bruno de Witte and
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On a not too remote visit to
Australia, where I attended a
congress which brought together
Jurists representing all countries
of the British Commonwealth, I was
asked continually how the Supreme
Court of Canada could succeed in
having to hear and decide appeals
now under the Common Law and then
under the Civil Law [...] I kept
on trying to convince them that
this offered no handicap. In such
a task I was helped by the Chief
Justice of South Africa, where a
similar situation occurs, except
that there the French language is
replaced by the Dutch language
[sic.], and the French Civil law
by the Roman Dutch law.813
Int roduction
This chapter is a continuation of the analysis undertaken
in the previous two and is the final of the set of four
concerned with the judgments of the Court seen in
comparative perspective. The examples that will be
discussed here deal with the problematic divide between
813The Right Honourable Thibaudeau Rinfret, "Reminiscences from the Supreme Court of
Canada", (1956) 3 McGill L. J. 1, 1.
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public and private law, a traditional civil law
classification whose presence in Strasbourg is still
noticeable.
5. The classification and rules of what is public
and private law
One traditional difference between the civil law and the
common law is the weight given to the dichotomy "public"
versus "private" law, so important in a civilian
jurisdiction that it may be considered its main
systematising division.814 Civilian legal theorists make
this dualism rest on a quotation from Ulpian in the
Digest :Q1S "Publicum jus est, quod ad statum rei Romanae
spectat; privatum, quod ad singulorum utilitatem", which
means - in their systems as heirs to the Roman law
tradition - that the rules of public law concern the
state while those of private law concern private persons:
For the civil law jurist the fundamental division is
that between private and public law. The dividing
lines may be unclear, the logical bases disputed, but
the traditional dualism recognized in Roman law
remains the most significant division in a civil law
system. 816
The feature has been carried forward through the
centuries on the European continent, and its echoes are
still perceptible in some decisions of the European
Court. For example, it has been argued on admissibility
issues, particularly when civilian countries as
respondent governments seek dismissals of cases which
fall within the category of "public" law which is
apparently left out of the protection of the ECHR.
814R. David and H. de Vries The French Legal System. An Introduction to the Civil Law
System, (1958), 45
8l5Digest.l.2.11.
816Henry P. de Vries, Civil Law and the Anglo-American Lawyer: A case-illustrated
introduction to civil law institutions and method. (1976), 69.
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In fact, there is a polarisation between common law and
civilian countries over the use of this defence. The
general experience of the United Kingdom government
before the Court suggests the lesser importance (or
perhaps irrelevance) of the classification in a common
law system as British lawyers seem not to argue this
distinction in situations in which their continental
counterparts are liable to claim it. This circumstance
shows that there are no anxieties in the common law world
over whether a proceeding to enforce or set aside an
administrative decision is "civil" or "public" because
for common lawyers any such litigation is to be brought
in an ordinary court under the procedural rules applied
in civil actions. To illustrate, in Golder v. United
Kingdom817 the Court said that "One point has not been put
in issue and the Court takes it for granted: the 'right'
which Golder wished, rightly or wrongly to invoke against
Laird before an English court was a 'civil right' within
the meaning of Article 6 (1)". The case concerned an
inmate who sued a prison officer, which would have been a
"public" law question to be brought in the administrative
courts in a civilian country. Likewise, in Campbell and
Fell v. the United Kingdom818 the subject-matter concerned
disciplinary proceedings in prison, and the applicants
complained that there had been delays in granting them
permission to seek legal advice to sue for assaults
committed by prison officers acting within the course of
their duties. The "civil" nature of this action was not
put in issue by the respondent government, probably
because the distinction "private" and "public" law does
not carry the connotations attached to it on the
continent: "When English lawyers think of public law, it
817(1979-80) 1 EHRR 524, para. 27.
818(1985) 7 EHRR 165, para. 105-7.
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is thought of primarily in terms of the application for
judicial review. "819
Such an ingrained civilian dichotomy was bound to emerge
in the reasoning of the European Court. For one thing,
civil law trained judges make up the majority of the
bench. For another, Article 6 ECHR and its clause
"determination of civil rights and obligations" provided
a backdrop to the problem. The European Court was faced
with the issue of establishing uniform criteria to have
jurisdiction to protect the due process equally in
relation to (some) decisions and actions of
administrative authorities and agencies of the common law
and civilian member states. Arguably the European Court
would have not been able to hear the continental
equivalents of Golder or Campbell and Fell because of the
seeming "public" nature of the rights in dispute. The
Court, however, did not cast the distinction entirely
aside. Rather than playing down the relevance of drawing
a substantive law line between "public" and "private" law
the European Court to some extent avoided the issue by
determining that the meaning of Article 6 ECHR was
"autonomous".820 Strasbourg does not understand the
meaning of the expression "civil rights and obligations"
in terms of the domestic law of the member state in which
it comes in issue. Whether the underlying dispute is one
between individuals or one between an individual and a
public authority is not decisive, even if the latter is
involved in a sovereign capacity nor is it decisive
whether the proceedings take place before a civil court
or any other body with jurisdiction. The
"determination", on the other hand, need not be the main
point of the proceedings and for this reason this
comparative point tends to appear as a "threshold
819Peter de Cruz, A Modern Approach to Comparative Law. (1993), 93.
82 °J. E. S. Fawcett, The Application of the European Convention on Human Rights (1969).
125.
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issue"821 regarding whether the Court has jurisdiction to
hear a case.
In the German case Konig, the applicant, Mr. Konig, was a
medical practitioner whose licence to practise medicine
and run a clinic was withdrawn by the administrative
authorities. He filed the appropriate action with the
competent bodies with the result that, at the moment of
filing a complaint in Strasbourg, the proceedings with
respect to running the clinic had extended for nearly 11
years without a final determination and those concerning
the right to practise had already taken seven. Without
waiting for the completion of the domestic litigation Mr.
Konig claimed in Strasbourg that the delays infringed his
rights under Article 6 (1) ECHR and, therefore, he sought
a declaratory judgment and damages. The European Court
ruled that the German courts took too long to decide.
The important point for us, however, was how the
Strasbourg Court removed the obstacle that otherwise
would have blocked any European determination on this
case: the question of whether Article 6 ECHR covered the
administrative proceedings of the kind involved in this
case which were "public" under German domestic law.
The point of divergence between the Court's method and a
purely civilian treatment of the issue lay in the
exclusion of the Court's jurisdiction that would have
resulted from following a traditional civil law approach.
It goes without saying that the civilian method suited
the respondent government's position, who deployed a very
strong argument, from a civilian point of view,
submitting - perhaps also seeking the understanding of
their fellow civilian lawyers in the Court - that:
... Article 6 (1) covers private-law disputes in the
traditional sense, that is, disputes between
821Wilson Finnie, "Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights 1991" 1992
Juridical Review 287.
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individuals or between an individual and the State
to the extent that the latter had been acting as a
private person, subject to private law; among other
things, disputes between an individual and the State
acting in its sovereign capacity would be excluded
from the ambit of that Article.822
The Court was not, however, impressed by that argument of
the German government lawyers - which was almost a
paraphrase of the "private" and "public" law distinction
in Digest - and interpreted the terms of Article
6 (1) ECHR as "autonomous" and not dependent on German
law.823 The Strasbourg Court said that:
... Whilst the Court thus concludes that the concept
of 'civil rights and obligations' is autonomous, it
nevertheless does not consider that, in this
context, the legislation of the State concerned is
without importance. Whether or not a right is to be
regarded as civil within the meaning of this
expression in the Convention must be determined by
reference to the substantive content and effects of
the right -and not its legal classification- under
the domestic law of the State concerned ...824
Nonetheless, by making a reference to the relevance of
the "substantive content and effects of the right" the
judgment revealed that the Court was not, however,
prepared to set entirely aside the traditional civilian
distinction in order to, for example, follow an approach
similar to that of the common law. The Court appeared to
reappraise the right at issue but maintaining legal
reasoning within the straitjacket of the classic civilian
dichotomy. Its technique, although in the end put the
applicant in a better position, consisted in finding a
"civil" right behind what "appeared" to be "public": the
legal relationship between a doctor with his or her
patients was "private" because it was contractually
822(1978) 2 EHRR 170 para. 90.
823J. G. Merrills, The development of international law bv the European Court of Human
Rights. (1988), 66.
824(1978) 2 EHRR 170 para. 89.
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based. Whether the underlying dispute was one between
individuals and a public authority and whether the
proceedings had taken place before a body with
jurisdiction other than a civil court were not decisive.
Therefore, decisions to continue to exercise the right to
run a private clinic and practise medicine were decisions
about civil rights while decisions to grant the right to
practise medicine and run a private clinic were not: "If
the case concerns a dispute between an individual and a
public authority, whether the latter had acted as a
private person or in its sovereign capacity is therefore
not conclusive" 825 .
Judge Matscher's disagreement with the classification of
the right as "civil"826 indirectly showed that the Court
did not part ways with such civilian framework of
reasoning. The Austrian judge resorted to the "European
consensus" of the greater part of the (civil law) member
states to dispute the result arrived at by the majority
in the use made of the distinction "civil" versus
"public" law. Unlike the majority's position, in his
opinion the right at issue was "public":
... when [the Court] states that the professional
position of the doctor is to be classified as a
civil right within the meaning of Article 6 (1) of
the Convention, the Court is creating a notion of
'civil right' which is not only 'autonomous' within
the meaning of the Convention but which finds no
basis in the legal systems of the vast majority of
the contracting States ...827
This (civilian) consensus would have worked in the
government's favour. In the instant case, it would have
825ln the Ringeisen Case (No. 1) the Court said that "The character of the legislation which
governs how the matter is to be determined (civil, commercial, administrative law, et.) and
that or the authority which is invested with jurisdiction in the matter (ordinary court,
administrative body, etc.) are therefore of little consequence. (1979-80) 1 EHRR 455,
para. 94.
826Mr. Franz Matscher is the Austrian judge.
827(1978) 2 EHRR 170, Judge Matscher's dissenting opinion.
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determined a refusal of an extension of the protection of
Article 6 ECHR.828 Incidentally, it also serves to show
that the balancing principles used by the Court sometimes
work - or at least, have a potential to work - in one
direction and sometimes in the opposite. It can be
speculated also that the appeal of the archetype of a
single system of protection capable of assimilating both
traditions might have played a role in attributing
"autonomy" to the prescriptions of the article.
The pattern was repeated in several other cases, for
example, in X v. France829 . Mr. X was a haemophiliac who
contracted AIDS from HIV infected blood. He claimed
compensation from the French Minister of Health for the
damage allegedly resulting from the government's
negligence in failing to introduce adequate safety
regulations concerning blood products. As had happened
in Konig some years before, the Court rejected the
government's civil law based submission that Mr. X's
claim fell outside the scope of Article 6 ECHR because it
was framed only on the basis of the French government's
liability for negligence in the exercise of its
regulatory function, which in France would not be
classified as a matter concerning "civil rights and
obligations". France followed the usual attempt of the
civilian member states to seek a dismissal by arguing
this distinction from the point of view of their own
municipal law and the Court answered reasserting that the
notion was "autonomous":
... As the Court has consistently held, the notion of
"civil rights and obligations" is not to be
interpreted solely by reference to the respondent
State's domestic law and Article 6 (1) applies
irrespective of the parties' status, be it private or
828Clovis C. Morrisson, Jr. The Dynamics of Development in the European Human Rights
Convention System. 18.
829 (81/1991/333/406). See case note by David Geer, "Right to a hearing within reasonable
time", Legal Action, June 1992, 22.
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public, and of the nature of the legislation which
governs the manner in which the dispute is to be
determined; it is sufficient that the outcome of the
proceedings should be decisive for private rights and
obligations. That is indeed the case in this
instance, in view of the purpose of the action, so
that Article 6 (1) is applicable . . .830
The European Court then turned to decide whether Mr. X's
claim against the Minister of Health had been heard
within a reasonable time by the French administrative
courts. The ruling was in favour of Mr. X. The
character of the domestic legislation which governed how
the question was to be determined (civil, commercial,
administrative law, and so on) and that of the authority
with jurisdiction to hear the matter (for example
judicial court or administrative body) were of little
consequence.831
The Court's case law does not define abstractly, however,
what is a "civil right". In Konig and Le Compte, the
notion of "civil" even if it is equated with "private"
can be applied to many proceedings which in form or
subject are "public" in the usual civilian approach,
although the outcome is of direct interest for the
determination and/or content of a private right or a
private obligation. The issue is, then, whether "civil"
in the ECHR means "private" in the civilian dichotomy.
In Ringeisen832 the Court apparently answered in the
affirmative. In Konig, however, the European Court left
the question open: "...the Court concludes that Article 6
(1) is applicable, without it being necessary in the
present case to decide whether the concept of 'civil
rights and obligations' within the meaning of that
provision extends beyond those rights which have a
83°(81/1991/333/406), para. 30.
831M. A. Eissen, Case-law on Article 6 of the Convention. European Court of Human
Rights, 5 and 6.
832( 1979-80) 1 EHRR 455.
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private nature." 833 In Benthem334 the Court declined the
opportunity to give an abstract definition: "The Court
does not consider that it has to give on this occasion an
abstract definition of the concept of "civil rights and
obligations"...835 Do the travaux preparatoires help?
Professor van Dijk836 explained that the formula "civil
rights and obligations" was adopted in French without
changes, but in English, a change was introduced at the
last moment, and the present expression replaced the
wording "rights and obligations in a suit-at-law."
Although no reason was given, "suit-at-law" seems not to
have been an equivalent to "de caractere civil" for the
continental lawyers and linguists involved. Judge
Matscher, on the other hand, in his dissenting opinion in
Konig, pointed out that the study of the antecedents of
Article 6 ECHR may not be of benefit for the process of
decision-making: "There is an abundance of writing on the
pre-history of Article 6. It shows us that one cannot
obtain from the legislative history very concrete ideas
of the scope of the provision."
Whatever the case, the dichotomy can also appear before
the European Court in other guises. For example, it
impinges on the organisation of the domestic court system
of some (civilian) member states, and as it is the case
with other traditions or even idiosyncracies of national
law, it can percolate through the adjudication process at
Strasbourg. In the civil law world, the distinction "is
crucial to the process of allocation of the court which
has jurisdiction to hear the case."837 The difference
833(1979.80) 2EHRR 170, para. 95.
834The facts of this case were discussed in Chapter 9.
83 5(1986) 8 EHRR 1, para. 35.
836Pieter van Dijk, "The interpretation of "civil rights and obligations" by the European Court
of Human Rights - one more step to take", Protecting Human Rights: The European
Dimension. Studies in honour of Gerard J. Wiarda. F. Matscher and H. Petzold (ed.),
(1988), 131. He also explains that the travaux preparatoires of Article 14 of the United
Nations Covenant on Human Rights can cast light on the meaning of "civil rights and
obligations" of Article 6 (1) ECHR.
837Peter de Cruz, op. cit., 93.
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between "civil/private" law and "public" law is
substantive as well as procedural; however, the paradox
with this opposition is that despite its importance (and
its ubiquity) continental lawyers are not all agreed on
how to make it. The jurisprudence is decisive to
distinguish what is "public" from what is "private". If
both the judicial and administrative courts claim
jurisdiction over a case, the French "positive" approach
involves a final decision by the Tribunal des Conflits
while the German "negative" approach requires sending the
case to a court of a different judicial hierarchy upon a
motion of the plaintiff and this transfer is binding on
the receiving court unless reversed on appeal.838
The distinction between judicial and administrative
courts - a direct "organisational" consequence of the use
of the dichotomy in Belgian law - was brought to the
European forum by the admissibility issue in the case of
De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp (No. I)839. The European Court
had to turn into a sort of supranational Tribunal des
Conflits and determine whether the case at hand was
"judicial" or "administrative". The result was decisive
concerning admissibility. If the Belgian administrative
hierarchy of courts had jurisdiction to hear the claim,
then the applicants had not exhausted the domestic
remedies and Strasbourg was precluded from determining
the case. Conversely, if it was the judicial system of
courts, then the European path was open to them because
no further remedies would have been available in national
law. In this case, after the examination of the internal
aspects of Belgian law, the European Court was able to
say that the domestic remedies had been exhausted and
therefore Strasbourg had jurisdiction over the case. It
should be remembered that in continental countries the
838Rudolf B. Schlesinger, HansW. Baade, Mirjan R. Damaska, and Peter Herzog,
Comparative Law: Cases - Text - Materials. (1988) 503.
839(1979-80) 1 EHRR 373.
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different branches of the law tend to keep an
"autonomous" character to the extent that there is no
unity of method throughout the legal system as implied in
the phrase "common law".840 This situation may impinge on
the outcome of a case as different results may ensue if
it were argued before one or the other branch of courts.
Each branch has special procedural requirements, for
example, and their jurisprudence may be considerably
different.
Three vagrants surrendered themselves voluntarily to the
Belgian police. A magistrate placed them in detention.
They all made several requests to the Minister of Justice
for release, but did not contest the detention before the
administrative courts or the Council of State because the
Belgian jurisprudence was thought to preclude any such
recourse. Two months after the Commission declared the
applications admissible, however, the domestic case law
changed.841 The applicants were eventually released, but
the Strasbourg Court ruled against the Belgian government
under the prescriptions of Article 5 (4) ECHR. Moreover,
the Court concluded that it could reexamine the
admissibility of an application under Article 26 ECHR in
spite of the examination already carried out by the
Commission.842 The Court also said that the government
840Rene David and Henry P.de Vries, op. cit., 44.
841The Belgian Council of State had dealt only once with an appeal for the annulment of
detention orders for vagrancy before this case was declared admissible by the European
Commission. The other appeal was heard two months after the filing of this application, in
which the Council of State annulled a decision by which the police had placed Dubois, the
appellant, in detention at the disposal of the Belgian government in pursuance of Section
16 of the 1891 Act. The Council of State considered the decision of the police to be not a
finding of a criminal offence but an administrative security measure not open to appeal
before the ordinary courts.
842 In a dissent in Broziek v. Italy (1990) 12 EHRR 371, Judge Martens advocated that the
Court rid itself of the Article 26 doctrine developed in the Vagrancy cases. By devoting
itself to the issue in this particular case, the Court had to address again a comparative law
problem and go into complex domestic law questions that had already been studied by the
Commission. In Martens' words in para. 4.4:"(...) questions may arise as to the
interpretation of the many subtly connected rules that we conveniently, but with some over¬
simplification, designate as the exhaustion rule; and, lastly, it may be necessary to go into
intricate questions of domestic law and to make difficult factual assessments. Moreover,
most of these questions will already have been answered by the other Convention organ,
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was not estopped from raising the question of
inadmissibility of the application.
The government argued that the applicants could have
challenged - administratively - the Minister of Justice's
decision, however, the government's agent had
acknowledged at the first hearing before the Commission
that the Council of State would not have granted leave to
appeal. The European Court, based on the domestic case
Vleminckx, 843 said therefore that the applicants had been
justified in keeping their actions within the judicial
hierarchy of courts. The test carried out was as
follows: were the domestic decisions rendered under the
Belgian vagrancy Act of 1891844 administrative and not
judgments (of the judicial hierarchy of courts) and thus,
not subject to appeal or cassation proceedings? The
Strasbourg Court understood that at the time of the
application the actions were not of an administrative
nature and therefore the applicants were excused from
attempting a remedy before the administrative system of
courts. The European Court had jurisdiction and granted
protection providing a remedy to protect the rights of
the applicants.
which has far more practice and therefore experience in this field than the Court". In his
separate opinion in the Case of B. v. France (57/1990/248/319) he brought up the issue
again: "I would have been even more content if the Court had accepted the Commission's
plea to abandon the De Wilde, Ooms and Versyp doctrine (...) I am glad to note that several
of my colleagues now share that opinion".
843(1979-80) 1 EHRR 373, para. 37.
844Sigmund Cohn, "International Adjudication of Human Rights and the European Court of
Human Rights: A Survey of its Procedural and Some of its Substantive Holdings, (1977) 7
Ga.J.lnt'l & Comp.L. 315, 377: The Belgian vagrancy Act of 1891 required that suspects of
vagrancy be brought before a police court composed of a magistrate, where, after
determining the "identity, age, physical and mental state and manner of life" of the person,
the magistrate would consider whether the individual was a vagrant. Section 13 laid down
that a person could be detained at the disposal of the government in a "vagrancy centre"
between 2 and 7 years, but could be released earlier than that if the Minister of Justice
considered that there was no reason to continue the detention. Under Section 16 the
detention could take place in an "assistance home" for not more than a year. Sigmund
Cohn wrote the available system of rehabilitation had almost erased the differences
between "vagrancy centres" and "assistance homes." See also: Thomas E. McCarthy,
'The International Protection of Human Rights Ritual or Reality? The Vagrancy Cases
Before the European Court of Human Rights", (1976) 25 ICLQ 261.
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Undoubtedly the legal cultures are split over the power
of this dichotomy and its effects within a legal system.
It may well serve as an illustration of the fault-lines
between the traditions the rhetorical question asked by a
continental commentator845 who wondered, on the eve of the
United Kingdom's accesion to the European Community,
whether the system of public law available in that
country could adapt itself to the new situation. British
writers are aware of such civilian perception and put it
(tongue-in-cheek) "...we are sometimes said by Europeans
to possess no public law."846
Can the dichotomy lead to difficulties or
misunderstandings when the Court has to deal with
applications from a common law jurisdiction? We should
consider, for example, the AGOSI case847 , where the
comparative point was the following: did the English
(administrative) legal system provide sufficient
protection to the right of an innocent bona fide owner to
repossess his goods seized by customs officers from
convicted smugglers? Judge Pettiti, dissenting, said
that it did not. AGOSI was a case involving the seizure
of 1,500 Kriigerrands by British customs which, after
judicial proceedings, were declared forfeit. X and Y,
from whom the Krilgerrands were sequestered, were arrested
and convicted of attempting to smuggle the coins into the
United Kingdom, where the import of gold coins was
illegal. The coins had been sold and delivered by AGOSI
to X and Y, but had been paid with a cheque which was
later dishonoured. The company laid claim to the coins
as an innocent third party after being notified of the
seizure by the United Kingdom Customs and Excise. As a
consequence of the company's claim the Commissionners
845 "Des voix tres autorisees soulignent depuis un certain temps, I'insuffisance du droit
public au Royaume-Uni", Jean-Victor Louis, "Rapport" (1972) 5 RDH 675, 682.
846Carol Harlow, ""Public" and "Private" Law: Definition without distinction", (1980) 43
MLR 1,1.
847(1986) 9 EHRR 1.
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started court proceedings to have the coins forfeited.
The High Court declared so on March 10, 1978. On
December 10, 1979, the Court of Appeal dismissed AGOSI's
petition. Lord Denning said that the procedure to be
followed was administrative and to be brought before the
Commissionners subsequent to forfeiture848 but AGOSI's
claim was refused again. The company, however, did not
seek judicial review of this rejection.
In Strasbourg, the European Commission found that the
forfeiture constituted a breach by the United Kingdom of
Article 1 of Protocol 1. Yet the Court held by 6 votes
to 1 that there had been no violation of this article and
found that Article 6 ECHR did not apply on the
determination of a criminal charge nor was it necessary
to consider it as regards the issue of "civil rights and
obligations".
On the other hand, one may justifiably believe that Judge
Pettiti's dissenting position was that of being an
"outsider" to the common law system and which gave him
some beneficial scepticism for his questions. Whatever
the case, no doubt it is the French lawyer in him who is
speaking - probably from a position of familiarity with
an administrative court system presided over by the
Council of State - when he found the English law solution
wanting in those terms:
...before the Commission and the Court, we saw how
complicated were the English procedural rules on
this subject. The English rules cannot be compared
with those of the Continental systems which ensure
that there is precise judicial review of
administrative acts in the course of administrative
dispute proceedings.
In taking this position he had in mind a continental
conception of administrative law. Such a conception is
848Under Section 288 of the Customs and Excise Act 1952.
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more comprehensive than the common law position, for it
takes in more issues, such as the use of regulatory
power, the law of both the civil service and government
property, and administrative obligations. In the common
law tradition, to address the issue in a nutshell,
administrative law is concerned with powers and remedies.
It answers questions such as the extent of the
administrative powers vested in agencies, their bounds
and the remedies available to keep the authorities within
their limits.849 Perhaps "Drawing their inspiration from
French traditions, continental lawywers are apt to give
"public law" the highly specific meaning of "a body of
wholly autonomous rules, entirely separate from private
law""850 but probably also, at the time this case was
argued, English law was still lagging behind the
Continental (or French) position851 as the usefulness of
judicial review in the case may have been open to doubt.
Judge Pettiti highlighted a vacuum in English law in a
period stretching from 1836 to 1985, when apparently no
case had been heard concerning judicial review of the
exercise of the discretionary power of Customs and Excise
to restore seized property. "It is true that in the
United Kingdom the judicial review procedure is
developing positively, but it can still be puzzling even
to informed British lawyers as is shown by the
infrequency of judgments on the subject", he wrote in his
dissent.
The key point of difference between the approach taken in
the United Kingdom and Judge Pettiti's civilian reasoning
was the blurred distinction between a criminal and an
administrative sanction in English public law: "If the
Customs had taken criminal proceedings against AGOSI's
849Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law. (1976), 2.
850Carol Harlow, op. cit., 1.
851Andrew Drzemczewski and Colin Warbrick, "The European Convention on Human
Rights", (1986) 6 YEL 417, 427.
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manager for alleged complicity in the crime, he would
have benefited from a fair trial". He wrote that the
English system did not distinguish between forfeiture and
definitive confiscation, and incidentally, he was
concerned with the possibility of a different outcome in
a different system of public law:
... it seems to me that the procedure followed did
not draw a sufficient distinction between criminal
law and administrative law, between confiscation in
the English sense of "forfeiture" and definitive
confiscation, i.e. transferring the property to the
benefit of the State, so as to ensure that the
exercise of the right of a legitimate owner is not
defeated by a criminal or customs offence...
He argued, therefore, that the discretionary powers of
restitution of the Commissionners of Customs and Excise
were too wide. Perhaps imposing the guidelines of French
or continental administrative law, he found English
public law below the standards of protection set down in
the ECHR. In his view AGOSI was entitled to repossess
the coins, and he added that "What we find is an
administrative sanction taken by the Customs and not
motivated by any guilt of any sort on AGOSI's part".
The issue running through all these cases was, again,
whether the European Court could build a jurisprudence
which can be shared by all the member states vis-a-vis
the different public law systems available and the
different approaches to the distinction between private
and public law. Sometimes the issues could not be
assimilated across the divide. On occasion, the European
Court was successful in avoiding too much of an imbalance
that a different judgments would have produced,
particularly on the admissibility distinction. By the
creation of an "autonomous" concept, the "civil" notion
of Article 6 ECHR expanded the European jurisdiction to a
degree. The dichotomy is still present in the European
jurisprudence but the "autonomous" interpretation has
- 326 -
increased the "transplantability" of the standards of the
Court to similar cases irrespective of their jurisdiction
of origin.
Conelusions
Although there may be much approximation between the
legal traditions, many components of the law and legal
culture of the member states still keep their particular
distinctiveness: the "transplants" from one legal
tradition to the other do not erase it completely. There
is no counterpart in Convention law to Article 177 EEC.852
The remedies to protect human rights are still primarily
determined by national law and the ultimate control the
Strasbourg institutions can exercise over the outcomes is
a good deal weaker than that of the EU in its area of
influence. It would appear, then, that harmonisation is
a reality in some areas while in others it still remains
an unattained goal notwithstanding the efforts or the
good will of the Strasbourg institutions or even the
respondent governments.
In many cases the Strasbourg institutions appear to be in
a tantalising quest for a single European law of human
rights. Diversity interposes itself, however, as the
stumbling block which prevents the achievement of the
goal. The paradox is that a complete success in
establishing a single system would entail a defeat,
because heterogeneity is a source of inspiration in
Convention law, "unlocked" by the use of the comparative
method. It is suggested that a single system, apart from
being almost imposssible to set up, would lack dynamism
and richness.
852John Temple Lang, "The Sphere in which Member States are obliged to comply with the
General Principles of Law and Community Fundamental Rights Principles", (1991) LI El 23,
33.
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The evolving European law of human rights has a strength
in its variety, and also in the tensions produced by its
superimposition on other systems already in place in the
member states. As a shared framework it accommodates
diversity (with more or less success according to the
case) and as such, it is far from anything resembling a
single structure. The Strasbourg system does not appear
to take over, it rather offers an extra option to the
several other systems already in operation in the member
states and elsewhere. It is a further safety device, for
its operation is triggered by a failure of the domestic
systems to protect a right. Underlying the system is the
understanding that the member states may, of course, give
more protection than that afforded by the Convention
system.
With regard to the method used in the analysis, it should
be kept in mind that the comparative method does not,
however, capture all the aspects involved in the
interpretation of the Convention law which have an impact
on the outcome of the cases. Elements such as policy
considerations, both in Strasbourg and in the member
states, the doctrine of the margin of appreciation or the
due respect to national characteristics play their
important part in the final outcome of a case. Legal
interpretation of Convention law is affected, therefore,
by those various ingredients, all of them closely
interwoven and operating in conjunction. Social and
other factors do influence outcomes, but an underlying
idea in these four chapters has been that the law moves
in its own domain, and thus it is possible to study it in
relative isolation from those other elements and in our
case, concentrate on legal interpretation. The
comparative method has the potential to help in the
unending refinement of Convention law by means of the
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"transplants" of standards, principles and ideas from one
tradition to the other.
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Strasbourg as Donor:
Human Rights in the
European Union
What better introduction to the
European ideal than to examine the
way in which these [human] rights,
extending across the whole gamut
of civil and criminal law and
across the chasm which divides
substantive law from procedure and
the administration of justice,
come under threat and are brought
within the mantle of the
protection of justice.853
The transfer by States from their
domestic legal system to the
Community legal system of rights
and obligations arising under the
Treaty carries with it a permanent
limitation of their sovereign
rights, against which a subsequent
unilateral act incompatible with
the concept of the Community
cannot prevail
Introduction
Of the many aspects that the relationship between the EU
system and the protection of human rights involves, this
chapter concentrates on the ECJ's human rights
jurisprudence - a "mix" of the legal traditions of the
member states - in order to see whether cross-cultural
rules and case law enhance the ECJ's ability for
protecting human rights in a multicultural setting. The
purpose is to see how the legal traditions, among other
forces, shape the decision-making process.
853Roy Goode, "The European Law School", (1993) 13 Legal Studies 1, 14.
854Costa v. Ente Nazionaleper I'Energia Elettrica (ENEL), [1964] CMLR 425.
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The chapter is divided in two parts: the first will
address the substantive discussion of the existence of
human rights principles in the EU legal order, and the




The relevant principles applicable to human rights in the
field of EU law have been evolving over a long space of
time. They derive from the Treaty of Rome and the case
law of the ECJ. At present there is a new situation
since Article F (2) of the Treaty on European Union
(hereafter Maastricht) guarantees respect for human
rights as laid out in the ECHR by giving statutory
expression to the idea which had been guiding the ECJ
case law. Maastricht sets down that fundamental rights
as protected by the ECHR and the constitutional
traditions common to the member states are general
principles of EU law.
In EU law there were formerly no provisions such as, for
example. Article 3 of the Statute of the Council of
Europe that required acceptance of the rule of law and
human rights as a condition of membership. There was no
listing of EU human rights and the situation was not
entirely clear:
As long as there is no codification of Community
human rights, it will be hard to establish which
855The comparative methodology has already been applied to the case law of the European
Court of Human Rights in chapters 7 to 10, and the literature relied on for this chapter,
included, among others: Liana Fiol Matta, "Civil Law and Common Law in the Legal Method of
Puerto Rico", (1992) 40 AJCL 783, Peter H. Russell, The Supreme Court of Canada as a
Bilingual and Bicultural Institution (Documents of the Roval Commission on Bilinqualism and
Biculturalismi 1969, and T. B. Smith, Studies Critical and Comparative. (1962).
- 331 -
principles belong to this category. There is no
sharp division drawn between basic human rights and
other legal principles. Several of the legal
principles recognized by the Court of Justice [...]
can at the same time be held to be basic human
rights.856
Although there was no explicit allusion to the ECHR in
the EEC Treaty, hundreds of EU provisions, however, touch
upon human rights issues. In general, these rights (now
as it was then) tend to be based on social and economic
grounds. For example, the EU confers rights at the
national level related to the activities of the EU such
as "the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles
to freedom of movement of persons, services and
capital"857 or the provisions on freedom of movement and
its implementation.858 in addition, the principle of non¬
discrimination does underpin several articles.859 Some
articles establish the promotion of a better standard of
living as a goal of the EU860, and others list activities
relevant to that end861 or recognise a right to be
compensated for illegal acts of the EU.862
There are other substantive rules of importance.863 The
agreements concluded by the member states before entry
are preserved and the obligations of the member states
under the ECHR are protected.864 The logic of the EU
system requires that the ECJ be the ultimate arbiter in
856H. G. Schermers, Judicial Protection in the European Communities. (1983), 39.
857Article 3 (c) EEC.
888Articles 48 to 58 EEC.
8 5 9Such as for example, Articles 7, 48 (2) and 220 EEC which ban discrimination on grounds
of nationality, Article 37 (1) EEC which deals with the activities of State monopolies or Article
119 EEC which grants equal pay for both sexes.
860Article 2 EEC.
86i|ncluding the creation of a European Social Fund, regulated by Article 123.
862Article 215 EEC.
863See also: A. H. Robertson and J. G. Merrills, Human Rights in Europe: A Study of the
European Convention on Human Rights. (1993), 362 and M. Sorensen, "Punti di contatto tra




matters of EU law.865 Furthermore, Article 62 ECHR is
relevant in this context: if conflict arises, EU law will
prevail where the rights it guarantees are superior to
those under the ECHR (e.g. equal pay for both sexes866, no
discrimination on grounds of nationality).
The ECHR imported into the legal system of the EU
The principles related to human rights protection have
been evolving in different ways. The European Parliament
(which passes resolutions with no legal effect in the
member states867) passed a Declaration of Fundamental
Rights and Freedoms on April 12, 1989. The EU
Commission868 had also said that the ECHR "has binding
effect on the activities of the Community institutions."
This organ had become interested in a Bill of Rights
particularly after conflicts with the German and Italian
Constitutional Courts over the supremacy of the basic
provisions on human rights in their national
constitutions.869
The EU Commission, the Council of Ministers and the
European Parliament, jointly adopted a Common Declaration
of Rights in 1977S70 which emphasised "the prime
importance they attach to the protection of fundamental
rights, as derived in particular from the constitutions
of the member states and the [ECHR]." Although not
865Article 219 EEC.
866On the issue of protection against discrimination on grounds of sexual orientation in the
sphere of European law see the discussions in the collection of essays edited by Kees
Waaldijk and Andrew Clapham, Homosexuality: A European Community Issue. (1993).
867 It may be speculated that for this reason it is inclined to make bolder proposals than the
other EU organs.
868Whose proposals possibly have to be politically attractive to be accepted by the
Committee of Ministers before they end up as enforceable rules.
869W. R. Edeson and F. Wooldridge, "European Community Law and Fundamental Human
Rights: Some Recent Decisions of the European Court and of National Courts", (1976) 1 LI El
1, 52.
87°O.J. 1977 C 103/1.
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legally binding, this Declaration justified the
presumption that the EU did not intend to infringe
fundamental rights in its activities. The ECJ, perhaps
spurred on by the anxieties of the German and Italian
Constitutional Courts871 succeeded in transplanting the
rights guaranteed by the ECHR to EU law, especially at a
time when the ECJ was trying to assert the supremacy of
EU law over national law and constitutions. Nonetheless,
in the case law of the ECJ the inflow of human rights law
through the application of the Community legal order
takes place only insofar as an EU right is concerned.872
It could be speculated that the reasons for the ECJ's
response could be that if it did not carry out this
review those issues would go unchecked; if so, they would
have to be reviewable in the member states; and as a
consequence, a harmonious and uniform development would
be harder to attain.
The case Nold v. Commission873 (hereafter Nold) was the
first case in which the ECJ mentioned the ECHR by
referring to it as a guideline to be used when confronted
with a question of fundamental rights. Although Nold
(and also Rutili874 ) set down insufficient875 criteria to
determine the protection of basic rights, other cases
followed where fundamental rights were considered an
integral part of the general principles of EU law. In
the Stauder case876, the ECJ persuaded the German courts
to accept the supremacy of EU law even in the case of an
871M. H. Mendelson, 'The European Court of Justice and Human Rights", (1981) 1 YEL
125, 130. This author argued that unsurprisingly the unease with the state of affairs in this
area of the law came from Germany and Italy; in those two countries rights are strongly
entrenched constitutionally largely as a response to their fascist past.
872On the other hand, the possibility of incompatible interpretations of the ECHR by the ECJ
and the Strasbourg Court cannot be ruled out. See: Nicholas Grief, "The Domestic Impact of
the European Convention on Human Rights as Mediated through Community Law", [1991]
PL 555.
873[1974] ECR491.
87 4Rutili v. Minister of the Interior, [1975] ECR 1219.
875Andrew Z. Drzemczewski, "Fundamental Rights and the European Communities: Recent
Developments", (1977) 2,1 HR Rev. 69, 80.
87 6[1969] ECR 419.
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alleged conflict with the fundamental rights provisions
of the German Constitution based on the existence of
fundamental rights enshrined in EU law.
The ECJ issued other judgments in line with the ECHR but
without acknowledging it as a source. For example, Jean
Noel Royer was about a preliminary ruling under Article
177 EEC concerning the expulsion of a Frenchman with a
criminal record from Belgium for failure to register with
the Belgian authorities. The EU Commission thought the
expulsion to be too extreme a measure and alluded to the
ECJ having to pay heed to the ECHR as "an integral part
of Community law"877 because it was an instrument ratified
by all the member states. Although the ECJ reached a
similar conclusion, it did not make a reference to the
ECHR, and said "[...] the mere failure by a national of a
Member State to complete the legal formalities of aliens
does not justify a decision ordering expulsion."878
Another example is Prais v. Council879 where the plaintiff
argued that her fundamental right to freedom of religion
had been infringed by the date on which a written test
for a post of translator with the EU was to take place.
She invoked Article 9 ECHR. Although the ECJ dismissed
the claim on the facts, it accepted the principle that
the ECHR was to be taken into consideration by the
Council.
In Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfalzsso a German court re¬
ferred to the ECJ the question whether a Council
regulation prohibiting the new planting of vines for a
period of 3 years infringed the right to property
guaranteed by Article 1 of Protocol 1. The ECJ observed
that the Protocol allowed restrictions upon the use of
877[1976] ECR 497, 506-7.




property provided they were deemed necessary for the
general interest. Therefore, the applicant's right to
property had not been infringed. This case also raised
the problem of satisfying national sensitivities:
Human rights jurisprudence typically differs in the
articulation of various balancing tests. The Hauer
case offers a useful example: the right to free use
of property is always balanced by societal concerns
about the use of such property. In some cases the
societal interest can be so overriding as to demand
the actual confiscation of the property (with
varying degrees of compensation and subject to
principled decisions, proportionality and so on) as
in the case of compulsory purchase for major social
construction work. The collective "good" of a
community is acknowledged, not simply as a
legitimate curb on individual rights, but as a
manifestation of a value which has comparable
weight. In the final analysis taxation is a
manifestation of this principle.881
The interpretation of EU law in relation to human rights
has generated some sensitive issues. For example, the
member states' constitutional courts may be displaced
when the ECJ checks the conformity of national provisions
with EU law, and an ECJ judgment in this field may pre¬
empt the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights.
In addition, before Maastricht, there was no specific
catalogue of human rights to work from (at present,
Article F (2) mentions the ECHR and therefore identifies
the source of principles). The accession of the EU to
the ECHR system, however, still remains as an outstanding
issue.882 Finally, some cases may arise within the field
of EU law where the issues are non-economic, such as the
right to life.883 In the case Society for the Protection
of Unborn Children Ireland Ltd. (S.P.U.C.) v. Stephen
Grogan and others884 a reference was made under Article
881Joseph H. H. Weiler, op. cit., 1127.
882Andrew Clapham, "Human Rights and the European Community: A Critical Overview" in
European Union: The Human Rights Challenge, vol. I, (1991), 30.
883Bruno De Witte, "Community Law and National Constitutional Values", (1991) 2 LIEI 1,
12.
884(1991) 3 CMLR 849.
- 336 -
177 EEC to the ECJ, who found that the Irish ban to
distribute information on United Kingdom abortion clinics
which had been applied to a group of students did not
breach Article 59 EEC. Ireland could therefore bar the
students from publishing the information and no issue of
EU law arose.885 The ECJ recognised that it had no
jurisdiction on national legislation outside the scope of
EU law:
when required to give a preliminary ruling, must
provide the national court with all the elements of
interpretation which are necessary in order to
enable it to assess the compatibility of that
legislation with fundamental rights - as laid down
in particular in the European Convention - the
observance of which the Court ensures.886
In addition, no questions of EU law were found to have
arisen in another case, this time before the Irish
Supreme Court. In Attorney General v. X887 the Supreme
Court came very close to having to deal, inter alia, with
the EU freedom to receive services in the other member
states, but, as Chief Justice Finlay pointed out: "No
decision on any question of European law is therefore
necessary to enable the Court to give judgment." The
reasons were put forward when he subsequently stated
that:
Apart from the practical time scale difficulties of
obtaining a ruling by way of a preliminary ruling
from the Court of Justice of the European
Communities, pursuant to Article 177 of the Treaty of
Rome, in time for due resolution of the problems
arising in this case, it is consistent with the
jurisprudence of the Court that there being a ground
on which the case can be decided without reference to
European law, but under Irish law only that method
should be employed.888
885See: Dena T. Sacco and Alexia Brown, "Regulation of Abortion in the European
Community", (1992) 33 Harvard International Law Journal 291 and Brian Wilkinson,
"Abortion, the Irish Constitution and the EEC", [1992] PL 20.
886(1991) 3 CMLR 849, para. 30.
887Lexis Transcript, 5 March 1992.
888Lexis Transcript, 5 March 1992, Finlay CJ.
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The Supreme Court then overturned the injunction granted
by a Dublin High Court on a 14-year-old rape victim who
had been prohibited from seeking an abortion abroad.
Are the EU organs, institutions or agents bound by
the ECHR?
Article F (2) of the Maastricht Treaty requires that the
EU respect the human rights laid out in the ECHR and
also, those common to the traditions of the member
states, as general principles of EU law. Yet even before
Maastricht the member states were individually liable
under the ECHR for breaches they might have committed in
the exercise of a discretion conferred or, even in
pursuance of a duty imposed by EU law.889
Another question is whether an individual may lodge an
application with the Human Rights Commission against an
act adopted by the EU institutions in order to attribute
responsibility to an EU institution for a breach of the
ECHR under the ECHR machinery. The answer is in the
negative, for the reason that it is not possible to
institute proceedings before the Commission of Human
Rights against the EU, its institutions or organs because
they are not party to the ECHR. The European Commission
of Human Rights rejected such type of application in the
case D. v. Belgium and the EC890 concerning the European
School in Brussels.
On the other hand, the protection of human rights within
the EU system is subordinate to the existence an EU right
or even perhaps to the ideas of EU integration. The ECJ
stated:
; y 9See: Confederation Frangaise Democratique de Travail (CDFT), (1979) 2 CMLR 229.
890(1979) 2 CMLR 57.
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In fact, respect for fundamental rights forms an
integral part of the general principles of law
protected by the Court of Justice. The protection
of such rights, whilst inspired by the
constitutional traditions common to the Member
States, must be ensured within the framework of the
structure and objectives of the Community . .,891
This situation prompted some writers to argue that the EU
does not take human rights seriously.892 in Rutili v.
Minister of the Interior893 for example, the ECJ was
prepared to apply the standards of human rights to member
states so long as it was a field governed by EU law. The
case concerned a citizen of Italy engaged in political
activities in France who was banned to live in certain
departements. Such prohibitions could not be placed on a
EU national unless the threat to French public policy was
genuine and serious.
The ECJ human rights protection activity has always been
subordinate to an EU connection because "in no case has
it actually upheld claims based on this ground alone"894
and although the EU appeared to be bound by the
substantive provisions of the ECHR (even before
Maastricht) it is not bound by the Convention's
procedural arrangements.895 The case Hubert Wachauf v.
Federal Republic of Germany896 suggests that the
exigencies of European integration may take precedence
over the protection of fundamental rights. Bearing those
89X[1970] ECR 1125, 1134, para. 4.
892Aidan O'Neal and Jason Coppel, "Taking Rights Seriously?", EUI Working Paper No.
92/21, February, 1992, 3.
893[1975] ECR 1219, para. 32.
894M. H. Mendelson, op. cit., 152.
895M. H. Mendelson, op. cit., 158.
896[1989] ECR 2609. "The fundamental rights recognized by the Court are not absolute,
however, but must be considered in relation to their social function. Consequently,
restrictions may be imposed on the exercise of those rights, in particular in the context of a
common organization of a market, provided that those restrictions in fact correspond to
objectives of general interest pursued by the Community and do not constitute, with regard
to the aim pursued, a disproportionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very
substance of those rights."
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ideas in mind as a backdrop we should now embark on the
comparative analysis of the case law in Strasbourg.
Part II
Interpretation by the ECJ: the comparative
perspective
Human rights principles are applied, through EU law, to
the EU legal order itself (unlike the Strasbourg system
which is a benchmark for the practices of the member
states) or to the member states in implementing EU
measures or taking decisions affecting rights given or
protected by EU law or in areas regulated by EU law (and
here, much like the Strasbourg system). Human rights
issues could also arise in the action of the member
states as "trustees" for the EU.897
In the protection of human rights - unlike other areas of
EU law - the ECJ resorts to a comparative survey similar
to the Strasbourg technique. In other situations the ECJ
may be unwilling to do so in order to avoid appearing to
compromise on the issue of the supremacy of EU statutory
law:
The technique, derived from comparative law, would
be difficult for the Court of Justice of the
Communities to adopt, save in the human rights field
where the trend of its case-law suggests that the
Court accepts the notion of human rights as set
forth in the Convention. Community law is a
specific law, distinct from the law of the member
States, and it replaces and overrides national rules
in certain spheres.898
897John Temple Lang, "The Sphere in which Member States are obliged to comply with the
General Principles of Law and Community Fundamental Right Principles", (1991) LIEI 23, 30
898W. J. Ganshof van der Meersch, "Reliance, in the Case-Law of the European Court of
Human Rights, on the Domestic Law of the States", (1980) 1 Human Rights Law Journal 13,
25.
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It has been argued that ECJ looks for a common ground not
confined to the principles shared by all the member
states, but rather, that it uses an "evaluative
comparative law" which is "progressive" or "maximalist"
and that it consists in "...surveying the laws of all
Member States and then - in the light of the particular
objectives and structure of the Community - selecting the
'best' or most suitable rules, even though they are to be
found in only a minority of these systems."899 If legal
principles are drawn from the EU member states, then they
must be adapted to the structure and purposes of the EU:
"They require, in one word, transplantation and
acclimatization to a new environment. They cannot form
an obstacle to the realization of the objectives of the
Community."900 Other authors pointed out that "The Court
should reject, and in fact has rejected, the notion and
the language of trying to adopt the maximal standard
prevailing among the Member States, not simply because it
will in effect subject the Community to the
constitutional dictates of the different Member States,
but because it is an impossible exercise."901 Indeed
these apparently contradictory views are not in real
opposition, but indicate that the human rights
jurisprudence oscillates between the aspiration to unity
and the acknowledgment of the pull of diversity.
Another similarity with the Strasbourg system is that the
judges sitting in the ECJ bring a multiplicity of legal
systems to the bench through their training and legal
thinking. The presence of an A-G before the ECJ
contributes also to the introduction of comparative
elements in decision-making. Unlike the European Court
899M. H. Mendelson, op. cit., 154.
900Ulrich Scheuner, "Fundamental Rights in European Community Law and in National
Constitutional Law; Recent Decisions in Italy and the Federal Republic of Germany", (1975)
12 CML Rev . 171, 185.
901Joseph H. H. Weiler, op. cit., 1128.
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of Human Rights, however, the ECJ system followed the
French tradition of not allowing the publication of
dissenting or concurring opinions.
The different legal systems and traditions come together
in the process of decision-making. In order to organise
the discussion, three areas of "contact" between systems
and traditions have been identified, as follows: (a)
institutions particular to a legal tradition; (b) the
legal sources and their handling; and (c) the division of
private and public law. Under these headings we will
analyse the positions of the traditions and how, together
with other forces, they shape the outcomes. This study
is aimed at observing the influences of the traditions in
the human rights case law of the ECJ. Most of the cases
dealt with (although not all) will concern complaints
filed against the EU institutions, therefore, the
comparative problems discussed will be mainly those
appearing when an individual or an undertaking need the
protection of the ECHR against the EU organs.
The premise with which to start is the notion that the
use of the comparative method by the ECJ can be made
visible in the adjudication process. At some points of
the analysis it will be necessary to step back to look at
how the ECJ or the A-G went on to make observations on
the adjudication methodology and see the influence of the
legal traditions. A first comparative point stems from:
"... the (relative) failure of the Treaties to make
provision for human rights amounted to an ambiguity or
lacuna which needed to be resolved or filled and,
further, that resort to general principles of the Member
States' municipal law was the appropriate means of making
good that deficiency"902 it may be a matter of opinion
whether, under Articles 31-33 of the Vienna Convention on
902M. H. Mendelson, op. cit., 154.
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the Law of Treaties 1969, other courts would have held
that they faced a gap which was to be filled or that it
was necessary to look so far away from the Treaty to make
up for the deficiency. Whatever the case, the
comparative issue is that the ECJ followed an approach
similar to the civilian conviction that a legal system is
a whole from which solutions to cases can always be
(syllogistically) deduced. As a continental court, the
ECJ resorted to legal principles in the process of
decision-making and created a body of jurisprudential EU
human rights law from scratch. This case law is resorted
to in subsequent cases as a jurisprudence constante.
(a) Institutions particular to a legal tradition:
In common law systems the role of procedural elements is
more prominent than in civilian orders, to the extent
that, when a decision is challenged before a court, "The
question is also, and perhaps mainly, whether the
decision has been arrived at in a legally proper way."903
The case Transocean Marine Paint Association v.
Commission904 can provide some information about the
extent of common law infiltration in the ECJ's approach
to procedural law in the field of human rights
protection. The facts of the case were as follows: in
1967 the EU Commission granted an exemption under Article
85 (3) EEC to the various enterprises forming the
Transocean Marine Paint Association, subject to the
condition that the Association keep the Commission in¬
formed, inter alia, of the composition of its membership.
In December 1973, although the exemption was going to be
renewed, an additional duty was placed on the
Association, this time its members were also requested to
903T. Koopmans, "The Birth of European Law at the CrossRoads of Legal Traditions", (1991)
39 AJCL 493, 503.
904[1974] ECR 1063, 1088-89.
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keep the Commission informed of the existence of various
types of links between companies inside and outside the
Association. The applicants objected to the new burden
on grounds that they had been denied an opportunity to
put their views forward because neither the provision had
been raised in the hearings before the EU Commission's
nor had it been included in a "Notice of Objections." In
the end, the ECJ struck down the challenged requirement
although the rest of the decision was allowed to stand so
that the Commission could reach a new decision on the
point but only after hearing the members of the
Association. 905
In taking the decision, although no direct allusion to
the principle audi alteram partem was made, the ECJ
reached an interpretation of the applicable EU law on the
analogy of the English law principle: "the general rule
that a person whose interests are perceptibly affected by
a decision taken by a public authority must be given the
opportunity to make his point of view known."906 The
legal position of the applicant association in relation
to its procedural rights had been affected by the
proceedings of the EU Commission, and the procedural
defect could have had effects on its legal standing under
substantive law.
The nationality of the A-G and the judges may be
particularly important in the infiltration of principles
to the EU legal order. In this case, Warner A-G thought
that the situation was one where at least in English law,
the procedural principle audi alteram partem would apply
and in consequence, requested a comparative study of the
laws of the other member states on their position in
relation to the right to a hearing.
9 0 5A new decision was taken on October 23, 1975. OJ. 1975, L286/24.
906[1974] ECR 1063, 1080, para 15.
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A principle may be common in various other member states
in the same or different form. The requested comparative
survey suggested that although the principle was not
unknown in some civilian jurisdictions, it was at least
(considerably) less developed than in the common law
world. In France the principle was still in the course
of development. In Germany, the Basic Law provided that
the right to be heard applied only to the ordinary civil
law courts, however, some administrative law cases
appeared to have been resolved according to the
principle. In Luxembourg, although the legislation was
silent on this point, the Council of State had placed on
the administration a duty to hear those concerned if a
certain decision might affect proprietary interests.
Ireland, Scotland and Denmark appeared to support the
principle, however, neither Belgium, the Netherlands or
Italy did. The use made of the principle in the case
suggests, therefore, an approach closer to the common
law.
From our comparative point of view there is another
interesting aspect to this case. Although the judgment
was reached on procedural grounds, using a rule borrowed
from English law, the methodology applied by the ECJ was
nevertheless civilian. The rule was treated as a
principle "applied" to a situation and severed from
supporting case law, as if it had been deduced from a
rule laid down in a civilian code, so to speak.
Subsequent cases have used the principle. In the case of
Al-Jubail Fertilizer Company (SAMAD) and another v. E.C.
Council (E.C. Commission intervening)901 (hereafter Al-
907(1991) 3 CMLR 377. The new regime substituted a duty at 40 per cent in proportion to
the value of the product for the old duty equal to the amount by which the import price was
less than 133 ECUs per tonne. Two manufacturers of urea in Saudi Arabia were affected by
the new regulation and appealed on grounds of inadequate statement of reasons, manifest
errors of appraisal, errors of law resulting in distortion of the facts and denial of a fair hearing.
See also: Jurgen Schwarze, European Administrative Law. (1992), 1222.
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Jubail) the common law principle audi alteram partem was
transplanted again into EU law with the result that a
certain EU practice could not measure up to it. As a
consequence, the ECJ annulled an article of a Regulation
in respect to the applicants. The case of the example
arose out of the enforcement of Regulation 3339/87
(hereafter, the derivate regulation) that made changes to
the regime of anti-dumping duties on imports of urea from
Saudi Arabia. The EU Council had adopted a basic
Regulation 2176/84 (hereafter, the basic regulation)
which was the basis for the adoption of anti-dumping
regulations concerning particular goods. The issue of
whether a fair hearing had been held became the centre of
the case. The failure to disclose serious information
rebutting the applicant's arguments was deemed decisive
and therefore, determined the decision to annul Article 1
of the derivate regulation. The applicants could not
voice their views on the matter.908 This position was
supported by the consideration of the importance of the
general EU principles of fundamental rights and the right
to a fair hearing. The EU institutions had to be
conscientious in providing information to enable the
parties make their own opinion on the evidence available,
and in this case:
[...] with regard to the right to a fair hearing,
any action taken by the Community institutions must
be all the more scrupulous in view of the fact that,
as they stand at present, the rules in question do
not provide all the procedural guarantees for the
protection of the individual which may exist in
certain national legal systems.909
The matter had been considered by Darmon A-G who pointed
the way in which the case was to be decided. In his
view, the administrative powers of the EU should be kept
908(1991) 3 CMLR 377, 414, para. 15.
909(1991) 3 CMLR 377, 414, para. 16.
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under check by insisting on the need to grant the due
process of law and the right to a hearing:
[...] there seems to be no doubt that the anti¬
dumping proceeding, although conducted by an
administrative authority, must meet the needs of a
'fair hearing', which implies that an 'equality of
arms' must prevail between the parties.
Furthermore, observance of the principle of hearing
arguments from both sides demands that the party or
his representative have the opportunity of
consulting and criticising the case documents, and
in particular the evidence on which the decision was
based.910
Nonetheless, despite the fact that the case was decided
on procedural grounds in a manner similar to the common
law approach, there was no shift towards a common law
methodology. In reaching the decision there was no
substitution of a common law oriented inductive reasoning
for a civilian-style deductive technique. Again, as in
Transocean, the ECJ applied the English law rule as a
legal principle according to a civilian method. The
principle was deemed capable of standing alone and the
ECJ did not embark on any elaborate case citations or
distinctions or even English references to show the
connection of the principle with previously decided
cases. This is unsurprising because the ECJ tends to use
its own jurisprudence in a civilian manner, and for that
reason, "Although the quasi-normative decisions of the
Court of Justice are described as judge-made law, that is
not intended to mean that they have the effect as such of
binding "precedents" in the Common law sense."911 Or, to
put it in a rather disingenuous way, "Napoleon may
perhaps be thought of as the principal, though
involuntary, inspiration of the European Court."912
910(1991) 3 CMLR 377, 407.
911Jurgen Schwarze, op. cit., 63.
912L. Neville Brown and J. F. Garner, French Administrative Law. (1983),171.
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In the case of Josette Pecastaing v. the Belgian State913
the A-G suggested giving the case a treatment that took
account of the the right to a hearing set down in the
common law inspired Article 6 ECHR. Capotorti A-G made
the point when considering the relevant provisions of
Council Directive 64/221 EEC of February 24, 1964,
(hereafter, the Directive), highlighting that "regard
must be had for the basic principles of a fair hearing
which are to be inferred from Article 6 of the European
Convention." He supported his views with the case law of
the European Commission and Court of Human Rights and on
the basis of Golder concluded that there might be a right
for the applicant to petition to a court although he
recognised that the Strasbourg case law made the
requirement of a personal appearance in civil proceedings
dependent on the facts of the particular case.
This case concerned an Article 177 EEC reference to the
ECJ of the question whether a French national, suspected
prostitute, had the right to remain in Belgium pending
her court action against the refusal of residence permit
and deportation order. One of the issues was whether her
expulsion before the hearing in the domestic court would
devoid that right (enshrined in Article 6 ECHR) of any
meaning in the case. The ECJ, however, interpreted the
Directive to the effect that although the complainant was
entitled to the same access to judicial remedies provided
by the Belgian courts as any Belgian national, she could
not insist on staying in Belgium pending her appeal. The
right of access to the courts did not require personal
presence, especially in view of the "margin of
appreciation" implied in the "public policy" exception of
Article 48 (3) EEC which was a recognised limitation to
the principle of freedom of movement.914 Incidentally,
the ECJ did not think it necessary to include a rep-
9]1(1980) 3 CMLR 685.
914(1980) 3 CMLR 685,708.
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etition of its earlier case law to justify its resorting
to the ECHR.
Let us look at other situations. One of these is how to
protect an applicant against the risk of self-
incrimination or breach of professional privilege915 vis¬
a-vis the extensive powers of the EU Commission under
competition law (which are in contrast to the restricted
powers of investigation under anti-dumping law). Under
competition law, it is a matter for the Commission's
discretion when investigating an undertaking to choose
between issuing a non-binding (informal) request or a
compulsory order for submission to an investigation.916
In National Panasonic (UK) Ltd. v. Commission917
(hereafter Panasonic) the plaintiff company claimed that
the Commission, by failing to communicate beforehand a
decision ordering an investigation had infringed its
fundamental rights protected under Article 8 ECHR, which
the plaintiff considered applicable mutatis mutandi to
legal persons. In the applicant company's view the EU
Commission had disregarded the rights to notice, to be
heard and to the privacy of the premises (allegedly)
afforded by Article 8 ECHR.
Rights were not without restrictions. The outcome was,
however, that the interference complained of was in
accordance with the ECHR.918 The protection of the public
interest, individual businesses and consumers embodied in
the EU rules of competition outbalanced Panasonic's
rights "to respect to his private and family life, his
home and his correspondence."919 The common law inspired
right to a fair hearing was used to measure the EU
915Jurgen Schwarze, op. cit., 1221.
916Jurgen Schwarze, op. cit., 1220.
917[1980] ECR 2033.
918This balance was similar to those the European Court of Human Rights is normally asked
to perform.
919Article 8 (1) ECHR.
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Commission's practice but in the ECJ's view the searches
without prior notification were covered by Article 8 (2)
ECHR as being a limitation in accordance with the law and
necessary in a democratic society:
[...] it is necessary to point out that Article 8
(2) of the European Convention, in so far as it
applies to legal persons, whilst stating the
principle that public authorities should not
interfere with the exercise of the rights referred
to in Article 8 (1), acknowledges that such
interference is permissible to the extent to which
it 'is in accordance with the law and is necessary
in a democratic society in the interest of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being
of the country, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, or
for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others920
The principle of protection against self incrimination
was considered again in Orkem v. Commission.921 The
applicant company, accused of anti-competitive practices
by the EU Commission, sought the annulment of a decision
requiring certain answers that allegedly amounted to a
confession to an infringement of the competition rules
and as such, a self-incrimination in breach of Article 6
ECHR. The applicant had been asked questions seeking an
acknowledgement of its participation in an agreement
"whose object was to fix selling prices and which was
capable of preventing or restricting competition, or to
state that it intended to achieve that objective" or
which was "intended to limit or control production or
outlets or to share markets."922
In arriving at the conclusion to protect the applicant's
rights, the ECJ followed an approach similar to the
common law principle of no self-incrimination. The ECJ,
respectful of the adversarial proceedings, observed that,
920[1980] ECR 3125, para 19.
921(1989] ECR 3283.
92 2(1989] ECR 3283,3352.
- 350 -
although "neither the wording of [Article 6 ECHR] nor the
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights indicate
that it upholds the right not to give evidence against
oneself"923 the right of defence should be upheld even in
preliminary inquiries and the EU Commission cannot be
allowed to "undermine the rights of defence of the
undertaking concerned" 924 in the course of competition
investigations. The ECJ responded to the need to curb
the powers of the EU Commission in competition procedures
by drawing the line where the Commission appeared to
attempt a reversal of the onus of the proof by way of
compelling Orkem to admit to an infringement which was
incumbent upon the Commission to prove.
Darmon A-G pointed to the common law ancestry of the
principle of no self-incrimination when he wrote,
"reference is readily made to common-law tradition when
speaking of the right not to give evidence against
oneself."925 The principle is usually associated to
common law procedural guarantees, and its goal is the
achievement of "fair play" in adversarial proceedings.
Practices leaning towards an inquisitorial model are
difficult to assimilate under its requirements.
The comparative survey undertaken by the A-G showed,
however, that although "there is common principle
enshrining the right not to give evidence against
oneself" in the legal systems of the member states, he
had to admit that "the principle becomes progressively
less common as one moves away from the area of what I
shall call classic criminal procedure."926 In continental
countries the "autonomy" of the different branches of the
law extends to a lack of unity of method throughout the
923[1989] ECR 3283,3350.
92 4[1989] ECR 3283,3351.
92 E[1989] ECR 3283,3328.
926[1989] ECR 3283,3327.
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legal system as implied in the phrase "common law".927
The ECJ blurred such civilian distinctions and
transferred principles of protection from criminal to
administrative law. As it also happened in other cases
where a potentially grievous administrative action
jeopardised human rights, the ECJ was willing to borrow
from criminal law:
Thus the principles of nulla poena sine lege, ne bis
in idem, in dubio pro reo and nulla poena sine culpa
originally developed under criminal law can also be
applied within administrative law, in particular
where the issue, as in the case of the loss of a
deposit in agricultural law or the imposition of
fines in competition law, concerns not exactly
criminal penalties but at least burdensome
administrative measures.928
The ECJ put in evidence its own civilian "spirit" once
more when it dealt with the rule as an isolated legal
principle to be "applied" to a situation without
elaborate case citations or distinctions or common law
references. Principles are handled at a high level of
abstraction, under the assumption that the legal system
of the EU is a whole from which a solution to a case can
always be found by deductive processes. This approach
applies to principles with common law or civilian
ancestry. Consider, for example, the substantive
principle of proportionality taken from German law and
applied to a human rights issue in Internationale
Handelgesellschaft. Not surprisingly, it was treated in
the same (civilian) way as the principle of no self-
incrimination discussed above or that of audi alteram
partem. The principle of proportionality (as well as
other doctrines of public law) are transplanted by the
ECJ into the legal systems of the member states where
they did not exist originally.929 Rights are usually
927Rene David and Henry P.de Vries, op. cit., 44.
928Jurgen Schwarze, op. cit., 1456.
929Aidan O'Neal and Jason Coppel, op. cit., 46.
- 352 -
balanced against other sets of rights; in this case,
economic freedom was limited in the common interest.
Internationale Handelgesellschaft arose under EU
agricultural regulations on import and export permits for
certain products. If an operation is not performed
within a period of time, a trader would lose its monetary
guarantee. The purpose of the system was to enable the
EU to plan and regulate the volume of imports and exports
of certain goods. In various cases of failure to import
or export, however, the Chamber of the Administrative
Court of Frankfurt had held the invalidity of the EU
rules on forfeiture of the deposits for the reason that
they were contrary to the German constitutional principle
of proportionality. In 1970 that domestic court referred
the case of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft to the ECJ
for a preliminary ruling. The ECJ took the principle
from the hands of the domestic court and held that the
validity of an EU measure could not be affected by an
alleged contravention of fundamental rights embodied in a
member state Constitution or principles of national
constitutional structure, and as a result, the challenged
rules were not found to surpass the bounds of
proportionality.
(b) The legal sources and their handling:
Two points need to be made on the study of sources. One
aspect concerns focusing on the ECJ's borrowing common
law principles by the adjudication process and whether
that determined a shift in the hierarchy of sources as
applied by the ECJ. The other point (the purpose of this
sub-section (b)) is whether the member states can be
treated equally as regards the survey of the laws of the
member states with different constitutional traditions.
The aim is to see whether the constitutional make-up of
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the member states influences the selection, and also,
whether different traditions can be assimilated by the
ECJ.
In stauder v. Sozialamt (Social Welfare Office) der Stadt
Ulm930 the applicant, Mr. Stauder, complained that his
right of privacy and personal dignity had been violated
by one requirement of the Council Regulation which
entitled him to receive inexpensive butter. He was
required to disclose his identity to the person making
the delivery in order to prove that he was on welfare
assistance. The ECJ sympathised with his case and found
a solution stating that, suitably interpreted, the
Regulation did not demand nominative identification and
that other methods of preventing abuse would be
sufficient. The whole issue had arisen because the
German translation of the Regulation was harsher than
other official versions.
The ECJ found that fundamental rights were part of the
unwritten law derived from the common traditions of the
member states, "enshrined in the general principles of
Community law and protected by the Court"931 and
transplanted them to its jurisprudence. The difficulty
lay in the ECJ's lack of clarity in pointing out to the
Constitutions of the member states as a source of law, a
formula which made it difficult to assimilate the
unwritten constitution of the United Kingdom, and also,
the French constitutional text which does not make
specific references to human rights protection.932
93°[1969] ECR 419.
931[1969] ECR 419, 425.
932ln fact, as it was pointed out in Chapter 3 of this dissertation, in the UK where there was no
catalogue of human rights, reference must be made to ordinary legislation and recognised
legal principles and France, lies somewhere in between, civil and political freedoms are
guaranteed by certain constitutional provisions and by legal principles.
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We should turn our attention to another decision. In its
judgment in Nold (2), the ECJ said that "fundamental
rights form an integral part of the principles of law,
the observance of which it ensures"933 and explained that
in safeguarding those rights it was:
bound to draw inspiration from constitutional
traditions common to the Member States, and [...]
Similarly, international treaties for the protection
of human rights on which the Member States have
collaborated or of which they are signatories, can
supply guidelines which should be followed within
the framework of Community law.934
The ECJ also referred to "fundamental rights recognized
and protected by the Constitutions of those Member
States." Not all the member states had written
constitutions in the sense that the expression appeared
to suggest. How could the different traditions be
assimilated? The coupling of these two formulae was
changed in the Panasonic case, where the ECJ reverted to
the open formula, "the constitutional traditions common
to the Member States." Although the main source for
human rights is to be found in constitutional provisions,
not all fundamental rights are expressed there, and even
if the issue is thought of a mere semanticism, it is
nevertheless very important for a court in the
supranational position of the ECJ to pay attention to
detail in order not to leave some member states
unnecessarily out of the process of creation of European
law.935 The reference to all member states indicates a
reference to the British situation and those other
countries where rights are not codified.936 The open
formula was more in line with the recognition that
"generalisations about 'written constitutions' or
'unwritten constitutions' are unfounded, because they
933[1974] ECR 491, 507.
934 [1974] ECR 491, 507.
935M. H. Mendelson, op. cit., 149.
936Joseph H. H. Weiler, op. cit., 1130.
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depend upon a distinction which is misleading and
inexact"937 and as a result, allowed room for the
assimilation of all the EU member states as possible
donors. As the Commission Report pointed out, "many
common features of principle contrast with deep-rooted
differences in the manner in which these fundamental
rights have been elaborated amongst the Member States."938
If we take a step back and look at the approach of the
ECJ, more evidence on another comparative point can be
gathered. Again, the ECJ when trying to find a common
approach or European consensus from where to extract
principles was following the civilian assumption that
there is a coherent system of general rules derived from
a few basic principles from which the solution to any
given situation can be derived.
(c) The division of private and public law:
The dichotomy private versus public law is relevant
before the ECJ. The public law and legal systems of
France and Germany have supplied many general principles
and ways of thought in public law for the EU legal order.
For example, in R v. Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries
and Food ex parte Federation Europeenne de la Sante
Animale (FEDESA) 939 , the Council Directive 88/146/EC
banning certain substances having hormonal action for
livestock farming was attacked on grounds, inter alia,
that legislation should not be retroactive. The ECJ,
following the civilian idea that each branch of the law
has its own particular methodology, made a distinction
between penal and non-penal provisions and established
937Colin R. Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law. (1987), 7.
938"The Protection of Fundamental Rights in the European Community", Commission
report, Bulletin of the European Communities (1976) Supplement 5/76, page 52 et seq.
939(1991) 1 CMLR 507.
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that the former may not have retroactive effect. Thus,
the challenged Council Directive could not be construed
as requiring the member states to adopt measures which
violated that principle and the ECJ found that it would
not sanction criminal proceedings instituted under
national provisions adopted in implementation, and only
on the basis, of the annulled directive. Outside
criminal law, however, retrospectivity is exceptionally
allowed although subject to the protection of the
legitimate expectations of those concerned.940
The treatment of the legal point corresponds to the
doctrine of legitimate expectations, which has French
ancestry.941 One cannot assume, however, that there are
always unconditional civilian and common law positions on
each issue of law. In 1991, when this case was decided,
the House of Lords had already decided (in 1984) the case
Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil
Service942 where this (civilian) doctrine had been
accepted in English public law. Therefore this doctrine
is not completely alien to the common law tradition of
the United Kingdom. It has already been argued in this
dissertation that the legal traditions are drawing closer
in many areas, and under the increased contacts between
them, some cases may be in contrast to changes taking
place in their own legal systems of origin.943
940[iggi] 1 CMLR 507, 537.
94ijurgen Schwarze, op. cit., 1438.
942[1984] 3 All ER 935.
943similar observation was made in Quebec family law cases concerning the custody of
children heard by the Supreme Court of Canada. Some of the civilian judges sitting in the
Supreme Court were prepared to decide against the natural parents of a child when it
appeared to be in the child's interest his being left in a home other than that of his natural
parents for a variety of reasons. The Quebec Civil Code (following the civilian tradition)
stressed that a child remains under the authority of his parents until he comes of age, but
legal changes as regards custody of children were taking place in the legal system of Quebec
itself. See, for further details: Peter H. Russel, The Supreme Court of Canada as a Bilingual
and Bicultural Institution. (1969),186-7.
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Take another example. Marguerite Johnston v. Chief
Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary944 (hereafter
Johnston) concerns the issue of the supremacy of EU law
over national law. Directives in general obligate the
member states to produce an end result. All authorities,
included the courts of the member states for matters
within their jurisdiction, are duty-bound to achieve the
results envisaged by a Directive. The member states
differ in what is considered to be a part of the state
and therefore the tension between unity and diversity
makes it difficult to assimilate different traditions in
the fold of a jurisprudence which can be shared equally
by all member states. In general, public law in the
United Kingdom does not provide for appeals against a
discretionary decision of a minister involving issues of
national policy. Johnston dealt with the right to be
heard on appeal against an administrative decision made
by a minister. The applicant challenged the legality of
the policy of not issuing firearms to female members of
the R.U.C. under domestic law.945 The ECJ ruled that
Article 6 of the Equal Treatment Directive had to be
interpreted in the light of accepting judicial control as
a reflection of a the general principle of law underlying
the constitutional traditions common to the member states
and which was also laid down in Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.
For these reasons, a certificate issued by a Secretary of
State in the United Kingdom could not be accepted as
conclusive evidence that there was a justification for
not treating men and women equally on grounds of national
security or policy considerations.
The United Kingdom was bound to award judicial review in
the field of EU law946 even if it was normally unavailable
for cases outside that area of the law. The domestic
944(1986) 3 CMLR 240.
945Article 53 (2) of the Sex Discrimination (Northern Ireland) Order 1976.
946john Temple Lang, op. cit., 27.
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statute made to implement the Directive was held to be
legally ineffectual because it did not comply with the
requirements of Article 6 of the Equal Treatment
Directive nor Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, by which everyone
whose rights are violated is entitled to an effective
remedy before a judicial body.
Conclusions
Lord Denning's play on words went "Just as in Rome, you
should do as Rome does. So in the European Community,
you should do as the European Court does."947 Then, what
does the ECJ do in the area of human rights applied
within the sphere of EU law? This chapter attempted an
answer from the point of view of the uses and effects of
the comparative method on a selected group of ECJ
judgments dealing with human rights protection, where the
application of the ECHR through EU law was studied from
the viewpoint of the solutions and ways of thought
related to the legal traditions.
Maastricht described human rights as general principles.
It recognised statutorily what the ECJ had achieved by
way of jurisprudence alone. Before Maastricht, however,
the work of the ECJ in transplanting human rights to the
EU legal order could have been comparable to the creation
of French administrative law through the jurisprudence of
the Council of State. Nonetheless, despite the
recognition of fundamental rights, the cases have usually
been resolved on the basis of EU law alone or the rights
were limited in the EU interest. There is some truth in
the criticisms voiced on the ECJ's "not taking rights
seriously" on the basis of the apparent priority given to
947Buchanan & Co. v. Babco Forwarding & Shipping Ltd. , [1977] QB 208, 214.
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the needs of European integration over the protection of
fundamental rights.
Almost unavoidably for a court in a multicultural
setting, the comparative method resorted to by the ECJ in
the field of human rights has enhanced its decision
making capabilities by taking principles from both sides
of the divide between the traditions. The main
contribution of the common law has been in the field of
procedural law, furnishing the ECJ with procedural
elements pointing in the direction of (further) openness
and fairness of the proceedings. The ECJ has struck down
practices of EU organs or the member states that did not
live up to those standards. That the common law made a
contribution in the procedural field is hardly
surprising, since it is the field where this tradition is
at its strongest and besides, a similar kind of influence
was experienced by other "mixed" legal systems. The ECJ
is beginning to resemble more and more a court in a
"mixed" jurisdiction, at least in the area of human
rights, although not all traditions and differences are
easy to assimilate. The ECJ, in the field of human
rights protection, appeared transplanting outlooks and
values from one tradition to the other by resorting to
the comparative method.
The ECJ revealed its civilian ancestry, however,
particularly when it sensed a loophole in human rights
protection in the system of EU law and moved in to fill
in the gap, probably guided by the civilian notion that a
legal system is a whole from which principles can always
be derived. The same situation happened when it applied
common law inspired principles according to methods
related to the civilian tradition. The common law
contribution in the area of procedural law has
nevertheless not involved a parallel change in the
methodology of decision-making nor made exigencies
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towards a radical departure from the (civilian) hierarchy
of norms the ECJ tends to "apply" to each situation. The
ECJ itself is a result of a "mix" of the legal traditions
of the member states and its human rights jurisprudence
is a blend of their outlooks and traditions. The tension




Even the most realistic photograph
is not the same as the
subject...948
This chapter closes the dissertation and poses again the
question with which we began - "Is there a European law
of human rights?" The answer is in the affirmative, but
qualified. There is, of course, an apparent paradox in
the picture that comes out of a first encounter with the
stacks of human rights law reports in the Library. It
makes us wonder whether there is indeed one European
"common law" of human rights, created by the European
Court of Human Rights, shared by all the member states of
the Council of Europe and which is, more or less,
contained in those books. But that first (misleading)
impression soon vanishes in view of the diversity of
systems and remedies in existence. The reality to be
reckoned with is one where there is not one but a variety
of overlapping systems of protection of civil liberties.
What is the effect on interpretation by judges and
lawyers of such a multiplicity of systems? An
environment permeated by legal diversity makes
interpretation swing like a pendulum between unity and
diversity. To understand the present situation we need
to acknowledge that its hallmark is tension and
discrepancy: there is pulling and ambivalence between the
aspiration to uniformity, which is implied in the
question of the title of this dissertation, and the
acknowledgement of diversity, which is accepted in its
subtitle. The purpose of this final chapter is therefore
to delineate the factors already analysed to see their
948Ansel Adams. The Camera. (1980), 1.
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various influences; the approach is synthetic rather than
analytic.
This thesis gave an account of the correlation of the
interpretation of the law of the ECHR with the Western
legal traditions represented by the various legal systems
that come together in Strasbourg. It concentrated on the
"traditionally" different responses they give to legal
problems and how those are accommodated in a "European"
context. As Professor MacCormick has pointed out, there
is a cluster of systems interacting and overlapping in
the European environment; as such, this multiplicity
points to a conception of the law which is diffuse and
lacks a single origin.949 As regards human rights
protection, in addition to the national law arrangements
and approaches, there is the system of the United Nations
and in Western Europe, the protection of rights by the EU
system (although the latter will deal with human rights
only as long as such issues touch upon questions of EU
law) .
The comparative method helped to make visible the effects
of the multiplicity of the available systems on the
interpretation of human rights law. On the basis of the
theory of legal families, a first step in making sense
out of this diversity was to group the legal systems of
the member states in the two well-known categories: the
civil law and the common law. Both traditions meet in
Strasbourg and "mix" in the process of decision-making
(despite the many differences separating them) in a
situation sufficiently remarkable (because of those
differences) to interest the comparatist.
The methodology for this study did not consist in the
preparation of a list of (artificial) characteristics to
9 4 9Neil MacCormick, "Beyond the Sovereign State", (1993) 56 MLR 1,8.
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"oppose" the civil law to the common law; such an
oversimplified and sweeping approach would have had
little meaning. Rather, it involved looking for
tendencies operating in the systems which can explain
choices made or inclinations present in the style or the
reasoning. The experience of mixed jurisdictions helped
in the definition of the method of study and the
comparison started on the foundation that the civil law
and the common law still differ in their underlying
assumptions. The comparative problems in the case law of
the European Court were classified under the following
labels: the general structure of the legal system
(considering the legal sources and their handling and the
cases where aspects of the legal system per se is
affecting the human rights of the individuals), the
procedural law and the rules of evidence.
On the other hand, the emphasis of this work on the
comparative elements does not imply that those were
understood as the only determinants of the result of a
case nor that the comparative method captured all the
aspects involved in the interpretation of the Convention
law. Other elements influence the outcomes as well, such
as more or less overtly recognised policy considerations,
both in Strasbourg and in the member states, the use of
the doctrine of the margin of appreciation or the
periodic necessity to pay due respect to national
characteristics, to name a few.
On several occasions the European Court appeared to try
to assimilate the various legal systems in one
jurisprudence which could be evenly shared by all,
although in some cases this proved impossible. The
construction of human rights law stands therefore at an
interpretative cross-roads because the European Court, on
the one hand, yields sometimes to the pragmatic need to
make allowances for the different approaches of a variety
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of legal systems, from which it also draws inspiration,
but on the other, it seeks uniformity, which, in turn,
sets its sights high towards the tantalising archetype of
a single system of protection. Such a belief on the part
of the Court is also a practical tool of interpretation
because it gives a sense of direction to its work. The
case law showed, however, that the pull towards
uniformity is not sufficiently powerful to erase all the
differences between the systems of protection of human
rights or to neutralise their effect on interpretation.
Consider a representative group of cases which illustrate
the tensions between the traditions in a microcosm.
Under the title "The general strueture of the legal
system of the respondent member state", two aspects were
observed. The first concerned the legal sources and
their handling. This aspect was studied in the cases
addressing the meaning of "law", NSunday Times Case No.
I950 , Kruslin v. France951 and Huvig v. France952 where the
Court managed to assimilate both traditions under the
same line of jurisprudence. The other aspect concerned
the situation where a particular feature of a legal
system was affecting the human rights of the individuals
and where the European Court had to dwell on detailed
administrative aspects of the laws of the member states
as a result of which it could not produce a jurisprudence
capable of being evenly shared by both traditions. These
cases dealt with the issue of Article 8 and 12 ECHR and
the rights of transsexuals to the recognition of their
"new" identity: Rees v. United Kingdom, Cossey v. United
Kingdom993 and B. v. France, 954 Under a second title, "The
procedural law of the member states", some common law
inspired "bench-marks" built in the ECHR were "applied"
950(1979-80) 2 EHRR 245
951(1990) 12 EHRR 547.
952(1990) 12 EHRR 528.
953(1991) 13 EHRR 622.
954(1993) 16 EHRR 1.
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by a majority of civilian judges according to a civil law
inspired procedure and method and, as a result, some
civilian (or civil law based) institutions failed the
test. For example, some domestic rules of evidence
clashed with Article 6 ECHR. The inquisitorial
underpinnings of the "por reproducida" procedure in
Spain, in the case Barbera, Messegue and Jabardo v.
Spain955 did not meet the ECHR standards. The right to
cross-examine witnesses guaranteed in Article 6 ECHR made
the Court reject the system of witnesses tout court,
typical of the continental procedure. The system, in
both Unterpentiger v. Austria956 and Kostovski v. The
Netherlands, 957 failed the test. The importance of the
appearances was discussed in Borgers v. Belgium958 which
reversed the previous Delcourt v. Belgium959 on grounds
that the institution of the Ministere Public did not
appear sufficiently fair. Further, the inquisitorial
assumptions behind the system of Austrian "croquis" which
involved the submission by the Procureur of a proposal of
a decision was also set aside on similar grounds in
Brands tetter v. Austria. 960 The civilian tendency of
keeping one (original) copy of the accused's file, was
discussed in Toth v. Austria961 and was deemed not to
fulfil the requirements of the ECHR. Finally, the Dutch
"Crown Appeal" procedure before the Council of State, was
addressed in Benthem v. The Netherlands962 (and
sidestepped in Oerlemanns963 ) where the Court insisted on
the Convention requirements of due process and the
institution was found wanting in this respect.
955(1988) 11 EHRR 360.
956(1991) 13 EHRR 175.
957(1990) 12 EHRR 434.
958(1993) 15 EHRR 92.
9 59(1979-80) 1 EHRR 355,
9 60(1993) 15 EHRR 378.
961(1991) 14 EHRR 551.
962(1986) 8 EHRR 1.
9 6 3(42/1990/233/299).
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Further clashes between the traditions were observable in
cases dealing with the important differences between what
is good administration in the different member states.
The gulf between the civilian countries and the United
Kingdom on the distinction between investigation by the
police and that performed by the (continental)
investigative judges had repercussions in Strasbourg.
Specifically, the differences between the Court and the
United Kingdom over judicial control in cases of pre¬
trial detention in a situation of emergency were
discussed in Brogan v. United Kingdom964 with the result
that the respondent government entered a notice of
derogation.
In many instances, however, the Court was successful in
"transplanting" standards from one tradition to the other
through the "application" of the ECHR to a situation. As
a result, it introduced further elements of due process
and of the appearances of a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR)
which are basic tenets of the common law, and insisted on
the need for respect of the contents of Article 5 ECHR
(which carries the common law model of the protection of
personal liberty in its rather detailed requirements) in
jurisdictions where those principles were absent or
treated less emphatically. Although in some areas the
common law and the civil law are gradually moving closer
even in their methods and techniques - and the European
Court's "sideways transplants" may contribute to this
result in some measure - yet the point of complete
assimilation has not been reached and, of course, it may
never be reached.
More problematically, the study of these cases also
revealed the effect of another "comparative" aspect: the
human rights organs in Strasbourg are composed of people
964(1989) 11 EHRR 117.
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who have been appointed from the various member states
and their presence contributes to a measure of - perhaps
subconscious - "transplantation" of legal thinking. The
case law revealed the influence of the background and
legal training of the judges of the European Court in
decision-making. Although the judges exercise their
initiative, carry out skilled improvisations on occasion
and usually seem to work as a "team", they are at times
reluctant to leave hold of the methods and techniques
they learnt in their own legal systems. Writing in 1972
after Strasbourg ruled on the Delcourt case, K.
Nadelmann965 said that the individual reputation and
prestige of each of the judges could not make up for the
risks involved in requesting them to decide issues of
particularly local966 (i.e. national), and not general,
law.967 The very diverse backgrounds of the judges and
the fact that they did not sit together regularly enough
added to the hazards, in his opinion. By reading the
case law one can observe that the European judges are
however very careful to demonstrate that they had
understood the case at hand, perhaps because they are
conscious of being a body of "outsiders" with no special
knowledge of the internal law and practice of the various
domestic legal systems.968 Some authors suggest that the
varied backgrounds of the judges and the distance from
the cases give them a more balanced and objective view of
the issues.969
965K. Nadelmann, id., 514.
966ln a conversation with Strasbourg Court judges from continental Europe: they spoke of
the British legal system without making distinctions as to the different legal systems of the
United Kingdom.
967The judges sitting at the European Court of Human Rights spend each year close to 135
days in Strasbourg and on preparatory work at home. Rolv Ryssdal, The future of the
Furopean Court of Human Rights. European Court of Human Rights: Report #
ECOUR90296.AB (1990), p. 1.
968J. G. Merrills, op. cit, 29.
969Francis G. Jacobs, "The Convention and the English judge", in: F. Matscher and H.
Petzold (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension. Studies in honour of
Gerard J. Wiarda. (1988), 277.
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The situation in Strasbourg is, in this respect, similar
to the ECJ, because the judges bring to the bench the
conceptual background and the instinctive reactions they
have developed in the course of their law careers in
their legal systems. "Almost subconsciously, therefore,
comparative law must be influencing their interpretative
function"970 and it is not surprising that the
jurisprudence revealed that, through the agency of a
diverse bench, the member states appear to have borrowed
legal elements from one another in a movement of
"sideways" transplantation of standards. Rudolph
Bernhardt wrote appropriately that "(...) a comparison is
guaranteed at least to some degree by the fact that
human-rights organs are usually composed of lawyers from
different States and different legal orders, and their
experience and knowledge contribute to a measure of
comparative analysis."971 The various judges by the mere
fact of working together at the European Court can draw
the attention of their colleagues to at least some of the
many procedures tenable in law. The same sort of
opportunities for this form of comparative method were
seen in the biculturalism of the Supreme Court of Canada
by one of its justices:
Perhaps to one who has not had access to the
conferences of the Court, it might be hard to
realize the unique service rendered, in the course
of the discussions, by the Judges raised in one or
the other system of law endeavouring to secure from
brother Judges explanations on the meaning and
purport of some articles of the Quebec Civil Code,
or likewise, of some precedents under the Common
Law. When one has been accustomed to a particular
aspect of his law, he is most apt to take for
granted a particular interpretation, which, very
often he has ceased to take the trouble of
analyzing. But if he is asked to give some
97 °L. Neville Brown and Francis Jabobs, The Court of Justice of the European
Communities. 3r. ed. (1989), 284.
971Rudolph Bernhardt, "Thoughts on the interpretation of human rights treaties" in: F.
Matscher and H. Petzold (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: The European Dimension.
Studies in honour of Gerard J. Wiarda. (1988), 67.
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explanation of it, then he is compelled to go deeper
into the reason for his interpretation; and one
cannot begin to appreciate to what extent and how
much more thorough becomes his grasp of the
intention of the legislator.972
The whole environment where the Convention operates is
conducive to the engagement of the different legal
traditions in a "dialectical relationship":
The Convention is drafted to control and influence
the behaviour of states. Its notions are frequently
wide and vague. They must be interpreted and
clarified by the Convention organs. Those organs do
not operate in a vacuum. Their members are
influenced by their national context, their
juridical background and many other factors. There
is a constant meeting of different judicial
traditions and standards in these organs.973
Perhaps it can be said that the Court finds a middle
ground or compromise between the various systems when
passing judgment and that the judges seem to have
developed a shared "legal common sense" which enables
them to work together. Further, they may also have
become a team and give themselves to co-operation to a
degree that differences are minimised. Similarly, in
1970, the ECJ judge Pierre Pescatore played down the
importance of national habits and training of the (all
civilian) judges sitting at the Luxembourg Court:
...in fact, it appears that in spite of the
differences among the legal systems in the six
countries, which should not be underrated, the
factor of national tendencies has appeared to be
practically of very little moment inside the Court.
Individual factors such as specialization in
different fields of law, as well as past
professional experience tend to override influences
coming from the distinctive features of the national
legal background of each one. Attitudes are
97jThe Right Honourable Thibaudeau Rinfret, "Reminiscences from the Supreme Court of
Canada", (1956) 3 McGill L. J. 1, 2.
973Jochen A. Frowein, "The European Convention on Human Rights as the Public Order of
Europe", in: Andrew Clapham and Frank Emmert (eds.), Collected Courses of the Academy
of European Law: 1990: The Protection of Human Rights in Europe. (1992), 305.
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determined by the substance of the problems and not
by national bias.974
In addition, this writer also noticed that the fact that
most of the Strasbourg judges have to draft and discuss
issues in a second or third language instead of their
mother tongue acts as an equalising element that may help
in their coming together.
What is the general perception of the Strasbourg
officials? Their view seems to be that the diversity of
origins of the judges does not affect the decision-making
process of the Court adversely. A senior official at the
Registry said that the main difference he had noticed was
that some judges have a preference for oral trials over
written procedure. Concerning the lawyers pleading
before the Court, he said that he noticed only that
academic lawyers seemed to have more difficulties with
the procedures than their colleagues in practice.
To what extent, then, do the cases reviewed confirm those
views? Do the multiplicity of legal orders from which
the judges are drawn and also, their own legal knowledge,
training and "lawyerly instincts", have an effect on the
outcomes? The appointment of judges from many legal
systems may offset the tendency to use domestic
experience indiscriminately in dealing with "foreign"
problems, which is one of the pitfalls of the comparative
method in general.975 In some instances, as for example,
in those dealing with the "autonomous" concepts, the case
law showed that the judges cast aside habits acquired in
the context of their national legal systems.976 On
97 4 Pierre Pescatore, speech given at the Annual Banquet of the British Chamber of
Commerce for Belgium and Luxembourg in Brussels, February 5, 1970.
975Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Hans W. Baade, Mirjan R. Damaska and Peter Herzog,
Cor, iparative Law: Cases - Text - Materials. (1988), 890.
97 6See, as regards the ECJ: T. Koopmans 'The Birth of European Law at the Crossroads
of Legal Traditions" (1991) AJCL 493, 499-500, a situation also observed by Peter de
Cruz, A Modern Approach to Comparative Law. (1993),17.
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occasion, a similar observation was made as regards the
way the cases were handled procedurally, as in Fejde v.
Sweden977 where a body of mostly civilian judges
distinguished it from Ekbetani978 in a manner common
lawyers would be comfortable with.
Unfortunately, some other cases revealed that things do
not always run smoothly. Unlike the ECJ, the Strasbourg
system admits dissenting, partly dissenting or separate
opinions, a situation which works to our advantage as it
served the purpose of making visible such difficulties.
As far back as 1968, in his dissent in Wemhoff979 , Judge
Zekia indirectly made the point that he might have
decided according to common law concepts: "Coming from a
country [Cyprus] where the system of common law obtains,
I might unwittingly have been influenced by this
system."980 Judge Martens' dissent in Borgers v.
Belgium981 highlighted the connection between the outcome
of the case and the composition of the Court. The point
of the Netherlands' judge was that, for those of his
brethren unacquainted with the institution of the
Ministere Public, Borgers (and also Delcourt) became a
case concerning the fundamental principles of fair trial,
while for those with a grasp of the Ministere's role,
there was no threat to the due process of law in sight.
The absence of Ministere Public in many of the judges'
domestic jurisdictions and therefore, their unfamiliarity
with the institution, might have led them to bring in the
common law concept of the importance of the appearances
to resolve the case:
... the Court is confronted in a double sense with
various procedural systems: its members have been
schooled in different procedural traditions and those
977(1994) 17 EHRR 14.
97 8(1991) 13 EHRR 504.
97 9(1978-1979) 1 EHRR 55.
980(1978-1979) 1 EHRR 55, Judge Zekia's dissenting opinion, para. 18.
981(1993) 15 EHRR 92.
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of the respondent State permeate the issues under
Article 6 (1). It may be that those who are
completely unfamiliar with a particular procedural
institution will be more readily inclined to find it
incompatible with the requirements of "fair trial"
than those who form part of the same tradition ...
In Borgers the foundations on which the institution of
the Ministere Public rested were part of the "logic" of
an entire family of legal systems, and therefore, "... it
is quite something for an international court to hold
that the very proceedings (in criminal cases) before the
highest court in one of the member States are "unfair"
"982
Moreover, there are other cases where the judges are very
reluctant to depart from their national legal training.
The point is that lawyers, by practising (and having been
educated) in a legal system develop a particular
intuition of how legal institutions work according to
that system.983 This wisdom, together with, perhaps, some
acquired automatic reactions, makes them more efficient
professionals in their own legal culture. The
complication appears, however, when they go across the
boundaries and their national legal outlook colours their
views and moreover - to stretch the point slightly - one
may wonder whether their national training leads them to
misunderstand a "foreign" system.984 The influence of the
judges' national perspectives is evident in the
disagreements over the right to a public hearing in the
982(1993) 15 EHRR 92, Judge Martens' dissenting opinion, para .4.1.
983Rudolf B. Schlesinger et al., op. cit., 890.
984The issue of properly understanding a "foreign" legal system was raised in Canada as
regards the Supreme Court's hearing appeals from the civilian system of Quebec. Unlike
the situation in the European Court, in Canada common law judges are the majority of those
sitting in the Supreme Court bench. Apparently, then, there was a risk that a majority of
common law judges could reverse a decision of a Quebec court of appeal (which could have
been reached unanimously) in issues governed by the civil law. This concern delayed the
establishment of the Supreme Court until 1875, and led to the increase in the
representation of judges drawn from Quebec from two to three in 1949 so when a civil law
appeal was heard it was possible to convene a bench of five judges with a majority of
civilians in order to protect the distinctiveness of Quebec. For further details see: Peter W.
Hogg, Constitutional Law of Canada. 2nd.ed., (1985),174 and 186.
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case Hennings v. Germany.985 The main point of
discrepancy between the majority and minority took place
where the legal traditions offered different solutions.
Judge Walsh, a common law practitioner and judge, stood
against the majority as he held on to a "no exceptions"
policy towards the right to a public hearing. In
general, the common law tradition tends to place a
special emphasis on the right to a hearing. As a
consequence, this judge applied a different standard with
the result that, in his opinion, Germany had violated
Article 6 (1) ECHR. His position required the
conclusion, which he did not deny, that although "the
offences [were] classed as minor offences"986 a right to a
hearing was to be granted.987 For the (civilian)
majority, conversely, the case was merely an issue of
procedural expediency where Germany was not in breach of
the ECHR. This case concerned a Mr. Hennings who ran
into problems on a train ride from Kufstein in Austria to
Munich in Germany, had an angry exchange of words with a
ticket collector and was finally fined. The Strasbourg
Court determined that the authorities could not be held
responsible for barring Mr. Hennings' access to a court
in the circumstances of the case: the applicant had
failed to take the necessary steps to ensure receipt of
his mail (he had lost the key to his mailbox) and
therefore, had missed the opportunity to file an
objection or seek a reinstatement of the proceedings
within the time-limits set down in German law.
All in all, the study of the jurisprudence outlined the
(subconscious) comparative aspect which also shapes
Convention interpretation and is brought "bottom-up" to
985(1993) 16 EHRR 83.
986(1993) 16 EHRR 83, Judge Walsh's dissenting opinion.
987This pattern of reasoning is repeated, on the issue of the waiver of the right to a hearing,
in para. 2 of his dissenting opinion in Schuler-Zgraggen v. Switzerland, for example. (1993)
16 EHRR 405.
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the European Court through the different backgrounds and
traditions of its members.988
In addition, the comparative method performed a double
task in this work. It was discussed as a tool of
interpretation989 resorted to by the European Court in the
process of decision-making and it was the approach used
in the analysis in order to enable conclusions on the
legal traditions shaping adjudication to be drawn. The
comparative method used as a tool of research was, in
this sense, "extracted" from the work of the Court
itself.
The use of the comparative method by the European Court
raised the issue of the legitimacy of a non-elected body
grafting elements from another legal tradition into the
member states' legal systems. Moreover, if we step back
and look at the cases from a distance, they all bear the
marks of a supranational judicial review of state
behaviour. In this dissertation, the judicial review of
member state conduct was equated to the work of a
Constitutional Court in domestic law. Such evidence as
was found suggested a transfer of the grounds for
protection by a higher law in domestic law to a
supranational level. The European Court has become a
powerful force for change and innovation by putting
pressure on the member states to align their practices
with the ECHR. It adjudicates on issues concerning a
supranational Bill of Rights written in open-ended
988Moreover, this "subconscious" influence on adjudication has been recognised as one
of the very many indicators of the influence of the judges in shaping the law through
interpretation. This "symptomatic" point has of course been made as regards the
confirmation process of the candidates to the Supreme Court of the United States. This is
partly because it is recognised that the nature of constitutional interpretation gives them
considerable leeway to shape the law:"... the appointment of a Supreme Court justice and
the confirmation process before the Senate must take account of the following truth: the
nature of constitutional interpretation in the process of adjudication inevitably means that
constitutional law is shaped, influenced, indeed made by those authorized to interpret.
This is not a dirty little secret." (Harry W. Wellington, Interpreting the Constitution: The
Supreme Court and the Process of Adjudication. (1990), 153.)
9 8 QPeter de Cruz, A Modern Approach to Comparative Law. (1993),17.
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language which was created to last for future
generations, hence teleology is called in so as to
provide the sort of continuing protection that a national
Constitution provides for individual freedom. The
European Court tends not to support finding the intention
of the drafters as a method of interpretation.
In some measure, the ECHR can be depicted as the
foundation of a lus commune based on the common culture
and common interests shared by the member states. The
protection of human rights is part of a wider framework
of public law which is becoming increasingly European in
the sense that the Convention system is striving to
establish an ordre public europeen, 990 but it is conceded
that it is still too early to speak in such terms. The
issue of harmonisation, unification or approximation of
law touches upon another dilemma that faces all the
institutions looking for European union, i.e. the limits
to be imposed on the autonomy of the member states.
The picture that emerged from this research was that of
the "European" human rights system of the Council of
Europe being a framework shared by many countries (and
their legal systems), striving to accommodate plurality
(with more or less success according to the case) but
without replacing the domestic systems of protection.
The pattern observed was that of the promotion of
harmonisation and approximation but without eliminating
the diversity of the legal systems of the member states,
for the Court "is not moving towards a single 'European'
system but it has put down markers for the States."991 It
is not necessary to harmonise all legislation if the goal
is to "unite Europe." It is clear, then, that in such a
task the issues of comparative law are central to the
990A. Z. Drzemczewski, European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law: A
Comparative Study. (1988), 19.
991Colin Warbrick, "The European Convention on Human Rights", (1989) 9 YEL 385, 411.
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process of interpreting and applying the law. The
analysis of interpretation at the European Court,
however, cannot be used to predict the outcome of
individual cases for the reason that many factors
(including extra-legal ones) operate in conjunction in
the decision-making process in any tribunal.
Consequently, it is argued that although interpretation
of the rules does not entirely determine the outcomes, it
certainly influences them as was shown in this work.
The European Court develops its jurisprudence between the
pull towards a maximum and a minimum requirement of
protection. A number of trends are at work: the idea of
further European integration pitted against the concern
for respecting national diversity as translated into the
different answers given to a legal question by the
systems of the member states; the wishes of the applicant
versus those of the respondent government; a wide versus
a narrow margin of appreciation, the latter depending, in
turn, on an "acid test" also prepared by means of the
comparative method (i.e. the existence or not of a
"European consensus" on a certain matter). On some
occasions, the European Court manages to assimilate the
legal traditions under the umbrella of one "European"
blended jurisprudence. At times, however, the Court
appeared powerless to stop the member states from acting
independently. The situation led us to conclude that,
contradictory though it may seem, success in establishing
a single system of human rights would involve a failure
since heterogeneity is a source of inspiration for the
Strasbourg system to operate. It was observed that a
complex process of mutual transplantations of rules and
legal methodology takes place between the legal
traditions.
All that intricacy was put into manageable terms in this
work by the metaphor of "transplants", comparable with a
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photograph that "flattens" the three dimensions of the
world into two. This dissertation proposed the adoption
of the figure of "transplants of laws" as an aid to the
study of human rights law. The metaphor (coined several
years ago to explain situations in which laws were
"borrowed" from a legal system and "incorporated" into
another) simplifies, for the argument's sake, the complex
interconnections and migratory routes of principles and
underpinnings exchanged between the legal systems and the
traditions. The metaphor was mixed with the idea of an
"incoming tide" to imply that the relationship between
overlapping legal systems is in constant movement.
Unlike the experience of legal transplants in colonial
Africa, where local inhabitants had (almost) no part in
the process of "transplantation" of metropolitan law, in
the European law of human rights there are two main
groups of "transplants", "bottom-up" and "top-down."
The judgments of the European Court "export" standards to
the constitutional orders of the member states in a "top-
down" fashion. These standards can set limits to the
power of governments in a sweeping range of issues:
privacy, freedom of speech, immigration, minority rights,
nationalisation of business, prevention of terrorism,
clandestine surveillance by security forces, legal status
of single parents and their children, child care,
education, administrative complaints, trade union rights,
prison rules and so on. In addition, the tests carried
out in Strasbourg are grounded on concepts with distinct
"autonomous" meanings, such as: "criminal charge",
"mental patient", "conviction", "determination of his
civil rights and obligations", "detention", "deprived of
his liberty", "law", "judge or other officer authorised
by law to exercise judicial power", "witness" and many
others. Strasbourg does not understand the meaning of
these expressions in terms of the domestic law of the
member state in which they come in issue. In addition,
- 378 -
as is the case of a Constitution, these concepts are not
historically specific conceptions, therefore the views of
the drafters of the ECHR, even if known, will not
necessarily determine interpretation.
Another form of "top-down" "transplantation" is by means
of incorporating into domestic law the combination of
rules and principles laid out in both statutory (the ECHR
and the ratified Protocols), and case law form.
Nonetheless, in spite of non-incorporation, as soon as
the right of individual petition is granted, the ECHR has
proved capable of permeating some of its effects all the
way down to domestic law, and to the minds of legal
practitioners. A survey of national law reports showed
that the attitudes of national courts in relation to the
ECHR vary considerably from country to country and,
similarly, their statute books revealed different
positions for the ECHR in municipal law. Although the
influence of the ECHR is not negligible even where it is
not a part of national law, the infiltration proved
nevertheless laborious. It was impossible to conclude
with complete assurance that the ECHR had precedence over
national law. On the other hand, the continuous
reference to the Convention by the national courts
appears to be the key to further harmonisation. At least
national judges stopped to ponder how far the Strasbourg
decisions were binding on them whenever the ECHR was
pleaded by the complainants and their lawyers.
The research on the infiltration of the ECHR in national
law brought together sources from three domestic
countries. The situation and operation of the ECHR was
different in each jurisdiction. To begin with, many
(local) constitutional arguments served the purpose of
holding back the penetration of the ECHR. In the United
Kingdom many suggested the entrenchment of a Bill of
Rights as a possible solution, although this option
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clearly runs counter to the traditional constitutional
argument of continuing parliamentary sovereignty. Across
the English Channel, the doctrine of the inviolability of
statutes influenced the French judiciary so much that as
late as 1989 (when the Council of State passed judgment
in Nicolo992 ) the three supreme courts were not agreed on
the position of international law, and hence the ECHR, in
municipal law. Nevertheless, after 1989 the French have
the edge on the British (and the Italians) as there is
more room for a "complicity" between Strasbourg and their
national courts. In Italy, the weakness of Convention
law, which is attributable to its vulnerability to
posterior laws, makes the ECHR's position rather
vacillating and, unsurprisingly, the difficulties
appeared to have driven many citizens, as is the case of
the United Kingdom, to look for redress in Strasbourg.
In taking cases to Strasbourg the applicants prompt
further "top-down" transplantation of principles and
standards to the member states. This transplantation is
also "sideways" as seen in the case law discussed in this
dissertation because the Court transfers values and
principles from one legal tradition to the other through
its comparative method.
Although the Strasbourg procedure itself appeared to be
closer to the civilian tradition it did not prevent the
operation of the common law inspired procedural devices
of the ECHR or the use of legal thinking from the common
law (e.g. the importance of the appearances, due process
and so on). Likewise, the common law concepts of the
ECHR, particularly in the area of procedural law have not
involved a parallel change in the methodology of decision
making nor made demands for a radical departure from the
(civilian) hierarchy of norms applied by the European
992Roger Errera, "Recent Decisions of the French Conseil d'Etat", [1990] PL 134.
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Court. Following the approach of the civilian tradition,
the European Court handles its own case law as
jurisprudence constante without the elaborate case
citations or distinctions characteristic of the common
law. A preference for a deductive approach to legal
justification was detected in the layout of the judgments
with two premises leading necessarily to a conclusion
(dispositif). This style became all the more noticeable
when confronted with those dissenting opinions written by
common lawyers. The Court clings to a deductive model of
argumentation that grounds justification on the
Convention's rules instead of relying on substantive
reasons elaborated by the judges and set down in the
judgment itself. It is suggested that shifting the
present position of the "centre of gravity" of
justification towards the judgments could strengthen the
authority of the European Court in all its endeavours.
Bearing witness to the complexity of the connections and
to the fact that all the member states can
("democratically") participate in the creation of human
rights law, there is also a "bottom-up" "transplantation"
from the national legal systems to the European Court.
We should not forget that the cases have already been
argued in municipal lav; and the wide differences between
the national legal systems have to be dealt with in
Strasbourg - for example, a particular legal vocabulary,
categories to organise and systematise rules, national
techniques of interpretation and a legal system's
structures, sources, hierarchies, courts, organisation of
the legal profession and so on, which are different in
each member state.993 The Court also borrows principles
from the member states' legal orders namely, the
principles of "proportionality", of the "accessibility
993E. Orucu, "An exercise on the internal logic of legal systems" (1987) 7 Legal Studies
310, 310.
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and previsibility of the law" and of the "balance" of the
interests involved.
The "European consensus" involves another type of
"bottom-up" transplantation of standards, values,
principles and legal thinking, which are "discovered" by
means of the comparative method and incorporated into the
process of decision-making. This "common law" results of
a comparative survey from the laws of at least some of
the member states. The European Court usually
acknowledges it by resorting to generalisations such as
"the law of the member States of the Council of Europe",
"the law of the Contracting States" or some other similar
wording to express the notion that the practices of
(various) member states point in a certain direction
which is then taken as one of the guidelines for deciding
the case.
The figure of "transplants" also helps to see the ECHR
itself as a piece of legislation which is not "tradition-
neutral." The legal traditions left their marks in the
drafting process as a result of which the legal text is
rather like "patch-work design" because its standards
came ("boctom-up") from both sides of the legal divide,
although the actual combination of elements may have been
chosen on political grounds. In the diplomatic
negotiations leading to the drafting of the ECHR, the
split between the civilian and common law traditions
appeared as a struggle between two perspectives, which
were given the names "enumeration theory" supported by
the civilians and the "definition theory" favoured by the
common lawyers. Although the research made us suggest
that the division between the delegates was partly due to
a struggle over imposing their own way of carrying out
legal drafting, it was conceded that their positions may
have hidden other grounds for opposing the suggestions of
their colleagues but, for diplomatic reasons, they were
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unwilling to voice as such. Unsurprisingly, the effect
of this, as seen in the jurisprudence, was that
difficulties were observed in the "application" of (some)
principles of the ECHR to cases framed and argued in a
legal tradition with underpinnings "alien" to those of
particular articles of the Convention.
The European law of human rights was also "transplanted"
to the system of the EU. Parallels were seen between
both systems; their similarities range from the forms of
penetration of the "European" law in the member states,
to the (civilian) style of the decisions as a logical
(and arguably non-political) conclusion of the
"application" of the law to a situation, the comparative
survey of the laws of the member states (in the field of
human rights) or to the borrowing of principles from
domestic law for use at the European level. Both systems
are clearly a meeting-point of several legal orders.
There are also important differences. The tools for
harmonisation and control of outcomes are in law much
weaker in Strasbourg than in the EU. There is no
counterpart to Article 177 EEC in Convention law. The
remedies to protect human rights were still primarily
determined by national law and the Strasbourg
institutions suffer from a (relative) lack of power to
control the outcomes. The Strasbourg Court's
jurisdiction extends to a "declaration" of the non-
fulfilment of Convention obligations, but unlike national
courts the system depends on the willingness of the
member states to co-operate. The obligations Strasbourg
imposes on the member states when passing judgment are
only binding in international law and there is no "direct
effect" or harmonisation by directive in the EU sense of
the term. In addition, the cases reviewed confirmed that
the protection of human rights in the context of EU law
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is subservient to the existence of an EU right or even to
the ideas of EU integration.
Looking back on the entire work, the interpretation of
ECHR law was examined in relative isolation from other
factors (e.g. political or social considerations and
other extra-legal factors) and the work concentrated on
whether a more effective interpretation of the law of
human rights, which is taking shape in Europe, can
improve the protection of rights and freedoms. The
availability of a legal bench-mark against which national
practices can be measured (and then, if necessary,
modified) in a context of further control over state
action is of substantial importance. It was conceded
that the present study was grounded on a few assumptions
concerning tendencies operating in (Western) Europe.
First, the general readiness of the member states to
conform to the rule of law and to honour (albeit
reluctantly sometimes) Strasbourg findings. Second, the
debate over the universality or not of human rights
standards did not appear in Europe with the same
paralysing intensity as in the United Nations. Third,
all the (Western) European countries share notions of
justice and individual freedom. As a consequence, these
preconditions facilitate the ECHR system to improve the
available protection in the "more homogeneous" (than the
world at large) European context.
In the sphere of interpretation of human rights law, can
the ambivalence between a maximum and a minimum of
protection be somehow resolved? It is suggested that the
tension between unity and diversity is an ongoing
struggle which does not need to be resolved to achieve
sustained improvements in the defence of human rights.
There is no one system of protection of human rights but
several. The protection of rights takes place in an
environment where different systems, traditions,
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standards and principles overlap. The jurisprudence of
the European Court cannot be shared as yet on an equal
basis by all the member states all the time. Strasbourg
acts as a culture broker which seeks the convergence of
all the systems of protection. The safeguard lies in
keeping up the work in that direction without
interruptions but not in achieving an ultimate synthesis.
The situation is to a degree comparable to linking
together the exchange rates of a group of countries in
order to make their currencies operate within
progressively tighter parities. Benefits can be derived
from the operation of the system independently of the
achievement of the final goal of monetary union. Unlike
the human rights protection systems, however, a full
monetary union in the EU is seen as a desirable and
attainable goal (at least by some).
What is at stake, then, in the final assessment? It is
the protection of the rights of the individual vis-a-vis
the state. The Strasbourg system brings substantive
rights and also, principles such as fairness and openness
in the procedures - already a part of most of the laws of
the member states - to a very concrete and practical
operational level. On the other hand, Strasbourg still
carries with it elements of international law: there are
"opt-outs" for the governments that rely on policy
issues, such as derogations, a wide margin of
appreciation on some questions and also the possibility
for the government to invoke the defence of the reason of
state. Another drawback is its complaint-based character
which requires perseverance to pursue the case over a
long space of time. Nonetheless, the litigants who
instruct their lawyers to take their cases to a
supranational European tribunal for redress see another
chance open to them beyond the "sovereign" state. The
"European" option offers them another avenue to challenge
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their governments and also, the possibility of obtaining
a better balance of the issues involved in their cases.
The thesis advocated here suggests that the use of the
comparative method can contribute to the enhancement of
the effectiveness of the methodology of interpretation.
The European Court can make use of its comparative law
edge - derived from its situation and also, diverse
membership - to make available more legal devices for
protection. The evolving common standards can upgrade
the protection through a continuing interpretation of the
law. A further implication of the thesis is that it can
help to create a common system of European public law
where all member states could share a jurisprudence on an
equal basis. Although it is beyond the goals of this
dissertation to address the reforms to the structure of
the system recently agreed upon, the research suggests
that it makes sense to give the system further
harmonising effectiveness in order to mix the outlooks of
both legal traditions and offer more options of
protection through a shared jurisprudence. A permanent
Court may increase the collegiality of the panel and
encourage the cross-system dialogue of the judges. In
general, the consequences of not using the comparative
method effectively may leave individuals unprotected and
without access to justice. An improved method of
interpretation is therefore an important step in the
direction of standing up for the protection of human
rights and dignity.
To close, a word on this writer in relation to the topic
and the comparative method. Having been brought up in
South America, he has tried to use his "western but non-
European" point of view to see all of Western Europe as a
totality, a circumstance which, it is hoped, indirectly
helped to place all legal systems studied on an
equivalent basis for analysis. Perhaps this situation
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has minimised the imbalances that too much reliance on
one's own legal system of training may produce in any
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